What's the Best-Case for Japan in WW2?

[o***@yahoo.com]

I've seen lots of discussion on alternate WW2s in Europe,
but not many in the Pacific. So, I'll post a simple question:

With a POD of 1-1-1942[1] or later, could Japan have won[2] WW2?

[1] Or, after 8 Dec '41, if you prefer.

[2] What does "win" mean? That's my question. What's the best that
they could have hoped for? At a minimum, let's say that it means
avoiding getting nuked, and avoiding foreign occupation of the home
islands. Is this possible? How? Can Japan hope for more? How and
why?

[p***@river-valley.net]

Post by o***@yahoo.com
I've seen lots of discussion on alternate WW2s in Europe,
With a POD of 1-1-1942[1] or later, could Japan have won[2] WW2?

Perhaps stronger U.S. isolationism? The major reaction to the attack on
Pearl Harbour is 'We shouldn't have been out there in the first place.'
The Pacific fleet is moved to California and Congress urges the
President, at the behest of their isolationist constituants, to seek
terms with Japan.

I'd also suggest a possibility of win could be as OTL, but the Emperor
is still considered divine and has more than ceremonial power.

[Tim McDaniel]

Post by p***@river-valley.net

Post by o***@yahoo.com
I've seen lots of discussion on alternate WW2s in Europe,
With a POD of 1-1-1942[1] or later, could Japan have won[2] WW2?

[1] was, I think, "Or 8 December 1941, if you prefer" --
the point being, only PODs after Pearl Harbor.
[2] was, more or less, "For Some Value of 'won'".

Post by p***@river-valley.net
Perhaps stronger U.S. isolationism? The major reaction to the attack
on Pearl Harbour is 'We shouldn't have been out there in the first
place.'

That would take a significant POD before Pearl Harbor, then.

I really really don't think that reaction is possible with the OTL
7 December 1941 attack. It was a US fleet sitting peacefully in dock
in a harbor that had been US territory for over 40 years, attacked
without warning on a Sunday morning. Short of Japanese planes
napalming churches, playgrounds, and hospitals in front of functioning
movie cameras, or dropping leaflets saying "We'll rape your kittens
with cacti for science" [3], I'm having a hard time thinking of how to
make an alternate Japanese pure aerial attack any more provocative.

[3] Tip o' the nib to <http://www.somethingpositive.com>, a great Web
comic.

Which is to say, the only ways I can think of to not have America
react like a pepper-sprayed pit bull to the 7 December 1941 attack
is with a really big POD before that. Say that the US took Hawaii
from Japan, or that Japan had some other strong claim. Or if the
American fleet was blockading near Japan. Or if American ships sank
some Japanese ships first.

But unless I misremember, orpheus_j excluded PODs before 7 December,
and certainly stated no PODs before 1 January 1942. FDR is going to
give his "day which will live in infamy" speech, Congress will vote a
declaration of war with only one "no" vote, Hitler will declare war a
few days later but be able to not do much more than send a few (though
devastating) subs.

[o***@yahoo.com]

Post by Tim McDaniel
That would take a significant POD before Pearl Harbor, then.
I really really don't think that reaction is possible with the OTL
7 December 1941 attack.

That's kind of what I was thinking. Sure, there's the oil embargo and
the Philippines and all that, but I sometimes wonder, "WHAT WERE THE
JAPANESE THINKING?!?" -- but I mean that as a serious question.

I suppose if you get into "Axis Wins in Europe" scenarios, you might
be able to start to consider the possibility of the US giving up in
the Pacific. But, short of that, I don't know.

Say that an anti-militarist coup takes over in Japan at some point.
When would be the best time for this, from Japan's point of view,
and what is the best deal that they can get from the US?

I don't see how such a cabal could have any support in Japan while
its military is still strong. How could they ring up (wire) FRD and
say,
"Sorry about Pearl Harbour; that was a mistake -- we won't let it
happen again. Let's be friends now"?

[f***@yahoo.com]

Post by o***@yahoo.com
I've seen lots of discussion on alternate WW2s in Europe,
With a POD of 1-1-1942[1] or later, could Japan have won[2] WW2?
[1] Or, after 8 Dec '41, if you prefer.
[2] What does "win" mean? That's my question. What's the best that
they could have hoped for? At a minimum, let's say that it means
avoiding getting nuked, and avoiding foreign occupation of the home
islands. Is this possible? How? Can Japan hope for more? How and
why?

Their basic philosophy was divine destiny to dominate Asia. Look at a
map and the sheer size of their ambition is incredible. A country of
80 million people! It was nuts. They even attacked British India.

If they don't do Pearl Harbor they might be better off. But only if
the US never comes into the war. If the US fortifies and holds the
Phillipines then starts the war then Japan is a goner. Japan couldn't
take that chance.

Best they can do with their crazy beginning is be beaten by the British
after Hitler is done with. Maybe if Hilter doesn't attack USSR then
Britain is held up indefinitely and Imperial Japan survives.

Sure is a good thing that evil is greedy enough to destroy itself.

[Robert Kolker]

Post by f***@yahoo.com
Britain is held up indefinitely and Imperial Japan survives.
Sure is a good thing that evil is greedy enough to destroy itself.

Heve you ever heard of Prudent Preditors?

The British Empire lasted a while and Britain did not destroy itself. It
made itself poorer but that is not destruction. And for a while Evil
paid off handsomely.

Bob Kolker

[a***@pacific.net.au]

On Sat, 07 May 2005 09:54:20 -0400, Robert Kolker

Post by Robert Kolker

Post by f***@yahoo.com
Britain is held up indefinitely and Imperial Japan survives.
Sure is a good thing that evil is greedy enough to destroy itself.

Heve you ever heard of Prudent Preditors?
The British Empire lasted a while and Britain did not destroy itself. It
made itself poorer but that is not destruction. And for a while Evil
paid off handsomely.

So, how then does one classify the US regime?

Certainly "evil" (in the sense that you have used if regarding the
British Empire, *your* definition, of course, not necessarily mine or
anyone elses') is equally applicable to the US hegemony?

Which would mean that, if any rules applied, this should go to shf.

Phil

Author, Space Opera (FGU), RBB #1 (FASA), Road to Armageddon (PGD).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Email: ***@pacific.net.au

[f***@yahoo.com]

Post by Robert Kolker

Post by f***@yahoo.com
Britain is held up indefinitely and Imperial Japan survives.
Sure is a good thing that evil is greedy enough to destroy itself.

Heve you ever heard of Prudent Preditors?
The British Empire lasted a while and Britain did not destroy itself. It
made itself poorer but that is not destruction. And for a while Evil
paid off handsomely.

True enough. But Imperial Japan was definitely more evil that the
British Empire.

The Roman Empire went on for 1200 years. But it is not clear whether
it was better or worse than what it replaced.

[Robert Kolker]

Post by f***@yahoo.com
The Roman Empire went on for 1200 years. But it is not clear whether
it was better or worse than what it replaced.

The point is that being evil does not automatically lead to downfall.
Being excessively can lead to downfall because it triggers a reaction.
Being moderately evil is such that the victims learn to put up with it.

Bob Kolker

[heretic]

Post by o***@yahoo.com
I've seen lots of discussion on alternate WW2s in Europe,
With a POD of 1-1-1942[1] or later, could Japan have won[2] WW2?
[1] Or, after 8 Dec '41, if you prefer.
[2] What does "win" mean? That's my question. What's the best that
they could have hoped for? At a minimum, let's say that it means
avoiding getting nuked, and avoiding foreign occupation of the home
islands. Is this possible? How? Can Japan hope for more? How and
why?

Going with a 'Keep WWI-era Empire' value of Win? Only real chance is
an anti-militarist Coup (perhaps led by Yamamoto?) with the at least
quiet approval of the Emperor himself, followed by a prompt cease-fire
and repudation of the Axis alliance.

Even then, I wonder what the Japanese will have to offer for an
honorable peace? Withdrawal from the Phillipines and repartations are
the bare minimum, and it is given that the coup would pull the IJA back
to Manchukuo (or cut them off if they did not listen).

HTG

[Juan Valdez]

[snip]

Post by heretic
Even then, I wonder what the Japanese will have to offer for an
honorable peace? Withdrawal from the Phillipines and repartations are
the bare minimum, and it is given that the coup would pull the IJA back
to Manchukuo (or cut them off if they did not listen).

Nothing less than the utter disassembly of the Japanese Empire will do.
If
they do this willingly, instead of being bombed into submission, they
will
be in better shape by 1950 in this ATL, w/ a PCGDP of $700/yr, or
approximately OTL's USSR's PCGDP. This is about twice as good as OTL. WI
Japan, having surrendered before ever really fighting, keeps the warrior
spirit (all those agro dads not killed in the Pacific war) and keeps its
OTL pre-WW2 population growth rate. By 1960, Japan could have 105m
people
and not have a propensity towards abortion. Should it industrialize like
OTL but be crowded like Java, wouldn't it be likely it would try to
start a war later (having never been 'honorably' defeated?)?

[Kris Overstreet]

Post by o***@yahoo.com
I've seen lots of discussion on alternate WW2s in Europe,
With a POD of 1-1-1942[1] or later, could Japan have won[2] WW2?

The odds are extremely long, but it could just barely possibly have
happened.

The only way it -could- have happened, however, is for Japan to
concentrate all its forces on eliminating the United States as a
Pacific power as swiftly as possible. This means uniting the
ever-feuding army and navy factions in Japanese politics and
abandoning all military operations which do not have, as their focus,
taking out America's ability to project force against Japan.

After Singapore and the Malay Peninsula are taken, and the Phillipines
and other American-owned islands in the western Pacific are forced to
capitulate, all offensives in China, Burma, and New Guinea need to
stop. No Aleutians campaign, no Coral Sea. Only overwhelming force
directed against America itself can stand a prayer of bringing the
United States to the negotiating table.

Imagine Midway as Yamamoto envisioned it, with ten aircraft carriers
instead of four.

Imagine two hundred thousand Japanese Army soldiers invading Oahu.

Imagine repeated strikes by air and sea on the Panama Canal and
shipyards and naval bases on the American west coast.

Imagine invasion of California by 1943.

All of this would have to go completely successfully before the
American government would even consider suing for peace... and yes,
it's all extremely long odds... and yes, in the meantime this pretty
much leaves the British and Australians free to do whatever they can,
along with whatever American units they can transport the long way
around and support.

But let's look on the other side. Japan's armaments were inferior in
every way to American arms except in the number of aircraft carriers
and the size of two superdreadnoughts. The Japanese were spendthrift
with their manpower, disdaining the concept of preserving men for
future battles. Japan's supply of raw materials, even WITH the
Phillipines and Indonesia in their possession, was inferior to
American supplies, and their manufacturing base was inferior by an
order of magnitude. Even the vaunted Zero fighter was little different
from an American -training- airplane which could be, and was, quickly
surpassed by American designers durng the war. In short, Japan was at
a severe disadvantage at the beginning- and those disadvantages would
only grow worse, never better, as the war continued.

Japan has to bring America to peace talks within two years. By January
1944, America's infrastructure, resources, manpower, and technology
will be enough to roll over the Japanese, no matter how strong the
Japanese have made themselves by this point. Any action by Japan which
does not actively work to knock America out of the war is utterly
wasted, in the long view. Japan must gamble all on this effort,
because anything less is a guarantee of long-term defeat.

The only way I see this happening is if, somehow, for some reason,
Hideki Tojo's government is toppled and Isaroku Yamamoto himself, hero
of Pearl Harbor, becomes the new Prime Minister... and this must
happen no later than March 1942, as the final plans were being made
for what would become Midway.

Redneck

[M***@nyu.edu]

I think the POD would have to come much earlier - at the rise of the
Tokugawa Shogunate. Japan converts to Christianity - but not
Catholicism. More along the lines of the fanatical Calvanism. Then it
closes its doors. When America opens Japan in the 1851, they find a
nation of puritan co-religionists. Let history flow from that point as
it does in our timeline. When Japan fights China, it's not simply
imperialism, but also for the purpose of bringing Christianity to those
"damn heathen Chinese". The influence of Christian missionaries was a
major factor in raising US support for China versus the Japanese.
Except in this case the Japanese have been the allies - and
co-religionists - of the missionaries and US. Rape of Nanking? Damn
fiflthy lie on the part of those damn Chinese - half of whom are
commies anyway! There's no need for Pearl Harbor. Why would the US cut
off oil to those "scrappy" Japanese doing the hard work of "civilizing"
the Chinese? And maybe we could sell/send them tanks and artillery so
they could fight the Godless commie Russians in Manchuria and Mongolia?

[d***@anonymous.to]

Post by M***@nyu.edu
I think the POD would have to come much earlier - at the rise of the
Tokugawa Shogunate. Japan converts to Christianity -

You don't see any way before this to come up with a better outcome than
"army destroyed as a fighting force in two theaters of war, capital
burned to a shell, two cities consumed in nuclear fire, and military
occupation."? Come, think again; in any case, the original question
posited a post-December 7 POD.

[mike]

Post by d***@anonymous.to
You don't see any way before this to come up with a better outcome
than "army destroyed as a fighting force in two theaters of war,
capital burned to a shell, two cities consumed in nuclear fire,
and military occupation."?

