WI The bombers targeted German fuel earlier in WWII

[Jack Linthicum]

Given the timeline for the Allied bombing as carried out on OTL as
presented below, WI the alternative scenario offered by Haywoord
Hansell in the text bloc below had been carried out starting in the
earliest possible time, the sensible targets the German electric,
petroleum, synthetic fuel, nitrogen fixing plants were targeted from
day 1, leaving the Germans in the situation they faced in March 1945 at
the earliest possible moment. "OT A Memorandum from the Luftwaffe in
August 1944 pointed out :that fuel production had gone from 5850 tons
daily to 120 tons in:July 1944 as a result of the enemy air offensive.
"


Aug 17, 1942 - First all-American air attack in Europe.

Jan 27, 1943 - First bombing raid by Americans on Germany (at
Wilhelmshaven).

March 16-20, 1943 - Battle of Atlantic climaxes with 27 merchant ships
sunk by German U-boats.

May 16/17 - British air raid on the Ruhr.

June 10, 1943 - 'Pointblank' directive to improve Allied bombing
strategy issued.

July 24, 1943 - British bombing raid on Hamburg.

July 27/28 - Allied air raid causes a firestorm in Hamburg.

Aug 17, 1943 - American daylight air raids on Regensburg and
Schweinfurt in Germany; Allies reach Messina, Sicily.

Nov 18, 1943 - Large British air raid on Berlin.

March 18, 1944 - British drop 3000 tons of bombs during an air raid on
Hamburg, Germany.


June 6, 1944 - D-Day landings.

then the scenario

Given the actual development of escort fighters, it also seems
certain that any of the three strategic air plans (AWPD-1, AWPD-42, and
the CBO) could have been carried out as planned. And the Combined
Bomber Offensive could have included the destruction of most of the
German powerplants and the disruption of the power distribution system
by demolishing the switching stations. Further, it appears to me that
the U.S. strategic air forces should not have been dismembered by
sending forty percent of the aircraft to the Mediterranean to be used
chiefly for theater objectives. The air power could have been better
used to destroy and disrupt the electric power system. Coupled to this
would be the collapse of the synthetic petroleum system, the loss of
nitrogen for explosives, and disruption of the German transportation
system. Altogether, they would have produced in May or June of 1944 the
chaos which characterized the German war industry and the German state
in January, February, and March of 1945.

I also feel it would have been possible to achieve this fatal chaos
before the Normandy Invasion. The greatest single deterrent to this
achievement was probably the decision to invade North Africa, and later
to extend military operations the length of the Mediterranean,
including Italy. This was, of course, a political decision. Even during
a war, one can not quarrel with the right of political leaders to base
major decisions on political rather than military factors. The action
was quite within the bounds of American political philosophy. The U.S.
Joint Chiefs of Staff had their day in court, expressing with candor
and vigor their opposition to this Mediterranean strategy. They
contended it was a dangerous diversion from the main military objective
-- the defeat of Germany. President Roosevelt made it clear he
understood the military reasoning of his professional military
advisors. But he had other elements to deal with as well. Thus, the
right of the President and Prime Minister Churchill to override the
advice of the U.S. Joint Chiefs and reach a political decision, and the
propriety of their action in this case, are beyond question. The
decision's outcome must be evaluated in terms of political
accomplishments. Its effect on military achievements and other
political goals should likewise be weighed.
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/Hansell/Hansell-7.html

[curmudgeon]

Oil is blood, no oil, no Mobil forces of any great worth.
Nor could Germany have moved much of its limited supplies.
It would have been trench warfare all over again.
But for a much shorter time frame.
The Allies, would have just bombarded Germany in to oblivion.




I live in a world all of my own, but that is alright , because everyone
knows me there.

[John Anderton]

On 31 Jan 2006 13:42:29 -0800, "Jack Linthicum"

Post by Jack Linthicum
Given the timeline for the Allied bombing as carried out on OTL as
presented below, WI the alternative scenario offered by Haywoord
Hansell in the text bloc below had been carried out starting in the
earliest possible time, the sensible targets the German electric,
petroleum, synthetic fuel, nitrogen fixing plants were targeted from
day 1, leaving the Germans in the situation they faced in March 1945 at
the earliest possible moment.

<snip details>

I think the biggest obstacle to this plan would be the fact that all
the targets listed above were somewhat smaller than the targets listed
for OTL (all cities). The bomber fleets were unable to hit targets of
this size for much of the war so this plan could not have been carried
out as a straight alternative to the historical offensive from day 1,
it would have to have been delayed until such time as the bombers
could hit these targets.

Also, the main source for German petroleum was in Rumania which was
out of range of the bomber fleets on day 1,

Cheers,

John

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by John Anderton
On 31 Jan 2006 13:42:29 -0800, "Jack Linthicum"

Post by Jack Linthicum
Given the timeline for the Allied bombing as carried out on OTL as
presented below, WI the alternative scenario offered by Haywoord
Hansell in the text bloc below had been carried out starting in the
earliest possible time, the sensible targets the German electric,
petroleum, synthetic fuel, nitrogen fixing plants were targeted from
day 1, leaving the Germans in the situation they faced in March 1945 at
the earliest possible moment.

<snip details>
I think the biggest obstacle to this plan would be the fact that all
the targets listed above were somewhat smaller than the targets listed
for OTL (all cities). The bomber fleets were unable to hit targets of
this size for much of the war so this plan could not have been carried
out as a straight alternative to the historical offensive from day 1,
it would have to have been delayed until such time as the bombers
could hit these targets.
Also, the main source for German petroleum was in Rumania which was
out of range of the bomber fleets on day 1,
Cheers,
John

I tend to think that if they could bomb with a clear conscience homes
and schools they could drop bombs on such targets as power plants,
distribution points, nitrogen factories and such like and still take
the 55,000 casualties they did take hitting homes and schools it would
tilt to the plus side. IRC the synthetic fuel plants were not in
Romania.

[k***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

In article

Post by Jack Linthicum
IRC the synthetic fuel plants were not in
Romania.

Not all of them were in the Ruhr. However for precision daylight
raiding you not only need better weather (clear skies) you need
the Mustang. For night bombing you need advanced navigation aids
such as Gee, oboe was not accurate enough, besides range of both
was limited. The other problem, is that the over running of
Ploesti by the Soviets had considerably more effect than allied
bombing.

Ken Young

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
In article

Post by Jack Linthicum
IRC the synthetic fuel plants were not in
Romania.

Not all of them were in the Ruhr. However for precision daylight
raiding you not only need better weather (clear skies) you need
the Mustang. For night bombing you need advanced navigation aids
such as Gee, oboe was not accurate enough, besides range of both
was limited. The other problem, is that the over running of
Ploesti by the Soviets had considerably more effect than allied
bombing.
Ken Young

Not all were in the Rurhr but the majority were. If the bombers could
dump all that explosive on civilians and not damage their morale until
late in the war why bother? Essentially because bombing electrical
plants was 13th on the list and the hydrogenation plants fifth. Bomb
airfields, submarine plants, transportation but not vital suppliers.

The cite is a long discussion of Germany's oil problems, even extracts
would be too long for any use here. But five hydrogenation plants were
constructed, one of which was based on bituminous coal treatment. This
plant, Scholven, was located in the Ruhr area; the other four plants at
Leuna, Böhlen, Magdeburg, and Zeitz were located in central Germany,
adjacent to lignite deposits, four new hydrogenation plants were to be
erected at Gelsenkirchen, Welheim, and Wesseling in the Ruhr and at
Pölitz near Stettin on the Baltic Sea. The scheduled construction time
for these projects was 18 months, a goal that turned out to be rather
unrealistic. Even more unrealistic were the completion dates assigned
to twelve Fischer-Tropsch plants with relatively low production goals;
they were to be finished by 1 April 1938. By 1945 only nine of them
were operational; they reached their maximum capacity in 1943 with less
than 2.8 million barrels.

Much of the cite's discussion of synthetic fuel plants is based on
Wolfgang Birkenfeld, Der synthetishe Treibstoff 1933-1945 (Göttingen,
1964), p. 217. It is interesting to note that without Austria, West
Germany's crude oil production after a brief hiatus in 1945 and 1946
began to rise again in 1947 and by 1959 had reached 32 million barrels,
a figure which doubtless would have appeared astronomical to Hitler and
Speer.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1981/jul-aug/becker.htm

The next is a discussion of the effect the 1944 attacks had on the
hydrogenation plants and Speer's reaction to them:

The first massive raid was flown on 12 May 1944 and directed against
five plants. Other raids followed successively and continued into the
spring of 1945. The severity of the raids was immediately recognized by
the Germans. Between 30 June 1944 and 19 January 1945, Albert Speer
directed five memoranda to Hitler which left no doubt about the
increasingly serious situation. Speer pointed out that the attacks in
May and June had reduced the output of aviation fuel by 90 percent. It
would require six to eight weeks to make minimal repairs to resume
production, but unless the refineries were protected by all possible
means, coverage of the most urgent requirements of the armed forces
could no longer be assured. An unbridgeable gap would be opened that
must perforce have tragic consequences. Continued attacks also
negatively influenced the output of automotive gasoline, diesel fuel,
Buna, and methanol, the last an essential ingredient in the production
of powder and explosives. If, Speer warned, the attacks were sustained,
production would sink further, the last remaining reserve stocks would
be consumed, and the essential materials for the prosecution of a
modern technological war would be lacking in the most important areas.

In his final report, Speer noted that the undisturbed repair and
operation of the plants were essential prerequisites for further
supply, but the experience of recent months had shown that this was
impossible under existing conditions. Behind Speer's warnings was his
awareness that once production of fuels was substantially curtailed,
once reserves and the fuel in the distribution system were depleted,
the Germans would be finished and the end could be predicted with
almost mathematical accuracy. In a way, Speer was merely echoing the
prophetic utterance of Field Marshal Erhard Milch from the summer of
1943:

"The hydrogenation plants are our most vulnerable spots; with them
stands and falls our entire ability to wage war. Not only will planes
no longer fly, but tanks and submarines also will stop running if the
hydrogenation plants should actually be attacked."

