Climate Change Impacts "Call for Action by US Naval Leadership" -- National Rese
arch Council
Nick Sundt
Climate Science Watch
March 12, 2011
Arctic climate change challenge for US Navy (Image source: US Navy)
The US National Research Council warned in a new report released March 10,
National Security Implications of Climate Change for US Naval Forces, that
"even the most moderate predicted trends in climate change will present new
national security challenges for the US Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard."
The seriousness of the climate change preparedness discourse in this report,
commisioned by the US Department of the Navy, and the seriousness with
which it treats scientific intelligence and the assessments by the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, contrasts with the rampant
denialism we have been witnessing in Congress and the right-wing blogosphere.
Regardless of one's views on US national security policy issues, this report
from the leading US scientific advisory body to the US government raises
key issues in the science-policy nexus, most particularly with regard to the
potential impacts of climate change in the Arctic region.
The following is re-posted with the permission of the author from the World
Wildlife Fund's Climate Blog.
In National Security Implications of Climate Change for US Naval Forces, the
US National Research Council (NRC) warned yesterday (10 March 2011) that "even
the most moderate predicted trends in climate change will present new national
security challenges for the US Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard." Frank
L. Bowman, a retired US navy admiral and co-chair of the NRC committee that
wrote the report said: "Naval forces need to monitor more closely and start
preparing now for projected challenges climate change will present in the
future." The NRC is the main operating agency of the National Academy of
Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering.
The study, sponsored by the US Department of the Navy, covered a wide range of
climate change implications for naval operations around the world, but it
highlighted the implications of Arctic warming. "Of all the theaters of naval
operations that the committee considered could be impacted by climate change,
the Arctic was found to have the most immediate challenges," the report
says. We provide below excerpts from the report, outlining the panel's
findings and recommendations in 6 areas for "US Naval Leadership Action."
Action Area 1: Support ratification of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea.
FINDING: The committee has studied the implications of the failure of the
United States to ratify the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) from the standpoint of potential impacts on national security in
the context of a changing climate. As climate change affords increased access
to the Arctic, it is envisioned that there will be new opportunities for
natural resource exploration and recovery, as well as increased ship traffic
of all kinds, and with that a need for broadened naval partnership and
cooperation, and a framework for settling potential disputes and conflicts. By
remaining outside the Convention, the United States makes it more difficult
for US naval forces to have maximum operating flexibility in the Arctic and
complicates negotiations with maritime partners for coordinated search and
rescue operations in the region. (Chapter 1)
RECOMMENDATION: The ability of US naval forces to carry out their missions
would be assisted if the United States were to ratify UNCLOS. Therefore, the
committee recommends that the Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard continue to put forward
the naval forces' view of the potential value and operational impact of UNCLOS
ratification on US naval operations, especially in the Arctic region. (Chapter
1)
Action Area 2: Prepare for increased strain on capabilities due to greater
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR)-related missions, as well as
the opening of new international and territorial waters in the Arctic.
FINDING: The unique capability provided by the US Navy hospital ships will
become even more important in supporting potential humanitarian
assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR)-related missions that will likely occur as
a result of crises created by climate change. The Navy needs to maintain this
capability beyond the life of its current two-ship hospital fleet. (Chapter 2)
RECOMMENDATION: The Program Executive Office for Ships (PEO-Ships), the Naval
Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), and the Military Sealift Command (MSC) should
analyze alternatives to retain the medical capability of the current hospital
ships into the future. The analysis should address construction of new
military or commercial platforms like the Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) that
will join the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF); modification to current
surface platforms or amphibious "big-decks"; or construction of
next-generation Navy fleet hospitals to meet the requirements. In this
context, PEO-Ships, NAVSEA, and MSC should also explore the feasibility of
leasing commercial ships and crews to meet the requirements, but in doing
guaranteed availability on very short notice are included. (Chapter 2)
FINDING: Global climate change projections from the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) suggest damaging impacts in
developing and developed nations that may be destabilizing in many parts of
the world. These projections would affect US national security and stress
naval resources. In particular, naval forces will likely be required to carry
out more frequent humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR)-related
