Discussion:
Major issue - Win 7 will **not** install on Fat 32
(too old to reply)
thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-02 10:50:43 UTC
Permalink
Shaun, this is a major problem. I was looking forward to installing
Win 7 on Fat 32 so that I could set up a hidden OS, as I have many
times in the past withWIn XP. It will simply not install on anything
but NTFS. I have Ultimate OEM by the way, gold.

Do you have a solution?

thang
thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-09 12:53:51 UTC
Permalink
Its academic now. I have dispensed with DCPP as old hat, and
installed Truecrypt. It doesn't matter if you have NTFS, it still
installs ok even with Windows 7 and is a spectacular system.

Drivecrypt, pull up your socks.

thang
John Smith
2009-08-11 04:08:27 UTC
Permalink
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Its academic now. I have dispensed with DCPP as old hat, and
installed Truecrypt. It doesn't matter if you have NTFS, it still
installs ok even with Windows 7 and is a spectacular system.
Drivecrypt, pull up your socks.
thang
An 18 year old can crack/hack truecrypt and proved it, regards
Carsten Krueger
2009-08-11 12:03:48 UTC
Permalink
Post by John Smith
An 18 year old can crack/hack truecrypt and proved it, regards
Wrong

greetings
Carsten
--
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http://www.realname-diskussion.info - Realnames sind keine Pflicht
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cakruege (at) gmail (dot) com | http://www.geocities.com/mungfaq/
thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-12 05:45:52 UTC
Permalink
Are you talking about Stoned Bootkit, you stupid cunt? Fuck me, you
are hereby killfiled, plonk, down the shitchute.

Needs physical access, needs a few other things too. Truecrypt is
foolproof and open source. AES 256 (key) would need a few eternities
to brute force crack, and you need to know its actually ***there*** in
any case.

You are a low IQ retard. My name is Hitler, cunt, and you will be the
subject of my next eugenics program.

Nyurante prick.

thang
Post by John Smith
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Its academic now. I have dispensed with DCPP as old hat, and
installed Truecrypt. It doesn't matter if you have NTFS, it still
installs ok even with Windows 7 and is a spectacular system.
Drivecrypt, pull up your socks.
thang
An 18 year old can crack/hack truecrypt and proved it, regards
John Smith
2009-08-12 07:44:34 UTC
Permalink
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Are you talking about Stoned Bootkit, you stupid cunt? Fuck me, you
are hereby killfiled, plonk, down the shitchute.
Needs physical access,
No one is going to try to break into an encrypted machine without having
physical access, read the paper on it before you spam like a child.
While you're at it, read about the new attacks on AES 256, it looks like
AES 128, serpent and two fish may possibly be more secure. I'm sure a
troll of the world like you hasn't missed what's been posted in the
security groups?

needs a few other things too. Truecrypt is
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
foolproof and open source. AES 256 (key) would need a few eternities
to brute force crack, and you need to know its actually ***there*** in
any case.
You are a low IQ retard. My name is Hitler, cunt, and you will be the
subject of my next eugenics program.
Nyurante prick.
thang
Post by John Smith
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Its academic now. I have dispensed with DCPP as old hat, and
installed Truecrypt. It doesn't matter if you have NTFS, it still
installs ok even with Windows 7 and is a spectacular system.
Drivecrypt, pull up your socks.
thang
An 18 year old can crack/hack truecrypt and proved it, regards
thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-14 02:52:39 UTC
Permalink
Post by John Smith
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Are you talking about Stoned Bootkit, you stupid cunt? Fuck me, you
are hereby killfiled, plonk, down the shitchute.
Needs physical access,
No one is going to try to break into an encrypted machine without having
physical access, read the paper on it before you spam like a child.
While you're at it, read about the new attacks on AES 256, it looks like
AES 128, serpent and two fish may possibly be more secure. I'm sure a
troll of the world like you hasn't missed what's been posted in the
security groups?
Right, my anonymous friend. Now, I don't give a shit about breaking
into a machine as that is a matter of physical security. I am
concerned about traffic and the interception thereof. I am concerned
about the sequestration of my machine, or indeed any machine the data
and/or OS of which is secured by Truecrypt , such as mine because
****the original comment below******** was that an 18 year old could
hack Truecrypt.

Even Schneier when he was developing Twofish said that
AES256-encrypted *traffic* would never be decrypted. XLS doesn't work
on AES256/14 rounds. Read Schneier, as I do pal. His present view is
that a direct attack on the cypher itself cannot succeed for the
forseeable future because of the inherent complexity which is still in
the order of so many powers of 2 that several eternities would still
be needed even with the recent academic *attacks* to which you refer.

Turning to the Truecrypt implementation of AES256, only if there is
leakage of the key itself (in my case, firmly committed to memory
cells only), I believe it is pragmatically, uncrackable. There can be
no leakage from the hidden OS because of the read-only state imposed
on the remaining file systems when operating from the hidden volume
(unless those file systems are in hidden volumes which are on
partitions which themselves are fully encrypted). Esoteric stuff like
cache timing and so on are academically interesting, but won't work in
practice in reality.

Lets look at physical access. If the antagonist has transient access
to your machine, then a physical keylogger can be installed internally
or even on the USB (assuming wireless) input cable (I check my cables
and periodically rebuild my machines, so this won't work). Or, a
wireless sniffer can be set up to pick up the keys/buttons used - this
can't be defeated **but** one need only look for the white van parked
outside with the directional apparatus on the roof masquerading as a
satellite TV installation vehicle (however, read with some concern...
http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/security/soa/Microsoft-wireless-keyboard-hacked-from-50-metres/0,130061744,339284328,00.htm)

With Truecrypt, a software keylogger may not be effective unless it
works at pre-boot, so an altered BIOS may do the trick, but physical
access is necessary to flash the BIOS and in my case, both chips. I
have recently done this importing SLIC 2.1 functionality into a
non-SLP Award BIOS so that I could run the fully activated OEM WIn 7
(sucessfully, with Truecrypt running sucessfully also). There is no
way however to alter the backup BIOS chip on my mainboard.

I have always thought that the keyboard buffer in BIOS was the most
vulnerable point of attack of any symmetric-keyed cypher system in any
case. Again, physical access needed.

Rootkits like the Stoned whatsit, access again needed. Social
engineering, truncheon diplomacy, etc etc, all can result in key
disclosure but are unlikely in my case.

Getting to your *point* though that a troll like me isn't aware of
changes in security status for AES 256, Twofish, Serpent etc etc.
Well, the preeminent security Blog *is* Schneier isn't it? He did
help develop Twofish so he knows what he is talking about, doesn't he?
You do refer to recent attacks on AES 256, which undoubtedly are the
Biryukov et al attacks, don't you? I'm not aware of anything else in
the recent past which has much import. Well, read Schneier again,
because he discounts both for feasibility (ie being able to implement
non-academic attacks within the age of our solar system) for the
following reasons, in no specific order:

The levels of complexity, while reduced, are still huge for AES 256
(2^119) - the older of the more recent attacks.

The most recent attack was on AES 256 but with 10 rounds, not the 14
implemented in Truecrypt. Schneier says for 14 rounds, this attack,
the most recent, does not work.

So, what specifically have I missed? I have taken the trouble to
dispel your mistaken notion that I am a troll with zero knowledge of
symmetric key encryption security - how about you dispel my belief
that you have only superficial knowledge, and please don't trot out
that stupid Stoned bootkit crap. Surely you are better than that Mr
Smith?

thang
Post by John Smith
needs a few other things too. Truecrypt is
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
foolproof and open source. AES 256 (key) would need a few eternities
to brute force crack, and you need to know its actually ***there*** in
any case.
You are a low IQ retard. My name is Hitler, cunt, and you will be the
subject of my next eugenics program.
Nyurante prick.
thang
Post by John Smith
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Its academic now. I have dispensed with DCPP as old hat, and
installed Truecrypt. It doesn't matter if you have NTFS, it still
installs ok even with Windows 7 and is a spectacular system.
Drivecrypt, pull up your socks.
thang
An 18 year old can crack/hack truecrypt and proved it, regards
John Smith
2009-08-14 13:39:07 UTC
Permalink
thang ornithorhynchus wrote:

Flush
thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-14 14:30:16 UTC
Permalink
The eminently knowledgeable Monsieur Smith knows fuck all and has been
caught out. You poor, poor cunt.

thang
Flush
John Smith
2009-08-14 19:41:52 UTC
Permalink
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
The eminently knowledgeable Monsieur Smith knows fuck all and has been
caught out. You poor, poor cunt.
thang
Flush
thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-15 00:56:13 UTC
Permalink
Gee got a lot to say haven't you? Dope. What the hell are you doing
here? I have been a habitue since Shawn joined Securstar from
Scramdisk and Sarah was doing her degree and taking a hobby interest
in OTFE systems (and comparisons). And you, you fucking know-nothing,
criticize me?? What a laugh. I have written code, right down to
machine level, since 1982. What the fuck have you done? I have used
DCPP and DC for almost a decade, but now with Windows 7 (which is an
absolutely beautiful OS) I am using TC for the lot. No flaws with Win
7 at all so I guess it has a running start on Securstar. Sorry,
Securstar, but the combo of open source and installation on NTFS
rather than FAT beats you hands down (oh yeah, and its free too).

thang
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
The eminently knowledgeable Monsieur Smith knows fuck all and has been
caught out. You poor, poor cunt.
thang
Flush
John Smith
2009-08-15 05:32:49 UTC
Permalink
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Gee got a lot to say haven't you? Dope. What the hell are you doing
here? I have been a habitue since Shawn joined Securstar from
Scramdisk and Sarah was doing her degree and taking a hobby interest
in OTFE systems (and comparisons). And you, you fucking know-nothing,
criticize me?? What a laugh. I have written code, right down to
machine level, since 1982. What the fuck have you done? I have used
DCPP and DC for almost a decade, but now with Windows 7 (which is an
absolutely beautiful OS) I am using TC for the lot. No flaws with Win
7 at all so I guess it has a running start on Securstar. Sorry,
Securstar, but the combo of open source and installation on NTFS
rather than FAT beats you hands down (oh yeah, and its free too).
thang
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
The eminently knowledgeable Monsieur Smith knows fuck all and has been
caught out. You poor, poor cunt.
thang
Flush
thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-15 11:19:19 UTC
Permalink
Cat got your tongue fuckhead?