A perfect example of this was the amount of aviation fuel allotted to
the training of pilots. Toward the last nine months of the war, they
were sent into combat with only one-third of the training hours
actually required.

[Alex Filonov]

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
In article

Post by Jack Linthicum
IRC the synthetic fuel plants were not in
Romania.

Not all of them were in the Ruhr. However for precision daylight
raiding you not only need better weather (clear skies) you need
the Mustang. For night bombing you need advanced navigation aids

I think the need for Mustang is a little bit exaggerated. P-38 could
fill escort fighter role quite nicely. AFAIK bobmer command didn't
want them as escort (bomber will get through). P-38 was available
since the beginning of campaign.
Of course, another possibility was to use Mosquito (fighter version)
as an escort, but I don't think that thought was easy to push into
Air generals minds.

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
such as Gee, oboe was not accurate enough, besides range of both
was limited. The other problem, is that the over running of
Ploesti by the Soviets had considerably more effect than allied
bombing.
Ken Young

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by Alex Filonov

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
In article

Post by Jack Linthicum
IRC the synthetic fuel plants were not in
Romania.

Not all of them were in the Ruhr. However for precision daylight
raiding you not only need better weather (clear skies) you need
the Mustang. For night bombing you need advanced navigation aids

I think the need for Mustang is a little bit exaggerated. P-38 could
fill escort fighter role quite nicely. AFAIK bobmer command didn't
want them as escort (bomber will get through). P-38 was available
since the beginning of campaign.
Of course, another possibility was to use Mosquito (fighter version)
as an escort, but I don't think that thought was easy to push into
Air generals minds.

If not exaggerated certainly an excuse for not recognizing that if the
RAF shot down Luftwaffe bombers because the Me 109 escorts couldn't
reach far enough to support them then Allied bombers might need
something with legs. I read a lot of what I consider crap from sources
saying that after Schweinfurt the USAF waited for the Mustang before
they returned to large bombing raids. I also read where the Mustang
needed the Merlin engine to reach its full potential, ceiling and
speed, when range is the excuse given for not bombing in the August to
December 1943 time frame. I think the bomber people made the same
mistake in the US and UK as Germany did and hid under the guise of
needing better escorts when "the bomber will get through" phrase of
Douhet was found to be bullshit.

"The P-51 was designed as the NA-73 in 1940 at Britain's request. The
design showed promise and AAF purchases of Allison-powered Mustangs
began in 1941 primarily for photo recon and ground support use due to
its limited high-altitude performance. But in 1942, tests of P-51s
using the British Rolls-Royce "Merlin" engine revealed much improved
speed and service ceiling, and in Dec. 1943, Merlin-powered P-51Bs
first entered combat over Europe. Providing high-altitude escort to
B-17s and B-24s, they scored heavily over German interceptors and by
war's end, P-51s had destroyed 4,950 enemy aircraft in the air, more
than any other fighter in Europe."
http://www.wpafb.af.mil/museum/air_power/ap9.htm

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Alex Filonov
I think the need for Mustang is a little bit exaggerated. P-38 could
fill escort fighter role quite nicely.

Not really. There is a difference between a 'heavy'
long-range strike fighter such as the P-38 and an
air-superiority fighter such as the P-51.

For one thing P-38s are much more expensive.

The P-38, Beaufighter, Mosquito fighter, etc,
had speed, range, and firepower, but much less
maneuverability.

[mike]

Post by Rich Rostrom
Not really. There is a difference between a 'heavy'
long-range strike fighter such as the P-38 and an
air-superiority fighter such as the P-51.
For one thing P-38s are much more expensive.
The P-38, Beaufighter, Mosquito fighter, etc,
had speed, range, and firepower, but much less
maneuverability.

But P-38 had a very good kill ratio against the far more
maneuverable Zero and Oscars, and early on, when
the IJA and IJN had decent Pilots flying as well.

Neither the Me-109 or P-51 had a great roll or turn
capability. All ofthe Soviet fighters and LL P-40
and P-63 were superior in that aspect

What the P-51 had was Range and Speed at high Alts, and
the Pilots had belief in them.
In the P-38 N.Europe had fuel issues that made them unreliable

**
mike
**

[Alex Filonov]

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Alex Filonov
I think the need for Mustang is a little bit exaggerated. P-38 could
fill escort fighter role quite nicely.

Not really. There is a difference between a 'heavy'
long-range strike fighter such as the P-38 and an
air-superiority fighter such as the P-51.

Air-superiority fighter is one thing (and don't forget, P-51
became air-superiority fighter when it was available in
big numbers. I'm not that sure that it was superior to
FW-190 one-to-one). Escort fighter is quite another. Even
if escort fighters lose on average to enemy fighters, they
make the main task of air defense, killing bombers,
much more expensive.

Post by Rich Rostrom
For one thing P-38s are much more expensive.

Much less expensive than B-17 or Lancaster.

Post by Rich Rostrom
The P-38, Beaufighter, Mosquito fighter, etc,
had speed, range, and firepower, but much less
maneuverability.

You don't need superior maneuverability for escort fighter.
Enemy fighters will come to you. You just need enough
maneuverability to tie them in fight. Red Air Force found
it out (too late as well) around mid-1943, when they
started providing powerful escorts to bombers. Fighters
were placed in the box arond bombers, one group below,
two more groups above on different altitudes. Bomber
losses were cut down drastically.

Post by Rich Rostrom
--
| The shocking lack of a fleet of modern luxury |
| dirigibles is only one of a great many things that |
| are seriously wrong with this here world. |
| -- blogger "Coop" at Positive Ape Index |

[Jamie McDonell]

Post by Alex Filonov

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Alex Filonov
I think the need for Mustang is a little bit exaggerated. P-38 could
fill escort fighter role quite nicely.

Not really. There is a difference between a 'heavy'
long-range strike fighter such as the P-38 and an
air-superiority fighter such as the P-51.

Air-superiority fighter is one thing (and don't forget, P-51
became air-superiority fighter when it was available in
big numbers. I'm not that sure that it was superior to
FW-190 one-to-one).

Fw 190D-9 of 1944 had a top speed of 685 kph, a ceiling of 12,000 m and
a range of 835 km. It was armed with two heavy 13mm machine guns and two
20 mm cannons.

The P-51B of 1943/44 had a top speed of 708 kph, a ceiling of 12,770 m
and a range (with drop tanks) of 2,575 km. It was armed with four heavy
13mm machine guns.

Post by Alex Filonov
Escort fighter is quite another. Even
if escort fighters lose on average to enemy fighters, they
make the main task of air defense, killing bombers,
much more expensive.

Post by Rich Rostrom
For one thing P-38s are much more expensive.

Much less expensive than B-17 or Lancaster.

Post by Rich Rostrom
The P-38, Beaufighter, Mosquito fighter, etc,
had speed, range, and firepower, but much less
maneuverability.

You don't need superior maneuverability for escort fighter.
Enemy fighters will come to you. You just need enough
maneuverability to tie them in fight. Red Air Force found
it out (too late as well) around mid-1943, when they
started providing powerful escorts to bombers. Fighters
were placed in the box arond bombers, one group below,
two more groups above on different altitudes. Bomber
losses were cut down drastically.

Jugs had that much maneuverability, and range, and firepower, and could
take more punishment than a Mustang. But then, they had to. They were
much more valuable as ground support.

[Alex Filonov]

Post by Jamie McDonell

Post by Alex Filonov

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Alex Filonov
I think the need for Mustang is a little bit exaggerated. P-38 could
fill escort fighter role quite nicely.

Not really. There is a difference between a 'heavy'
long-range strike fighter such as the P-38 and an
air-superiority fighter such as the P-51.

Air-superiority fighter is one thing (and don't forget, P-51
became air-superiority fighter when it was available in
big numbers. I'm not that sure that it was superior to
FW-190 one-to-one).

Fw 190D-9 of 1944 had a top speed of 685 kph, a ceiling of 12,000 m and
a range of 835 km. It was armed with two heavy 13mm machine guns and two
20 mm cannons.
The P-51B of 1943/44 had a top speed of 708 kph, a ceiling of 12,770 m
and a range (with drop tanks) of 2,575 km. It was armed with four heavy
13mm machine guns.

These numbers are not enough. Example from later times:

F-15 has lower top speed and ceiling than MIG-25. And it's undoubtedly
superior to MIG.

Does anybody have figures of air combat between P-51 and FW-190D
when in similar numbers on each side?

Post by Jamie McDonell

Post by Alex Filonov
Escort fighter is quite another. Even
if escort fighters lose on average to enemy fighters, they
make the main task of air defense, killing bombers,
much more expensive.

Post by Rich Rostrom
For one thing P-38s are much more expensive.

Much less expensive than B-17 or Lancaster.

Post by Rich Rostrom
The P-38, Beaufighter, Mosquito fighter, etc,
had speed, range, and firepower, but much less
maneuverability.

You don't need superior maneuverability for escort fighter.
Enemy fighters will come to you. You just need enough
maneuverability to tie them in fight. Red Air Force found
it out (too late as well) around mid-1943, when they
started providing powerful escorts to bombers. Fighters
were placed in the box arond bombers, one group below,
two more groups above on different altitudes. Bomber
losses were cut down drastically.

Jugs had that much maneuverability, and range, and firepower, and could
take more punishment than a Mustang. But then, they had to. They were
much more valuable as ground support.

But initial discussion was about precision strategic bombing and
escort fighters for that task. My take is that allies had fighters
capable of filling that role, but they were not used, for reasons
not exactly technical.