missions. At the same time, US naval forces would be expected to execute
their ongoing national security military missions and to position themselves
for supporting missions in destabilized regions around the globe. It is also
expected that the demand for US Naval Construction Force and Marine
Expeditionary Unit capabilities will increase in proportion to the operational
tempo of US-sponsored international HA/DR missions. (Chapter 2)
RECOMMENDATION: In the near term, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) should
not specifically fund new force-structure capabilities to deal with the
effects of projected climate change; however, the CNO should begin to hedge
against climate change impacts through planning for modifications of the
existing force structure as climate change requirements become clearer. The US
naval forces (the US Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) should begin to
consider potential specific force-structure capabilities and training
standards for conducting missions arising from, or affected by, climate
change, particularly HA/DR-related missions. (Chapter 2)
USCGC Healy, a Coast Guard icebreaker designed to support scientific research,
in the Arctic Ocean. Credit: Henry Dick Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution /
NSF
FINDING: The nation has very limited icebreaker capability, which could limit
the US ability to train, operate, and engage in the Arctic. Furthermore, as
noted in a 2007 National Research Council report, "both operations and
maintenance of [the] polar icebreaker fleet have been underfunded for many
years, and the capabilities of the nation's icebreaking fleet have diminished
substantially" and, among other things, "the US Coast Guard [USCG] should be
provided sufficient operations and maintenance budget[s] to support an
increased, regular, and influential presence in the Arctic." Moreover, US
national icebreaker assets are old, obsolete, and under the control of another
agency that does not have a national security operational mandate. The present
committee believes that future USCG missions in the Arctic will require
autonomy and command of their vessels. (Chapter 2)
RECOMMENDATION: In order to support the US naval forces' missions in the
Arctic, the US Coast Guard (USCG) needs icebreaker capabilities under its
operational control. While there are other national requirements for such
ships, action should be taken to provide these operational capabilities to the
USCG. Therefore, the Chief of Naval Operations should support the initiatives
of the Commandant of the Coast Guard to define future USCG icebreaker
needs. As such, future US national icebreaker assets should be defined as
part of a holistic force structure that also accommodates ongoing National
Science Foundation-sponsored polar research needs. (Chapter 2)
FINDING: The current situation of the 3 combatant commanders--Commander, US
European Command; Commander, US Northern Command; and Commander, US Pacific
Command--having overlapping areas of responsibility for the Arctic was perhaps
workable when the Arctic was less important than it is rapidly becoming. This
division of responsibility in the Arctic is inconsistent with US national
interests and does not match the command structure of other US agencies
(such as the Department of Homeland Security and the US Department of
State) in this increasingly significant region of the world. (Chapter 2)
RECOMMENDATION: The Chief of Naval Operations should engage the Joint Chiefs
of Staff in a review of combatant commanders' responsibilities for the Arctic,
with the goal of ensuring the most effective command structure. Interagency
considerations, including but not limited to the US Department of State,
should be included in these deliberations. (Chapter 2)
FINDING: In the post-Cold War era, the US Navy has had a very limited surface
ship presence in true northern latitude, cold-weather conditions. According to
information presented to the committee, the US military as a whole has lost
most of its competence in cold-weather operations for high-Arctic
warfare. (Chapter 2)
RECOMMENDATION: The Chief of Naval Operations, the Commandant of the Marine
Corps, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard should establish a strong and
consistently funded effort to increase Arctic operations and share lessons,
including with allies. In the immediate term, the Navy should begin Arctic
training and the Marine Corps should also reestablish a cold-weather training
program. (Chapter 2)
Action Area 3: Address naval coastal installation vulnerabilities due to
anticipated sea-level rise and increased storm surges.
FINDING: Peer-reviewed literature since the 2007 Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) suggests that loss of ice from
small ice bodies (e.g. mountain glaciers and small ice caps) may have been
underestimated in the last IPCC report and that major changes in Greenland and
Antarctic ice sheet dynamics can take place over relatively short
timescales. Sea-level variations caused by shifts in wind, rain, evaporation,
and land-ice volume can cause far greater local changes in sea-level
variations than the global mean rise that is projected from thermal expansion
of the ocean and land-surface meltwater runoff. (Chapter 3)
RECOMMENDATION: Based on recent peer-reviewed scientific literature, the
Department of the Navy should expect roughly 0.4 to 2 meters global average
sea-level rise by 2100, with a most likely value of about 0.8
meter. Projections of local sea-level rise could be much larger and should be
taken into account for naval planning purposes. However, US naval
leadership (e.g. the Oceanographer of the Navy) should be aware that this
estimate is subject to change, and it should be reviewed routinely for any
significant change. (Chapter 3)
FINDING: Neither regional nor global sea level is of primary interest in