You left out Navy nearly all sunk, and that what was left didn't
have fuel to sail, and Air Force unable to train pilots due to
lack of fuel, the big plan to stop the invasion was to meet them
on the beaches with Home Guard bamboo spears- as well.

**
mike
**

[mike]

Post by Kris Overstreet

Post by o***@yahoo.com
I've seen lots of discussion on alternate WW2s in Europe,
With a POD of 1-1-1942[1] or later, could Japan have won[2] WW2?

The odds are extremely long, but it could just barely possibly have
happened.

<snip long odd scenarios&info>

Post by Kris Overstreet
The only way I see this happening is if, somehow, for some reason,
Hideki Tojo's government is toppled and Isaroku Yamamoto himself, hero
of Pearl Harbor, becomes the new Prime Minister... and this must
happen no later than March 1942, as the final plans were being made
for what would become Midway.

How about this, though ts ahead of the PoD listed above.

Dec1 1941 Washington DC

Japanese emissaries Kurusu and Nomura continue talks with
Cordell Hull, but they know nothing of a secret package sent to Hull
at the days meetings end. An Airmail, from across the Pacific

It lists a fantastic Attack Plan against Pearl Harbor, and with
timetables for follow on attacks on other US and UK held areas,all
in Japanese, but has translations sheets in english, and lists
a contact point, to meet with an 'Mister X' at a certain place and
time.

He is a Japanese Agent from some in the IJA. He is prewarning the US
as he feels that any War that directly involves the US and UK will
not be in Japans interest for finishing the war in China, even though
peace talks are at an impass with Tojo's Government. There are others
in Japan, who wish to keep talking.

Leaking this plan will abort that PH attack, stop any War,weaken
Tojo and the IJN, even if the attack force was intercepted by some
'unknown' naval power, while in the middle of the Pacific, and allow
Prince Konoye to regain power in the Government, and start productive
talks and avoid a War that no sane person wants

Days later, the US Fleet Sorties from PH, and the Bases are now at
high alert, reported by local Japanese Agents on the HI.

The same day, Hull speaks with Nomura, and asks hime to wire
urgently back to Tokyo, with the simple message

'We know what is planned, and what is coming. The US Government
recommends that you order them to return, or you will lose them.
Pearl Harbor is empty.'

Attack is aborted, Tojo's Goventment falls. The Militarists
look like fools.



**
mike
**

[James Gassaway]

Post by mike

Post by Kris Overstreet

Post by o***@yahoo.com
I've seen lots of discussion on alternate WW2s in Europe,
With a POD of 1-1-1942[1] or later, could Japan have won[2] WW2?

The odds are extremely long, but it could just barely possibly have
happened.

<snip long odd scenarios&info>

Post by Kris Overstreet
The only way I see this happening is if, somehow, for some reason,
Hideki Tojo's government is toppled and Isaroku Yamamoto himself,

hero

Post by Kris Overstreet
of Pearl Harbor, becomes the new Prime Minister... and this must
happen no later than March 1942, as the final plans were being made
for what would become Midway.

How about this, though ts ahead of the PoD listed above.
Dec1 1941 Washington DC
Japanese emissaries Kurusu and Nomura continue talks with
Cordell Hull, but they know nothing of a secret package sent to Hull
at the days meetings end. An Airmail, from across the Pacific
It lists a fantastic Attack Plan against Pearl Harbor, and with
timetables for follow on attacks on other US and UK held areas,all
in Japanese, but has translations sheets in english, and lists
a contact point, to meet with an 'Mister X' at a certain place and
time.
He is a Japanese Agent from some in the IJA. He is prewarning the US
as he feels that any War that directly involves the US and UK will
not be in Japans interest for finishing the war in China, even though
peace talks are at an impass with Tojo's Government. There are others
in Japan, who wish to keep talking.
Leaking this plan will abort that PH attack, stop any War,weaken
Tojo and the IJN, even if the attack force was intercepted by some
'unknown' naval power, while in the middle of the Pacific, and allow
Prince Konoye to regain power in the Government, and start productive
talks and avoid a War that no sane person wants
Days later, the US Fleet Sorties from PH, and the Bases are now at
high alert, reported by local Japanese Agents on the HI.
The same day, Hull speaks with Nomura, and asks hime to wire
urgently back to Tokyo, with the simple message
'We know what is planned, and what is coming. The US Government
recommends that you order them to return, or you will lose them.
Pearl Harbor is empty.'
Attack is aborted, Tojo's Goventment falls. The Militarists
look like fools.

Problem is that the US military would want independant confirmation and IIRC
our intelligence at the time placed the IJN carriers at the home islands.
Increased air patrols? Sure. Go on alert? They already were nearly on a
war footing. Sortie the fleet? Not without proof. And copies of supposed
plans isn't proof.

[mike]

Post by James Gassaway
Problem is that the US military would want independant confirmation
and IIRC our intelligence at the time placed the IJN carriers at
the home islands.

Probably, but at the least, PI and HI will be on full alert, which will
be noticed, even if the Ships stay put.

Post by James Gassaway
Increased air patrols? Sure. Go on alert? They already were nearly
on a war footing.

But were expecting something to happen to the PI[1] not in nice,
safe, nearly all the way across the Pacific, Hawaiian Islands.

Post by James Gassaway
Sortie the fleet? Not without proof. And copies of supposed
plans isn't proof.

To be fair, just having Hull send the 'We Know' message might be
enough to get the Japanese to abort, without Kimmel&Short doing
a thing different- and Dec. 7 is just another lazy Sunday in Paradise
as the IJN Strikeforce beats feet back to Japan


[1] Not that Dugout Doug did much with the late November Warning,
let alone the 'This is no drill Pearl Harbor attacked' messages
he got on the 8th(well 7th in Pearl)

**
mike
**

[James Gassaway]

Post by mike

Post by James Gassaway
Problem is that the US military would want independant confirmation
and IIRC our intelligence at the time placed the IJN carriers at
the home islands.

Probably, but at the least, PI and HI will be on full alert, which will
be noticed, even if the Ships stay put.

Post by James Gassaway
Increased air patrols? Sure. Go on alert? They already were nearly
on a war footing.

But were expecting something to happen to the PI[1] not in nice,
safe, nearly all the way across the Pacific, Hawaiian Islands.

Post by James Gassaway
Sortie the fleet? Not without proof. And copies of supposed
plans isn't proof.

To be fair, just having Hull send the 'We Know' message might be
enough to get the Japanese to abort, without Kimmel&Short doing
a thing different- and Dec. 7 is just another lazy Sunday in Paradise
as the IJN Strikeforce beats feet back to Japan

That would assume the "We Know" gets routed from the Japanese Foreign
Ministry to the War Ministry to the Fleet to the Strike Force. Given the
mentality that was apparently prevalent in the Imperial government at the
time, I don't think you can count on that. And even if they did, as long as
the fleet is in port the attack is still viable. Heavier Japanese aircraft
losses, sure. They actually expected that I believe. They would (IMHO)
accept the likelyhood of being attacked by air after the strike(s). I think
the only thing that would abort the attack once it was enroute was if they
_knew_ the US Navy had sortied. Short of that, they were so obsessed that
they still would have gone thru with it. (All of this is IMO, of course.)

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by mike

Post by James Gassaway
Problem is that the US military would want independant confirmation
and IIRC our intelligence at the time placed the IJN carriers at
the home islands.

Probably, but at the least, PI and HI will be on full alert, which will
be noticed, even if the Ships stay put.

The Japanese expected to achieve strategic surprise, but
not tactical surprise. That is, they expected the Striking
Force to be spotted about the time it came into attack
range. This would be completely unexpected by the Americans,
and while they were responding to it, thrashing about in
panic and confusion, the Japanese would make their attack.
They would not have tactical surprise (AA guns would be
manned and firing, for instance), but they believed the
excellence of their planes and pilots would still inflict
a devastating blow. For instance, they thought their fighters
would clear the skies of US planes. Also, they would actually
have numeric superiority in aircraft.

Post by mike

Post by James Gassaway
Increased air patrols? Sure. Go on alert? They already were
nearly on a war footing.

But were expecting something to happen to the PI[1] not in nice,
safe, nearly all the way across the Pacific, Hawaiian Islands.

They were somewhat alert in Hawaii: Kimmel had destroyers
on ASW patrol south of Oahu (one of them sank a midget sub
a few minutes before the air attack). He also had PBYs
patrolling well out to the SW. That's where the nearest
Japanese bases were, in the Marshall Islands, and that
was the most logical threat axis. Short made elaborate
arrangements to protect Oahu's Army Air Corp assets from
sabotage or commando attack by infiltrators.

The Japanese succeeded at Pearl Harbor because they achieved
complete strategic and tactical surprise. They achieved
surprise because they adopted a very risky strategy - which
for that very reason was not expected.

[Kris Overstreet]

Post by mike
Dec1 1941 Washington DC

Nix. The POD has to be after Pearl Harbor as per the first post in
thread; otherwise you're saying nothing more than that Japan's best
outcome in a war with the USA is never to get in a war with the USA.

Redneck

[mike]

Post by Kris Overstreet
Nix. The POD has to be after Pearl Harbor as per the first post in
thread; otherwise you're saying nothing more than that Japan's best
outcome in a war with the USA is never to get in a war with the USA.

I did put that in that disclaimer.

But yes, as soon as its Dec 8 after Pearl Harbor, even if its not as
destructive as OTLs, and even if the Japanese run even wilder for many
months more (Say Midway, the USN is blown out by the IJN, never fixes
the Sub torpedos, etc ), the US will keep building more ships and more
planes till Japan is a burnt out shell, which becomes more and more
likely
after August 1945, even if the USAAF flys the Atomic bombers at night
from bases in China if Island Atolls are not availiable. Even if it
takes till 1947 when B-35 and/or B-36 Bombers fly from Alaska

All the Japanese can do is just prolong the pain. They can't stop it.
They even can't really reduce it.
Like said upthread, they would have to invade(and be seemingly able
to keep a Foothold on CONUS) before any President would think of
any type of Armistice

**
mike
**

[Mike Ralls]

Post by mike
All the Japanese can do is just prolong the pain. They can't stop it.
They even can't really reduce it.

Disagree on the last part. If Japan does better in the early months,
then it's convievable that the US won't be able to do any big pushes
until 1944 or so. Japan will have had more
time to train and replace its pilots during the lull, so there won't
be any equivalent to the Marianas Turkey shoot until 1945 when
attrition will have really struck at the Japanese fighter program.

1944 and 1945 also won't see any of the huge American and Japanese
casualties that ran up in the island land battles in '44 and '45.
This is because by the time the Americans have taken the offensive they
will also have a much stronger submarine arm than in OTL thus
preventing the Japanese from shipping the men and supplies to the
islands that were such slaughterhouses in OTL.

The pace of advancement will also be slowed and I think we'll end up
with the US being in firebombing range of Japan at or a little after
the development of the A-bomb. It's used just like in OTL. IMO the
Japanese will probably surrender after two or three bombs, The Soviets
would invade per OTL and we would likely get the same N-S Korea split &
Soviet roll over of Manchuria as in OTL.

The end result of a more succesful early Japanese offensive TL is a
Japan that has suffered over one million fewer deaths than in OTL,
possibly as high as 2 million if they get lucky, and has only seen two
or three of its cities destroyed instead of virtually all of them,
excepting Kyoto, as in OTL. Ironically enough the US is also likely to
have suffered fewer casualties than OTL due to the absence of large land
battles (possible exception: The Philippines).

Any thoughts on how a much less damaged Japan would develop during the
occupation and afterwards?

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by Mike Ralls

Post by mike
All the Japanese can do is just prolong the pain. They can't stop it.
They even can't really reduce it.

Disagree on the last part. If Japan does better in the early months,
then it's convievable that the US won't be able to do any big pushes
until 1944 or so. Japan will have had more
time to train and replace its pilots during the lull, so there won't
be any equivalent to the Marianas Turkey shoot until 1945 when
attrition will have really struck at the Japanese fighter program.
1944 and 1945 also won't see any of the huge American and Japanese
casualties that ran up in the island land battles in '44 and '45.
This is because by the time the Americans have taken the offensive they
will also have a much stronger submarine arm than in OTL thus
preventing the Japanese from shipping the men and supplies to the
islands that were such slaughterhouses in OTL.
The pace of advancement will also be slowed and I think we'll end up
with the US being in firebombing range of Japan at or a little after
the development of the A-bomb. It's used just like in OTL. IMO the
Japanese will probably surrender after two or three bombs, The

Soviets

Post by Mike Ralls
would invade per OTL and we would likely get the same N-S Korea split &
Soviet roll over of Manchuria as in OTL.
The end result of a more succesful early Japanese offensive TL is a
Japan that has suffered over one million fewer deaths than in OTL,
possibly as high as 2 million if they get lucky, and has only seen two
or three of its cities destroyed instead of virtually all of them,
excepting Kyoto, as in OTL. Ironically enough the US is also likely to
have suffered fewer casualties than OTL due to the absence of large land
battles (possible exception: The Philippines).
Any thoughts on how a much less damaged Japan would develop during the
occupation and afterwards?
--
Mike Ralls
http://mikesbooknotes.blogspot.com/
"I love deadlines, especially the whooshing sound they make as they go
by." - Douglas Adams

Japan had at least as many submarines as Germany had when it started
WWII. Proper deployment, less victory fever and Japanese spirit
overcoming good sense and an aggresive strategy against U.S. ports
starting with Honolulu. If minelaying could bottle up Pearl Harbor, it
has a very narrow entrance, for periods of weeks the strategy of the
U.S. might change to a more Eastern operational area, which the
Japanese planned/hoped for/believed in after December 7.