[Matt Giwer]

Post by Jack Linthicum
Given the timeline for the Allied bombing as carried out on OTL as
presented below, WI the alternative scenario offered by Haywoord
Hansell in the text bloc below had been carried out starting in the
earliest possible time, the sensible targets the German electric,
petroleum, synthetic fuel, nitrogen fixing plants were targeted from
day 1, leaving the Germans in the situation they faced in March 1945 at
the earliest possible moment. "OT A Memorandum from the Luftwaffe in
August 1944 pointed out :that fuel production had gone from 5850 tons
daily to 120 tons in:July 1944 as a result of the enemy air offensive.

First they have to find them and then have the ability to reach them and do so effectively.
That means hundreds of long range bombers in a raid. Those bombers had the greatest losses much
later when the Luftwaffe was largely crippled. So even if the Brits had had thousands of bombers on
day one likely only a handful would have survived to reach the target and none returned to England.

It is not clear how it would have been possible to do from day one.

[Nicholas Smid]

(snip)

Post by Matt Giwer
First they have to find them and then have the ability to reach them and do so effectively.
That means hundreds of long range bombers in a raid. Those bombers had the

greatest losses much

Post by Matt Giwer
later when the Luftwaffe was largely crippled. So even if the Brits had

had thousands of bombers on

Post by Matt Giwer
day one likely only a handful would have survived to reach the target and

none returned to England.

Post by Matt Giwer
It is not clear how it would have been possible to do from day one.

Well range was not a major issue for RAF night bombers except for the most
esterly parts of Germany, all the major medium and heavy bombers could reach
Berlin with a useful load. Finding the targets is more of an issue but from
early 1943 they had Oboe which could cover targets out to 250 miles, and at
that range it was accurate to a hundred yards, ie you could keep most of the
bombs inside the fence of a large factory complex. for most of 1942 they had
GEE, which wasn't accurate enough for bombing but could get you to the
general area, combined with path finders to mark targets they could have
made a useful hole in a proper target list.
Also from early 1943 they had H2S, again not normally accurate enough for
bombing but it could get you close.
So well a bombing offencive aimed at oil could have been launched from day
one it wouldn't have been very effective for the first 2 and a bit years,
infact probably pretty useless. But from say the spring of 1942 with Gee and
pathfinders it could start to do useful damage, and from the spring of 1943
with Oboe and H2S it could start to be very damaging.

[Matt Giwer]

Post by Nicholas Smid
(snip)

Post by Matt Giwer
First they have to find them and then have the ability to reach them and

do so effectively.

Post by Matt Giwer
That means hundreds of long range bombers in a raid. Those bombers had the

greatest losses much

Post by Matt Giwer
later when the Luftwaffe was largely crippled. So even if the Brits had

had thousands of bombers on

Post by Matt Giwer
day one likely only a handful would have survived to reach the target and

none returned to England.

Post by Matt Giwer
It is not clear how it would have been possible to do from day one.

Well range was not a major issue for RAF night bombers except for the most
esterly parts of Germany,

And the oil fields and refineries were east of Germany not in eastern Germany. So they could not
have been reached.

If you want to talk military fuel dumps they are many and small and underground. For civilian ones
all they had to do was spread them around if they didn't want the extra expense of building them
underground.

[BernardZ]

In article <SE1Ef.105709$***@news.xtra.co.nz>, ***@xtra.co.nz
says...

Post by Nicholas Smid
Well range was not a major issue for RAF night bombers except for the most
esterly parts of Germany,

The range itself is not the major issue. The problem is for the planes
to travel so far means that they have to fly part of the time in day
light. In the day time the British bombers would suffer extremely heavy
losses.

[Nicholas Smid]

Post by BernardZ
says...

Post by Nicholas Smid
Well range was not a major issue for RAF night bombers except for the most
esterly parts of Germany,

The range itself is not the major issue. The problem is for the planes
to travel so far means that they have to fly part of the time in day
light. In the day time the British bombers would suffer extremely heavy
losses.

A rough rule of thumb is a bombers effective tactical radius is about 1/3
its range, thus take a Halifax, its range is given as 1,860 miles with a
5,800 lb bomb load. So as a rough guide it can hit a target 600 miles from
base with that load. Its cruise speed, from the same ref is given as 217
mph, that's 3 hours out, three hours back, only the shortest summer nights
don't give you 6 hours darkness over most of Europe, climbing and other
soughts of messing about before setting out can be done over friendly
territory just before sun down if needed and you can start out over the
North Sea before full dark. Ditto its actually an advantage if you are
making your landing after sun up. Even flying to dry tanks at 217 mph thats
a bit under 9 hours, well within night time for most of the year.
There might be a short period around mid summer where you have to restrict
max range missions, but over all full moon nights are much more of a problem
to a bomber offencive.

[BernardZ]

In article <BuGEf.125995$***@news.xtra.co.nz>, ***@xtra.co.nz
says...

Post by Nicholas Smid

Post by BernardZ
says...

Post by Nicholas Smid
Well range was not a major issue for RAF night bombers except for the

most

Post by BernardZ

Post by Nicholas Smid
esterly parts of Germany,

The range itself is not the major issue. The problem is for the planes
to travel so far means that they have to fly part of the time in day
light. In the day time the British bombers would suffer extremely heavy
losses.

A rough rule of thumb is a bombers effective tactical radius is about 1/3
its range, thus take a Halifax, its range is given as 1,860 miles with a
5,800 lb bomb load. So as a rough guide it can hit a target 600 miles from
base with that load. Its cruise speed, from the same ref is given as 217
mph, that's 3 hours out, three hours back, only the shortest summer nights
don't give you 6 hours darkness over most of Europe, climbing and other
soughts of messing about before setting out can be done over friendly
territory just before sun down if needed and you can start out over the
North Sea before full dark. Ditto its actually an advantage if you are
making your landing after sun up. Even flying to dry tanks at 217 mph thats
a bit under 9 hours, well within night time for most of the year.
There might be a short period around mid summer where you have to restrict
max range missions, but over all full moon nights are much more of a problem
to a bomber offencive.

I am not sure of this friendly sky business as the Germans were
intercepting Bomber Command over the North Sea in fact they did it over
Britain too for a while.


Yet when I got some flight times for a B-24 based in England which
cruises at 200 mph which is about what a Halifax could do. A mission to
Holland and back would take 3 to 4 hours, to northern or central France
4 to 6 hours, to Berlin 8 hours, Munich would take 9 to 10 hours and one
to Dresden would take 12 hours.


From a map.

1) Holland

A trip is about 400 miles

Theoretical time = 400 miles/200 mph = 2 hours
Actual time = 3.5 hours

2) Central France

700 miles

Theoretical time = 700 miles/200 mph = 3.5 hours
Actual time = 5 hours

3) To Berlin

I determine that a direct return trip from the Channel to Berlin is
about a 1000 mile trip.

Assuming the mission that they first went to some part of the North Sea
say about 200 miles and then fly 350 miles to Berlin they would fly
about 1100 return which is getting close to the limit. This trip would
take about.

In theory both these trip would take about 5.5 hours.
Actual time = 8 hours

Which is about the limit that a night bomber can travel!

Possibly the planes had to fly in a curve to avoid hot spots, they were
slowed down below cruise speed etc.

I suspect that most of the German oil plants were too far away for the
British night bombers

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by BernardZ
says...

Post by Nicholas Smid

Post by BernardZ
says...

Post by Nicholas Smid
Well range was not a major issue for RAF night bombers except for the

most

Post by BernardZ

Post by Nicholas Smid
esterly parts of Germany,

The range itself is not the major issue. The problem is for the planes
to travel so far means that they have to fly part of the time in day
light. In the day time the British bombers would suffer extremely heavy
losses.

A rough rule of thumb is a bombers effective tactical radius is about 1/3
its range, thus take a Halifax, its range is given as 1,860 miles with a
5,800 lb bomb load. So as a rough guide it can hit a target 600 miles from
base with that load. Its cruise speed, from the same ref is given as 217
mph, that's 3 hours out, three hours back, only the shortest summer nights
don't give you 6 hours darkness over most of Europe, climbing and other
soughts of messing about before setting out can be done over friendly
territory just before sun down if needed and you can start out over the
North Sea before full dark. Ditto its actually an advantage if you are
making your landing after sun up. Even flying to dry tanks at 217 mph thats
a bit under 9 hours, well within night time for most of the year.
There might be a short period around mid summer where you have to restrict
max range missions, but over all full moon nights are much more of a problem
to a bomber offencive.

I am not sure of this friendly sky business as the Germans were
intercepting Bomber Command over the North Sea in fact they did it over
Britain too for a while.
Yet when I got some flight times for a B-24 based in England which
cruises at 200 mph which is about what a Halifax could do. A mission to
Holland and back would take 3 to 4 hours, to northern or central France
4 to 6 hours, to Berlin 8 hours, Munich would take 9 to 10 hours and one
to Dresden would take 12 hours.
From a map.
1) Holland
A trip is about 400 miles
Theoretical time = 400 miles/200 mph = 2 hours
Actual time = 3.5 hours
2) Central France
700 miles
Theoretical time = 700 miles/200 mph = 3.5 hours
Actual time = 5 hours
3) To Berlin
I determine that a direct return trip from the Channel to Berlin is
about a 1000 mile trip.
Assuming the mission that they first went to some part of the North Sea
say about 200 miles and then fly 350 miles to Berlin they would fly
about 1100 return which is getting close to the limit. This trip would
take about.
In theory both these trip would take about 5.5 hours.
Actual time = 8 hours
Which is about the limit that a night bomber can travel!
Possibly the planes had to fly in a curve to avoid hot spots, they were
slowed down below cruise speed etc.
I suspect that most of the German oil plants were too far away for the
British night bombers

It looks like they could do it. The oil plants were in the Ruhr region,
except for one near Leipzig (Zeitz).

May 30, 1942 - First thousand bomber British air raid (against
Cologne).

Using incendiary bombs to illuminate targets, the RAF concentrated on
the heavy industrial areas of the Ruhr. Harris also ordered massive
attacks on the small coastal cities of Lubeck and Rostock. Although a
great deal of damage was done these raids had little impact on the
German economy or civilian morale.

