wolfbat359
2018-04-07 12:01:49 UTC
https://www.newyorker.com/news/our-columnists/the-moral-case-for-sanctions-against-russia?mbid=nl_180407_Daily&CNDID=48165278&spMailingID=13269525&spUserID=MTc4MTIyNTE0OTM5S0&spJobID=1380562238&spReportId=MTM4MDU2MjIzOAS2
excerpt:
A second category of sanction concerns trade and economic relations. These can be thought of as either strategic or punitive. The Obama Administration imposed these kinds of broad sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and framed them as strategic measures aimed at pressuring Vladimir Putin to change his behavior. John Bolton, the incoming national-security adviser, meanwhile, has made it clear that he views sanctions a punishment—he has tweeted and spoken about the need to exact a price from Russia in response to “behavior you don’t accept.” Different as the Obama-era and Trump-era attitudes may seem, they both stem from the same paternalistic assumption that Russia can be coerced or frightened into behaving differently. There is, however, no evidence for this: Russia’s response to sanctions has consistently ranged from indifference to escalation—including imposing counter-sanctions that cause even further economic pain among the Russian population. Indeed, the very idea that economic hardship undermines Putin’s rule is erroneous. Hard times can be good for autocracies, and Putin has masterfully used economic resentment to mobilize popular support.
The third kind of sanctions is known in policy circles as “smart” sanctions. (Bolton is a staunch opponent of this kind of sanctions.) These are premised on a more nuanced world view, which sees Putinism as a system that can be undermined from within. One theory in support of targeted sanctions imagines that the Russian élites, once squeezed, will rebel against Putin—a theory that betrays a basic misunderstanding of how Putin’s mafia state works. Putin is a patriarch at the center of a clan where every member is dependent on him for money and personal security. These are not conditions that could foment an uprising. It is true, however, that targeted sanctions undermine Putin’s authority as the sole source of his élites’ well-being: they take aim at his status as the patriarch.
The sanctions announced Friday belong to this last category. Measured by proximity to Putin and the sheer amount of wealth affected, these are, without a doubt, the harshest sanctions ever imposed on Russia’s super rich. Still, what informed the targeting of particular individuals is unclear. Ilya Zaslavskiy, a Russian political exile who runs underminers.info, which he describes as a “research project on post-Soviet kleptocrats,” pointed out in an interview that two of the wealthiest and most influential of Putin’s subjects, Roman Abramovich and Alisher Usmanov, both of whom have vast holdings in the West, are not on the list, while Oleg Deripaska and Viktor Vekselberg, two men with very large holdings in the United States, and Alexey Miller, head of the Russian state gas monopoly Gazprom, are.
Will these targeted sanctions be effective? Anyone who expects them to change Putin’s behavior will probably be disappointed .....
excerpt:
A second category of sanction concerns trade and economic relations. These can be thought of as either strategic or punitive. The Obama Administration imposed these kinds of broad sanctions in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and framed them as strategic measures aimed at pressuring Vladimir Putin to change his behavior. John Bolton, the incoming national-security adviser, meanwhile, has made it clear that he views sanctions a punishment—he has tweeted and spoken about the need to exact a price from Russia in response to “behavior you don’t accept.” Different as the Obama-era and Trump-era attitudes may seem, they both stem from the same paternalistic assumption that Russia can be coerced or frightened into behaving differently. There is, however, no evidence for this: Russia’s response to sanctions has consistently ranged from indifference to escalation—including imposing counter-sanctions that cause even further economic pain among the Russian population. Indeed, the very idea that economic hardship undermines Putin’s rule is erroneous. Hard times can be good for autocracies, and Putin has masterfully used economic resentment to mobilize popular support.
The third kind of sanctions is known in policy circles as “smart” sanctions. (Bolton is a staunch opponent of this kind of sanctions.) These are premised on a more nuanced world view, which sees Putinism as a system that can be undermined from within. One theory in support of targeted sanctions imagines that the Russian élites, once squeezed, will rebel against Putin—a theory that betrays a basic misunderstanding of how Putin’s mafia state works. Putin is a patriarch at the center of a clan where every member is dependent on him for money and personal security. These are not conditions that could foment an uprising. It is true, however, that targeted sanctions undermine Putin’s authority as the sole source of his élites’ well-being: they take aim at his status as the patriarch.
The sanctions announced Friday belong to this last category. Measured by proximity to Putin and the sheer amount of wealth affected, these are, without a doubt, the harshest sanctions ever imposed on Russia’s super rich. Still, what informed the targeting of particular individuals is unclear. Ilya Zaslavskiy, a Russian political exile who runs underminers.info, which he describes as a “research project on post-Soviet kleptocrats,” pointed out in an interview that two of the wealthiest and most influential of Putin’s subjects, Roman Abramovich and Alisher Usmanov, both of whom have vast holdings in the West, are not on the list, while Oleg Deripaska and Viktor Vekselberg, two men with very large holdings in the United States, and Alexey Miller, head of the Russian state gas monopoly Gazprom, are.
Will these targeted sanctions be effective? Anyone who expects them to change Putin’s behavior will probably be disappointed .....