thang babee
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Gee got a lot to say haven't you? Dope. What the hell are you doing
here? I have been a habitue since Shawn joined Securstar from
Scramdisk and Sarah was doing her degree and taking a hobby interest
in OTFE systems (and comparisons). And you, you fucking know-nothing,
criticize me?? What a laugh. I have written code, right down to
machine level, since 1982. What the fuck have you done? I have used
DCPP and DC for almost a decade, but now with Windows 7 (which is an
absolutely beautiful OS) I am using TC for the lot. No flaws with Win
7 at all so I guess it has a running start on Securstar. Sorry,
Securstar, but the combo of open source and installation on NTFS
rather than FAT beats you hands down (oh yeah, and its free too).
thang
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
The eminently knowledgeable Monsieur Smith knows fuck all and has been
caught out. You poor, poor cunt.
thang
Flush
John Smith
2009-08-16 23:04:29 UTC
Permalink
thang ornithorhynchus wrote:
thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-15 11:27:36 UTC
Permalink
On Sat, 15 Aug 2009 07:32:49 +0200, John Smith <***@nym.alias.net>
wrote:
In fact what I don't understand is, if you are using a nym, why are
you posting to Usenet Monster with a traceable ID? eg
09c00878.unlimited.usenetmonster.com
X-Trace:
DXC=86jC0jDKPK46I4d<_dR^23k\2KDSF=***@2FV0LA4MIjQ;***@1Wa<7bno43^OUC1Pk78S]@iP@<dRVBT^60M]7CDmX?omdd60OjD>[BMSgk6G6591:\iY384Md=^D^90Z:PXOFn;Nc9H4k4SUegX=bb2

See, the X-trace (you *can* turn that off in your client you know)
indicates which account is being used. You may as well post butt
naked pal.

thang
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Gee got a lot to say haven't you? Dope. What the hell are you doing
here? I have been a habitue since Shawn joined Securstar from
Scramdisk and Sarah was doing her degree and taking a hobby interest
in OTFE systems (and comparisons). And you, you fucking know-nothing,
criticize me?? What a laugh. I have written code, right down to
machine level, since 1982. What the fuck have you done? I have used
DCPP and DC for almost a decade, but now with Windows 7 (which is an
absolutely beautiful OS) I am using TC for the lot. No flaws with Win
7 at all so I guess it has a running start on Securstar. Sorry,
Securstar, but the combo of open source and installation on NTFS
rather than FAT beats you hands down (oh yeah, and its free too).
thang
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
The eminently knowledgeable Monsieur Smith knows fuck all and has been
caught out. You poor, poor cunt.
thang
Flush
John Smith
2009-08-15 18:44:38 UTC
Permalink
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
In fact what I don't understand is, if you are using a nym, why are
you posting to Usenet Monster with a traceable ID? eg
09c00878.unlimited.usenetmonster.com
See, the X-trace (you *can* turn that off in your client you know)
indicates which account is being used. You may as well post butt
naked pal.
thang
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Gee got a lot to say haven't you? Dope. What the hell are you doing
here? I have been a habitue since Shawn joined Securstar from
Scramdisk and Sarah was doing her degree and taking a hobby interest
in OTFE systems (and comparisons). And you, you fucking know-nothing,
criticize me?? What a laugh. I have written code, right down to
machine level, since 1982. What the fuck have you done? I have used
DCPP and DC for almost a decade, but now with Windows 7 (which is an
absolutely beautiful OS) I am using TC for the lot. No flaws with Win
7 at all so I guess it has a running start on Securstar. Sorry,
Securstar, but the combo of open source and installation on NTFS
rather than FAT beats you hands down (oh yeah, and its free too).
thang
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
The eminently knowledgeable Monsieur Smith knows fuck all and has been
caught out. You poor, poor cunt.
thang
Flush
thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-16 11:31:34 UTC
Permalink
Having a problem with your nym server, remailer or NNTP account?
Perhaps just your general knowledge is, shall we say, thin on the
ground? Scumbag.


have a nice day

thang
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
In fact what I don't understand is, if you are using a nym, why are
you posting to Usenet Monster with a traceable ID? eg
09c00878.unlimited.usenetmonster.com
See, the X-trace (you *can* turn that off in your client you know)
indicates which account is being used. You may as well post butt
naked pal.
thang
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Gee got a lot to say haven't you? Dope. What the hell are you doing
here? I have been a habitue since Shawn joined Securstar from
Scramdisk and Sarah was doing her degree and taking a hobby interest
in OTFE systems (and comparisons). And you, you fucking know-nothing,
criticize me?? What a laugh. I have written code, right down to
machine level, since 1982. What the fuck have you done? I have used
DCPP and DC for almost a decade, but now with Windows 7 (which is an
absolutely beautiful OS) I am using TC for the lot. No flaws with Win
7 at all so I guess it has a running start on Securstar. Sorry,
Securstar, but the combo of open source and installation on NTFS
rather than FAT beats you hands down (oh yeah, and its free too).
thang
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
The eminently knowledgeable Monsieur Smith knows fuck all and has been
caught out. You poor, poor cunt.
thang
Flush
John Smith
2009-08-16 18:03:28 UTC
Permalink
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Having a problem with your nym server, remailer or NNTP account?
Perhaps just your general knowledge is, shall we say, thin on the
ground? Scumbag.
have a nice day
thang
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
In fact what I don't understand is, if you are using a nym, why are
you posting to Usenet Monster with a traceable ID? eg
09c00878.unlimited.usenetmonster.com
See, the X-trace (you *can* turn that off in your client you know)
indicates which account is being used. You may as well post butt
naked pal.
thang
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Gee got a lot to say haven't you? Dope. What the hell are you doing
here? I have been a habitue since Shawn joined Securstar from
Scramdisk and Sarah was doing her degree and taking a hobby interest
in OTFE systems (and comparisons). And you, you fucking know-nothing,
criticize me?? What a laugh. I have written code, right down to
machine level, since 1982. What the fuck have you done? I have used
DCPP and DC for almost a decade, but now with Windows 7 (which is an
absolutely beautiful OS) I am using TC for the lot. No flaws with Win
7 at all so I guess it has a running start on Securstar. Sorry,
Securstar, but the combo of open source and installation on NTFS
rather than FAT beats you hands down (oh yeah, and its free too).
thang
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
The eminently knowledgeable Monsieur Smith knows fuck all and has been
caught out. You poor, poor cunt.
thang
Flush
Shaun Hollingworth
2009-08-18 13:24:12 UTC
Permalink
Hello,

Vista has the same issue.

We studied the TrueCrypt implementation of hidden disks and decided it
wasn't how we wanted to do things for various reasons.

We are working on a solution for release in due course.

As for TrueCrypt - Anything I said regarding that particular program
would simply be interpreted as being sour grapes, so I simply keep my
mouth shut.

Regards,
Shaun.



?On Sun, 02 Aug 2009 18:50:43 +0800, thang ornithorhynchus
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Shaun, this is a major problem. I was looking forward to installing
Win 7 on Fat 32 so that I could set up a hidden OS, as I have many
times in the past withWIn XP. It will simply not install on anything
but NTFS. I have Ultimate OEM by the way, gold.
Do you have a solution?
thang
thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-20 03:33:29 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, 18 Aug 2009 14:24:12 +0100, Shaun Hollingworth
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Hello,
Vista has the same issue.
We studied the TrueCrypt implementation of hidden disks and decided it
wasn't how we wanted to do things for various reasons.
We are working on a solution for release in due course.
As for TrueCrypt - Anything I said regarding that particular program
would simply be interpreted as being sour grapes, so I simply keep my
mouth shut.
Regards,
Shaun.
At last, intelligent comment! Thank you. May I comment as follows?

1. Truecrypt is much less user-friendly than DCPP, however because
separate partitions are its basis along with inability to write to
volumes which are not on encrypted partitions, it is potentially
leak-proof. Data simply cannot leak, except for residual electronic
charges in RAM on unplanned shutdown.

2. I much prefer the DCPP way of doing things, which is unfortunately
prone to leakage, but at least one can write from the hidden OS to any
available device, partition or file system. More user friendly
therefore.

3. The decoy OS with Truecrypt can, and should, be used all of the
time, thereby supporting PD. This is permissible due to separation of
partitions. Same with the sacrificial outer volume, except this
doesn't work with Win 7 at the moment. With DCPP this is a no-no due
to the same partition being used and non-protection of the hidden OS,
therefore potential overwrite and destruction of the hidden OS.

Shaun, Truecrypt works with Win 7 except for the fact that the outer
volumes cannot be written to for some reason, without triggering write
protection. This is a shame due to the inherent huge wastage of disk
space, especially the outer volume of the second partition containing
the hidden OS clone. For my 1TB active primary, this means wastage at
least of over 300GB which is inaccessible. However, at least
Truecrypt works otherwise with Win 7 (I am running RTM, final OEM
Ultimate) on NTFS, which is not the case with DCPP.

I don't see how you can continue with DCPP in its present form, that
is, needing to format the partition as FAT32 and then reformatting the
hidden OS in NTFS. You need to be able to start off in NTFS and the
only way to do that is to work backwards like Truecrypt and reinstall
the OS on the initial partition in NTFS, so that only the outer volume
is FAT32. There is no other way to do it, and that would mean that
you follow Truecrypt's way of doing things.

This is a real issue for you because, unlike Vista, Win 7 will be very
popular indeed. It is probably the best OS from MS ever, and I have
been using it now for several weeks. Just about everything is
compatible with it, or can be made compatible, especially games and
most apps. It will make XP bone dead, and you need therefore to
evolve DCPP, which is a great product, accordingly. I don't know how
you can do this however without huge changes to the concept itself.
Bear in mind that there are real inconveniences with Truecrypt due to
the fact it tries to prevent all potential leakage from the OS, while
DCPP could be less onerous and therefore more user-friendly. Why not
implement bit mapped protection of the hidden OS area so that the
decoy can be used therefore becoming more plausible as a decoy?

