Post by PLPost by PLA free Cuba that is truly democratic and that respects people's human
rights
Post by PLis what I support.
How about you?
PL
---------------------------
PL
Good questions. here are my answers
[1] I don't believe you mean what you say. I think you are a hypocrite.
and you base yourself on what to think that or is it just the fact that I
condemn the current regime that bothers you?
We will come back to the hypocrite thing further down.
Post by PL[2] About Cuba, I believe the first thing we must do is to respect their
sovereignty.
Their?
The soveignty lies in the people. They are the only ones that can claims to
truly represent the sovereignty of the nation.
They can delegate the exercise of that sovereignty to a freely and fairly
elected government.
Any government that is not freely and fairly elected can not claim to
represent the sovereignty of the country.
It violates the sovereignty of the people.
Post by PLWhat type of government they chose is their problem.
True.
But they should be able to do so in free and fair elections, no?
Not have anything imposed on them.
Post by PLDemocracy
may appear good to us, but may not to them.
and prey how can you know if a country has no freedom of expression and
repressive laws like these below what the people really want?
If there is no free expression of the popular will possible how can you say
what the people wants?
Your statements reeks (heavily) of hypocrisy.
I agree with the UN:
"the electoral process is so tightly controlled that the final phase,
the voting itself, could be dispensed with without the final result being
substantially affected"
http://www.hri.ca/fortherecord1998/vol4/cubachr.htm
abusive laws aimed a repressing dissent:
1.. Article 144, which defines the crime of desacato, or "disrespect." It
states that anyone who threatens, slanders, defames, insults, harms or in
anyway outrages or offends, verbally or in writing, the dignity or honor of
an authority, public official, or their agents or auxiliaries, in the
exercise of their functions or because of them can be imprisoned for between
three months and one year or fined or both. If the act of disrespect is
directed at the head of state or other senior officials the penalty is a
prison term from one to three years.
2.. Articles 208 and 209, which define the crime of asociación ilícita, or
"illicit association." These articles state that anyone belonging to an
unregistered association can be fined or imprisoned for between one and
three months. The promoters or leaders of such an association can be fined
or imprisoned for between three months and a year. Anyone who participates
in illegal meetings or demonstrations can be fined or imprisoned for between
one and three months. The organizers of illegal meetings or demonstrations
can be fined or imprisoned for between three months and a year.
3.. Article 103, which defines the crime of propaganda enemiga, or "enemy
propaganda." It states that anyone who incites against the social order,
international solidarity or the socialist state by means of verbal, written
or any other kind of propaganda, or who makes, distributes or possesses such
propaganda, can be imprisoned from between one to eight years. Anyone who
spreads false news or malicious predictions likely to cause alarm or
discontent among the population, or public disorder, can be imprisoned from
between one and four years. If the mass media are used, the sentence can be
from seven to fifteen years in prison.
4.. Article 207, which defines the crime of asociación para delinquir, or
"associating with others to commit crimes." It states that if three or more
persons join together in a group to commit crimes, they can be imprisoned
for between one and three years, simply for meeting together. If the only
objective of the group is to provoke disorder or interrupt family or public
parties, spectacles or other community events or to commit other anti-social
acts, the penalty is a fine or a prison sentence of between three months and
one year.
5.. Article 115, which defines the crime of difusión de falsas informaciones
contra la paz internacional, or "dissemination of false information against
international peace." It states that anyone who spreads
false news with aim of disturbing international peace or putting in danger
the prestige or credit of the Cuban State or its good relations with another
state can be imprisoned for between one and four years.
6.. Article 143, which defines the crime of resistencia, or "resistance." On
occasion, the crime is referred to as desobediencia, or "disobedience." It
states that anyone who resists an official in the exercise of his duties can
be imprisoned for between three months and a year or fined. If the official
is trying to apprehend a criminal or someone who has escaped from prison,
the penalty is a prison term from two to five years.
7.. Articles 72-90, which define the crime of peligrosidad, or
"dangerousness." These articles come under the heading, "The Dangerous
Status and Security Measures," a section of the Penal Code under which
someone can be sentenced for up to four years in prison on the grounds that
the authorities believe the individual has a "special proclivity" to commit
crimes, even though he or she might not have actually committed a crime.