Massive air attacks on Germany continued and in May 1942 Arthur Harris
ordered a 1,050 bomber raid on Cologne. This involved the Royal Air
Force using every aircraft available and in two hours over a third of
the city was badly damaged.

Aug 17, 1942 - First all-American air attack in Europe.

"The first Eighth Air Force units arrived in Britain on May 12, 1942.
The first USAAF Flying Fortress arrived at Prestwick in Scotland on
July 1, 1942. The first Flying Fortress raid over Europe was launched
on August 17, 1942 by 18 B-17Es of the 97th Bombardment Group against
railroad marshaling yards at Rouen-Sotteville in France. Twelve planes
made the actual attack and the remaining six flew a diversionary sweep
up the coast. Brig General Ira Eaker flew B-17E 41-9023 "Yankee
Doodle". The formation was escorted by Spitfires and no opposition was
encountered from the Luftwaffe. "

[BernardZ]

Post by Jack Linthicum

Post by BernardZ
says...

Post by Nicholas Smid

Post by BernardZ
says...

Post by Nicholas Smid
Well range was not a major issue for RAF night bombers except for the

most

Post by BernardZ

Post by Nicholas Smid
esterly parts of Germany,

The range itself is not the major issue. The problem is for the planes
to travel so far means that they have to fly part of the time in day
light. In the day time the British bombers would suffer extremely heavy
losses.

A rough rule of thumb is a bombers effective tactical radius is about 1/3
its range, thus take a Halifax, its range is given as 1,860 miles with a
5,800 lb bomb load. So as a rough guide it can hit a target 600 miles from
base with that load. Its cruise speed, from the same ref is given as 217
mph, that's 3 hours out, three hours back, only the shortest summer nights
don't give you 6 hours darkness over most of Europe, climbing and other
soughts of messing about before setting out can be done over friendly
territory just before sun down if needed and you can start out over the
North Sea before full dark. Ditto its actually an advantage if you are
making your landing after sun up. Even flying to dry tanks at 217 mph thats
a bit under 9 hours, well within night time for most of the year.
There might be a short period around mid summer where you have to restrict
max range missions, but over all full moon nights are much more of a problem
to a bomber offencive.

I am not sure of this friendly sky business as the Germans were
intercepting Bomber Command over the North Sea in fact they did it over
Britain too for a while.
Yet when I got some flight times for a B-24 based in England which
cruises at 200 mph which is about what a Halifax could do. A mission to
Holland and back would take 3 to 4 hours, to northern or central France
4 to 6 hours, to Berlin 8 hours, Munich would take 9 to 10 hours and one
to Dresden would take 12 hours.
From a map.
1) Holland
A trip is about 400 miles
Theoretical time = 400 miles/200 mph = 2 hours
Actual time = 3.5 hours
2) Central France
700 miles
Theoretical time = 700 miles/200 mph = 3.5 hours
Actual time = 5 hours
3) To Berlin
I determine that a direct return trip from the Channel to Berlin is
about a 1000 mile trip.
Assuming the mission that they first went to some part of the North Sea
say about 200 miles and then fly 350 miles to Berlin they would fly
about 1100 return which is getting close to the limit. This trip would
take about.
In theory both these trip would take about 5.5 hours.
Actual time = 8 hours
Which is about the limit that a night bomber can travel!
Possibly the planes had to fly in a curve to avoid hot spots, they were
slowed down below cruise speed etc.
I suspect that most of the German oil plants were too far away for the
British night bombers

It looks like they could do it. The oil plants were in the Ruhr region,
except for one near Leipzig (Zeitz).
May 30, 1942 - First thousand bomber British air raid (against
Cologne).
Using incendiary bombs to illuminate targets, the RAF concentrated on
the heavy industrial areas of the Ruhr. Harris also ordered massive
attacks on the small coastal cities of Lubeck and Rostock. Although a
great deal of damage was done these raids had little impact on the
German economy or civilian morale.
Massive air attacks on Germany continued and in May 1942 Arthur Harris
ordered a 1,050 bomber raid on Cologne. This involved the Royal Air
Force using every aircraft available and in two hours over a third of
the city was badly damaged.

You will find that the British with night bombers could hit targets up
to Berlin. Most of the major German oil installations were outside their
range.

Post by Jack Linthicum
Aug 17, 1942 - First all-American air attack in Europe.
"The first Eighth Air Force units arrived in Britain on May 12, 1942.
The first USAAF Flying Fortress arrived at Prestwick in Scotland on
July 1, 1942. The first Flying Fortress raid over Europe was launched
on August 17, 1942 by 18 B-17Es of the 97th Bombardment Group against
railroad marshaling yards at Rouen-Sotteville in France. Twelve planes
made the actual attack and the remaining six flew a diversionary sweep
up the coast. Brig General Ira Eaker flew B-17E 41-9023 "Yankee
Doodle". The formation was escorted by Spitfires and no opposition was
encountered from the Luftwaffe. "

The US's planes were daylight bombers could hit further as they could
fight in the day time.

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by BernardZ

Post by Jack Linthicum

Post by BernardZ
says...

Post by Nicholas Smid

Post by BernardZ
says...

Post by Nicholas Smid
Well range was not a major issue for RAF night bombers except for the

most

Post by BernardZ

Post by Nicholas Smid
esterly parts of Germany,

The range itself is not the major issue. The problem is for the planes
to travel so far means that they have to fly part of the time in day
light. In the day time the British bombers would suffer extremely heavy
losses.

A rough rule of thumb is a bombers effective tactical radius is about 1/3
its range, thus take a Halifax, its range is given as 1,860 miles with a
5,800 lb bomb load. So as a rough guide it can hit a target 600 miles from
base with that load. Its cruise speed, from the same ref is given as 217
mph, that's 3 hours out, three hours back, only the shortest summer nights
don't give you 6 hours darkness over most of Europe, climbing and other
soughts of messing about before setting out can be done over friendly
territory just before sun down if needed and you can start out over the
North Sea before full dark. Ditto its actually an advantage if you are
making your landing after sun up. Even flying to dry tanks at 217 mph thats
a bit under 9 hours, well within night time for most of the year.
There might be a short period around mid summer where you have to restrict
max range missions, but over all full moon nights are much more of a problem
to a bomber offencive.

I am not sure of this friendly sky business as the Germans were
intercepting Bomber Command over the North Sea in fact they did it over
Britain too for a while.
Yet when I got some flight times for a B-24 based in England which
cruises at 200 mph which is about what a Halifax could do. A mission to
Holland and back would take 3 to 4 hours, to northern or central France
4 to 6 hours, to Berlin 8 hours, Munich would take 9 to 10 hours and one
to Dresden would take 12 hours.
From a map.
1) Holland
A trip is about 400 miles
Theoretical time = 400 miles/200 mph = 2 hours
Actual time = 3.5 hours
2) Central France
700 miles
Theoretical time = 700 miles/200 mph = 3.5 hours
Actual time = 5 hours
3) To Berlin
I determine that a direct return trip from the Channel to Berlin is
about a 1000 mile trip.
Assuming the mission that they first went to some part of the North Sea
say about 200 miles and then fly 350 miles to Berlin they would fly
about 1100 return which is getting close to the limit. This trip would
take about.
In theory both these trip would take about 5.5 hours.
Actual time = 8 hours
Which is about the limit that a night bomber can travel!
Possibly the planes had to fly in a curve to avoid hot spots, they were
slowed down below cruise speed etc.
I suspect that most of the German oil plants were too far away for the
British night bombers

It looks like they could do it. The oil plants were in the Ruhr region,
except for one near Leipzig (Zeitz).
May 30, 1942 - First thousand bomber British air raid (against
Cologne).
Using incendiary bombs to illuminate targets, the RAF concentrated on
the heavy industrial areas of the Ruhr. Harris also ordered massive
attacks on the small coastal cities of Lubeck and Rostock. Although a
great deal of damage was done these raids had little impact on the
German economy or civilian morale.
Massive air attacks on Germany continued and in May 1942 Arthur Harris
ordered a 1,050 bomber raid on Cologne. This involved the Royal Air
Force using every aircraft available and in two hours over a third of
the city was badly damaged.

You will find that the British with night bombers could hit targets up
to Berlin. Most of the major German oil installations were outside their
range.

Post by Jack Linthicum
Aug 17, 1942 - First all-American air attack in Europe.
"The first Eighth Air Force units arrived in Britain on May 12, 1942.
The first USAAF Flying Fortress arrived at Prestwick in Scotland on
July 1, 1942. The first Flying Fortress raid over Europe was launched
on August 17, 1942 by 18 B-17Es of the 97th Bombardment Group against
railroad marshaling yards at Rouen-Sotteville in France. Twelve planes
made the actual attack and the remaining six flew a diversionary sweep
up the coast. Brig General Ira Eaker flew B-17E 41-9023 "Yankee
Doodle". The formation was escorted by Spitfires and no opposition was
encountered from the Luftwaffe. "

The US's planes were daylight bombers could hit further as they could
fight in the day time.

This is an earlier post in this thread, IIRC Berlin is further than the
Ruhr.
Not all were in the Rurhr but the majority were. If the bombers could
dump all that explosive on civilians and not damage their morale until
late in the war why bother? Essentially because bombing electrical
plants was 13th on the list and the hydrogenation plants fifth. Bomb
airfields, submarine plants, transportation but not vital suppliers.

The cite is a long discussion of Germany's oil problems, even extracts
would be too long for any use here. But five hydrogenation plants were
constructed, one of which was based on bituminous coal treatment. This
plant, Scholven, was located in the Ruhr area; the other four plants at
Leuna, Böhlen, Magdeburg, and Zeitz were located in central Germany,
adjacent to lignite deposits, four new hydrogenation plants were to be
erected at Gelsenkirchen, Welheim, and Wesseling in the Ruhr and at
Pölitz near Stettin on the Baltic Sea. The scheduled construction time
for these projects was 18 months, a goal that turned out to be rather
unrealistic. Even more unrealistic were the completion dates assigned
to twelve Fischer-Tropsch plants with relatively low production goals;
they were to be finished by 1 April 1938. By 1945 only nine of them
were operational; they reached their maximum capacity in 1943 with less
than 2.8 million barrels.