Finally, I think you are a great programmer and one of the first in
the field to conceive of OTFE and the like. A pioneer if you like.
Any comment by you on Truecrypt will be most graciously received by
me, at least. Feel free.

regards

thang
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
?On Sun, 02 Aug 2009 18:50:43 +0800, thang ornithorhynchus
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Shaun, this is a major problem. I was looking forward to installing
Win 7 on Fat 32 so that I could set up a hidden OS, as I have many
times in the past withWIn XP. It will simply not install on anything
but NTFS. I have Ultimate OEM by the way, gold.
Do you have a solution?
thang
John Smith
2009-08-20 07:11:40 UTC
Permalink
TrueCrypt is a great program, just keep it away from 18 year old
hackers, lol

Flush/Jerk
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
On Tue, 18 Aug 2009 14:24:12 +0100, Shaun Hollingworth
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Hello,
Vista has the same issue.
We studied the TrueCrypt implementation of hidden disks and decided it
wasn't how we wanted to do things for various reasons.
We are working on a solution for release in due course.
As for TrueCrypt - Anything I said regarding that particular program
would simply be interpreted as being sour grapes, so I simply keep my
mouth shut.
Regards,
Shaun.
At last, intelligent comment! Thank you. May I comment as follows?
1. Truecrypt is much less user-friendly than DCPP, however because
separate partitions are its basis along with inability to write to
volumes which are not on encrypted partitions, it is potentially
leak-proof. Data simply cannot leak, except for residual electronic
charges in RAM on unplanned shutdown.
2. I much prefer the DCPP way of doing things, which is unfortunately
prone to leakage, but at least one can write from the hidden OS to any
available device, partition or file system. More user friendly
therefore.
3. The decoy OS with Truecrypt can, and should, be used all of the
time, thereby supporting PD. This is permissible due to separation of
partitions. Same with the sacrificial outer volume, except this
doesn't work with Win 7 at the moment. With DCPP this is a no-no due
to the same partition being used and non-protection of the hidden OS,
therefore potential overwrite and destruction of the hidden OS.
Shaun, Truecrypt works with Win 7 except for the fact that the outer
volumes cannot be written to for some reason, without triggering write
protection. This is a shame due to the inherent huge wastage of disk
space, especially the outer volume of the second partition containing
the hidden OS clone. For my 1TB active primary, this means wastage at
least of over 300GB which is inaccessible. However, at least
Truecrypt works otherwise with Win 7 (I am running RTM, final OEM
Ultimate) on NTFS, which is not the case with DCPP.
I don't see how you can continue with DCPP in its present form, that
is, needing to format the partition as FAT32 and then reformatting the
hidden OS in NTFS. You need to be able to start off in NTFS and the
only way to do that is to work backwards like Truecrypt and reinstall
the OS on the initial partition in NTFS, so that only the outer volume
is FAT32. There is no other way to do it, and that would mean that
you follow Truecrypt's way of doing things.
This is a real issue for you because, unlike Vista, Win 7 will be very
popular indeed. It is probably the best OS from MS ever, and I have
been using it now for several weeks. Just about everything is
compatible with it, or can be made compatible, especially games and
most apps. It will make XP bone dead, and you need therefore to
evolve DCPP, which is a great product, accordingly. I don't know how
you can do this however without huge changes to the concept itself.
Bear in mind that there are real inconveniences with Truecrypt due to
the fact it tries to prevent all potential leakage from the OS, while
DCPP could be less onerous and therefore more user-friendly. Why not
implement bit mapped protection of the hidden OS area so that the
decoy can be used therefore becoming more plausible as a decoy?
Finally, I think you are a great programmer and one of the first in
the field to conceive of OTFE and the like. A pioneer if you like.
Any comment by you on Truecrypt will be most graciously received by
me, at least. Feel free.
regards
thang
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
?On Sun, 02 Aug 2009 18:50:43 +0800, thang ornithorhynchus
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Shaun, this is a major problem. I was looking forward to installing
Win 7 on Fat 32 so that I could set up a hidden OS, as I have many
times in the past withWIn XP. It will simply not install on anything
but NTFS. I have Ultimate OEM by the way, gold.
Do you have a solution?
thang
thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-20 09:09:07 UTC
Permalink
Top posting illiterate noob *strikes* again, with constructive
commentary as usual.

Why don't you piss off and ask Mommy for a ham sandwich.

thang
Post by John Smith
TrueCrypt is a great program, just keep it away from 18 year old
hackers, lol
Flush/Jerk
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
On Tue, 18 Aug 2009 14:24:12 +0100, Shaun Hollingworth
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Hello,
Vista has the same issue.
We studied the TrueCrypt implementation of hidden disks and decided it
wasn't how we wanted to do things for various reasons.
We are working on a solution for release in due course.
As for TrueCrypt - Anything I said regarding that particular program
would simply be interpreted as being sour grapes, so I simply keep my
mouth shut.
Regards,
Shaun.
At last, intelligent comment! Thank you. May I comment as follows?
1. Truecrypt is much less user-friendly than DCPP, however because
separate partitions are its basis along with inability to write to
volumes which are not on encrypted partitions, it is potentially
leak-proof. Data simply cannot leak, except for residual electronic
charges in RAM on unplanned shutdown.
2. I much prefer the DCPP way of doing things, which is unfortunately
prone to leakage, but at least one can write from the hidden OS to any
available device, partition or file system. More user friendly
therefore.
3. The decoy OS with Truecrypt can, and should, be used all of the
time, thereby supporting PD. This is permissible due to separation of
partitions. Same with the sacrificial outer volume, except this
doesn't work with Win 7 at the moment. With DCPP this is a no-no due
to the same partition being used and non-protection of the hidden OS,
therefore potential overwrite and destruction of the hidden OS.
Shaun, Truecrypt works with Win 7 except for the fact that the outer
volumes cannot be written to for some reason, without triggering write
protection. This is a shame due to the inherent huge wastage of disk
space, especially the outer volume of the second partition containing
the hidden OS clone. For my 1TB active primary, this means wastage at
least of over 300GB which is inaccessible. However, at least
Truecrypt works otherwise with Win 7 (I am running RTM, final OEM
Ultimate) on NTFS, which is not the case with DCPP.
I don't see how you can continue with DCPP in its present form, that
is, needing to format the partition as FAT32 and then reformatting the
hidden OS in NTFS. You need to be able to start off in NTFS and the
only way to do that is to work backwards like Truecrypt and reinstall
the OS on the initial partition in NTFS, so that only the outer volume
is FAT32. There is no other way to do it, and that would mean that
you follow Truecrypt's way of doing things.
This is a real issue for you because, unlike Vista, Win 7 will be very
popular indeed. It is probably the best OS from MS ever, and I have
been using it now for several weeks. Just about everything is
compatible with it, or can be made compatible, especially games and
most apps. It will make XP bone dead, and you need therefore to
evolve DCPP, which is a great product, accordingly. I don't know how
you can do this however without huge changes to the concept itself.
Bear in mind that there are real inconveniences with Truecrypt due to
the fact it tries to prevent all potential leakage from the OS, while
DCPP could be less onerous and therefore more user-friendly. Why not
implement bit mapped protection of the hidden OS area so that the
decoy can be used therefore becoming more plausible as a decoy?
Finally, I think you are a great programmer and one of the first in
the field to conceive of OTFE and the like. A pioneer if you like.
Any comment by you on Truecrypt will be most graciously received by
me, at least. Feel free.
regards
thang
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
?On Sun, 02 Aug 2009 18:50:43 +0800, thang ornithorhynchus
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Shaun, this is a major problem. I was looking forward to installing
Win 7 on Fat 32 so that I could set up a hidden OS, as I have many
times in the past withWIn XP. It will simply not install on anything
but NTFS. I have Ultimate OEM by the way, gold.
Do you have a solution?
thang
John Smith
2009-08-21 01:19:41 UTC
Permalink
Shaun Hollingworth
2009-08-24 14:38:01 UTC
Permalink
On Thu, 20 Aug 2009 11:33:29 +0800, thang ornithorhynchus
<***@spitzola.com.org.net> wrote:

[...]
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Regards,
Shaun.
At last, intelligent comment! Thank you. May I comment as follows?
1. Truecrypt is much less user-friendly than DCPP, however because
separate partitions are its basis along with inability to write to
volumes which are not on encrypted partitions, it is potentially
leak-proof. Data simply cannot leak, except for residual electronic
charges in RAM on unplanned shutdown.
I understood other non-os partitionswere accessible pm TC, and indeed
that they couldn't be encrypted without destroying the data. It's some
months since I looked at TC and played around with it so I will have
to check out their latest version when I can get the time.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
2. I much prefer the DCPP way of doing things, which is unfortunately
prone to leakage, but at least one can write from the hidden OS to any
available device, partition or file system. More user friendly
therefore.
Well the answer is to simply encrypt all those partitions you use.
DCPP doesn;t have a limit on the partitions that can be encrypted of
course.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
3. The decoy OS with Truecrypt can, and should, be used all of the
time, thereby supporting PD. This is permissible due to separation of
partitions.
Same with the sacrificial outer volume, except this
doesn't work with Win 7 at the moment. With DCPP this is a no-no due
to the same partition being used and non-protection of the hidden OS,
therefore potential overwrite and destruction of the hidden OS.
The issue is this separation of that data, and the fact that the
hidden os and the normal os are on different areas of the disk, and
how to protect the hiddenOS without giving the game away that there is
a hiddenOS at all when the "outer" volume is in use. Such protection
requires some intervention which could reveal some knowledge of the
hidden os. Of course it could be disabled by yet a another set of
passwords intended to be given to the authorities....

I guess I need to study their source code and software a bit harder.
Currently I am a bit behind with it. The problem with NTFS is simply
that it is much more likely to scribble over your hidden area, if it
is on the same partition.

One could hide it in NTFS perhaps in some hidden or meta file however
when the main OS was up and running, I can't see how one would prevent
this from being detected by others, or perhaps defrag ruining things.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
There is no other way to do it, and that would mean that
you follow Truecrypt's way of doing things.
NEVER EVER, EVER! ;)

I am proud of the fact that I (rather than those HiddenDevs at
TrueCrypt) was the first person to create a working hiddenOS on a
publicly released product, and I was the person who, (at least as far
as I know) invented containers which appear completely random (as
opposed to having an identifiable header on them) features that the
TrueCrypt Foundation make much of in their products.. (Source of sour
grapes I guess)

However I do have an idea how I intend to implement hiddenOS on
Windows Vista ad perhaps Windows 7 too. In this new plan the access to
the "outer" OS should also be completely safe, subject to one possible
single important exception.