determining naval coastal installation vulnerability. Rather, it is the
increased vulnerability associated with extreme events (storm surges) and
their dependence on changes in regional sea level, tidal amplitudes, and the
nature of extraordinary meteorological forces that are of greatest
importance. (Chapter 3)
FINDING: US Navy, Coast Guard, and Marine Corps coastal installations around
the globe will become increasingly susceptible to projected climate
change. Several assessments now under way on naval installation
vulnerabilities appear to be focused primarily on static sea-level rise and
coastal inundation only. According to these current assessments, some adaptive
actions are indicated owing to already identified vulnerabilities at specific
naval installations. The preliminary review of climate-changerelated base
vulnerabilities across the DOD--currently under way as directed by the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review--does not include some important factors that
affect coastal installation vulnerabilities, although it provides a baseline
assessment across all branches of the armed services and serves as a starting
point for more in-depth analysis and action. (Chapter 3)
RECOMMENDATION: The Commander, Naval Installations Command, and the Navy
Director for Fleet Readiness and Logistics should work with their US Coast
Guard and Marine Corps counterparts--and in conjunction with the other armed
services and the Office of the Secretary of Defense--to ensure that a
coordinated analysis is undertaken to address naval-installation vulnerability
to rising sea levels, higher storm surges, and other consequences of climate
change. In performing this vulnerability analysis, naval facility managers
should recognize that each and every naval facility has a unique configuration
and requires ongoing oversight of the changing risks as the climate system
shifts. For example, local storm surge impact in climate-induced extreme
storm events is likely to represent a bigger vulnerability than sea-level rise
alone. (Chapter 3)
RECOMMENDATION: For Program Objective Memorandum (POM)-14 planning purposes,
the Chief of Naval Operations should prepare to invest in early-stage
adaptation for targeted low-elevation naval installations identified in
current vulnerability assessments as being at "very high risk" from more
intense storm surges, sea-level rise, and other climate change impacts. Other
risks for naval installations as a result of projected climate change require
further analysis and planning at this time, but no immediate direct additional
substantial investment beyond current budget plans. (Chapter 3)
Action Area 4: Address US, allied, and/or international maritime
partnership demands based on climate change scenarios.
FINDING: All regions of the world will experience the effects of projected
climate change. Some climate change effects, such as changes in storm patterns
and drought, will have direct impacts in the United States. Should regional
storms and droughts intensify over time they may well drive mass migrations to
the United States from neighboring countries, including Mexico, the Caribbean,
and Central America. Projected climate change will also directly and
indirectly affect most US allies, including NATO countries, Australia,
Japan, and all other major non-NATO allies, which in turn may request or
require US assistance. (Chapter 4)
RECOMMENDATION: Given that US naval forces cannot be fully prepared for or
respond to all plausible climate contingencies, the Chief of Naval Operations,
working with the combatant commanders, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and
the Commandant of the Marine Corps, should develop or expand maritime
partnerships with other nations. Projected climate change will affect all
regions of the world, and so US naval forces should seek to develop these
partnerships with long-standing allies and nontraditional partners alike,
including Russia, China, and nongovernmental organizations. In particular,
developing climate change response capabilities within the NATO alliance could
strengthen global climate change response capabilities and the alliance
itself. (Chapter 4)
FINDING: Although the likelihood of conflict in the Arctic is low, it cannot
be ruled out, and competition in the region is a given. However, cooperation
in the region should not be considered a given, even with close
allies. Although there are mechanisms for bilateral and multilateral
cooperation in the area, including the Arctic Council, these relationships and
mechanisms are largely untested for emerging conditions. Additionally, with
the ratification of UNCLOS, US naval forces will be better positioned to
conduct future naval operations and protect national security interests,
especially in the Arctic. (Chapter 4)
RECOMMENDATION: The Chief of Naval Operations, working with the combatant
commanders, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, and the Commandant of the
Marine Corps, should build maritime partnerships in the Arctic region and
encourage the United States to continue to identify and adopt policies and
relationships in the Arctic that will build cooperation for new circumstances
and minimize the risks of confrontation. (For example, naval leaders should
pursue bilateral and multilateral training and exercising of US naval
personnel with partner nation personnel in maritime security, search and
rescue, and HA/DR, and continue strong support of the US efforts in the Arctic
Council.) There should be no assumption that the geostrategic situation will
take care of itself or that US interests in the region are currently protected
and promoted. (Chapter 4)
Action Area 5: Address the potential impacts on the technical underpinnings
that enable, in part, naval force capabilities, especially any impacts due to
the necessity to operate in polar regions.