Subsequent actual use of submarines to attack coastal and ocean
shipping, an (if necessary) suicide closing of the Panama Canal,
launching aircraft to actually attack West Coast cities with something
that would make more than a muffled noise, better radio intercept
capabilities and just maybe a break in the U.S. codes for Naval
command. Taking Midway as a submarine base, as it became for the US,
would place their forces further forward.

The major problem besides undue optimism was a side effect which the
Germans also had: it will be a short war so we play with what toys we
have and have no need to make many more and upgrade the ones we have.

[mike]

Post by Mike Ralls
then it's convievable that the US won't be able to do any big
pushes until 1944 or so. Japan will have had more
time to train and replace its pilots during the lull, so there
won't be any equivalent to the Marianas Turkey shoot until 1945
when attrition will have really struck at the Japanese fighter
program.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
check the numbers. Doesn't matter if the USN has every ship sunk
by 1943. Doomed, I tell ya.

In 1944, the US becan throttling back the economy, and even reducing
pilot training programs,as well slowing/stopping ship construction
of Essexes and Iowas in slips- just not needed.

If minelaying could bottle up Pearl Harbor, it has a very
narrow entrance, for periods of weeks the strategy of the

Like the USN not running sweepers? I have my doubts.

About the best thing the IJN could do to plug Pearl
would include the almost finished Yamato on the Dec. 7 strike
and have that sucker scuttle herself in the Channel, guns blazing

The major problem besides undue optimism was a side effect
which the Germans also had: it will be a short war so we play
with what toys we have and have no need to make many more and
upgrade the ones we have.

But if they have the clarity of thought to see that thier enemies
just might fight back to the last ounce of strength, just as the
two 'Supermen' 'Blessed by the Emperor' or whatever gave them
the delusion that they could fight and win the War, they wouldn't
have started it in the first place.

**
mike
**

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by mike

Post by Mike Ralls
then it's convievable that the US won't be able to do any big
pushes until 1944 or so. Japan will have had more
time to train and replace its pilots during the lull, so there
won't be any equivalent to the Marianas Turkey shoot until 1945
when attrition will have really struck at the Japanese fighter
program.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm
check the numbers. Doesn't matter if the USN has every ship sunk
by 1943. Doomed, I tell ya.
In 1944, the US becan throttling back the economy, and even reducing
pilot training programs,as well slowing/stopping ship construction
of Essexes and Iowas in slips- just not needed.

If minelaying could bottle up Pearl Harbor, it has a very
narrow entrance, for periods of weeks the strategy of the

Like the USN not running sweepers? I have my doubts.
About the best thing the IJN could do to plug Pearl
would include the almost finished Yamato on the Dec. 7 strike
and have that sucker scuttle herself in the Channel, guns blazing

The major problem besides undue optimism was a side effect
which the Germans also had: it will be a short war so we play
with what toys we have and have no need to make many more and
upgrade the ones we have.

But if they have the clarity of thought to see that thier enemies
just might fight back to the last ounce of strength, just as the
two 'Supermen' 'Blessed by the Emperor' or whatever gave them
the delusion that they could fight and win the War, they wouldn't
have started it in the first place.
**
mike
**

I presume you know of the various types of mines and their ability to
detonate or not detonate depending upon the size of ship. A torpedo
mine, see text below, sent into the channel at Pearl that sank a
cruiser would block that channel for weeks. This almost happened during
the Pearl Harbor raid when a damaged cruiser tried to clear the harbor
but was eventually beached. A variety of 'unsweepable' mines in the
soft bottom of the channel could detonate on long schedules, or when
disturbed by efforts at sweeping.


http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/mines.htm

Mines
Naval mines are relatively low-cost and highly effective weapons.
Potent ship killers, just the threat of mines can deter an enemy from
sending his surface ships or submarines into an area. Mines are
difficult to locate and sweep. They can be set to activate only when a
certain ship signature - the ship's machinery sounds, movement through
the water, or hull metal - is detected. Ship-counts can be set in the
mine to allow a specific number of ships to pass before the mine fires.
Some mines are bottom mines, placed on the seafloor, while others are
moored mines suspended in the water with part of the mine serving as an
anchor.


When deployed, mines may be used as offensive or defensive weapons. As
offensive weapons, they may be planted in the enemys waterways,
harbors, anchorages, and channels or they may be planted in sea lanes
removed from the enemys harbor areas to menace his military and
commercial shipping. The actual threat of such mines is frequently of
equal importance with the actual sinking of ships, since the presence
or threat of mines requires the necessary countermeasures to sweep or
neutralize them. Consequently, this causes delays in shipping schedules
which may require that ships use alternate routes and port areas. As
defensive weapons, mines may be planted in ports, harbors, channels,
anchorages (perimeter defenses), bays, estuaries, or open waters to
protect against enemy offensive seaborne attacks into these areas.


Modern magnetic, acoustic and pressure-sensitive mines were first
developed by the Germans during World War II. Also, the deployment of
mines by submarine and aircraft and the development of deep-sea mines
sharply increased the need for modern mine countermeasures. Mines were
used by all sides throughout World War II, and surface ships were
fitted with paravanes to fend off contact mines. In Japan, US aircraft
laid more than 12,000 mines around Japanese shipping routes and harbor
approaches, sinking 650 ships and choking off all maritime shipping.




Position
When classified according to the position they assume in the water,
mines fall into three categories: bottom mines, moored mines, and
drifting mines. Bottom mines are influence activated and rest at the
bottom of shallow areas of water. Moored mines are effective against
submarines as well as surface ships and are placed at a pre-determined
depth under the water. Drifting mines, which were banned under the
Hague Convention of 1907, move freely through the water. A moored mine
that has lost its tether cable becomes a drifting mine.

* Bottom Mines are most effective in comparatively shallow waters.
A large negative buoyancy (tendency to sink) brings the bottom mine to
rest on the ocean floor and keeps it there. In very deep waters,
surface vessels may pass over the mine without actuating its firing
mechanisms or, in the event of actuation, without suffering much
damage. Of course a bottom mine planted in deep water is still
effective against submarines.
* Moored Mines are used for deep water plants and are effective
against submarines and surface ships. The explosive charge and firing
mechanism in a moored mine are housed in a positive-buoyancy case,
i.e., one that tends to float. A cable, attached to an anchor on the
bottom, holds the case at a predetermined depth below the surface.
* Drifting Mines float freely at or near the surface. They have no
anchoring devices, and their buoyancy is approximately neutral.
Drifting mines are no longer represented in the US Navys stockpile.

Method of delivery
Mines can be deployed by aircraft, submarine, or surface ship. Air-laid
mines are dropped over an area, similar to a bomb. Submarine-laid mines
can be secretly planted and are usually launched from a sub's torpedo
tubes.


* Submarine-laid mines, normally used in offensive operations, are
specially configured mines that are launched from the torpedo tubes of
submarines. When secrecy is paramount, the submarine is the preferred
mine-laying vehicle. Although submarines can carry mines great
distances from home ports, they are not conducive to carrying large
payloads. Tactically, the limited number of mines that a submarine can
carry may be considered a disadvantage, but the secrecy with which a
submarine can deliver mines to an enemy port or operating area at great
distances from friendly bases provides an overwhelming tactical
advantage. Submarines can be highly effective in the minelaying role as
they are capable of covert operations, permitting them to enter waters
normally denied to surface ships or aircraft because of enemy forces,
bad weather, or ice. Most attack submarines can carry and lay mines.


Method of Actuation
Mines can be activated by contact, target influence, or remote control.
Contact mines are activated by physical touch and are the oldest and
most common type. Target influence mines seek to detect ships or
submarines using a magnetometer, hydrophone, or pressure device.
Influence mines can be calibrated to detonate only near ships of a
certain size. Controlled mines are remotely operated by a cable
connected to the shore.
Major Components

A typical bottom mine consists of an explosive case and a firing
mechanism. More complicated mines may be outfitted with a variety of
other features. A battery may be included in electronic mines; an
arming device may be employed to make a mine active only after it has
reached a certain depth, a ship counter that allows the mine to let a
certain number of valid targets pass before detonating, and a clock
delay and sterilizer that make the mine potent only for a certain
length of time, after which the mine shuts down. Air-delivered mines
may be fitted with a parachute and tail fins to lessen the impact as it
strikes the water.

A typical moored mine uses an anchor, which is located on the front of
the mine. Upon impact with the bottom of the water, the anchor section
breaks away and the rest of the mine rises upwards on a tether cable
until it reaches its pre-determined depth. Influence-type mines contain
a magnetometer, search coil, hydrophone or pressure-sensitive device
that can target specific classes of ships.

Magnetic mines utilize a magnetic search coil or magnetometer to detect
passing ships. The older, heavier search coils are used in bottom mines
to detect changes in the earth's magnetic field caused by passing
vessels. Newer magnetometers are often used in moored mines and can
detect ships or submarines in any direction.

Acoustic mines employ a hydrophone to detect the sounds emanated by
ships and submarines including engine and propeller noises. Such sounds
must meet certain criteria, including frequency band and must increase
in volume at a prescribed rate or the mine will ignore them.

Pressure mines use electro-hydraulic pressure sensors to detect ships
or submarines. The pressure sensor waits for the pressure drop
underwater associated with the passing of a vessel and, if the target
vessel is displacing enough water, the mine will actuate.
Sources and Resources

[pyotr filipivich]

Post by Jack Linthicum
I presume you know of the various types of mines and their ability to
detonate or not detonate depending upon the size of ship. A torpedo
mine, see text below, sent into the channel at Pearl that sank a
cruiser would block that channel for weeks. This almost happened during
the Pearl Harbor raid when a damaged cruiser tried to clear the harbor
but was eventually beached.

The USS Nevada was a cruiser? Hmmm, and all these years I thought it
was a Capital Ship, known as a Battleship.

Post by Jack Linthicum
A variety of 'unsweepable' mines in the
soft bottom of the channel could detonate on long schedules, or when
disturbed by efforts at sweeping.

And these unsweepable mines were available in 1940? Interesting.

tschus
pyotr

[Jack Linthicum]

Let the record show that "Jack Linthicum"

Post by Jack Linthicum
I presume you know of the various types of mines and their ability to
detonate or not detonate depending upon the size of ship. A torpedo
mine, see text below, sent into the channel at Pearl that sank a
cruiser would block that channel for weeks. This almost happened during
the Pearl Harbor raid when a damaged cruiser tried to clear the harbor
but was eventually beached.

The USS Nevada was a cruiser? Hmmm, and all these years I thought it
was a Capital Ship, known as a Battleship.

Post by Jack Linthicum
A variety of 'unsweepable' mines in the
soft bottom of the channel could detonate on long schedules, or when
disturbed by efforts at sweeping.

And these unsweepable mines were available in 1940? Interesting.
tschus
pyotr
--
pyotr
Go not to the Net for answers, for it will tell you Yes and no. And
you are a bloody fool, only an ignorant cretin would even ask the
question, forty two, 47, the second door, and how many blonde lawyers
does it take to change a lightbulb.

bad case of top of the head response and not looking far enough into At
Dawn We Slept. German torpedo acoustic mines were laid by the Japanese
in March 1943. The IJN had only four Kirai sen subs to lay their Type
88 (1928) mine swith 400 pounds of explosives (ok 396). An illustration
of the wishy-washy attitude towards mine laying is the addition of
gasoline tanks to the mine-layers to refuel aircraft.

This is WI so getting the Magnetic Mines, Acoustic Mines and Pressure
Mines from Germany to Japan is a matter of wanna. The following vaguely
supports what I was driving at. Sweeping a multi-sensor mine from the
mud at the bottom of a channel (35 feet) that needs constant dredging
is not a happy task.

http://pigtrail.uark.edu/people/rcordell/defense/minewar.html
These mines were first developed in 1917, but only the Germans
continued to work with them between wars. When 1939 arrived, the Nazis
were ready to launch a magnetic mine campaign, but the British were
just beginning to reconsider them.

The Japanese also had these types of mines, though not in as great
numbers as their European counterparts.

Acoustic Mines

The first acoustic mines were detected by the British in the Thames
Estuary in October of 1940. These mines operated via a microphone that
was set to react to particular sound signatures - the propellers
turning in the water. The mine could be set to respond to a particular
frequency of sound - thus controlling whether or not the mine would
detonate when a particular kind of ship passed overhead. If it was set
with a "coarse" setting, it would target more kinds of ships (since
they all had different sound signatures), but they would be easier to
sweep that way. A "fine" setting would not explode until a larger
vessel, with its louder and lower sound signature, passed overhead.