As for TrueCrypt generally, if I were to use their software...

(which for obvious reasons I dont (I have less reason to trust their
clandestinely developed open source software than my own closed source
stuff simply because It is not closed source for me)

...the first thing I would ask them about, is why all the cloak and
dagger approach to their identity and their work. Some of the capable
work they've done, is quite staggering, given that they are doing it
for free. We certainly couldn't get people of this calibre to work for
nothing; we cannot even recruit people to do it for a very good living
wage. Indeed good low level developers are very hard to find at any
price.

Thus I am afraid my suspicions are aroused to some degree, because I
can only speculate on these guys, and their apparently altruistic
motives. Assuming they really are human beings (the most important
factor IMHO), this will mean they have to eat, clothe themselves and
pay thier bills etc. Very laudible then, if they are going off to do a
hard days work, and then coming home and working even harder for "The
TrueCrypt Foundation" for absolutely nothing, rather than going to the
pub for a pint; or meeting the girlfriend or whatever at the end of a
hard day...



Back in my Scramdisk days, I also wanted to advance that project, and
though I got literally hundreds and hundreds of emails, I did't get
ANY offering assistance with device driver level development, apart
from the brilliant Paul Le Roux when we collaborated together on some
technical issues. It was he, who introduced me to SecurStar....

So, then, suddently, out of nowhere comes these unknown, unnamed
Truecrypt folk with all their vast experience of device driver coding,
such expertise easily allowing them to make the transition to the
difficult Vista environment and the like.

I therefore now cannot help but wonder if they are being bankrolled by
someone, perhaps even the US government. Far fetched ? There might
well be those forces who would benefit greately from the vast
majority of the worlds crypto users all employing exactly the same
software. It would make any attacks they might wish to make much
easier to mount than having to deal with multiple software systems as
was much more the case in the past. Yes we all have the source code.
We can all review it. Being able to do so is widely held to be a
panacea to assurances of security, but this only applies IMHO if
experts review it, and my guess is that many such people will have
done this to some degree. In spite of all that there is still a
nagging doubt in my mind about these people, their motives and this
software. This isn't sour grapes but simply speculation after a
rational examination of the facts at hand.

Such a doubt will completely evaporate, if I could learn exactly who
these people actually are, who if anyone is backing them, and what
their motives really are. Also I am led to believe that posts can be
met with a good deal of hostility if queries are made regading the
identity of the people behind TC. I was told that someone even got
banned from the site because of that. If this is true, then I have to
wonder why that would be.

Please note that I don't accuse anyone of anything, and my comments
here are based on pure speculation, and my own gut feelings nothing
more.

In truth I have no more reason to air such suspicions than anyone
else, apart for the fact that I know from first hand experience how
hard some of this stuff is, especially the driver level code. But
others have done, and I note the responses people tell me, they then
get...

People might say that I started something similar myself over ten
years ago with Scramdisk. This is to some degree true. However I do
have to confess that my motives at the beginning were less than
completely altruistic though that did come later, for a time, whilst I
could afford it.. SD was developed because of an interest in the
subject in the hope that the company I owned a third of, would
diversify somewhat into this area, focussing on the corporate userbase
and allowing free use for individuals. During the initial involvment
with SD I used to call myself "Aman", The main reason for this, is
that I didn't want to reveal my identify until I had properly gauged
the reaction to Scramdisk. If it was rubbish then I am afraid I would
have remained anonymous. There was also the fact that I was unsure if
there would be any hostility to my releasing this stuff, and wanted to
protect myself against that. I "came out" when I knew that both were
not a problem.

My business partners late last century didn't want to know about SD,
so out it all went on the Internet, freeware, source and all, because
I thought it would be a shame just to completely waste it. Development
then continued as and when time permitted, usually during idle periods
at the office. Then my company went down in the ,dot com meltdown.
Shortly after, along came SecurStar to the employment rescue, as I had
no job and had to feed and clothe my kids and pay my bills..


Many thanks for the complements you've given me.

Regards,
Shaun.
Carsten Krueger
2009-08-24 16:12:25 UTC
Permalink
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
I understood other non-os partitionswere accessible pm TC, and indeed
that they couldn't be encrypted without destroying the data.
With Vista it works.
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
It's some months since I looked at TC and played around with it so I will have
to check out their latest version when I can get the time.
Try DiskCryptor, it's GPL and open developed.
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
One could hide it in NTFS perhaps in some hidden or meta file however
No. It's trivial to detect this big amount of data.

greetings
Carsten
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John Smith
2009-08-25 07:27:21 UTC
Permalink
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
I understood other non-os partitionswere accessible pm TC, and indeed
that they couldn't be encrypted without destroying the data.
With Vista it works.
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
It's some months since I looked at TC and played around with it so I will have
to check out their latest version when I can get the time.
Try DiskCryptor, it's GPL and open developed.
Hi Carsten, can some 18 yr old hack DiskCryptor, lol, good thing is you
can't beat the price,
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
One could hide it in NTFS perhaps in some hidden or meta file however
No. It's trivial to detect this big amount of data.
Not if done properly.

Best Regards
Post by Carsten Krueger
greetings
Carsten
Carsten Krueger
2009-08-25 20:23:47 UTC
Permalink
Post by John Smith
Hi Carsten, can some 18 yr old hack DiskCryptor, lol, good thing is you
can't beat the price,
a) no one knows ntldr
b) diskcryptor is far superior to Truecrypt in many points

stupid prejudice
Post by John Smith
Post by Carsten Krueger
No. It's trivial to detect this big amount of data.
Not if done properly.
That can't be done properly. A regular filesystem doesn't includes gigabyte
of pure random.

greetings
Carsten
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thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-26 05:59:34 UTC
Permalink
On Tue, 25 Aug 2009 22:23:47 +0200, Carsten Krueger
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by John Smith
Hi Carsten, can some 18 yr old hack DiskCryptor, lol, good thing is you
can't beat the price,
a) no one knows ntldr
b) diskcryptor is far superior to Truecrypt in many points
stupid prejudice
I wasn't aware of DiskCryptor but after reviewing its Wiki I can see
that both DCPP and TC are superior in one way which, for me, is
fundamental: the availability of a hidden cloned operating system. I
do note however that it is compatible in full with Win 7 both 32 and
64, while DCPP needs to be completely adapted and TC has some, to me,
nagging bugs with Win 7 7600, mainly the fact that the sacrificial
outer volume of the secondary partition is totally write protected as
soon as NTFS even looks at it, so on my 1TB drive I have lost about
one third.
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by John Smith
Post by Carsten Krueger
No. It's trivial to detect this big amount of data.
Not if done properly.
That can't be done properly. A regular filesystem doesn't includes gigabyte
of pure random.
I agree, but would that be sufficient to convince a Judge or
Magistrate in the UK for instance that there was not only a hidden
partition/volume, but that it held meaningful data and also there was
a password the disclosure of which could be enforced by the Court? The
burden of proof would be "beyond a reasonable doubt" and I think that
there is _at least_ a reasonable doubt that the random gibber
comprised password protected hidden partition or volume. No case, no
conviction. This would not apply of course to non-judicial
proceedings (drills, pokers, truncheons etc).

I live in both UK and Australia at times and the law holds sway in
both places, as far as I know.

regards

thang
Post by Carsten Krueger
greetings
Carsten
Carsten Krueger
2009-08-27 14:43:18 UTC
Permalink
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
I wasn't aware of DiskCryptor but after reviewing its Wiki I can see
that both DCPP and TC are superior in one way which, for me, is
fundamental: the availability of a hidden cloned operating system.
Hidden OS is a useless feature for me.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
I agree, but would that be sufficient to convince a Judge or
Magistrate in the UK for instance that there was not only a hidden
partition/volume, but that it held meaningful data and also there was
a password the disclosure of which could be enforced by the Court?
I think yes.
2 Persons are arrested because they don't disclose a password
http://www.surveillancecommissioners.gov.uk/docs1/osc_annual_rpt_2008_09.pdf

greetings
Carsten
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thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-28 00:49:52 UTC
Permalink
On Thu, 27 Aug 2009 16:43:18 +0200, Carsten Krueger
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
I wasn't aware of DiskCryptor but after reviewing its Wiki I can see
that both DCPP and TC are superior in one way which, for me, is
fundamental: the availability of a hidden cloned operating system.
Hidden OS is a useless feature for me.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
I agree, but would that be sufficient to convince a Judge or
Magistrate in the UK for instance that there was not only a hidden
partition/volume, but that it held meaningful data and also there was
a password the disclosure of which could be enforced by the Court?
I think yes.
2 Persons are arrested because they don't disclose a password
http://www.surveillancecommissioners.gov.uk/docs1/osc_annual_rpt_2008_09.pdf
greetings
Carsten
Carsten, thanks for your rather brief comments. I would like you to
elaborate please as I am a trained legal professional who lives in
both the UK and Aus, an amateur cryptographer and a player in
commercial and industrial politics at the highest levels. I want
intelligent input.

Here goes:

1. Whether hidden OS is practical or even desirable is personal. In
my case it is fundamental, in yours not, lets leave it out at the
moment.

2. RIPA has a very similar statute in Aus, nothing like it in the US
though due to the more tangible freedoms there. See this:

http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/encryption/faqs/

Can you imagine anything like this existing in the US or probably even
in Russia? Certainly not in Australia.

3. Yes several Notices have been served and some who have not
provided their "keys" have been sentenced. But, the report gives no
detail - we must therefore assume that the cryptography was the most
base available, that is absence of hidden volumes and/or hidden OS.
Just plain bottom-of-the-garden single disk/partition/container
encryption. Amateur encryption.

4. This being the case, it is easy to tell "on reasonable grounds"
that the electronic data is "protected data" for the purposes of RIPA.
5. Not so easy to tell "on reasonable grounds" that there exists a
hidden volume or another, fully encrypted OS besides the main one.

See this:
http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/encryption/types-of-encryption/

It looks as though they do not even **know** of Truecrypt or DCPP!
This is the current page and no mention of hidden volumes etc just
basic

6. Therefore, once you are served your Notice under RIPA, give up
your "key" immediately to the sacrificial encrypted OS (it is being
used with Truecrypt so the timestamps etc are good and current). You
are then served another Notice for a further key for the remaining
volume (assuming Truecypt 6.2a it is the sacrificial outer volume of
the second primary partition), you give that up as well. Same for any
encrpyted non-system disks or partitions.