Much of the cite's discussion of synthetic fuel plants is based on
Wolfgang Birkenfeld, Der synthetishe Treibstoff 1933-1945 (Göttingen,
1964), p. 217. It is interesting to note that without Austria, West
Germany's crude oil production after a brief hiatus in 1945 and 1946
began to rise again in 1947 and by 1959 had reached 32 million barrels,
a figure which doubtless would have appeared astronomical to Hitler and
Speer.

http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1981/jul-au...

The next is a discussion of the effect the 1944 attacks had on the
hydrogenation plants and Speer's reaction to them:

The first massive raid was flown on 12 May 1944 and directed against
five plants. Other raids followed successively and continued into the
spring of 1945. The severity of the raids was immediately recognized by
the Germans. Between 30 June 1944 and 19 January 1945, Albert Speer
directed five memoranda to Hitler which left no doubt about the
increasingly serious situation. Speer pointed out that the attacks in
May and June had reduced the output of aviation fuel by 90 percent. It
would require six to eight weeks to make minimal repairs to resume
production, but unless the refineries were protected by all possible
means, coverage of the most urgent requirements of the armed forces
could no longer be assured. An unbridgeable gap would be opened that
must perforce have tragic consequences. Continued attacks also
negatively influenced the output of automotive gasoline, diesel fuel,
Buna, and methanol, the last an essential ingredient in the production
of powder and explosives. If, Speer warned, the attacks were sustained,
production would sink further, the last remaining reserve stocks would
be consumed, and the essential materials for the prosecution of a
modern technological war would be lacking in the most important areas.

In his final report, Speer noted that the undisturbed repair and
operation of the plants were essential prerequisites for further
supply, but the experience of recent months had shown that this was
impossible under existing conditions. Behind Speer's warnings was his
awareness that once production of fuels was substantially curtailed,
once reserves and the fuel in the distribution system were depleted,
the Germans would be finished and the end could be predicted with
almost mathematical accuracy. In a way, Speer was merely echoing the
prophetic utterance of Field Marshal Erhard Milch from the summer of
1943:

"The hydrogenation plants are our most vulnerable spots; with them
stands and falls our entire ability to wage war. Not only will planes
no longer fly, but tanks and submarines also will stop running if the
hydrogenation plants should actually be attacked."

A perfect example of this was the amount of aviation fuel allotted to
the training of pilots. Toward the last nine months of the war, they
were sent into combat with only one-third of the training hours
actually required.

[BernardZ]

I agree with you that5 the attack on oil was extremely successful.

Post by Jack Linthicum
The next is a discussion of the effect the 1944 attacks had on the

Until the US came in with day light bombers and P-51 Mustangs in
quantity most of Germans oil was too far away to attack in the quantity
and quantity required.


Basically this would mean January 1944 was the earliest the Allies could
be successful against the Axis oil supplies.

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by BernardZ
I agree with you that5 the attack on oil was extremely successful.

Post by Jack Linthicum
The next is a discussion of the effect the 1944 attacks had on the

Until the US came in with day light bombers and P-51 Mustangs in
quantity most of Germans oil was too far away to attack in the quantity
and quantity required.
Basically this would mean January 1944 was the earliest the Allies could
be successful against the Axis oil supplies.
--
A quick useful to determining the intended victim in a horror movie is
to try to determine the person who has no family in the story.
Observations of Bernard - No 95

Did I miss something? Most of the oil plants were either near the Ruhr
or in the general Erfurt-Leipzig area, think Schweinfurt. Not out of
range just not targeted.

[BernardZ]

Post by Jack Linthicum

Post by BernardZ
I agree with you that5 the attack on oil was extremely successful.

Post by Jack Linthicum
The next is a discussion of the effect the 1944 attacks had on the

Until the US came in with day light bombers and P-51 Mustangs in
quantity most of Germans oil was too far away to attack in the quantity
and quantity required.
Basically this would mean January 1944 was the earliest the Allies could
be successful against the Axis oil supplies.
--
A quick useful to determining the intended victim in a horror movie is
to try to determine the person who has no family in the story.
Observations of Bernard - No 95

Did I miss something? Most of the oil plants were either near the Ruhr
or in the general Erfurt-Leipzig area, think Schweinfurt. Not out of
range just not targeted.

Some did but most of German's oil came from Romania, the large synthetic
petroleum plants were in Poland and several were in North West Germany.

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by BernardZ

Post by Jack Linthicum

Post by BernardZ
I agree with you that5 the attack on oil was extremely successful.

Post by Jack Linthicum
The next is a discussion of the effect the 1944 attacks had on the

Until the US came in with day light bombers and P-51 Mustangs in
quantity most of Germans oil was too far away to attack in the quantity
and quantity required.
Basically this would mean January 1944 was the earliest the Allies could
be successful against the Axis oil supplies.
--
A quick useful to determining the intended victim in a horror movie is
to try to determine the person who has no family in the story.
Observations of Bernard - No 95

Did I miss something? Most of the oil plants were either near the Ruhr
or in the general Erfurt-Leipzig area, think Schweinfurt. Not out of
range just not targeted.

Some did but most of German's oil came from Romania, the large synthetic
petroleum plants were in Poland and several were in North West Germany.

With Ploesti and without the hydrogenation plants, Speer and Milch
both observed:

The first massive raid was flown on 12 May 1944 and directed against
five plants. . If, Speer warned, the attacks were sustained, production
would sink further, the last remaining reserve stocks would be
consumed, and the essential materials for the prosecution of a modern
technological war would be lacking in the most important areas.

In a way, Speer was merely echoing the prophetic utterance of Field
Marshal Erhard Milch from the summer of 1943:

"The hydrogenation plants are our most vulnerable spots; with them
stands and falls our entire ability to wage war. Not only will planes
no longer fly, but tanks and submarines also will stop running if the
hydrogenation plants should actually be attacked"

A perfect example of this was the amount of aviation fuel allotted to
the training of pilots. Toward the last nine months of the war, they
were sent into combat with only one-third of the training hours
actually required.37

By 1 September 1939 hydrogenation plants had reached the predicted
output. By 1940, the synthetic fuel production had jumped to 72,000
barrels per day that was 46 % of all the fuel supplies. About 90 % of
aviation petrol, without which Luftwaffe aircraft would not have taken
off, was provided by hydrogenation.

Finally, the air raids on the Ploesti oil fields and refineries in
August 1943 destroyed 50 percent of the Romanian refinery capacity.
Aerial mining of the Danube River constituted an additional serious
transportation impediment. Even so, Romanian deliveries amounted to 7
million barrels in the first half of 1944 and were not halted until
additional raids on Ploesti had been flown in the late spring and
summer of 1944.

So the shortage of aviation fuel existed not because of the Ploesti
attacks but those on the synthetic fuel plants in Germany.

Last post on this subject.

[bernardz]

Points taken

Post by Jack Linthicum
Last post on this subject.

One point that should be added that the Allied assault on the German
oil in Ww2 was successful but it was a very *expensive* victory. Its
only because the Allies had such large resources in 1944 that it could
be won.

[Michele Armellini]

"Jack Linthicum" <***@earthlink.net> ha scritto nel messaggio news:***@g43g2000cwa.googlegroups.com...

Even so, Romanian deliveries amounted to 7

Post by Jack Linthicum
million barrels in the first half of 1944 and were not halted until
additional raids on Ploesti had been flown in the late spring and
summer of 1944.

This might sound as if it were the additional raids in the summer of 1944
that finally closed that tap. Of course it ain't so. If the Axis had
remained in control of those oilfields, damages would have been repaired and
oil pumped. It was ground control of the oilfields that settled the issue,
at the end of August 1944.

[k***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

Post by Nicholas Smid
So as a rough guide it can hit a target 600 miles from
base with that load.

The problem is that the bombers did not fly in straight lines
there and back. Defensive routing to avoid flak clusters was used
for example. Also most bomber bases were inland the coastal bases
were reserved for emergency use by returning bombers. All of this
adds to journey time.

Ken Young

[a***@pacific.net.au]

On 31 Jan 2006 13:42:29 -0800, "Jack Linthicum"

Post by Jack Linthicum
Given the timeline for the Allied bombing as carried out on OTL as
presented below, WI the alternative scenario offered by Haywoord
Hansell in the text bloc below had been carried out starting in the
earliest possible time, the sensible targets the German electric,
petroleum, synthetic fuel, nitrogen fixing plants were targeted from
day 1, leaving the Germans in the situation they faced in March 1945 at
the earliest possible moment. "OT A Memorandum from the Luftwaffe in
August 1944 pointed out :that fuel production had gone from 5850 tons
daily to 120 tons in:July 1944 as a result of the enemy air offensive.
"

From what I have read over the years the problem is that while this
plan appears, on the face of it, to be viable, at least for the oil
facilities it may not be so simple.

The inaccuracy of the allied bombing attacks and the large size of oil
refinery complexes meant that there were often relatively few direct
hits and, even where there was, the damage was relatively easily
repaired.

The real killer was the *cumulative* effects. All the near misses, for
example, caused stress in nearby components so that, at some point,
another "near miss" would actually cause sprung welds or burst seals
and the like.

Evidently early war bombing raids rarely knocked the plants out of
action for extended periods or significantly reduced production rates
(except for the period the plant was not operating) but the cumulative
damage effects got to the point where the *amount* of relatively minor
damage that was caused from the cumulative effects swamped the
maintenance and repair efforts.

Also, there was the cumulative effects of the increasing German
dispersal of all war production plants ... spreading them all over the
map, often at the end of single spur rail lines that made them less
efficient (transport lag effects) and more vulnerable to transport
attacks ... if you couldn't get the raw materials *to* the plant or
the finished product(s) *from* the plant then it didn't really matter
whether the plant was technically operational or not.