Pressure Mines

The Germans also produced mines that lay on the seabed and operated on
the pressure waves of a ship passing overhead. The Japanese also used
these kinds of mines, and I'm gathering information on them.


http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761569623/Pearl_Harbor.html
The channel is 11 m (35 ft) deep, and the harbor has a maximum depth of
18 m (60 ft), making the harbor available to the largest naval vessels.

[mike]

Post by Jack Linthicum
I presume you know of the various types of mines and their ability to
detonate or not detonate depending upon the size of ship.

<snip infodump>

yes, but going from a quicky google...
http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WAMJAP_Mines.htm

'Aircraft Type 3 Mark 1 Model 1'
1,411 pounds, and since its 'Type 3' thats a mid-war development
(Japanese Year 2603, or 1943AD)and not availiable for PH


http://www.portorfordlifeboatstation.org/article10.html

'Prior to World War II, the Imperial Japanese Navy did not spend much
energy on mines. Mines were considered to be an defensive weapon;
Japanese Navy doctrine was almost exclusively offensive. Almost all
Japanese mines were of Hertz Horn construction - note the horns on
the mine above.' -- refering to a pic that isn't all that different
from the classic WWI Mine: just like that Gilligan's Island episode,
as more have probably seen that than grainy 50-90 year old photos.

Now Japanese could improvise, shown by the wood fins to allow
Torps in the shallows and Naval Shells used as bombs, but pre-WWII,
electronic gadgetry and Japan wasn't what most folks though of, for
good reason most of the Time[1]. They didn't do well with cutting
edge tech like Radar or Sonar

To me, the IJN mindset would be of 'why have a pilot carry a 1500
pound mine, when his craft could carry a bomb or torpedo, and be
more sure of damaging the enemy?'

[1] But as in all things, there are standouts, like Prof. Yagi

**
mike
**

[k***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

Post by Jack Linthicum
A variety of 'unsweepable' mines in the
soft bottom of the channel could detonate on long schedules, or when
disturbed by efforts at sweeping.

According to Naval Weapons of WW2 the Japanese never manufactured
influence mines. The only ones used were 93 captured Allied ones in
1945.

Ken Young
***@cix.co.uk
Maternity is a matter of fact
Paternity is a matter of opinion

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk

Post by Jack Linthicum
A variety of 'unsweepable' mines in the
soft bottom of the channel could detonate on long schedules, or when
disturbed by efforts at sweeping.

According to Naval Weapons of WW2 the Japanese never manufactured
influence mines. The only ones used were 93 captured Allied ones in
1945.
Ken Young
Maternity is a matter of fact
Paternity is a matter of opinion

The Germans did, this is WI not What did

[James Gassaway]

Post by Jack Linthicum

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk

Post by Jack Linthicum
A variety of 'unsweepable' mines in the
soft bottom of the channel could detonate on long schedules, or

when

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk

Post by Jack Linthicum
disturbed by efforts at sweeping.

According to Naval Weapons of WW2 the Japanese never manufactured
influence mines. The only ones used were 93 captured Allied ones in
1945.

The Germans did, this is WI not What did

A What-If with the POD being Dec 8, 1941. So the Japanese could acquire
these from the Germans _after_ the Pearl Harbor attack, which means they are
unlikely in the extreme to get any into the harbor channel.

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by James Gassaway

Post by Jack Linthicum

In article

Post by Jack Linthicum
A variety of 'unsweepable' mines in the
soft bottom of the channel could detonate on long schedules, or

when

Post by Jack Linthicum
disturbed by efforts at sweeping.

According to Naval Weapons of WW2 the Japanese never

manufactured

Post by James Gassaway

Post by Jack Linthicum

influence mines. The only ones used were 93 captured Allied ones in
1945.

The Germans did, this is WI not What did

A What-If with the POD being Dec 8, 1941. So the Japanese could acquire
these from the Germans _after_ the Pearl Harbor attack, which means they are
unlikely in the extreme to get any into the harbor channel.
--
Multiversal Mercenaries
You name it, we kill it. Any time, any reality

IIRC the Japanese had submarines after December 7, 1941 and used them
to perform missions to places futher than Hawaii. It is quite possible
with a forward strategist such as a modern Shinshi Akiyama or
longer-lived Nobumasa Suetsugu might have driven the IJN submarine
fleet to actually accomplish something besides troop carrying and
reconnaisance roles. It would not matter when a series of mines were
placed in the entrance of Pearl Harbor, one success would be enough to
make the port more tenuous. Similar tactics to the later U.S. practice
in Japanese home waters, carried out by the IJN in Hawaii and on the
West Coast would have been successful if only expending U.S. energy on
defense. The blocking of the Panama Canal would be of enormous utility.

I suggest you didn't read my earlier post about the Japanese using
German mines in 1943 and are mouthbreathing.

[mike]

Post by Jack Linthicum
Similar tactics to the later U.S. practice
in Japanese home waters, carried out by the IJN in Hawaii and on the
West Coast would have been successful if only expending U.S. energy
on defense. The blocking of the Panama Canal would be of enormous
utility.

More like all the men and money spent on the existing Harbor Entrance
Control Points at

Pearl Harbor, HI
Fort Amador, Panama Canal Zone
Fort Rosecrans at San Diego, CA[1]
Fort MacArthur at San Pedro, CA
Fort Winfield Scott at San Francisco[2]
Fort Stevens on the Columbia River
Fort Worden at Puget Sound, WA


Might have a chance to shoot at something and not be totally
wasted effort,as OTL.

even doubling this effort to cover more minor ports still
wouldn't help Japan win. They can damage more ships, but
not enough to swing the War, or even slow the US timetable much.
As of Dec 8, they are done.
Stick a Fork in 'em.

[1]http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/cabr/hrs6.htm
pretty typical HECP, but is light on details of Hydrophones,
Nets, command mines and detector loops that were emplaced as War was on
[2] Many also had Harbor Defense Command Posts (HDCP), which did about
the same thing as the HECP, but it was _Army_ staffed. Politics made
sure that both Army and Navy got to take a swing at it.

**
mike
**

[The Horny Goat]

Post by mike
Fort Worden at Puget Sound, WA
Might have a chance to shoot at something and not be totally
wasted effort,as OTL.

Japanese u-boats in Puget Sound?

You do know that to get there you have to go PAST the main Canadian
Pacific naval base _AND_ a fairly significant US naval base?

What a concept!

Maybe lay a few mines off Esquimault but attack Seattle? Sealion is
looking pretty good by comparison...

[a***@pacific.net.au]

On Mon, 09 May 2005 13:22:11 -0500, Kris Overstreet

Post by Kris Overstreet
Imagine two hundred thousand Japanese Army soldiers invading Oahu.

Consider the reality of 200,000 Japanese soldiers starving to death as
they could not possibly be supplied on Oahu.

Consider the rolling victories of Commonwealth and Chinese forces in
the CBI theater as the Japanese armed forces there wither on the vine
(the few that are actually left in the BI area) because the Japanese
simply did not have the capacity to supply your fantasy invasion of
Oahu *and* the CBI.

In short, try and figure out *why* the Japanese didn't do what you are
suggesting.

There are three answers.

1) Logistics
2) Logistics

and

3) Logistics

Not enough ships, basically. What there were weren't large enough or
fast enough. Not the glam glam warships. But the vitally important
Marus.

Post by Kris Overstreet
Imagine repeated strikes by air and sea on the Panama Canal and
shipyards and naval bases on the American west coast.

Imagine the Japanese ships trying this running out of fuel in mid
ocean either on the way there or the way back as they had no way of
supplying them with fuel to get there and back because of their
inherent logistic limits.

Post by Kris Overstreet
Imagine invasion of California by 1943.

With what and on what?

Unless the Japanese get a visit from JC who teachers them to walk on
water this is simply a fantasy so fantastic that no-one who has the
slightest knowledge of WW2 could possibly do anything but ROTFL.

I hope that you are actually implying the reverse of what you are
saying.

Phil

Author, Space Opera (FGU), RBB #1 (FASA), Road to Armageddon (PGD).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Email: ***@pacific.net.au

[Kris Overstreet]

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
On Mon, 09 May 2005 13:22:11 -0500, Kris Overstreet

Post by Kris Overstreet
Imagine two hundred thousand Japanese Army soldiers invading Oahu.

Consider the reality of 200,000 Japanese soldiers starving to death as
they could not possibly be supplied on Oahu.
Consider the rolling victories of Commonwealth and Chinese forces in
the CBI theater as the Japanese armed forces there wither on the vine
(the few that are actually left in the BI area) because the Japanese
simply did not have the capacity to supply your fantasy invasion of
Oahu *and* the CBI.
In short, try and figure out *why* the Japanese didn't do what you are
suggesting.
There are three answers.
1) Logistics
2) Logistics
and
3) Logistics
Not enough ships, basically. What there were weren't large enough or
fast enough. Not the glam glam warships. But the vitally important
Marus.

Which were insufficient in the extreme for ANY supply of ANY Japanese
force ANYWHERE.

Sorry, but to my reading of things the Japanese considered logistics
only for offensive maneuvers. Once territory was siezed, they lived
off the land for the most part. The only things they needed to ship,
for the most part, was ammo and fuel. Food and medical supplies were,
at best, a luxury.

Also consider that the Japanese were on the offensive in Burma/India
into 1945 and in China up to the invasion of Manchuria by the Soviet
Union. Despite the disintegrating supply conditions, the Japanese kept
attacking wherever they could, by whatever means they could.
Logistics, for them, were secondary to attack.

If the Japanese decide, prior to Coral Sea and Midway, that the only
way they can win is to throw absolutely everything at the United
States- and that IS the only way they can win- then I think they will
find or scrounge enough fuel and ammo for the task, just as they found
the fuel and ammo for all the pointless, distracting attacks they
engaged in OTL.

Post by a***@pacific.net.au

Post by Kris Overstreet
Imagine invasion of California by 1943.

With what and on what?
Unless the Japanese get a visit from JC who teachers them to walk on
water this is simply a fantasy so fantastic that no-one who has the
slightest knowledge of WW2 could possibly do anything but ROTFL.
I hope that you are actually implying the reverse of what you are
saying.

Let me put this bluntly.

If Japan stands on the defensive... THEY LOSE. PERIOD.

If Japan only attacks meaningless island bases close to home... THEY
LOSE. PERIOD.

If Japan invades India, Sinkiang, or Australia, none of which are
truly vital to the Allied war effort or helpful to Japan... THEY LOSE.
PERIOD.

ONLY by gambling it all and focusing all their industrial, logistical
and military efforts on making the United States unable to wage war in
Asia or the Pacific do they have even the faint prayer that they have
of forcing the US to sue for peace.

In OTL, despite their chronic shortages, the Japanese found the
supplies early in the war for a host of offensive operations, mostly
to no valuable effect for their final victory. They undertook these
operations in spite of blatant logistic shortcomings and persisted in
them long after it was obvious that the operations only served to
waste manpower, materiel and time.

Furthermore, when Japanese troops were cut off from supply, they held
out for surprisingly long periods of time. Rabaul in particular comes
to mind- a major Japanese military base with a garrison of over
100,000 people, bypassed and cut off by MacArthur and Halsey but never
surrendered or evacuated until the end of the war.

The capture of Oahu, and with it Hawaii, would give Japan the forward
base it needs to directly attack the Panama Canal and the US west
coast. 200,000 troops could be supplied in the same methods used by
the Japanese in the Phillipines- i. e. massive abuse, starvation and
enslavement of the local population. (This presumes that the Pacific
US command was prompt in destroying its own supplies to prevent
capture.) The military success of such a campaign is a longshot at
best... but the Japanese could support it if they stood to the
defensive on all other fronts and focused all their efforts on this
push.

As for the British, they're crippled to the breaking point by the
European war. Knock out the USA, and anything the Brits take or hold
can be taken by the victorious Japanese afterwards. Allow the USA to
get its economic and military feet under itself, and no victory is
possible.

Redneck

[a***@pacific.net.au]

On Tue, 10 May 2005 14:58:34 -0500, Kris Overstreet

Post by Kris Overstreet

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
On Mon, 09 May 2005 13:22:11 -0500, Kris Overstreet

Post by Kris Overstreet
Imagine two hundred thousand Japanese Army soldiers invading Oahu.

Consider the reality of 200,000 Japanese soldiers starving to death as
they could not possibly be supplied on Oahu.
Consider the rolling victories of Commonwealth and Chinese forces in
the CBI theater as the Japanese armed forces there wither on the vine
(the few that are actually left in the BI area) because the Japanese
simply did not have the capacity to supply your fantasy invasion of
Oahu *and* the CBI.
In short, try and figure out *why* the Japanese didn't do what you are
suggesting.
There are three answers.
1) Logistics
2) Logistics
and
3) Logistics
Not enough ships, basically. What there were weren't large enough or
fast enough. Not the glam glam warships. But the vitally important
Marus.

Which were insufficient in the extreme for ANY supply of ANY Japanese
force ANYWHERE.