These articles broadly define "dangerous" people as those who act in a
manner that contradicts "socialist morality" or engage in "anti-social
behavior." Moreover, Article 75 provides for an "official warning" to people
the authorities deem to be in danger of becoming "dangerous," i.e., those
who are not yet "dangerous" but who are regarded as having criminal
tendencies because of their "ties or relations with people who are
potentially dangerous to society, other people, and to the social, economic
and political order of the socialist State."
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) concludes that because
of "their lack of precision and their subjective nature," the legal
definitions of "dangerousness" and such terms as "socialist legality" and
"standards of socialist coexistence," constitute a source of juridical
insecurity which creates conditions permitting the Cuban authorities to take
arbitrary action.22
In other words, the Penal Code articles which define "dangerousness"
constitute a catch-all mechanism which gives the government the legal
justification for taking any citizen it wants out of circulation.
As Human Rights Watch/Americas stated in October 1995:
Cubans who engage in "anti-social behavior" or violate "socialist morality"
may be held in preventive detention under the "dangerousness" provisions of
the criminal code for as long as four years, even without
being convicted of a crime.23 According to Pax Christi Netherlands and
Amnesty International, there are clear indications that the crime of
"dangerousness" is used as a cover to imprison people for political reasons
on the grounds that they are common delinquents.24
The Penal Code also defines the crime of salida illegal del país,
"illegalexit from country." Under Penal Code Articles 216 and 217, those
caught trying to leave the country without the permission of the government
can be fined or imprisoned for up to three years if they have not used
violence and up to eight years if force or intimidation is used.
Footnotes:
22. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Organization of American
States (IACHR-OAS). "Cuba," Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission
on Human Rights 1996 (Washington, DC: 14 March 1997), p. 710.
23. Human Rights Watch/Americas. Cuba: Improvement Without Reform (New York:
October 1995), p. 9.
24. Pax Christi Netherlands. Cuba: The Reality Behind the Symbol (Utrecht,
The Netherlands: March 1996), p. 15. Amnesty International. Cuba: Hundreds
Imprisoned for "Dangerousness" (London: AMR 25/01/94, February 1994).
Source:
Cuba: Systematic Repression of Dissent
December 1998 (addressing country conditions through November 1997)
by Douglas Payne
http://www.worldpolicy.org/globalrights/carib/1997-cuba.html#penal
Cuba's penal code:
http://www.ruleoflawandcuba.fsu.edu/law-penal-code.cfm
The CDR VOP (Vigilancia y Orden Público- Vigilance and Public Order) Front
works directly with the uniformed police. At the end of the 1980s,
CDRs were reorganized, with each sector now consisting of several city
blocks with one person assigned control. Each morning, the sector controller
meets with the CDR officials (the president, vice-president, or other
official), particularly those in charge of VOP, at each block and obtain the
daily log of activities in that particular block.
The CDR officials have the duty to know the activities of each person in
their respective blocks. There is an individual file kept on each block
resident, some of which reveal the internal dynamics of households.
For this reason Maida Donate-Armada (1996) says that "perhaps the greatest
contribution (of the CDRs) to the history of world espionage may be to have
raised to the level of counterintelligence the daily gossip (chismes) and
disagreements (bretes) that go on at the neighborhood level. Citizens must
be careful of their actions and of what they say, as they are being
constantly monitored by the block CDR.
The structure consists of a president, vice-president, a treasurer, an
organizer, an official responsible for the work force, and another for
ideological control.
CDRs al include an important component, referred to as the CDR Vigilance and
Public Order Front (Vigilancia y Orden Público). After the September 1986
CDR Congress, a special component (front) was introduced to assist those
young people who neither work nor study. This division of the CDR is
referred to as the Prevention and Education Front.
This front notifies the police department of all pertinent information
regarding young people who are neither in school nor working.
CDR characteristics probably vary according to population size, prevalence
of common crime or acts against the state, extremism of the CDR authorities,
educational level, etc. An important variable is the lack of commitment of
the rank and file at the local level.