I don't recall where this thesis was proposed, it might have been the
Strategic Bombing Survey (but probably not) or specialist works on the
air war/bombing campaign, but it seemed to be well supported with data
... though, of course, maybe the author had a particular hobby horse
they wanted to ride ;-)

Phil

Author, Space Opera (FGU), RBB #1 (FASA), Road to Armageddon (PGD).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Email: ***@pacific.net.au

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by John Anderton
On 31 Jan 2006 13:42:29 -0800, "Jack Linthicum"

Post by Jack Linthicum
Given the timeline for the Allied bombing as carried out on OTL as
presented below, WI the alternative scenario offered by Haywoord
Hansell in the text bloc below had been carried out starting in the
earliest possible time, the sensible targets the German electric,
petroleum, synthetic fuel, nitrogen fixing plants were targeted from
day 1, leaving the Germans in the situation they faced in March 1945 at
the earliest possible moment. "OT A Memorandum from the Luftwaffe in
August 1944 pointed out :that fuel production had gone from 5850 tons
daily to 120 tons in:July 1944 as a result of the enemy air offensive.
"

From what I have read over the years the problem is that while this
plan appears, on the face of it, to be viable, at least for the oil
facilities it may not be so simple.
The inaccuracy of the allied bombing attacks and the large size of oil
refinery complexes meant that there were often relatively few direct
hits and, even where there was, the damage was relatively easily
repaired.
The real killer was the *cumulative* effects. All the near misses, for
example, caused stress in nearby components so that, at some point,
another "near miss" would actually cause sprung welds or burst seals
and the like.
Evidently early war bombing raids rarely knocked the plants out of
action for extended periods or significantly reduced production rates
(except for the period the plant was not operating) but the cumulative
damage effects got to the point where the *amount* of relatively minor
damage that was caused from the cumulative effects swamped the
maintenance and repair efforts.
Also, there was the cumulative effects of the increasing German
dispersal of all war production plants ... spreading them all over the
map, often at the end of single spur rail lines that made them less
efficient (transport lag effects) and more vulnerable to transport
attacks ... if you couldn't get the raw materials *to* the plant or
the finished product(s) *from* the plant then it didn't really matter
whether the plant was technically operational or not.
I don't recall where this thesis was proposed, it might have been the
Strategic Bombing Survey (but probably not) or specialist works on the
air war/bombing campaign, but it seemed to be well supported with data
... though, of course, maybe the author had a particular hobby horse
they wanted to ride ;-)
Phil
Author, Space Opera (FGU), RBB #1 (FASA), Road to Armageddon (PGD).
----------------------------------------------------------------------

This is my source and he does have Uncle Toby's disease. On the
location of the plants they were there before the war, any movement
would take time and probably be as disruptive as an actual bombing.
Hansell's remarks about the ownership of the plants is significant and
probably explains why not. You start with electricity and the known
plants, if you can send 1000 bombers to Scheinfurt to try and hit ball
bearings I would think some nice fragmentation bombs mixed with
incendiary would get at least part of a fuel or nitrogen plant,


http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/Hansell/Hansell-7.html

[Matt Giwer]

Post by Jack Linthicum
This is my source and he does have Uncle Toby's disease. On the
location of the plants they were there before the war, any movement
would take time and probably be as disruptive as an actual bombing.
Hansell's remarks about the ownership of the plants is significant and
probably explains why not. You start with electricity and the known
plants, if you can send 1000 bombers to Scheinfurt to try and hit ball
bearings I would think some nice fragmentation bombs mixed with
incendiary would get at least part of a fuel or nitrogen plant,

Perhaps the point is better made by noting the people who design and build oil refineries know for
a fact that oil burns and that it would be a total disaster for a fire to start. Therefore they were
built such that a fire would do minimal damage.

But where does England get 1000 long range bombers in October 1939?

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by Matt Giwer

Post by Jack Linthicum
This is my source and he does have Uncle Toby's disease. On the
location of the plants they were there before the war, any movement
would take time and probably be as disruptive as an actual bombing.
Hansell's remarks about the ownership of the plants is significant and
probably explains why not. You start with electricity and the known
plants, if you can send 1000 bombers to Scheinfurt to try and hit ball
bearings I would think some nice fragmentation bombs mixed with
incendiary would get at least part of a fuel or nitrogen plant,

Perhaps the point is better made by noting the people who design and build oil refineries know for
a fact that oil burns and that it would be a total disaster for a fire to start. Therefore they were
built such that a fire would do minimal damage.
But where does England get 1000 long range bombers in October 1939?

Didn't read the source did you? The 1000 bombers on Schweinfurt were in
October 1943. IIRC from my pipeline days and from reading about events
in the Middle East a refinery is a complex of many parts, destroying or
damaging one usually means you have to shut down much more than the
damaged part. The idea is to stop the flow not start a fire, the
incendiaries are a plus, maybe even inhumane for that time frame.

[Matt Giwer]

Post by Jack Linthicum

Post by Matt Giwer

Post by Jack Linthicum
This is my source and he does have Uncle Toby's disease. On the
location of the plants they were there before the war, any movement
would take time and probably be as disruptive as an actual bombing.
Hansell's remarks about the ownership of the plants is significant and
probably explains why not. You start with electricity and the known
plants, if you can send 1000 bombers to Scheinfurt to try and hit ball
bearings I would think some nice fragmentation bombs mixed with
incendiary would get at least part of a fuel or nitrogen plant,

Perhaps the point is better made by noting the people who design and build oil refineries know for
a fact that oil burns and that it would be a total disaster for a fire to start. Therefore they were
built such that a fire would do minimal damage.
But where does England get 1000 long range bombers in October 1939?

Didn't read the source did you? The 1000 bombers on Schweinfurt were in
October 1943.

When you wrote earlier it was not clear 1943 was earlier enough to be worth a WI. If one wants just
a little bit earlier then simply have a change in bombing policy.

Post by Jack Linthicum
IIRC from my pipeline days and from reading about events
in the Middle East a refinery is a complex of many parts, destroying or
damaging one usually means you have to shut down much more than the
damaged part. The idea is to stop the flow not start a fire, the
incendiaries are a plus, maybe even inhumane for that time frame.

It is my undetstanding Ploesti was bombed several times before being captured and production ended.

In any event my point was simply that refineries are designed and built to minimize the danger from
fires. Also they are not designed for that much greater production than peak demand so ease and
speed of repair would also be a design consideration.

[BernardZ]

In article <phkEf.11187$***@tornado.tampabay.rr.com>, jull43
@tampabay.REMover.rr.com says...

Post by Matt Giwer
It is my undetstanding Ploesti was bombed several times before being captured and production ended.

And it had to be repeatedly attacked to stop production

Post by Matt Giwer
In any event my point was simply that refineries are designed and built to minimize the danger from
fires.

They are. But they are considered very risky places for good reason.

The closest example I can think of is the Japanese who in WW2 took
burning and destroyed oil fields. These were probably better destroyed
then any bombing raid could do. It took them about a year to get back to
80% production.


Yes it can be fixed but it takes time.

Post by Matt Giwer
Also they are not designed for that much greater production than peak demand so ease and
speed of repair would also be a design consideration.

At that stage Germany needed all the oil she could get.

[Matt Giwer]

Post by BernardZ
@tampabay.REMover.rr.com says...

Post by Matt Giwer
It is my undetstanding Ploesti was bombed several times before being captured and production ended.

And it had to be repeatedly attacked to stop production

Right but I would have to find it again but I remember there was some production until its final
capture. Some was likely not much but it is not the imagine of starting a fire and it all disappears
forever.

Post by BernardZ

Post by Matt Giwer
In any event my point was simply that refineries are designed and built to minimize the danger from
fires.

They are. But they are considered very risky places for good reason.

True but risks are peace time risks. It does not appear on the top ten most dangerous jobs with
hookers and cab drivers at least in peace time.

Post by BernardZ
The closest example I can think of is the Japanese who in WW2 took
burning and destroyed oil fields. These were probably better destroyed
then any bombing raid could do. It took them about a year to get back to
80% production.

If one knows what they are doing in setting charges and has all the time in the world to do the job
right a year is probably about right as the layout and foundations would still be there but likely
little else.

Post by BernardZ
Yes it can be fixed but it takes time.

Post by Matt Giwer
Also they are not designed for that much greater production than peak demand so ease and
speed of repair would also be a design consideration.

At that stage Germany needed all the oil she could get.

In war time every nation needs all it can get. It was a field of math whose name escapes me that
was first applied in WWII to maximize production given available raw materials. If fuel supply is
decreasing you reduce the production of things that need fuel accordingly and build something else
which doesn't. I know the US used it. I don't know if Germany did. It is not a deterministic type of
math. It is playing lots of what-ifs and getting a range of solutions.

[a***@pacific.net.au]

On 1 Feb 2006 03:04:50 -0800, "Jack Linthicum"

Post by Jack Linthicum

Post by John Anderton
On 31 Jan 2006 13:42:29 -0800, "Jack Linthicum"

This is my source and he does have Uncle Toby's disease. On the
location of the plants they were there before the war, any movement
would take time and probably be as disruptive as an actual bombing.

As, indeed, it was! One of the unintended knock on effects of the
bombing.

Post by Jack Linthicum
Hansell's remarks about the ownership of the plants is significant and
probably explains why not. You start with electricity and the known
plants, if you can send 1000 bombers to Scheinfurt to try and hit ball
bearings I would think some nice fragmentation bombs mixed with
incendiary would get at least part of a fuel or nitrogen plant,
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/Hansell/Hansell-7.html

My understanding of the problem is that it really didn't make a
difference ... oil refineries were mostly empty space and the gross
inaccuracy of the strategic bombing attacks, even with 1000 bombers,
resulted in little short term effects.