Simply not true. The Japanese had limited logistic capabilities, but
could supply forces if they chose ... problem is, they had basically
enough to supply *one* Theater.

In late 1941 they basically abandoned offensive operations in China to
supply and move troops and ships and aircraft in operations in the SE
Asia and the South and SW Pacific.

By 1942 the emphasis had turned to supplying offensive operations in
the Burma/India Theater.

It was only in 1943-44 that they turned supplies back to offensive
operations in China.

Post by Kris Overstreet
Sorry, but to my reading of things the Japanese considered logistics
only for offensive maneuvers. Once territory was siezed, they lived
off the land for the most part. The only things they needed to ship,
for the most part, was ammo and fuel. Food and medical supplies were,
at best, a luxury.

Indeed. However, in many places there was simply no option but to send
food.

Pacific islands, for example, usually had garrisons far larger than
could be supplied from sources *on* said islands. External supply was
a necessity.

And to move food around, even if produced locally, to where the troops
were required POL that the Japanese didn't have in sufficient amounts
and had insufficient transport to move adequately.

Post by Kris Overstreet
Also consider that the Japanese were on the offensive in Burma/India
into 1945 and in China up to the invasion of Manchuria by the Soviet
Union. Despite the disintegrating supply conditions, the Japanese kept

Indeed, that was because they had switched their limited resources to
supplying those areas because they could no longer supply anywhere
else because of selfsame limited transport resources.

Post by Kris Overstreet
attacking wherever they could, by whatever means they could.
Logistics, for them, were secondary to attack.

And this brilliant idea lost them the war.

Worse, it was brilliant enough to get them to go to war against the
largest industrial powers in the world at the time with an economy
less than 1/20th the size of the largest.

Really ... dumb.

Post by Kris Overstreet
If the Japanese decide, prior to Coral Sea and Midway, that the only
way they can win is to throw absolutely everything at the United
States- and that IS the only way they can win- then I think they will
find or scrounge enough fuel and ammo for the task, just as they found
the fuel and ammo for all the pointless, distracting attacks they
engaged in OTL.

And it will make exactly no difference at all. None. Zip. Nada. Zero.
Null.

Logistics is more than just finding POL, it is about moving that POL
around. It is more than even finding and moving POL, it is about
supply in the broader sense ... manufacturing new equipment (and
better equipment), training soldiers (and sailors and airmen), moving
the manufactured goods (and the raw materials needed to make them) and
the soldiers around.

It is regrettable for your assertion that the Japanese were, using
technical terms here, up shit creek without a paddle, when it came to
doing these things.

Post by Kris Overstreet

Post by a***@pacific.net.au

Post by Kris Overstreet
Imagine invasion of California by 1943.

With what and on what?
Unless the Japanese get a visit from JC who teachers them to walk on
water this is simply a fantasy so fantastic that no-one who has the
slightest knowledge of WW2 could possibly do anything but ROTFL.
I hope that you are actually implying the reverse of what you are
saying.

Let me put this bluntly.
If Japan stands on the defensive... THEY LOSE. PERIOD.

Let *me* put this bluntly.

If Japan goes to war with the major industrial powers (UK/Commonwealth
and US, basically) THEY LOSE. PERIOD.

NOTHING can change this outcome.

Not even violent handwaving.

Post by Kris Overstreet
If Japan only attacks meaningless island bases close to home... THEY
LOSE. PERIOD.

If Japan attacks US and Commonwealth interests ... THEY LOSE. PERIOD.

Post by Kris Overstreet
If Japan invades India, Sinkiang, or Australia, none of which are
truly vital to the Allied war effort or helpful to Japan... THEY LOSE.
PERIOD.

If Japan attacks Pearl Harbour, SE Asia, the PI, and CBI while also
involved in India ... THEY LOSE. PERIOD.

Post by Kris Overstreet
ONLY by gambling it all and focusing all their industrial, logistical
and military efforts on making the United States unable to wage war in
Asia or the Pacific do they have even the faint prayer that they have
of forcing the US to sue for peace.

Only in some revisionist wet dream based on the situation as it was on
8 Dec 41.

I am sure you are not aware, or have forgotten, that the US utilised
around 85% of its resources (industrial and other) in pursuit of
victory in WW2.

About 15% of the total was used against Japan.

The remaining 70% was used against the Germans and Italians.

AT BEST what the Japanese do if they follow the "plan" you suggest is
that they attract whatever extra resources the US needs to fuck them
over, royally.

Which delays VE day until late 45 after the US nukes a number of
German cities. Which was the original intention of the A Bomb program.
Targets had even been picked.

The Japanese, the moment they were insane enough to attack Industrial
powers 20 times or more larger than they were, well ... THEY LOSE.
PERIOD.

Fantasy assertions aside.

Post by Kris Overstreet
Furthermore, when Japanese troops were cut off from supply, they held
out for surprisingly long periods of time. Rabaul in particular comes

Because the allies realised that they were a huge, pointless, POW
camp.

Post by Kris Overstreet
The capture of Oahu, and with it Hawaii, would give Japan the forward
base it needs to directly attack the Panama Canal and the US west

Sadly, this is wankfest fantasy.

The Japanese simply did not have the transport needed to move the
troops there and then supply them. This has been shown time and time
again on this group.

Maniacal handwaving will not change this.

The sad fact is that ... THEY LOSE. PERIOD.

Phil

Author, Space Opera (FGU), RBB #1 (FASA), Road to Armageddon (PGD).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Email: ***@pacific.net.au

[James Gassaway]

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
Maniacal handwaving will not change this.
The sad fact is that ... THEY LOSE. PERIOD.

I can't remember who it was, but someone here researched the number of ships
the US built (and scrapped incomplete in late '44/'45). The US was only
just starting to hit its stride, production wise, in 1945. One Yamato-class
vs. one Iowa-class, some edge to Japan. One Yamato-class vs. ten
Iowa-class, lots of dead IJN sailors. And the twenty Essex-class carriers
don't even bother changing course or speed on their way to flattening some
Japanese base.

They lose, period, yup.

[Daniel Silevitch]

Post by James Gassaway

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
Maniacal handwaving will not change this.
The sad fact is that ... THEY LOSE. PERIOD.

I can't remember who it was, but someone here researched the number of ships
the US built (and scrapped incomplete in late '44/'45). The US was only
just starting to hit its stride, production wise, in 1945. One Yamato-class
vs. one Iowa-class, some edge to Japan. One Yamato-class vs. ten
Iowa-class, lots of dead IJN sailors. And the twenty Essex-class carriers
don't even bother changing course or speed on their way to flattening some
Japanese base.

Sort of. The US scaled back production of ships starting in late 44 or
so.[1] Basically, the thought was that the war would only go through 46 at
the latest, so why build something that won't be ready until 47. Scrapping
partially-built stuff didn't really happen until after the war, though.

-dms

[1] e.g, per http://www.hazegray.org/navhist/carriers/us_fleet.htm , on 28
March 1945, the US cancelled orders for 6 Essex class carriers.

[d***@anonymous.to]

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
Let *me* put this bluntly.
If Japan goes to war with the major industrial powers

(UK/Commonwealth

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
and US, basically) THEY LOSE. PERIOD.
NOTHING can change this outcome.
Not even violent handwaving.

Post by Kris Overstreet
If Japan only attacks meaningless island bases close to home... THEY
LOSE. PERIOD.

If Japan attacks US and Commonwealth interests ... THEY LOSE. PERIOD.

Jesus, we know this. Nobody's impressed by your shouting. The
question is what is the *best case* for Japan in WW2?

[Kris Overstreet]

Post by d***@anonymous.to
Jesus, we know this. Nobody's impressed by your shouting. The
question is what is the *best case* for Japan in WW2?

Given the impossibility of Japanese victory in WW2 (something which I
do not concede- Japanese victory is wildly improbable, but not
completely impossible)- then OTL probably IS the best case scenario.

Anything which shortens the war means a US invasion of the Japanese
home islands, which in turn means massive civilian casualties and a
strong possibility of long-term bitterness in the future.

Anything which prolongs the war means Soviet invasion of Hokkaido and
the post-war partition of Japan. Instead of the Korean War, we have
the "police action in Japan" c. 1950.

And the US will not negotiate unless forced to do so, which means
barring massive military setbacks (note: high casualty lists do not
equal setbacks) they won't negotiate. Unconditional surrender or
nothing.

Redneck

[heretic]

Post by a***@pacific.net.au

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
Let *me* put this bluntly.
If Japan goes to war with the major industrial powers

(UK/Commonwealth

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
and US, basically) THEY LOSE. PERIOD.
NOTHING can change this outcome.
Not even violent handwaving.

Post by Kris Overstreet
If Japan only attacks meaningless island bases close to home... THEY
LOSE. PERIOD.

If Japan attacks US and Commonwealth interests ... THEY LOSE. PERIOD.

Jesus, we know this. Nobody's impressed by your shouting. The
question is what is the *best case* for Japan in WW2?

Post 7 Dec.? Like I said, pull back to Status Quo Ante Bellum and send
an extremely abject (although dignified) apology (along with the heads
of the War Cabinet factions). How this can be done domestically in
Japan, let alone how to finess the negotiations with the Yankees, is an
exercise best left to the reader.

HTG

[Anthony Buckland]

Post by heretic
...

Post by d***@anonymous.to
The
question is what is the *best case* for Japan in WW2?

Post 7 Dec.? Like I said, pull back to Status Quo Ante Bellum and send
an extremely abject (although dignified) apology (along with the heads
of the War Cabinet factions). How this can be done domestically in
Japan, let alone how to finess the negotiations with the Yankees, is an
exercise best left to the reader.

Post-Dec 7, there is no good case. Otherwise, the best case might
be to studiously avoid attacking any English-speaking power,
consolidate in China, and take Indochina and Indonesia, whose
colonial rulers of the time were occupied by Germany and could
therefore be forced into some kind of fake relinquishment of
their territories. Then hope the US becomes sufficiently entangled
with Germany.

[Larry M Headlund]

Post by Anthony Buckland

Post by heretic

Post by d***@anonymous.to
The
question is what is the *best case* for Japan in WW2?

Post 7 Dec.? Like I said, pull back to Status Quo Ante Bellum and send
an extremely abject (although dignified) apology (along with the heads
of the War Cabinet factions). How this can be done domestically in
Japan, let alone how to finess the negotiations with the Yankees, is an
exercise best left to the reader.

Post-Dec 7, there is no good case. Otherwise, the best case might
be to studiously avoid attacking any English-speaking power,
consolidate in China, and take Indochina and Indonesia, whose
colonial rulers of the time were occupied by Germany and could
therefore be forced into some kind of fake relinquishment of
their territories. Then hope the US becomes sufficiently entangled
with Germany.

Sticking with the Post Dec 7 restriction, here is the best I can come up
with(No victory, I leave that to bolder spirits than I):

POD #1: Something like a Japanese win at Midway. It was a near run thing
in OTL and it isn't inconcievable that the Japanese sink US carriers
instead of 100% the other way.

PLUS

POD #2

Some commanders get switched around and the US runs into the Peililu/Okinawa
tactics earlier in the Pacific war. No banzai charge instead dig in and
make the Alies bleen for every island.

From the Allies point of view the war against Japan looks like a bloody
and expensive slog. Imagine the US reaction to the battle for Okinawa
set a couple of years earlier.

From the Japanese point of view everything is going according to plan,
as much as they had a plan. Defeat the US Navy. Conquer a lot territory
and wear out the US until it offers a deal.

Now the ASB: Japan offers to surrender.

I said it was ASB.

At the very least I would think that the Allies, astonished and weighing
the cost, may let Japan keep Formosa and Korea, Possibly even Manchuko.
Almost certainly Japan gives up all the formerly German Pacific islands
she snapped up in WWI and pays reparations. Expect a virutal dismantling
of the Japanese military.

Would the Allies, offered such a bargain as this and with a somewhat
worse position than in OTL, with a European war still raging, turn
down such a bargain?

Things could get sticky if after all the terms are settled and everything
signed the details of Japanese behavior in Hong Kong and the Phillipines
comes to light.

[The Horny Goat]

On Wed, 11 May 2005 14:44:35 -0700, Anthony Buckland

Post by Anthony Buckland
Post-Dec 7, there is no good case. Otherwise, the best case might
be to studiously avoid attacking any English-speaking power,
consolidate in China, and take Indochina and Indonesia, whose
colonial rulers of the time were occupied by Germany and could
therefore be forced into some kind of fake relinquishment of
their territories. Then hope the US becomes sufficiently entangled
with Germany.

Given the British guarantee to the Dutch concerning their colonial
possessions taking the Dutch East Indies might be a bit difficult
without involving the UK and Australia.

Once Japan starts taking Hong Kong, Malaya, Singapore etc. it's a bit
difficult to conceive of the United States staying out.

Furthermore, the Japanese didn't believe they could supply the Dutch
East Indies reliably with an American held Phillipines though I would
have thought this would have been feasible with the Japanese
controlling Taiwan and French Indochina. (At least the western portion
which is where the oil fields are which is all the Japanese really
cared about - I'm not really aware they were enthusiastically lusting
after New Guinea for its own sake!)