7. Now, you tell me Carsten how on earth can it be shown "on
reasonable grounds" that amongst all the garble and randomness on the
second partition, there is **another** set of "protected data"?

By the way, I have had a look at the RIPA and this is the way it
works:

THere must be "protected data" which is defined as

“protected information” means any electronic data which, without the
key to the data—
(a)cannot, or cannot readily, be accessed, or
(b)cannot, or cannot readily, be put into an intelligible form;"

Then, Section 49(a) provides:

"If any person with the appropriate permission under Schedule 2
believes, on reasonable grounds— .
(a)
that a key to the protected information is in the possession of any
person, .
(b)
that the imposition of a disclosure requirement in respect of the
protected information is— .
(i)
necessary on grounds falling within subsection (3), or .
(ii)
necessary for the purpose of securing the effective exercise or proper
performance by any public authority of any statutory power or
statutory duty, .
(c)
that the imposition of such a requirement is proportionate to what is
sought to be achieved by its imposition, and .
(d)
that it is not reasonably practicable for the person with the
appropriate permission to obtain possession of the protected
information in an intelligible form without the giving of a notice
under this section, .
the person with that permission may, by notice to the person whom he
believes to have possession of the key, impose a disclosure
requirement in respect of the protected information."

Notice the words "on reasonable grounds". THis is a well known and
defined term in English common law, which applies equally in Aus. It
means the level or burden of evidence must be much much more than a
mere suspicion. It must be, although not provable, pretty much
*close* to provable. Tell me Carsten, how can the existence (in a
civilised country absent torture) of a hidden volume or hidden OS
**after** two sets of keys have **already** been given up be shown to
a Judge or Magistrate to exist "on reasonable grounds".

Please respond in some detail Carsten, thinking cap on please :) (or
Shaun or the TC devs who undoubtedly read this NG for inspiration).

cheers

thang
Carsten Krueger
2009-08-28 16:39:51 UTC
Permalink
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
1. Whether hidden OS is practical or even desirable is personal.
No, it's only important what the adversary model is.
If you don't get forced than hidden OS is useless, you don't need it at
all.
If you get forced than hidden OS is useless, too. Your adversary force you
to reveal BOTH passwords.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Can you imagine anything like this existing in the US or probably even
in Russia? Certainly not in Australia.
Don't know the laws there.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
3. Yes several Notices have been served and some who have not
provided their "keys" have been sentenced. But, the report gives no
detail - we must therefore assume that the cryptography was the most
base available, that is absence of hidden volumes and/or hidden OS.
Just plain bottom-of-the-garden single disk/partition/container
encryption. Amateur encryption.
That's an very dumb assumption.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
4. This being the case, it is easy to tell "on reasonable grounds"
that the electronic data is "protected data" for the purposes of RIPA.
5. Not so easy to tell "on reasonable grounds" that there exists a
hidden volume or another, fully encrypted OS besides the main one.
If someone says you are a terrorist, etc. than hidden OS is reasonable.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/encryption/types-of-encryption/
It looks as though they do not even **know** of Truecrypt or DCPP!
That's an very very dumb assumption.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
7. Now, you tell me Carsten how on earth can it be shown "on
reasonable grounds" that amongst all the garble and randomness on the
second partition, there is **another** set of "protected data"?
Truecrypt has the option to create hidden data so it's reasonable to expect
hidden data
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Tell me Carsten, how can the existence (in a
civilised country absent torture)
Which country do you mean?
USA -> Guantanmo
etc.

greetings
Carsten
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thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-29 01:13:23 UTC
Permalink
On Fri, 28 Aug 2009 18:39:51 +0200, Carsten Krueger
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
1. Whether hidden OS is practical or even desirable is personal.
No, it's only important what the adversary model is.
If you don't get forced than hidden OS is useless, you don't need it at
all.
If you get forced than hidden OS is useless, too. Your adversary force you
to reveal BOTH passwords.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Can you imagine anything like this existing in the US or probably even
in Russia? Certainly not in Australia.
Don't know the laws there.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
3. Yes several Notices have been served and some who have not
provided their "keys" have been sentenced. But, the report gives no
detail - we must therefore assume that the cryptography was the most
base available, that is absence of hidden volumes and/or hidden OS.
Just plain bottom-of-the-garden single disk/partition/container
encryption. Amateur encryption.
That's an very dumb assumption.
Why? Why assume complexity when the simple explanation will suffice
(Occam's Razor).
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
4. This being the case, it is easy to tell "on reasonable grounds"
that the electronic data is "protected data" for the purposes of RIPA.
5. Not so easy to tell "on reasonable grounds" that there exists a
hidden volume or another, fully encrypted OS besides the main one.
If someone says you are a terrorist, etc. than hidden OS is reasonable.
No. Its called the *law* Carsten. These are statutory words. Judges
are generally not corrupted. Need much more than someone "saying" you
are a terrorist or whatever. Need "reasonable grounds" which is
firmly rooted in half a millenia of English common law (precedent).
Plaintext might do it, but randomness where non-randonmess is expected
probably won't, before a Judge.
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/encryption/types-of-encryption/
It looks as though they do not even **know** of Truecrypt or DCPP!
That's an very very dumb assumption.
Why? The page is up to date and to the vast majority of people, TC
and DCPP are totally unknown. There is no mention of anything outside
of Vista.
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
7. Now, you tell me Carsten how on earth can it be shown "on
reasonable grounds" that amongst all the garble and randomness on the
second partition, there is **another** set of "protected data"?
Truecrypt has the option to create hidden data so it's reasonable to expect
hidden data
Not true. TC is usually used in its simpler, earlier fashion which is
for mountable containers. A minority plumb the depths of its
complexity and set up hidden volumes, let alone cloned OS's. I was
referring to the hidden volume on the second partition. It is
reasonable to expect hidden date, yes, but no hidden data within
hidden data. Prove "on reasonable grounds" that there is *further*
hidden data. Do you understand?
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Tell me Carsten, how can the existence (in a
civilised country absent torture)
Which country do you mean?
USA -> Guantanmo
etc.
Ha. I haven't been to the US for a decade and probably won't go there
again. I prefer the UK although it is heading down the same path. Tell
me, how is Germany nowdays? I have a friend who attended the last
Octoberfest which he enjoyed.
Post by Carsten Krueger
greetings
Carsten
thang
Carsten Krueger
2009-08-30 14:23:52 UTC
Permalink
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Why? Why assume complexity when the simple explanation will suffice
(Occam's Razor).
You underestimate the people that use encryption.
If the state need imprisonment to get passwords, it was secure encryption.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
No. Its called the *law* Carsten. These are statutory words. Judges
are generally not corrupted.
If you have laws that allows imprisonment for contempt and the prosecutor
is willing to impeach you for not giving a password (very rare), than
probable the judge will follow the theorie of hidden OS.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Why? The page is up to date and to the vast majority of people, TC
and DCPP are totally unknown. There is no mention of anything outside
of Vista.
You underestimate your enemy. Average police officer don't know TC, but the
law enforcement agencies no it for sure.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Not true. TC is usually used in its simpler, earlier fashion which is
for mountable containers.
No. It's used for encrypting the OS, so it's nearby that other advaned
features are used too.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
I prefer the UK although it is heading down the same path.
Exactly.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Tell me, how is Germany nowdays?
Not as bad as in UK. In Germany you can't get legally forced to provide
your password. Today you don't have to bedevil yourself or close relatives.
But I expect that it get's worse.

greetings
Carsten
--
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http://www.realname-diskussion.info - Realnames sind keine Pflicht
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thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-31 13:13:31 UTC
Permalink
On Sun, 30 Aug 2009 16:23:52 +0200, Carsten Krueger
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Why? Why assume complexity when the simple explanation will suffice
(Occam's Razor).
You underestimate the people that use encryption.
If the state need imprisonment to get passwords, it was secure encryption.
Most people who use encryption use symmetric key container, not
multi-partition hidden volume cloned-OS. DCPP requires knowledge of
partitioning so that you can split your partition to push all of your
initial data up to the front of the disk so as to maximise your hidden
OS partition. This takes practice and intellectual ability as it is
all in FAT32 and if you have a terabyte disk, you have major problems
recombining the partitions before you invoke the hidden OS app. (hint:
muck around with the sector size). Truecrypt took me a day to absorb
properly and there were obscure outcomes which didn't become apparent
until after I had created the 2 partitions and set up the hidden
volume with the cloned OS. In both cases, some ability is required.
Most people, because of this, tend to use containers which have no
hidden content. Law of least effort.
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
No. Its called the *law* Carsten. These are statutory words. Judges
are generally not corrupted.
If you have laws that allows imprisonment for contempt and the prosecutor
is willing to impeach you for not giving a password (very rare), than
probable the judge will follow the theorie of hidden OS.
Your literal translation from Deutsch into English is failing here I
think. In order to "impeach" you for not giving a password, one must
prove under the UK law that it is reasonable that there exists hidden
data. Judges are not that corrupted nor corruptible and they will
need evidence that there exists hidden data, not just a word from the
prosecutor. This is not the era of Judge Friesler or Roy Bean.
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Why? The page is up to date and to the vast majority of people, TC
and DCPP are totally unknown. There is no mention of anything outside
of Vista.
You underestimate your enemy. Average police officer don't know TC, but the
law enforcement agencies no it for sure.
I don't know who my enemy is but for sure I have them. I am certain
that at least some remailers are run by the "enemy", but that enemy
does not concern me because I am not of that particular world.My enemy
has lesser means than the NSA or Stasi or GeStaPo or whatever. At the
end of the day, I could be taken and tortured beyond tolerance and
dosed with Sodium Amytal and nubile women and I *will* give up, but
those actions, along with magnetic resonance testing of hard drives
etc, belong at the highest strata of intelligence and I don't populate
that world. I am certain that for you and I, the investigating
authorities would be of country bumpkin cop genus.
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Not true. TC is usually used in its simpler, earlier fashion which is
for mountable containers.
No. It's used for encrypting the OS, so it's nearby that other advaned
features are used too.
No, it *can* be used for encrypting the OS, but most people use it to
encrypt containers. It is too intellectually demanding otherwise. Its
like a modern computer is used by most people for word processing, IM,
browsing, and a few other things, way under design capacity.
Post by Carsten Krueger
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
I prefer the UK although it is heading down the same path.
Exactly.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Tell me, how is Germany nowdays?
Not as bad as in UK. In Germany you can't get legally forced to provide
your password. Today you don't have to bedevil yourself or close relatives.
But I expect that it get's worse.
There are only a few countries where you can be legally forced to
disclose pws, but only if there is a reasonable probability that
"protected data" exists on your hard drive.
Post by Carsten Krueger
greetings
Carsten
cheers