Yes, the attacks started fires. Yes, they caused damage. But, as I
understand the thesis, the damage was relatively easily and quickly
repaired. The problem was that a lot of the "repairs" were on the
order of "patch that hole/sprung weld/seal" and, as you slowly found
patches on patches on patches over time, it was easier and easier for
misses that would, on an "as new" instanllation, have had no effect,
to actually cause major problems.

Cumulative.

As for the factory raids, these were mostly failures for the simple
reason that, short of a bomb actually hitting an actual tool directly,
the overpressure of the blasts was nowhere near sufficient to actually
destroy them.

So you had the seemingly counterintuitive situation where German
factory *buildings* might be trashed, yet the machinery inside them
remained intact ... and restoring power and shifting debris meant that
the plants could be back in production within extremely short periods
of time, well before any buildings were reconstructed to provide
protection from the weather ;-)

I'm in *no* way saying your suggestion wouldn't work ... I just don't
think it would have worked all *that* much better than what was
actually done or, indeed, that it would *necessarily* have been
*significantly* faster.

I suspect you might shave a month or so off the final economic
collapse (historically, March-April 1945) ... but since the Germans
fought on for a month or more after the economy collapsed as it was,
it might not make all that much overall difference.

But I agree, with 20:20 hindsight the Allies could well have done
better with target selection for the strategic and operational
application of bombing attacks against the Germans.

Phil

Author, Space Opera (FGU), RBB #1 (FASA), Road to Armageddon (PGD).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Email: ***@pacific.net.au

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
On 1 Feb 2006 03:04:50 -0800, "Jack Linthicum"

Post by Jack Linthicum

Post by John Anderton
On 31 Jan 2006 13:42:29 -0800, "Jack Linthicum"

This is my source and he does have Uncle Toby's disease. On the
location of the plants they were there before the war, any movement
would take time and probably be as disruptive as an actual bombing.

As, indeed, it was! One of the unintended knock on effects of the
bombing.

Post by Jack Linthicum
Hansell's remarks about the ownership of the plants is significant and
probably explains why not. You start with electricity and the known
plants, if you can send 1000 bombers to Scheinfurt to try and hit ball
bearings I would think some nice fragmentation bombs mixed with
incendiary would get at least part of a fuel or nitrogen plant,
http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/Hansell/Hansell-7.html

My understanding of the problem is that it really didn't make a
difference ... oil refineries were mostly empty space and the gross
inaccuracy of the strategic bombing attacks, even with 1000 bombers,
resulted in little short term effects.
Yes, the attacks started fires. Yes, they caused damage. But, as I
understand the thesis, the damage was relatively easily and quickly
repaired. The problem was that a lot of the "repairs" were on the
order of "patch that hole/sprung weld/seal" and, as you slowly found
patches on patches on patches over time, it was easier and easier for
misses that would, on an "as new" instanllation, have had no effect,
to actually cause major problems.
Cumulative.
As for the factory raids, these were mostly failures for the simple
reason that, short of a bomb actually hitting an actual tool directly,
the overpressure of the blasts was nowhere near sufficient to actually
destroy them.
So you had the seemingly counterintuitive situation where German
factory *buildings* might be trashed, yet the machinery inside them
remained intact ... and restoring power and shifting debris meant that
the plants could be back in production within extremely short periods
of time, well before any buildings were reconstructed to provide
protection from the weather ;-)
I'm in *no* way saying your suggestion wouldn't work ... I just don't
think it would have worked all *that* much better than what was
actually done or, indeed, that it would *necessarily* have been
*significantly* faster.
I suspect you might shave a month or so off the final economic
collapse (historically, March-April 1945) ... but since the Germans
fought on for a month or more after the economy collapsed as it was,
it might not make all that much overall difference.
But I agree, with 20:20 hindsight the Allies could well have done
better with target selection for the strategic and operational
application of bombing attacks against the Germans.
Phil
Author, Space Opera (FGU), RBB #1 (FASA), Road to Armageddon (PGD).
----------------------------------------------------------------------

Probably true but if we take our WIs at maximum effect would the July
20, 1944 attempt have been made much earlier, especially if the Soviets
timed their emergence from winter to coincide with an Allied invasion?
Hansell's remark about North Africa being a critical and incorrect
decision seems to also beg for a WI. IE WI Torch was only moderately
succesful, sort of a larger scale Dieppe?

[The Horny Goat]

On 1 Feb 2006 05:02:34 -0800, "Jack Linthicum"

Post by Jack Linthicum
Probably true but if we take our WIs at maximum effect would the July
20, 1944 attempt have been made much earlier, especially if the Soviets
timed their emergence from winter to coincide with an Allied invasion?
Hansell's remark about North Africa being a critical and incorrect
decision seems to also beg for a WI. IE WI Torch was only moderately
succesful, sort of a larger scale Dieppe?

Boy those Vichy French were incredible supermen weren't they? With the
kind of armament they were allowed that would be an incredible
performance.

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by Jack Linthicum
Given the timeline for the Allied bombing as carried out on OTL as
presented below, WI the alternative scenario offered by Haywoord
Hansell in the text bloc below had been carried out starting in the
earliest possible time, the sensible targets the German electric,
petroleum, synthetic fuel, nitrogen fixing plants were targeted from
day 1, leaving the Germans in the situation they faced in March 1945 at
the earliest possible moment.

Well, not the situation they faced in 1945, because
at that time they had also seen the destruction of
the German aviation industry and systematic wrecking
of the German railroad system, plus general demolition
of urban areas with other industries.

Post by Jack Linthicum
"OT A Memorandum from the Luftwaffe in
August 1944 pointed out "that fuel production had gone from 5850 tons
daily to 120 tons in July 1944 as a result of the enemy air offensive."

I'd like to see a cite for that, and also evidence
that whatever LW guy wrote the memo wasn't blowing
smoke out his ass.

Post by Jack Linthicum
then the scenario
Given the actual development of escort fighters, it also seems
certain that any of the three strategic air plans (AWPD-1, AWPD-42, and
the CBO) could have been carried out as planned. And the Combined
Bomber Offensive could have included the destruction of most of the
German powerplants and the disruption of the power distribution system
by demolishing the switching stations. Further, it appears to me that
the U.S. strategic air forces should not have been dismembered by
sending forty percent of the aircraft to the Mediterranean to be used
chiefly for theater objectives.

Such as bombing the oilfields at Ploiesti? The bomber
forces in the Mediterranean also made many raids on Germany.
Silesia, for instance, is about 250 closer to the Foggia
airfields than to East Anglia.

Post by Jack Linthicum
I also feel it would have been possible to achieve this fatal chaos
before the Normandy Invasion. The greatest single deterrent to this
achievement was probably the decision to invade North Africa...

Plonk!

I don't know who Hansell actually was, but this reeks of
an airpower extremist expounding about "panacea targets".

Demolishing electrical generation plants was harder than
it looked, especially from high altitude against heavy
flak.

To be sure, by the end of the war, the Allies had realized
that bombing had to be concentrated on key industries, even
at the cost of ignoring others. Less than 100% damage was
often not worth the effort. An animal can survive with
80% loss of lung, kidney, liver, and heart function - but
100% of any _one_ of those kills quickly.

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Jack Linthicum
Given the timeline for the Allied bombing as carried out on OTL as
presented below, WI the alternative scenario offered by Haywoord
Hansell in the text bloc below had been carried out starting in the
earliest possible time, the sensible targets the German electric,
petroleum, synthetic fuel, nitrogen fixing plants were targeted from
day 1, leaving the Germans in the situation they faced in March 1945 at
the earliest possible moment.

Well, not the situation they faced in 1945, because
at that time they had also seen the destruction of
the German aviation industry and systematic wrecking
of the German railroad system, plus general demolition
of urban areas with other industries.

Post by Jack Linthicum
"OT A Memorandum from the Luftwaffe in
August 1944 pointed out "that fuel production had gone from 5850 tons
daily to 120 tons in July 1944 as a result of the enemy air offensive."

I'd like to see a cite for that, and also evidence
that whatever LW guy wrote the memo wasn't blowing
smoke out his ass.

Post by Jack Linthicum
then the scenario
Given the actual development of escort fighters, it also seems
certain that any of the three strategic air plans (AWPD-1, AWPD-42, and
the CBO) could have been carried out as planned. And the Combined
Bomber Offensive could have included the destruction of most of the
German powerplants and the disruption of the power distribution system
by demolishing the switching stations. Further, it appears to me that
the U.S. strategic air forces should not have been dismembered by
sending forty percent of the aircraft to the Mediterranean to be used
chiefly for theater objectives.

Such as bombing the oilfields at Ploiesti? The bomber
forces in the Mediterranean also made many raids on Germany.
Silesia, for instance, is about 250 closer to the Foggia
airfields than to East Anglia.

Post by Jack Linthicum
I also feel it would have been possible to achieve this fatal chaos
before the Normandy Invasion. The greatest single deterrent to this
achievement was probably the decision to invade North Africa...

Plonk!
I don't know who Hansell actually was, but this reeks of
an airpower extremist expounding about "panacea targets".
Demolishing electrical generation plants was harder than
it looked, especially from high altitude against heavy
flak.
To be sure, by the end of the war, the Allies had realized
that bombing had to be concentrated on key industries, even
at the cost of ignoring others. Less than 100% damage was
often not worth the effort. An animal can survive with
80% loss of lung, kidney, liver, and heart function - but
100% of any _one_ of those kills quickly.
--
| The shocking lack of a fleet of modern luxury |
| dirigibles is only one of a great many things that |
| are seriously wrong with this here world. |
| -- blogger "Coop" at Positive Ape Index |

This is Hansell's biography http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5693

And the Luftwaffe cite is from sci.military.naval thread on a parallel
topic:

a) A Memorandum tfrom the Luftwaffe in August 1944 pointed out
that fuel production had gone from 5850 tons daily to 120 tons in
July 1944 as a result of the enemy air offensive.

b) Generator production dropped by 43% in October and never caught
up again, as a result as of December, that the armaments industry
collapsed for good.