Militancy in CDRs is interchangeable with other organizations such as the
FMC, the Communist Party, or the League of Young Communists. Any militant of
the Party or of the Youth must show that he or she is a member of the CDRs
and/or FMC. These last two organizations, together with the Party and the
Youth are the most active at the local level. The statutes of the Cuban
Communist Party of Cuba, Chapter
VIII, Article 73, states:
"The Party guides and directs the work of the mass and social organizations,
based on the principle of full and conscious acceptance of its leadership
role and of the influence its members and aspirants have in the mass
organizations, while recognizing the organic independence of those
organizations."19
Within each block, there is one other agent who deals indirectly with the
CDRs: this person reports directly to an officer of the security apparatus
of the Ministry of Interior. Very rarely are the secret duties of this
person known to other block citizens or CDR officials. In order for a CDR
official to be informed of the duties of this person, there must be a
working relationship on a particular case.19. As quoted in Ritter (1985, p.
277).
The organization of the CDRs by sectors and blocks follows the
national-regional-province-municipalityzone-sector-block pyramid structure.
The sector controller holds a full-time job. They patrol on foot since they
do not have other means of transportation.Their work hours might vary from
9:00 a.m. to as late as 11:00 p.m. Most of them do not even live in the
sectors they patrol. The president of the CDR provides all pertinent
information to the sector controller.Frequently, however, the sector
controller does not trust the CDR president and usually verifies this
information with VOP Front Officials.
If enough evidence of wrongdoing is found regarding a particular citizen,
the sector controller meets with that individual. Three warnings are given
to each citizen, with the first two given in written form. After one
warning, the citizen's file is classified as category A; after two warnings,
as B. The third warning results in the arrest of the citizen and
classification of his or her file as category C.
There are national, provincial, municipal, and zone meetings for all CDR
presidents, who then pass on the information to their block officials and
citizens.
The VOP Front consists of people who have shown extreme loyalty to the
revolution, and who are willing to go to great means to discover wrongdoing.
The background of the Front officials varies from retirees to people who
have served in international missions.
The ideological control person usually has a college degree.
As is depicted in Figure 1, the Ministry of Interior and the CDRs have
parallel structures. Security bodies (intelligence and counterintelligence)
and police back-stop this mass organization. Designation of officials for
different posts within CDRs, especially for being in charge of "vigilance,"
are subject to consultation with the MININT officer in charge.
This network in turn is linked to the chiefs of "defense zones" and
territorial militia, which are the lower layer of the so-called "Republic of
Cuba's Unique System of Exploration" and the mobilization chain for any war
action. "Defense zones" are in charge of evacuating the civil population and
destroying cities and towns if the socialist system is in danger. These
activities are connected to the Ministry of Armed Forces.
There are "Voluntary Brigades of Activists" that are mobilized according to
instructions of the state security apparatus. The Brigades are sometimes
called into action by the police. They are the direct antecedent of the
so-called "Brigadas de Respuesta Rápida" (Quick Response Brigades) that hold
"repudiation meetings" in front of the homes of undesirable neighbors,
sometimes when it is known that they plan to leave the island. The Brigades
are a sort of para-military organization backed by the Cuban authorities
established for the purpose of harassing and fighting-physically sometimes,
with sticks, bricks, and hammers-dissident neighbors and families. The
notion of civil society is alien to the policies that the Cuban leadership
is pursuing at present. The theories of "transmission belts" and an
"enlightened vanguard" suit more closely regime's goals and modus operandi.
The essence of civil society lies in the possibility that social groups
could be autonomous, particularly from military and government tutelage and
control. This is impossible in today's Cuban society. The leadership has a
horizontal circulation system that allows the same faces and names to
transfer from government to mass organizations to military positions. This
revolving system has been operating for 36 years. The Party, the State and
mass organizations are intertwined. To claim that Cuban mass organizations
represent civil society is to deny that the latter has any right to exist as
an independent force. This is the kind of participation Nazi and fascist
regimes encourage, together with the "personality cult" of the leader. The
revolutionary leadership and the leader himself have designed a totalitarian
society; changes to the control mechanisms and reforms are attempts to
strengthen this grip.
http://lanic.utexas.edu/la/cb/cuba/asce/cuba6/36amaro.fm.pdf
Post by PLWhy don't you go and tell Israel or Saudi Arabia or Iran what kind of
government they can have? You are not even a real Cuban, go back to where
you came from and do something for your own people.
As soon as my family and friends in Cuba have their freedom of expression
and their respect of human rights I might.
But given the abuses that touch my family now I will continue to focus on
stating the truth about Cuba whether you like it or not.
PL