thang

John Smith
2009-08-24 17:40:11 UTC
Permalink
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
On Thu, 20 Aug 2009 11:33:29 +0800, thang ornithorhynchus
Keep up the good work Shaun.
MyNym
2009-08-25 16:32:51 UTC
Permalink
On Mon, 24 Aug 2009 15:38:01 +0100, Shaun Hollingworth
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
On Thu, 20 Aug 2009 11:33:29 +0800, thang ornithorhynchus
[...]
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Regards,
Shaun.
At last, intelligent comment! Thank you. May I comment as follows?
1. Truecrypt is much less user-friendly than DCPP, however because
separate partitions are its basis along with inability to write to
volumes which are not on encrypted partitions, it is potentially
leak-proof. Data simply cannot leak, except for residual electronic
charges in RAM on unplanned shutdown.
I understood other non-os partitionswere accessible pm TC, and indeed
that they couldn't be encrypted without destroying the data. It's some
months since I looked at TC and played around with it so I will have
to check out their latest version when I can get the time.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
2. I much prefer the DCPP way of doing things, which is unfortunately
prone to leakage, but at least one can write from the hidden OS to any
available device, partition or file system. More user friendly
therefore.
Well the answer is to simply encrypt all those partitions you use.
DCPP doesn;t have a limit on the partitions that can be encrypted of
course.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
3. The decoy OS with Truecrypt can, and should, be used all of the
time, thereby supporting PD. This is permissible due to separation of
partitions.
Same with the sacrificial outer volume, except this
doesn't work with Win 7 at the moment. With DCPP this is a no-no due
to the same partition being used and non-protection of the hidden OS,
therefore potential overwrite and destruction of the hidden OS.
The issue is this separation of that data, and the fact that the
hidden os and the normal os are on different areas of the disk, and
how to protect the hiddenOS without giving the game away that there is
a hiddenOS at all when the "outer" volume is in use. Such protection
requires some intervention which could reveal some knowledge of the
hidden os. Of course it could be disabled by yet a another set of
passwords intended to be given to the authorities....
I guess I need to study their source code and software a bit harder.
Currently I am a bit behind with it. The problem with NTFS is simply
that it is much more likely to scribble over your hidden area, if it
is on the same partition.
One could hide it in NTFS perhaps in some hidden or meta file however
when the main OS was up and running, I can't see how one would prevent
this from being detected by others, or perhaps defrag ruining things.
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
There is no other way to do it, and that would mean that
you follow Truecrypt's way of doing things.
NEVER EVER, EVER! ;)
I am proud of the fact that I (rather than those HiddenDevs at
TrueCrypt) was the first person to create a working hiddenOS on a
publicly released product, and I was the person who, (at least as far
as I know) invented containers which appear completely random (as
opposed to having an identifiable header on them) features that the
TrueCrypt Foundation make much of in their products.. (Source of sour
grapes I guess)
However I do have an idea how I intend to implement hiddenOS on
Windows Vista ad perhaps Windows 7 too. In this new plan the access to
the "outer" OS should also be completely safe, subject to one possible
single important exception.
As for TrueCrypt generally, if I were to use their software...
(which for obvious reasons I dont (I have less reason to trust their
clandestinely developed open source software than my own closed source
stuff simply because It is not closed source for me)
...the first thing I would ask them about, is why all the cloak and
dagger approach to their identity and their work. Some of the capable
work they've done, is quite staggering, given that they are doing it
for free. We certainly couldn't get people of this calibre to work for
nothing; we cannot even recruit people to do it for a very good living
wage. Indeed good low level developers are very hard to find at any
price.
Thus I am afraid my suspicions are aroused to some degree, because I
can only speculate on these guys, and their apparently altruistic
motives. Assuming they really are human beings (the most important
factor IMHO), this will mean they have to eat, clothe themselves and
pay thier bills etc. Very laudible then, if they are going off to do a
hard days work, and then coming home and working even harder for "The
TrueCrypt Foundation" for absolutely nothing, rather than going to the
pub for a pint; or meeting the girlfriend or whatever at the end of a
hard day...
Back in my Scramdisk days, I also wanted to advance that project, and
though I got literally hundreds and hundreds of emails, I did't get
ANY offering assistance with device driver level development, apart
from the brilliant Paul Le Roux when we collaborated together on some
technical issues. It was he, who introduced me to SecurStar....
So, then, suddently, out of nowhere comes these unknown, unnamed
Truecrypt folk with all their vast experience of device driver coding,
such expertise easily allowing them to make the transition to the
difficult Vista environment and the like.
I therefore now cannot help but wonder if they are being bankrolled by
someone, perhaps even the US government. Far fetched ? There might
well be those forces who would benefit greately from the vast
majority of the worlds crypto users all employing exactly the same
software. It would make any attacks they might wish to make much
easier to mount than having to deal with multiple software systems as
was much more the case in the past. Yes we all have the source code.
We can all review it. Being able to do so is widely held to be a
panacea to assurances of security, but this only applies IMHO if
experts review it, and my guess is that many such people will have
done this to some degree. In spite of all that there is still a
nagging doubt in my mind about these people, their motives and this
software. This isn't sour grapes but simply speculation after a
rational examination of the facts at hand.
Such a doubt will completely evaporate, if I could learn exactly who
these people actually are, who if anyone is backing them, and what
their motives really are. Also I am led to believe that posts can be
met with a good deal of hostility if queries are made regading the
identity of the people behind TC. I was told that someone even got
banned from the site because of that. If this is true, then I have to
wonder why that would be.
Please note that I don't accuse anyone of anything, and my comments
here are based on pure speculation, and my own gut feelings nothing
more.
In truth I have no more reason to air such suspicions than anyone
else, apart for the fact that I know from first hand experience how
hard some of this stuff is, especially the driver level code. But
others have done, and I note the responses people tell me, they then
get...
People might say that I started something similar myself over ten
years ago with Scramdisk. This is to some degree true. However I do
have to confess that my motives at the beginning were less than
completely altruistic though that did come later, for a time, whilst I
could afford it.. SD was developed because of an interest in the
subject in the hope that the company I owned a third of, would
diversify somewhat into this area, focussing on the corporate userbase
and allowing free use for individuals. During the initial involvment
with SD I used to call myself "Aman", The main reason for this, is
that I didn't want to reveal my identify until I had properly gauged
the reaction to Scramdisk. If it was rubbish then I am afraid I would
have remained anonymous. There was also the fact that I was unsure if
there would be any hostility to my releasing this stuff, and wanted to
protect myself against that. I "came out" when I knew that both were
not a problem.
My business partners late last century didn't want to know about SD,
so out it all went on the Internet, freeware, source and all, because
I thought it would be a shame just to completely waste it. Development
then continued as and when time permitted, usually during idle periods
at the office. Then my company went down in the ,dot com meltdown.
Shortly after, along came SecurStar to the employment rescue, as I had
no job and had to feed and clothe my kids and pay my bills..
Many thanks for the complements you've given me.
Regards,
Shaun.
Shaun,

Many thanks for your contributions to privacy, security and
encryption. You are, indeed, one of the pioneers.

I purchased registered versions of both of ypur encrrypted disk
products -- and updates -- And had no complaints with the products
whatsoever -- but ultimately the Securstar way of ensuring compliance
with licensing requirements became just too cumbersome...

Another concern, IMO, about Securstar's licensing requirements were
the implications potentially undercutting product security: (i) the
software gathered unidentified information about my computer and sent
same to Securstar; and (ii) Securstar required that my computer
communicate with a specific internet location in order to use the
security product.

I know you have expressed in the past that these requirements weren't
of your choosing -- And regardless of what any of us wish, at some
point we must all admit that we live in a real, and thus imperfect,
world (I suspect this may be particularly difficult for those of us
inclinded towards the math and logic side of the brain) -- And so we
do the best we can, and move on, simply to avoid the undesirable
alternative of giving up...

Please know that I (and probably many others) would return to your
licensed products if offered a less cumbersome purchasing alternative.
Be that as it may, if the Securstar approach is working, for you and
Securstar, satisfactorily from a financial standpoint, that's good
news in my book.

These days I use TrueCrypt. The Truecrypt developers are, like you,
also pioneers, albeit anonymous and later in the game.

As to their anonymity, the fact that the code is public and open to
study and review by others would seem to overcome any real security
concerns. If there is a security problem in the code, you and numerous
security excperts are free, and indeed encouraged, to point that out
to the public and to the TrueCrypt devs.

Conversly, even if the devs identity were known, that knowledge would
not preclude any or all of them from working surrepticiously with UK,
US, or other governmental agencies.

Given our imperfect world and its imperfect solutions, open code still
seems to be the best check and balance available...

Having said that, I would add that your personal history of trust and
reliability, extending over many years (decades?), likewise represents
an extremely high security value, amply sufficient in my book, to
justify using and paying for your software.

Thanks for your post and comments.