[a***@pacific.net.au]

On Tue, 10 May 2005 14:58:34 -0500, Kris Overstreet
In short, try and figure out *why* the Japanese didn't do what you are
suggesting.

There are three answers.

1) Logistics
2) Logistics

and

3) Logistics

Not enough ships, basically. What there were weren't large enough or
fast enough. Not the glam glam warships. But the vitally important
Marus.

Post by Kris Overstreet
Which were insufficient in the extreme for ANY supply of ANY Japanese
force ANYWHERE.
Sorry, but to my reading of things the Japanese considered logistics
only for offensive maneuvers. Once territory was siezed, they lived
off the land for the most part. The only things they needed to ship,
for the most part, was ammo and fuel. Food and medical supplies were,
at best, a luxury.

I can only, charitably, assume that your reading has been confined to
Japanese fanboy wankfest websites as the above statement and all that
followed (and which has been snipped) shows a complete and total lack
of even the most basic knowledge about Japanese logistic limitations.

Since you seem basically sincere and *n*o*t* grindingly stupid, the
only explanation is as I have posited ... a complete a total lack of
information.

So, lets start Japanese Logistics 101.

* Why did the Japanese attack the US in 1941?

Answer: Because of oil. The US, for what seemed good and proper
reasons at the time, cut off Japan's supply of oil. Since Japan
imported something like 97% of her oil from overseas sources, this was
a problem <massive understatement>

This was made somewhat worse <massive understatement> by the fact that
almost 100% of the oil Japan imported was *not* carried in Japanese
tankers. For the simple reason that Japan *had* almost no tankers. The
oil was carried in US or allied flagged tankers. The US embargo ended
all access of the Japanese to these tankers.

So, Japan has a problem - they have reserves that will fuel the
military and the civilian economy for around 18 months, at which point
everything will essentially grind to a halt and they will be reduced
to the stone age *or* they can get out of China *or* they can get the
oil. Somehow.

* So, where is the nearest oil?

Answer: In the Netherlands East Indies and Borneo.

Problem is, these are owned by Holland and the UK. Holland and the UK
have their own problems and need the oil themselves and, even if they
were inclined to thumb their noses at the US embargo, more
importantly, they don't have any tankers to spare to ship it to Japan.

Worse. The US embargo also involved a general trade embargo (more or
less) which meant that Japan was essentially out of the foreign
exchange she needed to buy the oil that wasn't available and that she
couldn't earn it, either.

So she had the same problem - 18 months of oil, then stone age *or*
get out of China *or* *s*t*e*a*l* the oil.

* Whose oil do they steal?

Answer: Dutch and British oil.

Problem. To get to Malaya, Borneo and the NEI, their invasion forces
*and* their merchant shipping have to pass close to the Phillippines.

Problem. The US owns (effectively) the Phillippines.

Problem. The US has significant armed forces in the Phillippines and
has well known plans to reinforce it with the bulk of PacFleet.

Problem. Who was it again who put Japan in this shithole? The one with
no oil, no hope of buying it and no hope of moving it?

Bingo! The US.

So, the Japanese High Command, not being Japanese Fanboy Wankers,
realised that the US had to be neutralised or they were even further
up shit creek, and arse deep in alligators to boot, with no paddles,
and a leaky canoe and no bailer.

* How do the Japanese ensure the US doesn't fuck with their stealing
the Dutch and British oil?

Answer: They neutralise the US PacFleet. This means attacking Pearl
Harbour. This means that the Phillippines cannot be reinforced and
will fall. It means that the British and Dutch positions in SE Asia
is, at best, dicey, at worst, unsupportable and doomed to defeat.

Problem. The US is 20 times <at least!> larger an economy than Japan
in all areas. The only advantage that Japan has, militarily, is that
it has spent ruinously huge amounts of money on her armed forces in
the inter-war years while the US has not. So, the *at start* forces
are somewhat in Japan's favour.

Problem. Yamamoto and the few sane Japanese commanders know that there
is no way that Japan can realistically force the US out of the war
militarily and that the chance of a political settlement once the
Japanese attack the US is less than nil. But they can't convince the
true lunatics of this. And the true lunatics are in charge of the
asylum.

So, that sets the scene. But it gets worse.

From the Japanese bases in Formosa and China where their troops used
for the invasion of the PI and Malaya/NEI/Borneo were staged out of,
is around 2000 klicks each way.

The Japanese were so short of shipping that the initial stages of
their invasion of these areas involved the moving around of, IIRC,
50-70,000 troops (and certainly no more than 100,000). Even so, in
both instances, the Japanese almost ran out of supplies before
Singapore and in the PI. They simply didn't have the capacity to move
more men or, indeed, to effectively supply those that they could move.

From Japanese bases to the Hawaiian Islands is around 6000 klicks.
Each way. So divide the forces that the Japanese can lift and drop by
1/3 ... around 20,000 men ... and that's all they can get to the
Hawaiian Islands.

But it gets worse.

The average Japanese Maru was around 3-5000 GRT and had a top speed of
around 5-6 kts.

The average Allied merchie was around 8-12000 GRT and had a top speed
of around 10-14 kts.

To move the same amount of troops and supplies on a ton for ton basis
the Japs need at least triple the number of ships.

But when you factor in the speed of the ships, you have to halve the
amount effectively available, at least ... meaning that the Japanese
can only move and supply 1/6 of the troops and supplies that the US
could for the same tonnage, not allowing for the inefficient design of
Japanese merchantmen compared to allied ones.

Now, consider the Normandy campaign. The Allies moved a hell of a lot
of troops 20 miles or so. And the campaign became a race between the
allies and the nazis to see who could get the most troops into
Normandy the fastest.

The Allies won, moderately handily.

The Japanese have to move and drop, and then supply, no more than
20,000 (and probably, realistically, 10,000) men across 6000 klicks
*each way* with a merchant marine that was woefully inadequate to the
task, and with troops untrained in amphibious warfare (read the record
of Japanese SNLFs ... woeful is being too generous), and face, IIRC,
the equivalent of 2 US divisions already in place, plus the Hawaii
National Guard, plus another full division that actually arrived,
IIRC, something like 4 weeks after the attack ... probably 80000 men
or so in those units alone, and you see the problem.

Worse, the Japanese did not have the oilers and tankers needed to keep
the Kido Butai in the area, and, in any case, operational losses would
soon have emasculated it (and that's only POL, the Japs had *no*
resupply vessels fitted for unerway replenishment of ordnance and
stores, so the KB would have to return to the Marianas or wherever
every 2-3 days ... probably a week or more for voyage time and loading
each way ... before heading back. Not a great way to maintain air
superiority), so the US will dominate the air very quickly.

And, well, no ... the Japanese are having a hard enough time supplying
the 10-20,000 ground troops on the islands, so forget about supplying
significant numbers of army fighters/bombers there.

And, well, have you realised what the biggest hole in the Japanese
Fanboy Wankfest is?

Yep.

You guessed it.

To do the invasion of Hawaii, they have to completely forego *ANY*
attempt to take the Phillipines, Borneo, Malaya or the NEI.

Since these were close run things as it was, whatever residual forces
the Japanese can commit mean that they have zip or less chance of
success.

So ... see the problem?

No oil.

No hope of getting the oil.

And, if they take the Hawaiian islands (no chance) even minimal supply
with their specific merchant shipping problems (capacity, speed, range
etc.) mean that they won't be able to move or supply enough forces to
take the PI or the NEI or Borneo and Malaya even with the Hawaiian
islands theirs.

OK. Finally, you propose that the US will, having lost the Hawaiian
islands (which is impossible, but just for the sake of refuting your
position), roll over and say to the Japanese "please! please! fuck me
up the bum!"

General sounds of mass ROTFL.

Right. Pull the other one. It plays "jingle bells."

The only thing that is going to happen if the Japanese manage to try
an invasion is that the 15% of the US War economy (i.e. 3x more than
the Japanese could produce) that was allocated to the PTO will be
boosted by as much more as is neede to fuck the Japanese over. as much
more as is needed.

And, lets get real here, the Japanese are (in December 1941)
congenitally incapable of committing multiple, ongoing, vicious,
brutal, inhumane atrocities on a mass scale against all the
inhabitants of the Hawaiian islands ... and there is no way the US
will roll over and let them fuck them in the bum for this.

None.

Nada.

Zip.

Zero.

Zilch.

As I said initially.

Logistics.

Logistics.

Logistics.

Phil

Author, Space Opera (FGU), RBB #1 (FASA), Road to Armageddon (PGD).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Email: ***@pacific.net.au

[David Johnson]

***@pacific.net.au wrote in news:***@news.pacific.net.au:

Phil, take a deep breath and try to relax. You two are basically arguing
two sides of the same argument. He's arguing that the only even _vaguely_
possible chance the Japanese had of getting out of WWII with more than
they came in with was taking out the U.S. first - and that this required
them to shift absolutely everything to fighting the U.S. and then, by a
miracle, take Hawaii and actually attack the mainland.

This isn't going to happen - as you keep pointing out. I'll further add
that, even if this _did_ happen, all that would result is that the U.S.
would get even madder and end up crushing Japan even flatter. But as he
points out that, from a there/then _Japanese_ standpoint, this is their
only chance to beat the U.S. and get what they want.

And this is because, essentially, the Japanese High Command in WWII _are_
"Japanese Fanboy Wankers."

Oh, the answer to the original POD question "What's the Best-Case for
Japan in WW2?" is to not actually get _involved_ in WWII, give up on
their China campaign, and go to the Allies and offer to help in their war
against Germany. They might actually get something out of that. They
won't ever _do_ this, of course - see paragraph above...

David

[a***@pacific.net.au]

On Wed, 11 May 2005 15:09:55 GMT, David Johnson

Post by David Johnson
Phil, take a deep breath and try to relax. You two are basically arguing
two sides of the same argument. He's arguing that the only even _vaguely_
possible chance the Japanese had of getting out of WWII with more than
they came in with was taking out the U.S. first - and that this required
them to shift absolutely everything to fighting the U.S. and then, by a
miracle, take Hawaii and actually attack the mainland.

Then he's doing a piss poor job of it.

THEY LOSE. PERIOD. Would sum up anything they do post 7 DEC 41 and the
historical attack on Pearl Harbour and elsewhere.

Short of, as someone suggested, there being a civilian coup and *all*
the heads of *all* the militarists being handed over to the allies ...
sans bodies.

And, also, a complete withdrawal from China and a roll over and
"please fuck me up the arse" attitude.

Short of that?

THEY LOSE. PERIOD.

I didn't notice him saying that outright. Or even alluding to it
obliquely.

YMMV.

Phil

Author, Space Opera (FGU), RBB #1 (FASA), Road to Armageddon (PGD).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Email: ***@pacific.net.au

[heretic]

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
On Wed, 11 May 2005 15:09:55 GMT, David Johnson

Post by David Johnson
Phil, take a deep breath and try to relax. You two are basically arguing
two sides of the same argument. He's arguing that the only even _vaguely_
possible chance the Japanese had of getting out of WWII with more than
they came in with was taking out the U.S. first - and that this required
them to shift absolutely everything to fighting the U.S. and then, by a
miracle, take Hawaii and actually attack the mainland.

Then he's doing a piss poor job of it.
THEY LOSE. PERIOD. Would sum up anything they do post 7 DEC 41 and the
historical attack on Pearl Harbour and elsewhere.
Short of, as someone suggested, there being a civilian coup and *all*
the heads of *all* the militarists being handed over to the allies ...
sans bodies.

That would be me.

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
And, also, a complete withdrawal from China and a roll over and
"please fuck me up the arse" attitude.

I am not certain that last would be needed. My question/proposal would
be what is the most the post-coup Japanese could hope for at the
negotiating table?

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
Short of that?
THEY LOSE. PERIOD.
I didn't notice him saying that outright. Or even alluding to it
obliquely.

I think he was looking at the best possible military strategy (i.e.
icecube-in-blastfurnace vs. snowflake-in-stellar-core odds). I too
question if the Japanese could get even that fortunate without heavy
application of diplomacy, but can understand his reasoning.

HTG

[Daniel Titley]

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
So, lets start Japanese Logistics 101.
* Why did the Japanese attack the US in 1941?
Answer: Because of oil. The US, for what seemed good and proper
reasons at the time, cut off Japan's supply of oil. Since Japan
imported something like 97% of her oil from overseas sources, this was
a problem <massive understatement>
This was made somewhat worse <massive understatement> by the fact that
almost 100% of the oil Japan imported was *not* carried in Japanese
tankers. For the simple reason that Japan *had* almost no tankers. The
oil was carried in US or allied flagged tankers. The US embargo ended
all access of the Japanese to these tankers.
So, Japan has a problem - they have reserves that will fuel the
military and the civilian economy for around 18 months, at which point
everything will essentially grind to a halt and they will be reduced
to the stone age *or* they can get out of China *or* they can get the
oil. Somehow.
* So, where is the nearest oil?
Answer: In the Netherlands East Indies and Borneo.
Problem is, these are owned by Holland and the UK. Holland and the UK
have their own problems and need the oil themselves and, even if they
were inclined to thumb their noses at the US embargo, more
importantly, they don't have any tankers to spare to ship it to Japan.
Worse. The US embargo also involved a general trade embargo (more or
less) which meant that Japan was essentially out of the foreign
exchange she needed to buy the oil that wasn't available and that she
couldn't earn it, either.
So she had the same problem - 18 months of oil, then stone age *or*
get out of China *or* *s*t*e*a*l* the oil.

