Post by menzasarmaPost by F.BertolazziPost by menzasarmaSinceramente, senza rancore.
Ancora dovresti avere del rancore? Per cosa?
Ho forse insinuato due volte che quoti in malafede? :-|
solo una precisazione e una domanda, poi la smettiamo di ragionare su come
dovresti scrivere tu secondo me e su altre stronzate simili
Ok. Però o tiri fuori un esempio di mio quoting in malafede oppure...
accetto le tue scuse.
Post by menzasarmaIl senza rancora significa solo che il mio intervento non aveva ll scopo di
darti addosso,
Ah. Ok. Però utilizzare le parole con precisione è il minimo che si
possa pretendere, soprattutto in un NG "parascientifico" come questo.
Post by menzasarmaLa domanda è un'altra: ma se ci reputi quasi tutti ignoranti, imbecilli, teste
di cazzo e indegni della tua cultura, perchè continui a postare qui? Non avevi
deciso di smettere?
Vero. Ti allego un articolo tratto dall'Economist che spero chiarisca
il perchè di queste mie pulsioni e la loro utilità sociale. Se non sai
l'inglese, dimmelo e ti faccio un brevissimo riassunto.
Post by menzasarmaSinceramente, certe volte mi lasci più perplesso di quanto solitamente non mi
lasciano le donne.....................cambio di sessualità in vista? :P
Di sesso, semmai. Non di sessualità. Come dico sempre "un chiaro
eloquio è lo specchio di una chiara co(no)sc(i)enza". Ed anche qui mi
date (AdI in particolare) un sacco di dolori.
Post by menzasarma(a scanso di equivoci, anche se la faccina dovrebbe fugare i dubbi, la
domandina finale era solo un modo per riportare il tutto su un tono più
goliardico e rilassato).
Non so da dove sia uscita fuori la faccina in fondo al mio post
precedente. Cioè sì, in effetti lo so. In origine era una faccina
sorridente, poi ho ripensato al fatto che non una, ma due volte mi hai
accusato ingiustamente. E questo, scusami, ma mi fa dimenticare
immediatamente qualsiasi spirito goliardico e rilassato.
Ciao
Pro bono publico
The evolution of punishment explained
HUMANS, unlike most other animals, often co-operate with individuals
to whom they are unrelated. That puzzles evolutionary biologists. It
means they have to explain the spread of genes which cause an
individual to engage in altruistic activities that are costly to
perform, and yet benefit only others. The usual assumption is that
favours will be repaid. The question is how, given the number of
cheats and freeloaders around, that repayment can be relied on. And
one of the answers is to punish the cheats.
However, imposing punishment, too, is costlyoften, it seems, more
costly than an individual's own interests could justify. So the
problem is merely pushed back a step. There still needs to be an
explanation for the evolution of this so-called altruistic punishment.
Robert Boyd, an anthropologist at the University of California, Los
Angeles, and his colleagues, think they have found it. In a paper just
published in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, they
discuss a series of computer simulations that show how, once they
appear, genes for altruistic punishment tend to spread.
Dr Boyd modelled 128 groups of individuals who, together, constituted
a virtual society. He then let his model society evolve. There were
two distinct evolutionary pressures at work. Individuals competed with
one another in a classic Darwinian manner. But entire groups competed
as well. In Dr Boyd's model (as in the real world), these two
pressures tended to work in opposite directions.
Each group comprised individuals who adopted one of three behavioural
strategies. Co-operators helped the group to improve its fitness at
the expense of their individual rewards. Defectors willingly
accepted the help of others, but did not reciprocate. Punishers
behaved like co-operators, but also punished defectors at a cost to
themselves.
At first, the researchers ran their model without including punishers
in it. In this case, when the groups were small (four individuals per
group), co-operators came to dominate. Freeloading off other group
members is not a great strategy when the others are few in number.
Co-operation, by contrast, helps everybody in the competition with
other groups. When the groups were larger, though (up to several
hundred individuals), defecting came to dominate. In this case the
benefits conferred on an individual by defecting outweighed the cost
to the group. Which is where punishment came in.
Dr Boyd showed that when punishers were introduced to the mix, even if
they started in only one group, their strategy spread rapidly through
the population. The benefits to a group of having punishers to keep
defectors in check outweigh the cost to individual punishers. This is
particularly true when defection is rare, as the cost to punishers is
then lower. And because defection does not pay when punishers are
common, it tends to be rarea virtuous circle.
So much for the theory. But it also seems to illuminate reality.
Modern hunter-gatherer societies, which are assumed to be similar to
those of early man, have a maximum size of 150-180 people. Without
punishment, the computer simulations suggest that co-operation would
have died out in groups of this size.
There is a long way to go, of course, before computational
anthropologists can accurately simulate human societies. Dr Boyd hopes
to move a bit in that direction by making the models of both
individual behaviour and group structure more complex. For example,
the existing model has no geography. All the different groups are thus
equally likely to encounter each other. However, the model can already
say something interesting about what might have happened hundreds of
thousands of years ago. And that is no small feat.
--
Nulla è impossibile per chi non lo deve fare.