Best regards.
thang ornithorhynchus
2009-08-26 06:26:32 UTC
Permalink
On Mon, 24 Aug 2009 15:38:01 +0100, Shaun Hollingworth
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
On Thu, 20 Aug 2009 11:33:29 +0800, thang ornithorhynchus
[...]
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Regards,
Shaun.
At last, intelligent comment! Thank you. May I comment as follows?
1. Truecrypt is much less user-friendly than DCPP, however because
separate partitions are its basis along with inability to write to
volumes which are not on encrypted partitions, it is potentially
leak-proof. Data simply cannot leak, except for residual electronic
charges in RAM on unplanned shutdown.
I understood other non-os partitionswere accessible pm TC, and indeed
that they couldn't be encrypted without destroying the data. It's some
months since I looked at TC and played around with it so I will have
to check out their latest version when I can get the time.
No. Data is quarantined to the hidden OS's volume unless the entire
target partition or device is encrypted - from the roots up. They
must be encrypted before writing to them, the encryption process does
destroy data.
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
2. I much prefer the DCPP way of doing things, which is unfortunately
prone to leakage, but at least one can write from the hidden OS to any
available device, partition or file system. More user friendly
therefore.
Well the answer is to simply encrypt all those partitions you use.
DCPP doesn;t have a limit on the partitions that can be encrypted of
course.
Yes, and I would still be using DCPP except it needs to be installed
on FAT32 and Win 7 will only install on NTFS. Your problem when you
adapt DCPP to Win 7 is the way that the journalling FS works, as you
say it scribbles everywhere.
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
3. The decoy OS with Truecrypt can, and should, be used all of the
time, thereby supporting PD. This is permissible due to separation of
partitions.
Same with the sacrificial outer volume, except this
doesn't work with Win 7 at the moment. With DCPP this is a no-no due
to the same partition being used and non-protection of the hidden OS,
therefore potential overwrite and destruction of the hidden OS.
The issue is this separation of that data, and the fact that the
hidden os and the normal os are on different areas of the disk, and
how to protect the hiddenOS without giving the game away that there is
a hiddenOS at all when the "outer" volume is in use. Such protection
requires some intervention which could reveal some knowledge of the
hidden os. Of course it could be disabled by yet a another set of
passwords intended to be given to the authorities....
See my comments to Carsten below. Under rule of law, there needs be
the presence of encrypted data _beyond a reasonable doubt_ for the
enforced provision of passwords per the UK laws etc. This doesn't
apply to uncivilized countries which use torture of course but they
are not OTFE major buyers anyhow. So, the presence of suspiciously
random data, providing headers cannot be distinguished, would not be
enough for courts of law in the UK for instance to punish a person for
not handing over pws.
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
I guess I need to study their source code and software a bit harder.
Currently I am a bit behind with it. The problem with NTFS is simply
that it is much more likely to scribble over your hidden area, if it
is on the same partition.
One could hide it in NTFS perhaps in some hidden or meta file however
when the main OS was up and running, I can't see how one would prevent
this from being detected by others, or perhaps defrag ruining things.
TC has some means of protecting hidden volumes. It undeniably works,
probably it is just first and last sector based and soon as a write op
takes place anywhere there, the whole partition becomes write
protected. Problem is with Win 7, it shuts out any data whatsoever
from the outer volume as soon as one stinking byte gets written
anywhere on the outer volume, let alone the inner. It is not working
properly at all, and you might get the steal on them if you can sort
this out quickly with Win 7.

By the way, I am open to testing for you, free copy of course etc :).
I have modded my Gigabyte bios to SLIC 2.1 so my OEM Win 7 thinks my
PC is a HP notebook running OEM Vista, works perfectly, so I am
actually beta testing TC (unknown to the unknown devs) on a RTM
Ultimate Win 7 OS. Work out this problem with the protection of the
hidden volume (analogous to how DCPP works anyhow) and you will steal
the march!
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
There is no other way to do it, and that would mean that
you follow Truecrypt's way of doing things.
NEVER EVER, EVER! ;)
I am proud of the fact that I (rather than those HiddenDevs at
TrueCrypt) was the first person to create a working hiddenOS on a
publicly released product, and I was the person who, (at least as far
as I know) invented containers which appear completely random (as
opposed to having an identifiable header on them) features that the
TrueCrypt Foundation make much of in their products.. (Source of sour
grapes I guess)
However I do have an idea how I intend to implement hiddenOS on
Windows Vista ad perhaps Windows 7 too. In this new plan the access to
the "outer" OS should also be completely safe, subject to one possible
single important exception.
As for TrueCrypt generally, if I were to use their software...
(which for obvious reasons I dont (I have less reason to trust their
clandestinely developed open source software than my own closed source
stuff simply because It is not closed source for me)
...the first thing I would ask them about, is why all the cloak and
dagger approach to their identity and their work. Some of the capable
work they've done, is quite staggering, given that they are doing it
for free. We certainly couldn't get people of this calibre to work for
nothing; we cannot even recruit people to do it for a very good living
wage. Indeed good low level developers are very hard to find at any
price.
Thus I am afraid my suspicions are aroused to some degree, because I
can only speculate on these guys, and their apparently altruistic
motives. Assuming they really are human beings (the most important
factor IMHO), this will mean they have to eat, clothe themselves and
pay thier bills etc. Very laudible then, if they are going off to do a
hard days work, and then coming home and working even harder for "The
TrueCrypt Foundation" for absolutely nothing, rather than going to the
pub for a pint; or meeting the girlfriend or whatever at the end of a
hard day...
Rightyo, all of this is news to me but I have just looked at some
Wikis and Wilder's forums, and you are right. Not only is their
identity unknown, but the domain is registered in the Antarctic -
false name. Damn. Now I'm paranoid, but then again the developer of
Tor was an employee of the US Naval Research Labs (I think) who
sponsored the project...

Here is a post by one Justin Troutman on Wilders

"Originally Posted by Justin Troutman
I used to contribute there quite often, with novel-like posts of
verbosity and concern, but, mysteriously, I tried logging in one day
to no avail. After numerous attempts to resolve the issue, including
contacting the forum administrators -- no luck. Even registering again
with another e-mail address -- not a free one, but an ISP-provided one
--- again, no luck. I'm not sure how closely this relates to the issue
you've mentioned. Regardless, I can still post my concerns about
TrueCrypt elsewhere, so not all is lost. "

Look, it well may be that NSA or some other spook agency has promoted
TC for the very reason that it has some obscure coding in it which is
so well hidden that it has not and will not be picked up through
expert, line by line, dissection. Has anyone done that anyway? So
that at some point, nuclear material is being discussed by Jihadis and
the threat to the US is so mortal that the backdoor is invoked.

But, once it happened, no one would ever again use TC. I can't see
that being the case but it could be a case of keeping the powder dry
until it is needed. For commercial and private users I don't think
this makes a whit of difference, it is unbreakable just like DCPP.
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Back in my Scramdisk days, I also wanted to advance that project, and
though I got literally hundreds and hundreds of emails, I did't get
ANY offering assistance with device driver level development, apart
from the brilliant Paul Le Roux when we collaborated together on some
technical issues. It was he, who introduced me to SecurStar....
So, then, suddently, out of nowhere comes these unknown, unnamed
Truecrypt folk with all their vast experience of device driver coding,
such expertise easily allowing them to make the transition to the
difficult Vista environment and the like.
I therefore now cannot help but wonder if they are being bankrolled by
someone, perhaps even the US government. Far fetched ? There might
well be those forces who would benefit greately from the vast
majority of the worlds crypto users all employing exactly the same
software. It would make any attacks they might wish to make much
easier to mount than having to deal with multiple software systems as
was much more the case in the past. Yes we all have the source code.
We can all review it. Being able to do so is widely held to be a
panacea to assurances of security, but this only applies IMHO if
experts review it, and my guess is that many such people will have
done this to some degree. In spite of all that there is still a
nagging doubt in my mind about these people, their motives and this
software. This isn't sour grapes but simply speculation after a
rational examination of the facts at hand.
Shaun, solve the problems of DCPP installation on NTFS and protection
of the hidden volume from writing to the outer volume, all on WIn 7
(because it is a really good OS), and you will beat TC at their own
game. I have posted questions all over the TV forum about why this
write protection issue is happening under Win 7 and I have not had one
single response. They are either too arrogant, too busy, or haven't
yet realized how damn good an OS Win 7 is, to respond. I asked the
bloody devs to look into it, no response.

Damn, it just occurred to me, wonder if they have a NG for TC?
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Such a doubt will completely evaporate, if I could learn exactly who
these people actually are, who if anyone is backing them, and what
their motives really are. Also I am led to believe that posts can be
met with a good deal of hostility if queries are made regading the
identity of the people behind TC. I was told that someone even got
banned from the site because of that. If this is true, then I have to
wonder why that would be.
Please note that I don't accuse anyone of anything, and my comments
here are based on pure speculation, and my own gut feelings nothing
more.
In truth I have no more reason to air such suspicions than anyone
else, apart for the fact that I know from first hand experience how
hard some of this stuff is, especially the driver level code. But
others have done, and I note the responses people tell me, they then
get...
People might say that I started something similar myself over ten
years ago with Scramdisk. This is to some degree true. However I do
have to confess that my motives at the beginning were less than
completely altruistic though that did come later, for a time, whilst I
could afford it.. SD was developed because of an interest in the
subject in the hope that the company I owned a third of, would
diversify somewhat into this area, focussing on the corporate userbase
and allowing free use for individuals. During the initial involvment
with SD I used to call myself "Aman", The main reason for this, is
that I didn't want to reveal my identify until I had properly gauged
the reaction to Scramdisk. If it was rubbish then I am afraid I would
have remained anonymous. There was also the fact that I was unsure if
there would be any hostility to my releasing this stuff, and wanted to
protect myself against that. I "came out" when I knew that both were
not a problem.
My business partners late last century didn't want to know about SD,
so out it all went on the Internet, freeware, source and all, because
I thought it would be a shame just to completely waste it. Development
then continued as and when time permitted, usually during idle periods
at the office. Then my company went down in the ,dot com meltdown.
Shortly after, along came SecurStar to the employment rescue, as I had
no job and had to feed and clothe my kids and pay my bills..
Many thanks for the complements you've given me.
Regards,
Shaun.
Its a pleasure, Shaun. If you don't know it, you are held in the
highest regard by old timers who are not blessed with your skills.