.... Albert Speer, Infiltration ISBN 0-02-612800-4

and it seems to have come from The RAF History

The Speer reports reproduced in the RAF history give the daily
avgas output for May, June, July and September 1944. They
show production drops after RAF and USAAF raids, for example
after the RAF attack of 12 June avgas production drops from
around 2,100 tons/day to 1,100 tons/day, the RAF raids of 22 June
dropped production from around 1,250 tons.day to 600 tons/day.

And so on for the various raids, the drop in production to 120 tons/day
in late July 1944 was after a group of USAAF and RAF raids.

http://www.aviationbanter.com/showthread.php?t=8818&page=2&pp=10
Thread from April 2004

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by Jack Linthicum

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Jack Linthicum
Given the timeline for the Allied bombing as carried out on OTL as
presented below, WI the alternative scenario offered by Haywoord
Hansell in the text bloc below had been carried out starting in the
earliest possible time, the sensible targets the German electric,
petroleum, synthetic fuel, nitrogen fixing plants were targeted from
day 1, leaving the Germans in the situation they faced in March 1945 at
the earliest possible moment.

Well, not the situation they faced in 1945, because
at that time they had also seen the destruction of
the German aviation industry and systematic wrecking
of the German railroad system, plus general demolition
of urban areas with other industries.

Post by Jack Linthicum
"OT A Memorandum from the Luftwaffe in
August 1944 pointed out "that fuel production had gone from 5850 tons
daily to 120 tons in July 1944 as a result of the enemy air offensive."

I'd like to see a cite for that, and also evidence
that whatever LW guy wrote the memo wasn't blowing
smoke out his ass.

Post by Jack Linthicum
then the scenario
Given the actual development of escort fighters, it also seems
certain that any of the three strategic air plans (AWPD-1, AWPD-42, and
the CBO) could have been carried out as planned. And the Combined
Bomber Offensive could have included the destruction of most of the
German powerplants and the disruption of the power distribution system
by demolishing the switching stations. Further, it appears to me that
the U.S. strategic air forces should not have been dismembered by
sending forty percent of the aircraft to the Mediterranean to be used
chiefly for theater objectives.

Such as bombing the oilfields at Ploiesti? The bomber
forces in the Mediterranean also made many raids on Germany.
Silesia, for instance, is about 250 closer to the Foggia
airfields than to East Anglia.

Post by Jack Linthicum
I also feel it would have been possible to achieve this fatal chaos
before the Normandy Invasion. The greatest single deterrent to this
achievement was probably the decision to invade North Africa...

Plonk!
I don't know who Hansell actually was, but this reeks of
an airpower extremist expounding about "panacea targets".
Demolishing electrical generation plants was harder than
it looked, especially from high altitude against heavy
flak.
To be sure, by the end of the war, the Allies had realized
that bombing had to be concentrated on key industries, even
at the cost of ignoring others. Less than 100% damage was
often not worth the effort. An animal can survive with
80% loss of lung, kidney, liver, and heart function - but
100% of any _one_ of those kills quickly.
--
| The shocking lack of a fleet of modern luxury |
| dirigibles is only one of a great many things that |
| are seriously wrong with this here world. |
| -- blogger "Coop" at Positive Ape Index |

This is Hansell's biography http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5693
And the Luftwaffe cite is from sci.military.naval thread on a parallel
a) A Memorandum tfrom the Luftwaffe in August 1944 pointed out
that fuel production had gone from 5850 tons daily to 120 tons in
July 1944 as a result of the enemy air offensive.
b) Generator production dropped by 43% in October and never caught
up again, as a result as of December, that the armaments industry
collapsed for good.
.... Albert Speer, Infiltration ISBN 0-02-612800-4
and it seems to have come from The RAF History
The Speer reports reproduced in the RAF history give the daily
avgas output for May, June, July and September 1944. They
show production drops after RAF and USAAF raids, for example
after the RAF attack of 12 June avgas production drops from
around 2,100 tons/day to 1,100 tons/day, the RAF raids of 22 June
dropped production from around 1,250 tons.day to 600 tons/day.
And so on for the various raids, the drop in production to 120 tons/day
in late July 1944 was after a group of USAAF and RAF raids.
http://www.aviationbanter.com/showthread.php?t=8818&page=2&pp=10
Thread from April 2004

Anyone going back to 1934 or so in their time machine could take along
the CIA Factbook figures for Germany

oil and gas production today:

Oil - production:
158,700 bbl/day (2003)
Oil - exports:
12,990 bbl/day (2003)
Oil - proved reserves:
395.8 million bbl (1 January 2004)
Natural gas - production:
21 billion cu m (2003)
Natural gas - exports:
7.731 billion cu m (2003)
Natural gas - proved reserves:
293 billion cu m (1 January 2004)

[a***@mforma.com]

Post by Jack Linthicum

Post by Rich Rostrom

Post by Jack Linthicum
Given the timeline for the Allied bombing as carried out on OTL as
presented below, WI the alternative scenario offered by Haywoord
Hansell in the text bloc below had been carried out starting in the
earliest possible time, the sensible targets the German electric,
petroleum, synthetic fuel, nitrogen fixing plants were targeted from
day 1, leaving the Germans in the situation they faced in March 1945 at
the earliest possible moment.

Well, not the situation they faced in 1945, because
at that time they had also seen the destruction of
the German aviation industry and systematic wrecking
of the German railroad system, plus general demolition
of urban areas with other industries.

Post by Jack Linthicum
"OT A Memorandum from the Luftwaffe in
August 1944 pointed out "that fuel production had gone from 5850 tons
daily to 120 tons in July 1944 as a result of the enemy air offensive."

I'd like to see a cite for that, and also evidence
that whatever LW guy wrote the memo wasn't blowing
smoke out his ass.

Post by Jack Linthicum
then the scenario
Given the actual development of escort fighters, it also seems
certain that any of the three strategic air plans (AWPD-1, AWPD-42, and
the CBO) could have been carried out as planned. And the Combined
Bomber Offensive could have included the destruction of most of the
German powerplants and the disruption of the power distribution system
by demolishing the switching stations. Further, it appears to me that
the U.S. strategic air forces should not have been dismembered by
sending forty percent of the aircraft to the Mediterranean to be used
chiefly for theater objectives.

Such as bombing the oilfields at Ploiesti? The bomber
forces in the Mediterranean also made many raids on Germany.
Silesia, for instance, is about 250 closer to the Foggia
airfields than to East Anglia.

Post by Jack Linthicum
I also feel it would have been possible to achieve this fatal chaos
before the Normandy Invasion. The greatest single deterrent to this
achievement was probably the decision to invade North Africa...

Plonk!
I don't know who Hansell actually was, but this reeks of
an airpower extremist expounding about "panacea targets".
Demolishing electrical generation plants was harder than
it looked, especially from high altitude against heavy
flak.
To be sure, by the end of the war, the Allies had realized
that bombing had to be concentrated on key industries, even
at the cost of ignoring others. Less than 100% damage was
often not worth the effort. An animal can survive with
80% loss of lung, kidney, liver, and heart function - but
100% of any _one_ of those kills quickly.
--
| The shocking lack of a fleet of modern luxury |
| dirigibles is only one of a great many things that |
| are seriously wrong with this here world. |
| -- blogger "Coop" at Positive Ape Index |

This is Hansell's biography http://www.af.mil/bios/bio.asp?bioID=5693
And the Luftwaffe cite is from sci.military.naval thread on a parallel
a) A Memorandum tfrom the Luftwaffe in August 1944 pointed out
that fuel production had gone from 5850 tons daily to 120 tons in
July 1944 as a result of the enemy air offensive.
b) Generator production dropped by 43% in October and never caught
up again, as a result as of December, that the armaments industry
collapsed for good.
.... Albert Speer, Infiltration ISBN 0-02-612800-4
and it seems to have come from The RAF History
The Speer reports reproduced in the RAF history give the daily
avgas output for May, June, July and September 1944. They
show production drops after RAF and USAAF raids, for example
after the RAF attack of 12 June avgas production drops from
around 2,100 tons/day to 1,100 tons/day, the RAF raids of 22 June
dropped production from around 1,250 tons.day to 600 tons/day.
And so on for the various raids, the drop in production to 120 tons/day
in late July 1944 was after a group of USAAF and RAF raids.
http://www.aviationbanter.com/showthread.php?t=8818&page=2&pp=10
Thread from April 2004

It's worth noting that the decline in
POL production starts after "Big Week"
and the operations designed to obtain
air superiority (as a prerequisite for
D-Day) had been concluded.

Without this air superiority, the
accurate and sustained bombing campaigns
needed to supress key target systems
would in all probability fail to reach
the effectiveness displayed in OTL.

Both RAF & USAAF analysis records that
bombing accuracy improved under conditions
of air superiority. AFAIK neither force
worked that out until the after air
superiority had been achieved.

Obtaining air superiority earlier requires
that the advantage is realised without
the spur of OVERLORD. It also needs the
8th AF (Bomber & Fighter groups) to build
up to Jan '44 levels sooner. Bombers could
be sent to 8th AF rather than creating
15th AF but the 8th still needs numbers of
long range fighters equal to its bomber
force if it's to succeed. Where do these
fighters come from? The P51 reaches service in
Dec '43. The P38 can't generally outfight
german air defence aircraft and has serious
reliabilty problems when operating at 8th AF
bombing altitudes.

My take is that (From OTL Data):
1] Air superiority is required if an effective
campaign to supress a key target system is to
take place.

2] An effective long range fighter is neccesary
in any campaign to gain air superiority.

3] That the trial of the up-engined Mustang I
will have to take place before the Mustang I
reaches RAF service rather than as a "field
modification", if the P51 program is to be
accelerated.

In this ATL:
I'm not sure whose mind needs to be adjusted to
get the above to happen, although John Terrain in
The Right Of The Line repeatedly blames Portal
for his, resistance to / disbelief in,
the concept of the long range fighter.


AndyG