On Feb 24, 5:44 pm, John Anderton
Post by John AndertonWhat does that book say on the matter ? I've seen US documents that
state the US evaluated the "funnies" but nothing definitive about an
offer/request or rejection(on either side),
Hi John,
I suppose I can't get away with, "buy my book"? Please...I mean I
still have my youngest in college, an expensive (and I hasten to add,
well worth it) girlfriend, and a taste for fine wines and good books
after all.
Anyway, here you go, minus the footnotes and the formatting. BTW, the
copy of the document I used for the book was supplied to me by Steve
Zaloga after he reminded me of it. I had run across it years ago and
actually forgotten about it until he happened to mention it to me in
an email...its reproduced in the book. Also BTW. Major Rollie Ward,
who was present running his squadron through its paces for Eisenhower
at the 27 January 1944 demonstration got into touch with me shortly
after Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall was published. He was the last
surviving squadron commander in the 1st Assault Brigade RE (although
he did not go in on D-Day) and had some very nice things to say about
it...along with some corrections I could have used before publication.
Sadly, he faded away last year.
Last BTW, if this doesn't make sense without formatting - buy my
book. :) Or drop me an email and I can send you it as a word doc along
with a JPEG of the document.
Cheers!
A Footnote to History: The "Offer" of A.V.R.E. to the U.S. Army
It has long been accepted as fact that the U.S. Army resistance to
using specialist assault vehicles on D-Day led to the severe
casualties suffered by American troops on OMAHA Beach. Furthermore,
the inference has been made that if the Americans had utilized such
vehicles that inevitably those casualties would have been less. For
example, Chester Wilmot writing in The Struggle for Europe in 1952
stated that,
There might have been some justification for the policy of direct
assault if the Americans had accepted Montgomery's plan for landing
armour en masse at the start of the attack, and for using the
specialized equipment of Hobart's 79th Armoured Division to deal with
the fortifications and the underwater obstacles. When Montgomery first
saw this equipment he ordered Hobart to make one-third of it available
to the Americans, and set himself to interest Eisenhower and Bradley
in its revolutionary employment. Hobart's account of the reaction of
the three generals is illuminating.
"Montgomery," he says, "was most inquisitive. After thorough tests and
searching questions he said in effect: 'I'll have this and this and
this; but I don't want that or that.' Eisenhower was equally
enthusiastic but not so discriminating. His response was, 'We'll take
everything you can give us.' Bradley appeared to be interested but,
when asked what he wanted, replied, 'I'll have to consult my staff.'"
Bradley and his staff eventually accepted the 'DDs' but did not take
up the offer of 'Crabs', 'Crocodiles', 'AVREs' and the rest of
Hobart's menagerie.
However the commonly accepted view appears to misstate both the
circumstances and the consequences of the American actions. For one,
there seems to be some confusion about what the Americans actually did
and didn't want. For another, there is little evidence that the
"policy of direct assault" was uniquely American. And, finally, there
is little real evidence that the lack of specialized engineering
vehicles would have resulted in reduced casualties on OMAHA.
Eisenhower's papers contain two or possibly three references to a
demonstration on 27 January by 617th Assault Squadron, R.E. On 29
January 1944 Eisenhower wrote a personnel note to General Hobart
thanking him for the demonstration, stating that he was, "much
impressed with all your work and the training you are doing" and that
he, "should like some of my senior officers to see what I did as I
know how much they would profit by it." At that time he did not
mention any of the Funnies specifically, although later on 7 February
in a note to Nicholas Straussler, Eisenhower specifically mentioned
Straussler's invention, the DD tank, and commented that he was,
"looking forward to the day we can use them to good effect." Then in
a letter on 9 February to General Marshall, Eisenhower again mentioned
the demonstration, but only commented that the, "visit was for the
purpose of inspecting special items of equipment that are designated
to help us through that type of defensive organization."