cheers

thang
John Smith
2009-08-27 20:43:53 UTC
Permalink
Post by MyNym
On Mon, 24 Aug 2009 15:38:01 +0100, Shaun Hollingworth
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
On Thu, 20 Aug 2009 11:33:29 +0800, thang ornithorhynchus
[...]
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Regards,
Shaun.
At last, intelligent comment! Thank you. May I comment as follows?
1. Truecrypt is much less user-friendly than DCPP, however because
separate partitions are its basis along with inability to write to
volumes which are not on encrypted partitions, it is potentially
leak-proof. Data simply cannot leak, except for residual electronic
charges in RAM on unplanned shutdown.
I understood other non-os partitionswere accessible pm TC, and indeed
that they couldn't be encrypted without destroying the data. It's some
months since I looked at TC and played around with it so I will have
to check out their latest version when I can get the time.
No. Data is quarantined to the hidden OS's volume unless the entire
target partition or device is encrypted - from the roots up. They
must be encrypted before writing to them, the encryption process does
destroy data.
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
2. I much prefer the DCPP way of doing things, which is unfortunately
prone to leakage, but at least one can write from the hidden OS to any
available device, partition or file system. More user friendly
therefore.
Well the answer is to simply encrypt all those partitions you use.
DCPP doesn;t have a limit on the partitions that can be encrypted of
course.
Yes, and I would still be using DCPP except it needs to be installed
on FAT32 and Win 7 will only install on NTFS. Your problem when you
adapt DCPP to Win 7 is the way that the journalling FS works, as you
say it scribbles everywhere.
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
3. The decoy OS with Truecrypt can, and should, be used all of the
time, thereby supporting PD. This is permissible due to separation of
partitions.
Same with the sacrificial outer volume, except this
doesn't work with Win 7 at the moment. With DCPP this is a no-no due
to the same partition being used and non-protection of the hidden OS,
therefore potential overwrite and destruction of the hidden OS.
The issue is this separation of that data, and the fact that the
hidden os and the normal os are on different areas of the disk, and
how to protect the hiddenOS without giving the game away that there is
a hiddenOS at all when the "outer" volume is in use. Such protection
requires some intervention which could reveal some knowledge of the
hidden os. Of course it could be disabled by yet a another set of
passwords intended to be given to the authorities....
See my comments to Carsten below. Under rule of law, there needs be
the presence of encrypted data _beyond a reasonable doubt_ for the
enforced provision of passwords per the UK laws etc. This doesn't
apply to uncivilized countries which use torture of course but they
are not OTFE major buyers anyhow. So, the presence of suspiciously
random data, providing headers cannot be distinguished, would not be
enough for courts of law in the UK for instance to punish a person for
not handing over pws.
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
I guess I need to study their source code and software a bit harder.
Currently I am a bit behind with it. The problem with NTFS is simply
that it is much more likely to scribble over your hidden area, if it
is on the same partition.
One could hide it in NTFS perhaps in some hidden or meta file however
when the main OS was up and running, I can't see how one would prevent
this from being detected by others, or perhaps defrag ruining things.
TC has some means of protecting hidden volumes. It undeniably works,
probably it is just first and last sector based and soon as a write op
takes place anywhere there, the whole partition becomes write
protected. Problem is with Win 7, it shuts out any data whatsoever
from the outer volume as soon as one stinking byte gets written
anywhere on the outer volume, let alone the inner. It is not working
properly at all, and you might get the steal on them if you can sort
this out quickly with Win 7.
By the way, I am open to testing for you, free copy of course etc :).
I have modded my Gigabyte bios to SLIC 2.1 so my OEM Win 7 thinks my
PC is a HP notebook running OEM Vista, works perfectly, so I am
actually beta testing TC (unknown to the unknown devs) on a RTM
Ultimate Win 7 OS. Work out this problem with the protection of the
hidden volume (analogous to how DCPP works anyhow) and you will steal
the march!
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
There is no other way to do it, and that would mean that
you follow Truecrypt's way of doing things.
NEVER EVER, EVER! ;)
I am proud of the fact that I (rather than those HiddenDevs at
TrueCrypt) was the first person to create a working hiddenOS on a
publicly released product, and I was the person who, (at least as far
as I know) invented containers which appear completely random (as
opposed to having an identifiable header on them) features that the
TrueCrypt Foundation make much of in their products.. (Source of sour
grapes I guess)
However I do have an idea how I intend to implement hiddenOS on
Windows Vista ad perhaps Windows 7 too. In this new plan the access to
the "outer" OS should also be completely safe, subject to one possible
single important exception.
As for TrueCrypt generally, if I were to use their software...
(which for obvious reasons I dont (I have less reason to trust their
clandestinely developed open source software than my own closed source
stuff simply because It is not closed source for me)
...the first thing I would ask them about, is why all the cloak and
dagger approach to their identity and their work. Some of the capable
work they've done, is quite staggering, given that they are doing it
for free. We certainly couldn't get people of this calibre to work for
nothing; we cannot even recruit people to do it for a very good living
wage. Indeed good low level developers are very hard to find at any
price.
Thus I am afraid my suspicions are aroused to some degree, because I
can only speculate on these guys, and their apparently altruistic
motives. Assuming they really are human beings (the most important
factor IMHO), this will mean they have to eat, clothe themselves and
pay thier bills etc. Very laudible then, if they are going off to do a
hard days work, and then coming home and working even harder for "The
TrueCrypt Foundation" for absolutely nothing, rather than going to the
pub for a pint; or meeting the girlfriend or whatever at the end of a
hard day...
Rightyo, all of this is news to me but I have just looked at some
Wikis and Wilder's forums, and you are right. Not only is their
identity unknown, but the domain is registered in the Antarctic -
false name. Damn. Now I'm paranoid, but then again the developer of
Tor was an employee of the US Naval Research Labs (I think) who
sponsored the project...
Here is a post by one Justin Troutman on Wilders
"Originally Posted by Justin Troutman
I used to contribute there quite often, with novel-like posts of
verbosity and concern, but, mysteriously, I tried logging in one day
to no avail. After numerous attempts to resolve the issue, including
contacting the forum administrators -- no luck. Even registering again
with another e-mail address -- not a free one, but an ISP-provided one
--- again, no luck. I'm not sure how closely this relates to the issue
you've mentioned. Regardless, I can still post my concerns about
TrueCrypt elsewhere, so not all is lost. "
Look, it well may be that NSA or some other spook agency has promoted
TC for the very reason that it has some obscure coding in it which is
so well hidden that it has not and will not be picked up through
expert, line by line, dissection. Has anyone done that anyway? So
that at some point, nuclear material is being discussed by Jihadis and
the threat to the US is so mortal that the backdoor is invoked.
But, once it happened, no one would ever again use TC. I can't see
that being the case but it could be a case of keeping the powder dry
until it is needed. For commercial and private users I don't think
this makes a whit of difference, it is unbreakable just like DCPP.
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Back in my Scramdisk days, I also wanted to advance that project, and
though I got literally hundreds and hundreds of emails, I did't get
ANY offering assistance with device driver level development, apart
from the brilliant Paul Le Roux when we collaborated together on some
technical issues. It was he, who introduced me to SecurStar....
So, then, suddently, out of nowhere comes these unknown, unnamed
Truecrypt folk with all their vast experience of device driver coding,
such expertise easily allowing them to make the transition to the
difficult Vista environment and the like.
I therefore now cannot help but wonder if they are being bankrolled by
someone, perhaps even the US government. Far fetched ? There might
well be those forces who would benefit greately from the vast
majority of the worlds crypto users all employing exactly the same
software. It would make any attacks they might wish to make much
easier to mount than having to deal with multiple software systems as
was much more the case in the past. Yes we all have the source code.
We can all review it. Being able to do so is widely held to be a
panacea to assurances of security, but this only applies IMHO if
experts review it, and my guess is that many such people will have
done this to some degree. In spite of all that there is still a
nagging doubt in my mind about these people, their motives and this
software. This isn't sour grapes but simply speculation after a
rational examination of the facts at hand.
Shaun, solve the problems of DCPP installation on NTFS and protection
of the hidden volume from writing to the outer volume, all on WIn 7
(because it is a really good OS), and you will beat TC at their own
game. I have posted questions all over the TV forum about why this
write protection issue is happening under Win 7 and I have not had one
single response. They are either too arrogant, too busy, or haven't
yet realized how damn good an OS Win 7 is, to respond. I asked the
bloody devs to look into it, no response.
Damn, it just occurred to me, wonder if they have a NG for TC?
Post by Shaun Hollingworth
Such a doubt will completely evaporate, if I could learn exactly who
these people actually are, who if anyone is backing them, and what
their motives really are. Also I am led to believe that posts can be
met with a good deal of hostility if queries are made regading the
identity of the people behind TC. I was told that someone even got
banned from the site because of that. If this is true, then I have to
wonder why that would be.
Please note that I don't accuse anyone of anything, and my comments
here are based on pure speculation, and my own gut feelings nothing
more.
In truth I have no more reason to air such suspicions than anyone
else, apart for the fact that I know from first hand experience how
hard some of this stuff is, especially the driver level code. But
others have done, and I note the responses people tell me, they then
get...
People might say that I started something similar myself over ten
years ago with Scramdisk. This is to some degree true. However I do
have to confess that my motives at the beginning were less than
completely altruistic though that did come later, for a time, whilst I
could afford it.. SD was developed because of an interest in the
subject in the hope that the company I owned a third of, would
diversify somewhat into this area, focussing on the corporate userbase
and allowing free use for individuals. During the initial involvment
with SD I used to call myself "Aman", The main reason for this, is
that I didn't want to reveal my identify until I had properly gauged
the reaction to Scramdisk. If it was rubbish then I am afraid I would
have remained anonymous. There was also the fact that I was unsure if
there would be any hostility to my releasing this stuff, and wanted to
protect myself against that. I "came out" when I knew that both were
not a problem.
My business partners late last century didn't want to know about SD,
so out it all went on the Internet, freeware, source and all, because
I thought it would be a shame just to completely waste it. Development
then continued as and when time permitted, usually during idle periods
at the office. Then my company went down in the ,dot com meltdown.
Shortly after, along came SecurStar to the employment rescue, as I had
no job and had to feed and clothe my kids and pay my bills..
Many thanks for the complements you've given me.
Regards,
Shaun.
Its a pleasure, Shaun. If you don't know it, you are held in the
highest regard by old timers who are not blessed with your skills.
cheers
thang
John Smith
2009-08-21 01:23:02 UTC
Permalink
Post by thang ornithorhynchus
Shaun, this is a major problem. I was looking forward to installing
Win 7 on Fat 32 so that I could set up a hidden OS, as I have many
times in the past withWIn XP. It will simply not install on anything
but NTFS. I have Ultimate OEM by the way, gold.
Do you have a solution?
thang
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