What would be the bare minimum the Japanise needed to do to get the
embargo lifted?

What would have been the effect of Japan doing whatever it takes to get
the embargo lifted?

[b***@comcast.net]

Post by Daniel Titley

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
Worse. The US embargo also involved a general trade
embargo (more or less) which meant that Japan was
essentially out of the foreign exchange she needed
to buy the oil that wasn't available and that she
couldn't earn it, either.

Japan had cars, planes, locomovites, pearls, textiles, gold and other
raw materials for trade. Mexico, according to the Oxford Companion to
WWII (OCWWII), continue to sell oil to Japan. It also states that Japan
continued to get oil from the Middle East. Japan, in addition, had
also invested in synthetic oil plants; had extensively explored for new
natural resource finds and found some. Japan's energy situation wasn't
as bad as Phil's source makes it out, if the OCWWII's statistics are
correct.

Post by Daniel Titley

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
So she had the same problem - 18 months of oil,
then stone age *or* get out of China *or*
*s*t*e*a*l* the oil.

What would be the bare minimum the Japanise needed
to do to get the embargo lifted?

Complete evacuation of China, Manchuria, and Korea and complete forfeit
of all commerical investments and respect for all Western Imperial
holdings and commercial investments.

Post by Daniel Titley
What would have been the effect of Japan doing
whatever it takes to get the embargo lifted?

A successful communist revolution in Asia before 1949. Inside Japan, I
don't know.


John Freck

[mike]

Post by b***@comcast.net
Japan had cars, planes, locomovites, pearls, textiles, gold
and other raw materials for trade.

Of the list, Gold was outflowing to support the War in China,
They didn't have much in export sales in Aircraft (Italy had
more aircraft sold worldwide) Japanese Car wouldn't be a real
export quantity untill the '50s(and not decent till about '70)

That leaves Pearls and Silk, pretty much

Post by b***@comcast.net
Mexico, according to the Oxford Companion to WWII (OCWWII),
continue to sell oil to Japan.

Since they were so short of Dollars, they Bartered with Mexico,
as did the other Axis nations. They had troubles fulfilling
their end of the Deals, as well.

In 1940, the Mexican President Cárdenas, who did most of those
deals(and Nationalized a lot of US and other Nations investments
in Oil and RRs, souring relations) was out, replaced by Camacho,
who got along well with FDR. cutting Japan off from Oil
resulted in PEMEX, the new Oil Company, was allowed access to
Dutch, UK and US markets where they had been embargoed since 1938

Post by b***@comcast.net
It also states that Japan continued to get oil from the Middle East.

which was British Petroleum and/or Standard Oil, who did the drilling
for the Arabs and Persians, where most of the oil came from,
which at this time, was a small % of World oil

Post by b***@comcast.net
Japan's energy situation wasn't as bad as Phil's source makes
it out, if the OCWWII's statistics are correct.

They had Coal. Doing Gasification doesn't help them with thier
Tanker shortage, even had they somehow made synthetic plants as
good as the Nazis

**
mike
**

[b***@comcast.net]

Post by mike

Post by b***@comcast.net
Japan had cars, planes, locomovites, pearls,
textiles, gold and other raw materials for trade.

Of the list, Gold was outflowing to support the
War in China, They didn't have much in export
sales in Aircraft (Italy had more aircraft sold
worldwide) Japanese Car wouldn't be a real export
quantity untill the '50s(and not decent till
about '70)

In China, what would Japan be using gold to buy? In 1938-1945 the only
nation I remember Japan using gold to buy goods and services from is
Germany. Germany aggressively sold manufacturing and weapons
technology for raw materials such as gold, opium, rubber, and some
others.

I don't have my abstract list from The Readers' Guide to Periodical
Literature entry for international relations "Japan" from the 1930s, so
I'm not going to stick my neck out too far, but Japan was searching for
trading partners for the listed items above.

Post by mike
That leaves Pearls and Silk, pretty much

They had those.

John Freck

[mike]

Post by b***@comcast.net
In China, what would Japan be using gold to buy?

Thier Armed Forces.

The War in China and upgrading the IJN was eating about
65% of thier Budget by 1940, and were borrowing about that much,
in loans and bonds to cover it.
About $1.7 Billion. Non-sustainable.

Japan, in 1939, imported very roughly, $200M from the US and
sold $100M. Made up some of the difference by sending $85M Gold
Bullion. If my math was right, they had $125M in Gold and Silver
left in reserves.

Jan. 26, 1940, the Trade Treaty between Japan and the USA expired,
a treaty that had been in force since 1911. Hull and Amb. Grew
pretty much told them it was due to thier mistreating of American
citizen and businesses in China. About 75% of Japan's trade
was with the US and UK, and theUK was lodging similar protests.

Post by b***@comcast.net
In 1938-1945 the only nation I remember Japan using gold
to buy goods and services from is Germany.

After 1939, they didn't have much left in thier Treasury,
(ditto for Nazi Germany) and were looking for Barter deals

Post by b***@comcast.net
I'm not going to stick my neck out too far, but Japan was searching for
trading partners for the listed items above.

Her two largest Trading Partners, the US and UK, had sold everything
that Japan needed, but for some reason, Japan's leaders tried thier
hardest at pissing them both off, reducing the chance of buying much
from them. In the mid '30s, both had sold aircraft, as well as
raw materials, to them. By 1940, Embargos, but even without that,
they were out of currency to buy.

So they decided to take, rather than deal over what they were doing
in China

**
mike
**

[b***@comcast.net]

Post by mike

Post by b***@comcast.net
In China, what would Japan be using gold to buy?

Thier Armed Forces.

Japan is be using gold to buy its armed forces in China during 1940.
Please elaborate further. Since Japanese dominate the economy wouldn't
the gold churn back into Japanese hands again? Or would the gold slip
away somehow out of China?

Post by mike
The War in China and upgrading the IJN was
eating about 65% of thier Budget by 1940,
and were borrowing about that much, in loans
and bonds to cover it. About $1.7 Billion.
Non-sustainable.

You write, "Non-sustainable." But you do realize that Japan did
continue on, and continued to expand militarily at least for the
short-term. I have heard the same sort of senario for Germany,
Britain, and Italy. The truth is that at least as for a the short-term
is concerned their war-production boomed. Italy may have stalled.
Germany and Britain nationalized their economies. How did Japan manage
to go on?

Post by mike
Japan, in 1939, imported very roughly, $200M from
the US and sold $100M. Made up some of the difference
by sending $85M Gold Bullion. If my math was right,
they had $125M in Gold and Silver left in reserves.

Your math is wrong as are some of your capilizaitions. 'Gold',
'Silver' and 'Gold Bullion' should have been lower case. As for the
subtraction, Japan had an intense exploration effort for natural
resources in the 1930s and even before that that had paid divideds.
Japan found gold and other valuable minerals, even a few small oil
deposits. In the 19th and 20th centuries many nations found large
gold, silver, platium, and other rare-earth deposits that were
exploited. The large discoviers of the 19th and 20th centuries of gold
and silver are largely forgotten history. These deposits helped "fuel"
the industrial revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries. Japan had
"money" mines in Korea and Manchuria.




John Freck

[mike]

Post by b***@comcast.net
Japan is be using gold to buy its armed forces in China during 1940.
Please elaborate further. Since Japanese dominate the economy

wouldn't

Post by b***@comcast.net
the gold churn back into Japanese hands again?

But which Japanese hands? How does the Gold end up at the Central?

Any government gets it funding various ways, Taxes, Fees, Tariffs
Bond Sales and such[1]. Japan also had the option of shaking down
the Zaibatsus, but the last went both ways, as sweet deals to them
was the Carrot so they wouldn't mind the stick every now and then
when they got shook down.

Post by b***@comcast.net
Or would the gold slip away somehow out of China?

it ws going out as fast as it could be mined.

One of the Zaibatsus, probably Sumitomo and/or Yasuda would
be doing the actual mining, Tokyo 'Buys' the Gold from them
by printing PaperMoney(bad)exchanging Bonds or doing side
deals with the very same Zaibatsu.

The Government needs that metal to back the currency: needed
for foreign Trade, Gold for Dollars or Pounds, forex, with thier
two largest Trading partners. The US would only accept Dollars
for Oil, and Japan had to use Gold to exhange for Dollars.
They wouldn't take Paper.

Post by b***@comcast.net
You write, "Non-sustainable." But you do realize that Japan did
continue on, and continued to expand militarily at least for the
short-term.

It was. they were running at over 75% inflation, caused by massive
Deficit Spending well before the the first bomb fell on PH, and had
over 70% of total spending was on the Military. The Civilian Sector
was dying.

Post by b***@comcast.net
I have heard the same sort of senario for Germany,
Britain, and Italy. The truth is that at least as for a the
short-term is concerned their war-production boomed. Italy may
have stalled. Germany and Britain nationalized their economies.
How did Japan manage to go on?

by using stockpiled raw materials, and cannabalizing the Civilian
Sector. Oh, and Robbing thier neighbors. Since near all Consumer Goods
production had stopped, even pots, pans and clothes were BlackMarket
items and Worker Productivity dropped each year, as they had to travel
(walking,public transport was mostly devoted to the War Effort)
to rural areas to trade with Farmers for Rice and Soy. Due to high
Inflation, Price Controls were active, but that just creates shortages,
and adds to a thriving Black Market, and Black Markets means the
Government doesn't get thier cut, except by corruption, which is back
to 'Bad' again.

Short Term is correct. Its a starving man eating his own leg.
Sure, it tastes good now, but you might need it later

Total War mobilization has its costs. yes, they multiplied thier
spending on the Military by 4.5 times.

But lowly Italy was able to do 5.5X as much, and Germany 5.8x
while keeping the Civilian side in much better shape.

The UK was able to do over 11 times

Those nations didn't have to worry about malnutrition
being a real problem, like Japan.

The US did 900 times over,never getting even close to Total
Mobilization.

The Japanese prayed for a short War, as thats the only one they
had a shot at getting a positive result, with the UK and US
asking for forgivness for not seeing Japan's 'Greatness'
on January 1942. Whoops.

They had no 'Plan B' except fight harder.

Post by b***@comcast.net
subtraction, Japan had an intense exploration effort for natural
resources in the 1930s and even before that that had paid divideds.
Japan found gold and other valuable minerals, even a few small oil
deposits.

They imported 80% of thier Oil, even with the synth. gasification
of Coal and the small wells they had.

Autarky just won't work for them, as they still needed to import
Rice, Cotton and Bauxtite

Post by b***@comcast.net
In the 19th and 20th centuries many nations found large
gold, silver, platium, and other rare-earth deposits that were

too much mining, esp. if directly owned by the State, causes
inflation.

Post by b***@comcast.net
exploited. The large discoviers of the 19th and 20th centuries of gold
and silver are largely forgotten history. These deposits helped "fuel"
the industrial revolution of the 19th and 20th centuries.

but it was mostly going into Heavy Industry for the Military,while
Farming was still primitive. Even Stalin's 5 year Plans had a better
result.

Post by b***@comcast.net
Japan had "money" mines in Korea and Manchuria.

And Spain had the Americas, for all the good it did them.

[1] plus the option of using the military to rob and plunder. But after
plundering, the area is wrecked, and hard to get more out of it,
unlike regular Trade.

**
mike
**

[b***@comcast.net]

<snip>


All that detailing is well and fine, but it doesn't gt to the point.
The point for me is whether Pycho McKookoo is accurate. He doesn't
provide statistic information from a reliable source and so it is
acedemic. His evaluation of Japan's energy situation isn't quanitified
other than an 18 month supply on hand. He makes it sound very
terrible, and from what I've read the Axis may well have lost because
of the smaller energy resources, especially oil. Additional synthetic
oil plants by Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Checkslovia, Poland, and
the Urkraine would have pushed the Axis over to a vicotry. Yet the USA
would likey get that atomic bomb first. So, it said that oil is the
Axis' best material case for the Axis defeat; is Pycho accurate.

Did Japan attack Pearl Harbor in order to secure oil? Is the attack on
Pearl Harbor forced?

Certainly, Japan needs better access to energy resources, especially
oil. This drive explains the military offensive into SE Asia and DEI,
but does to explain why Pearl was attacked and why this attack is
imposed by military science?

Is a Japanese-British war possbile w/o the USA at war with Japan? At
least for awhile, or it is totally stupid and inappropriate for the
this NG to discuss seriously.