Alan Brooke's diary entry for 27 January 1944 shows that he was
present at the demonstration with Eisenhower, although he is not
mentioned in the Hobart/Wilmot account,
Eisenhower met me at the station last night and we traveled up by
special train through the night. Hobart collected us at 9 am and took
us first to his HQ where he showed us his models, and his proposed
assault organization. We then went on to see various exhibits such as
the Sherman tank for destroying tank mines, with chains on a drum
driven by an engine, various methods of climbing walls with tanks,
blowing up of minefields and walls, flame throwing Churchill tanks,
wall destroying engineer parties, floating tanks, teaching men how to
escape from sunken tanks, etc, etc. A most interesting day, and one
which Eisenhower seemed to enjoy thoroughly. Hobart has been doing
wonders in his present job and I am delighted that we put him into
it.
Brooke's account confirms that the Sherman Crab mine-clearing vehicle
was demonstrated to Eisenhower, and it is evident that the
demonstration also included various bridging vehicles, probably
prototypes of the SBG assault bridge, demolition vehicles, Crocodiles,
hand emplaced demolitions, and DD tanks and their associated escape
gear. Note that Hobart also displayed "models" and a "proposed"
organization, implying that at that time only a few of the vehicles
and crews were ready, an assumption that as we have seen was confirmed
by the account of the organization and equipping of the brigade found
in their history, the various postwar remarks of some of the brigade
members, and of course the actual production records for the A.V.R.E.
Patrick Delaforce in Churchill's Secret Weapon: The Story of Hobart's
Funnies mentions an incident that apparently occurred at the 27
January demonstration that shows at least some A.V.R.E. were also
demonstrated,
Major Roland Ward of 617 Assault Squadron relates: 'Dick Stafford's
AVRE fell over upside down off an Assault bridge in trying to climb
over a wall in the Orford battle area. Eisenhower ran forward quite
concerned for the crew, but 'Hobo' said 'Don't worry - they do it
every day.
....Although Eisenhower was impressed with 'Funnies' and Montgomery
offered them to the American forces on D-Day, General Bradley turned
the offer down.
Mention is made of the 27 January demonstration in the 79th Armoured
Division Final Report as well. It states that in a meeting following
the demonstration it was agreed that First U.S. Army technical
representatives were to see the new equipment on 11 February after
which they were to inform the British of their requirements. It also
explicitly stated that General Bradley was at that post-demonstration
meeting on 27 January, so presumably also witnessed the
demonstration.
Although the meeting with the First Army technical representatives is
not mentioned in Bradley's papers or in the Historical Report of the
First Army Armor Section, it does appear that the U.S. Army
representatives did see the new equipment, since on 16 February 1944,
Brigadier Sir Edwin Otway Herbert, a General Staff officer with 21st
Army Group, sent a memo on the subject of US Requirements for British
Devices - OVERLORD to the British Under Secretary of State at the War
Office, with copies to the US First Army HQ, British Second Army, 79th
Armoured Division, SHAEF, and various staff sections in 21st Army
Group. He noted that,
1. Equipments as shown in the attached Appendix are required by First
US Army for operation OVERLORD. They will be operated by US personnel.
In the event of the US Army being equipped with similar equipment from
US sources, or suitable substitutes, the equipments will be returned
to the British.
2. "DD tanks" and "Porpoises" dealt with separately.
What is intriguing is that the requirements list included twelve
items, four of which were specifically mounted on Sherman-based
chassis; Crab, Sherman Bullshorn Plough, Sherman OAC Mark III Plough,
and Sherman Crocodile. Two others, Harrow and Centipede, were mine
clearing devices that were designed to be adaptable for towing or
mounting on either American or British vehicles. Of the remainder,
four were strictly British-based vehicles, A.V.R.E., ARK, and SBG Mark
II, all based on the Churchill, "Bridgelayers", which in this context
were probably the Valentine bridge-laying tank that was then being
distributed to Commonwealth armored units, and two were "devices",
"Special Charges (Gen Wade etc)" and "Snakes."
Significantly, it is the latter six items that First Army did not
place a requirement for. The primary reasoning given was that they did
not want to further complicate their already complex training program
and add to their logistical burden by accepting into inventory four
non-standard, British vehicles based on the Churchill and Valentine
tank chassis, just three and a half months before the projected date
of the assault (Commonwealth units of course had no such qualms, they
had been using American tanks since August 1941, and Sherman tanks
since August 1942).