FINDING: US military navigation and communications systems have been optimized
to support operations in non-polar regions. Likewise, data on terrain
elevation and bathymetry to support military operations and nautical charting
are of low resolution and sparse in the Arctic. Moreover, while accurate ice
coverage charts are available to guide surface navigation, reliable real-time
ice characterization and maps in emergent Arctic transit routes are not. The
combined effect of degraded navigation, communications, and charting systems
could impact safe operations and reduce the performance of military systems in
the polar regions. (Chapter 5)
RECOMMENDATION:The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development,
and Acquisition should increase research and development efforts at the Office
of Naval Research and the Naval Research Laboratory to address the operational
shortfalls of existing and planned navigation, communications, and charting
systems, leveraging both local and global augmentation technologies. In
conjunction with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the
Department of the Navy should increase priority for extending modern
navigation, communications, and charting coverage to include the Arctic
region. (Chapter 5)
FINDING: The United States had an Arctic research program during the Cold War
that has essentially ceased. Moreover, there is no infrastructure to support
antisubmarine warfare (ASW) in the Arctic. While there are no significant ASW
activities now in the Arctic, US naval forces need to be prepared to
operate there safely. The United States' diminished Arctic research program
and capabilities from what existed during the Cold War--plus the need for even
better performance from its ASW systems--put US naval forces' ability to
operate as needed in the Arctic at risk if the United States does not keep
pace with the capabilities of other Arctic nations, especially Russia with its
extensive claims of Arctic sovereignty, as well as with non-Arctic nations,
such as China. (Chapter 5)
RECOMMENDATION: Given that climate change may drive the US naval forces to
conduct antisubmarine warfare (ASW) operations in the Arctic, the Department
of the Navy should increase its submarine Arctic presence for training
purposes, extend its supporting ASW oceanographic data infrastructure to the
Arctic Ocean, and begin to conduct multiplatform ASW training exercises in the
Arctic. Specifically, this should include:
* Increased research for Arctic passive and active sonars;
* Long-range planning to install facilities that support Arctic ASW, such as
refurbishing and expanding the fixed array systems;
* Planning for aircraft support from the new P8;
* Development of high-latitude communications systems for relaying tactical
and environmental data;
* Identifying ports for emergencies; and
* Incorporation of a more robust under-ice capability on Virginia-class
submarines. (Chapter 5)
Action Area 6: Support investments for additional research and development
that have implications for future naval force operations and capabilities, and
might not be met by other groups pursuing climate-related research.
FINDING: Open access to previously classified Navy data and to other
Department of Defense assets through the MEDEA Program have enabled advances
in climate change research that have benefited the scientific community
studying climate change. A clear example of this benefit is the analysis of
submarine upward looking sonar, which shows that sea ice has been thinning in
response to climate change. (Chapter 6)
RECOMMENDATION: The Chief of Naval Research, the Oceanographer of the Navy,
and the Commander, Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Command, should consider
findings by the MEDEA Program (and take lessons from MEDEA actions within the
intelligence community) to develop and support a Navy philosophy for providing
access to previously classified information that can be used by the climate
research community. Such actions would enhance the potential of these
researchers to help the Navy better prepare for its mission in a future with a
warmer climate. (Chapter 6)
FINDING: The Navy has billions of dollars in assets exposed to the threats of
climate change, and it must make strategic decisions in the face of
considerable uncertainty about the pace, magnitude, and regional
manifestations of climate change. Yet Navy research at present has no
capability for modeling the coupled ocean-atmosphere-land-cryosphere system
and how it will respond to greenhouse gas forcing. The Navy also has no
programs in seasonal-to-decadal timescale climate forecasting to help guide
longrange strategic planning for operations, platforms, and facilities; it
relies almost entirely on civilian agencies and international assessments to
inform its policies and practices related to climate change. (Chapter 6)
RECOMMENDATION: The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development,
and Acquisition (ASN RDA) should examine the US Navy's overall research and
development capabilities vis-Ã -vis climate studies, especially with respect to
coupled models and climate forecasting on seasonal-to-decadal timescales. The
ASN RDA should give special emphasis to regional aspects of sea-level rise,
and sea-ice concentration and extent, because of their relevance to coastal
infrastructure and operational needs. The Department of the Navy should also
become actively engaged in the development of an Arctic Observing System,
specifically with respect to development and deployment of in situ and remote
sensing systems (i.e. gliders, buoys, and satellites) as well as icebreakers
in support of research. (Chapter 6)
Online Resources
National Security Implications of Climate Change for US Naval Forces. By
National Research Council, 2011. See also press release (dated 10 March
2011), US Naval Forces Need to Prepare for Effects of Climate Change; and a
summary document [PDF].
http://www.nap.edu/nap-cgi/report.cgi?record_id=12914&type=pdfxsum
MYREF: 20110323023002 msg2011032311672
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---
Scientists are always changing their story and as a Conservative, I
have no tolerance for ambiguity.
It proves that all science is lies and the only thing we can trust is
right wing rhetoric.
-- ***@27-32-240-172 [86 nyms and counting], 14 Jan 2011 14:46 +1100