Similarly the "Special Charges" were more or less standard engineer
shaped charges, while the Snake was essentially a giant Bangalore
torpedo, comprised of 20-foot lengths of 3-inch pipe that could be
assembled into as much as a 400-foot length, towed to the edge of a
minefield by a tank that then pushed it into place. In the case of
Snake the requisition specifically identified that an "order [was]
placed and supply promised from USA".
That left six items that were actually requested. Of those, the 25
Crabs actually requested must simply not have been available over and
above the Commonwealth requirements, since none were provided. That
was probably also the case for the 40 Bullshorn Ploughs, 40 OAC Mark
III Ploughs, and 50 Harrow ploughs that were requested, which also
weren't supplied. Neither was the Centipede, which was a device that
was specifically designed to clear antipersonnel mines more quickly
than Crab was capable of doing. Few Centipedes were ever built and
there is little evidence that it was ever used in combat.
The memo further specifically noted that the Sherman Crocodile was
"understood to conflict with Churchill Crocodile"; a statement that
was quite correct, and illustrative of some of the basic problems that
the Allies faced and that had to be considered by both the American
and British planners. In this case, the Churchill Crocodile prototype
had been demonstrated in March 1943 and had immediately attracted the
interest of the Americans. On 16 July 1943 the European Theater of
Operations, U.S. Army (ETOUSA) recommended that the British-designed
flamethrower should be adapted to fit in the Sherman and that 100
conversions and 25 extra trailers should be procured through a
combination of British and American resources. Unfortunately, the
adaptation did not prove to be as simple as was originally thought
and, although an initial prototype was completed in February 1944,
delays dogged the project. In the end, despite all plans to the
contrary, only four were ever completed; and they weren't issued to
units in the field until November 1944.
Finally, unstated in the memo was yet another, little known, fact that
may have been affecting the American decision - the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers and Ordnance Department were also developing their own
Assault Engineer Vehicle, based upon the M4 Medium Tank. At about the
same time that Denovan's two prototype A.V.R.E. were being completed
in February 1943, U.S. Army Ground Forces authorized a Corps of
Engineers study to investigate new and innovative ways to clear beach
and underwater obstacles at the Amphibious Training Base at Fort
Pierce, Florida. The tests resulted in a recommendation that an
armored engineering vehicle, based upon the Sherman tank, be
developed. That recommendation was approved in August 1943.
The result was a prototype that replaced the Sherman's 75mm gun with
twin access doors in the turret, a side access door in the right
sponson, and mounted a 7.2-inch T40 (later standardized as the M17)
"Whiz-Bang" multiple rocket launcher in a sturdy armored box above the
turret. It was completed and had undergone preliminary testing, but
did not arrive at Fort Pierce for operational testing until 20 March
1944. The tests resulted in further modifications and a second pilot,
but by then of course it was too late for any production to reach
Britain in time for the invasion and in any case there would have been
no time to train crews and to integrate the vehicles into the assault
plan. Eventually, although 1,000 conversion kits were authorized, only
two conversions were ever completed. That delay, and the refusal of
the Army Ground Forces and the Operations Division of the War
Department General Staff to authorize creation of a new engineer
organization to operate such units, doomed the project.
That US Army Ground Forces was resistant to unique organizations
intended for specific tasks is incontrovertible. However, in this
case it made little difference. There simply weren't sufficient
British-made specialist vehicles to support the American operations,
whether they were American or British-manned. The American projects to
develop similar equipment, begun in a similar timeframe as the British
projects, simply were delayed too late for them to have been available
in time. Those delays were, of course, unforeseen in mid 1943 when the
projects were begun and in early 1944 when the equipment requests were
made.
So although an "offer" of the special equipment developed by the 79th
Armoured Division was made to the U.S. Army it wasn't "refused" and in
fact a large number of various types were asked for, but for various
reasons were not supplied. And the "refusal" of some of those items
was for perfectly logical reasons; the difficulty associated with
issuing brand new, unique, and complicated items so close to the
invasion date, as well as the mistaken belief that similar equipment,
on standard American vehicles, would be supplied from the U.S. But
somehow that reasonable decision has become,