John Freck

[James Gassaway]

Post by b***@comcast.net
<snip>
All that detailing is well and fine, but it doesn't gt to the point.
The point for me is whether Pycho McKookoo is accurate. He doesn't
provide statistic information from a reliable source and so it is
acedemic. His evaluation of Japan's energy situation isn't quanitified
other than an 18 month supply on hand. He makes it sound very
terrible, and from what I've read the Axis may well have lost because
of the smaller energy resources, especially oil. Additional synthetic
oil plants by Germany, Italy, Japan, Hungary, Checkslovia, Poland, and
the Urkraine would have pushed the Axis over to a vicotry. Yet the USA
would likey get that atomic bomb first. So, it said that oil is the
Axis' best material case for the Axis defeat; is Pycho accurate.
Did Japan attack Pearl Harbor in order to secure oil? Is the attack on
Pearl Harbor forced?

Yes, and The Japanese thought so.

Post by b***@comcast.net
Certainly, Japan needs better access to energy resources, especially
oil. This drive explains the military offensive into SE Asia and DEI,
but does to explain why Pearl was attacked and why this attack is
imposed by military science?
Is a Japanese-British war possbile w/o the USA at war with Japan? At
least for awhile, or it is totally stupid and inappropriate for the
this NG to discuss seriously.

It is easier to understand the answers to these if you look at a map of the
Pacific. The sea routes between Japan and the DEI (where the oil was) pass
right past the Philippines. At the time, the PI (Philippine Islands) were
controlled by the US. Japan needed the DEI oil because the US was
embargoing oil sales to Japan. The US was doing so because of Japanese
actions in China and would therefore presumably not want Japan to have
access to alternative sources of oil. So Japan assumes that if they move
against the Dutch and British oil facilities the US will intervene and at a
minimum interdict the sea lanes from the perfectly positioned for this PI.
Japan _must_ have the oil and _must_ be able to transport it back to the
Home Islands. In order to secure the sealanes, Japan must control the PI.
That means war with the US. So, any attempt by Japan to get the oil (and
other resources) that they require will immediately involve them in a war
with the US. If they have to go to war with the US their best bet is to
knock out the USN right at the very beginning of it. Japan believed their
best chance of doing that was a surprise attack (or near surprise attack,
the 14 part message was supposed to be delivered before the attack, if only
by a few minutes) on the primary USN base in the Pacific. Pearl Harbor.

So, the answer to your last question is "Japan thought not."

[b***@comcast.net]

James Gassaway wrote:



<snip>

Post by James Gassaway

Post by b***@comcast.net
Did Japan attack Pearl Harbor in order to secure oil?
Is the attack on Pearl Harbor forced?

Yes, and The Japanese thought so.

This amounts to saying that the OTL is deterministically caused by the
assumptions of leaders. Sure, the Japanese thought they were making
the best possible decisions to resolve the Japan's problems.




<snip>

Post by James Gassaway
It is easier to understand the answers to these if you look at a map of the
Pacific. The sea routes between Japan and the DEI (where the oil was) pass
right past the Philippines. At the time, the PI (Philippine Islands) were
controlled by the US. Japan needed the DEI oil because the US was
embargoing oil sales to Japan. The US was doing so because of Japanese
actions in China and would therefore presumably not want Japan to have
access to alternative sources of oil. So Japan assumes that if they move
against the Dutch and British oil facilities the US will intervene and at a
minimum interdict the sea lanes from the perfectly positioned for this PI.
Japan _must_ have the oil and _must_ be able to transport it back to the
Home Islands. In order to secure the sealanes, Japan must control the PI.
That means war with the US. So, any attempt by Japan to get the oil (and
other resources) that they require will immediately involve them in a war
with the US. If they have to go to war with the US their best bet is to
knock out the USN right at the very beginning of it. Japan believed their
best chance of doing that was a surprise attack (or near surprise attack,
the 14 part message was supposed to be delivered before the attack, if only
by a few minutes) on the primary USN base in the Pacific. Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese might have thought of this line you are stating as a
possiblity. However, soon after Pearl Harbor is was clear that no USA
aircraft carriers were sunk and that most ships damaged at Pearl could
be raised, repaired and sent into battle--but the USA didn't sortie to
protect the Phillipines or in any way directly blockade Japan's sea
routes. The USA didn't have the naval power to do what you are
suggesting before Pearl Harbor, nor for years after Pearl Harbor. In
short, the USA naval and build-up as it stood in the Pacific upto Dec.
6th, 1941 would have needed several more years to directly cross the
Pacific to battle Japanese fleets in the Western Pacific. The USA is in
no postition to slamdunk Japan in November 1941 by June 1942 or June
1943.

Post by James Gassaway
So, the answer to your last question is "Japan thought not."

Which is an evasion. I know Japan though so and so...



John Freck

Post by James Gassaway
"I reject your reality and substitute my own."
"Now, quack, damn you!"
Multiversal Mercenaries
You name it, we kill it. Any time, any reality.

[James Gassaway]

Post by b***@comcast.net
<snip>

Post by James Gassaway

Post by b***@comcast.net
Did Japan attack Pearl Harbor in order to secure oil?
Is the attack on Pearl Harbor forced?

Yes, and The Japanese thought so.

This amounts to saying that the OTL is deterministically caused by the
assumptions of leaders. Sure, the Japanese thought they were making
the best possible decisions to resolve the Japan's problems.

Well, the assumptions and decisions of national leaders does tend to have a
large affect on the course of history. :)

Post by b***@comcast.net
<snip>

Post by James Gassaway
It is easier to understand the answers to these if you look at a map of the
Pacific. The sea routes between Japan and the DEI (where the oil was) pass
right past the Philippines. At the time, the PI (Philippine Islands) were
controlled by the US. Japan needed the DEI oil because the US was
embargoing oil sales to Japan. The US was doing so because of Japanese
actions in China and would therefore presumably not want Japan to have
access to alternative sources of oil. So Japan assumes that if they move
against the Dutch and British oil facilities the US will intervene and at a
minimum interdict the sea lanes from the perfectly positioned for this PI.
Japan _must_ have the oil and _must_ be able to transport it back to the
Home Islands. In order to secure the sealanes, Japan must control the PI.
That means war with the US. So, any attempt by Japan to get the oil (and
other resources) that they require will immediately involve them in a war
with the US. If they have to go to war with the US their best bet is to
knock out the USN right at the very beginning of it. Japan believed their
best chance of doing that was a surprise attack (or near surprise attack,
the 14 part message was supposed to be delivered before the attack, if only
by a few minutes) on the primary USN base in the Pacific. Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese might have thought of this line you are stating as a
possiblity. However, soon after Pearl Harbor is was clear that no USA
aircraft carriers were sunk and that most ships damaged at Pearl could
be raised, repaired and sent into battle--but the USA didn't sortie to
protect the Phillipines or in any way directly blockade Japan's sea
routes. The USA didn't have the naval power to do what you are
suggesting before Pearl Harbor, nor for years after Pearl Harbor. In
short, the USA naval and build-up as it stood in the Pacific upto Dec.
6th, 1941 would have needed several more years to directly cross the
Pacific to battle Japanese fleets in the Western Pacific. The USA is in
no postition to slamdunk Japan in November 1941 by June 1942 or June
1943.

The conventional military thinking at the time (Dec 1941) was that the US
_did_ have the naval strength to challenge the IJN. I can't speak to what
the Japanese knew about the repairability of the ships nearly sunk at Pearl,
but the US contingency plan for war with Japan expected an attack on the PI
and called for the battle fleet to sail from Pearl (or originally the West
Coast) to the Philippines in relief, so the US thought it had the strength
to take on the IJN. They fully expected to fight their way across most of
the Pacific.

Also remember that the IJN spent the next six months trying to draw the USN
carriers into an ambush. Trying to sink the US CVs was one of the primary
factors in the early Japanese campaigns, so they obviously thought that the
USN was still a threat. (The results of Midway would appear to support that
belief BTW. *eg*)

Post by b***@comcast.net

Post by James Gassaway
So, the answer to your last question is "Japan thought not."

Which is an evasion. I know Japan though so and so...

I'm not trying to be evasive. I just answered the questions asked. Now, if
you want to propose that the Imperial Japanese High Command came to some
other conclusions or change the situation that caused them to draw that
conclusion, feel free to post it.

[kamil]

Post by b***@comcast.net
The Japanese might have thought of this line you are stating as a
possiblity. However, soon after Pearl Harbor is was clear that no USA
aircraft carriers were sunk and that most ships damaged at Pearl could
be raised, repaired and sent into battle--but the USA didn't sortie to
protect the Phillipines or in any way directly blockade Japan's sea
routes. The USA didn't have the naval power to do what you are
suggesting before Pearl Harbor, nor for years after Pearl Harbor. In
short, the USA naval and build-up as it stood in the Pacific upto Dec.
6th, 1941 would have needed several more years to directly cross the
Pacific to battle Japanese fleets in the Western Pacific. The USA is in
no postition to slamdunk Japan in November 1941 by June 1942 or June
1943.

The US would not have to interdict Japan's access to captured
oilfields with conventional naval forces.

Aircraft based in the Philippines could do that, as well as subs based
in the Philippines could destroy the Japanese merchant marine which
would have to sail around the Philippines. The IJN would not be able
to protect its merchant marine even against a much smaller force while
sailing so close to and for such a long route along Philippine coast.

Aircraft and subs could also interdict any Japanese invasion of the
Philippines. The increase in US production of aircraft, armies and
equipment (that occurred before war was declared) was much faster than
building capital ships, a large amount of these aircraft, men,
equipment and supplies were planed to reinforce the Philippines. A
strongly fortified Philippines and naval bases would secure the US
merchant shipping allowing the basing of the USN there.

There was a short window of vulnerability of the Philippines that the
Japanese took advantage of.

Kamil

[b***@comcast.net]

kamil wrote:


<snip>

Post by kamil
The US would not have to interdict Japan's access
to captured oilfields with conventional naval forces.

In the OTL Japan invaded the Phillipines, defeated US military forces,
and remained there until 1944. Why would this be different?

Post by kamil
Aircraft based in the Philippines could do that, as well as subs based
in the Philippines could destroy the Japanese merchant marine which
would have to sail around the Philippines. The IJN would not be able
to protect its merchant marine even against a much smaller force while
sailing so close to and for such a long route along Philippine coast.

The Japanese Empire and the United States of America can still have a
conflict even if Pearl Harbor isn't attacked. Is it your opinion that
if Japan does't attack at Pearl, then Japan loses very quickly some war
with the USA in early 1942. That it would be over by May 1942?

Post by kamil
Aircraft and subs could also interdict any Japanese invasion of the
Philippines. The increase in US production of aircraft, armies and
equipment (that occurred before war was declared) was much faster than
building capital ships, a large amount of these aircraft, men,
equipment and supplies were planed to reinforce the Philippines. A
strongly fortified Philippines and naval bases would secure the US
merchant shipping allowing the basing of the USN there.

Why didn't this happen in the OTL? Are there any wargames around that
support this line?


John Freck

Post by kamil
There was a short window of vulnerability of the Philippines that the
Japanese took advantage of.
Kamil

[kamil]

Post by b***@comcast.net

Post by kamil
The US would not have to interdict Japan's access
to captured oilfields with conventional naval forces.

In the OTL Japan invaded the Phillipines, defeated US military forces,
and remained there until 1944. Why would this be different?

Thousands of combat aircraft, frontline divisions, supplies etc that
the US had planned, could make and was in a process of reinforcing the
Philippines.

Capital ships can take 2-3 years to produce, aircraft, tanks, supplies
and training troops takes less time to produce, by such an immense
industrial power like the US.

Post by b***@comcast.net

Post by kamil
Aircraft based in the Philippines could do that, as well as subs based
in the Philippines could destroy the Japanese merchant marine which
would have to sail around the Philippines. The IJN would not be able
to protect its merchant marine even against a much smaller force while
sailing so close to and for such a long route along Philippine coast.

The Japanese Empire and the United States of America can still have a
conflict even if Pearl Harbor isn't attacked. Is it your opinion that
if Japan does't attack at Pearl, then Japan loses very quickly some war
with the USA in early 1942. That it would be over by May 1942?

No. The war would not be quick. If the war starts in March - April
1942. The Japanese will not be able to take the Philippines, or most
places the IJN need to sail by the Philippines to invade. The US
still does not have enough naval power to take the fight to Japan
until roughly OTL.

Japan would not be able to carry out any of its strategic objectives
(capture and hold oil production), nor protect its merchant marine. It
is only a matter of time till Japan loses accelerated by near basing
of submarines starving Japan.

Post by b***@comcast.net

Post by kamil
Aircraft and subs could also interdict any Japanese invasion of the
Philippines. The increase in US production of aircraft, armies and
equipment (that occurred before war was declared) was much faster than
building capital ships, a large amount of these aircraft, men,
equipment and supplies were planed to reinforce the Philippines. A
strongly fortified Philippines and naval bases would secure the US
merchant shipping allowing the basing of the USN there.

Why didn't this happen in the OTL?

Along other things lack of resources (merchant marine, trained
soldiers, aircraft, pilots and supplies) capable of reaching the
Philippines from the US before and suring the Japan invasion.

Post by b***@comcast.net
Are there any wargames around that support this line?

It would be interesting to see the result, if the wargame ended in
late 1942.

It is practically impossible to have an interesting, playable and
accurate strategic level wargame between US and Japan in the 1940s.

Post by b***@comcast.net

Post by kamil
Kamil

[James Gassaway]

Post by kamil

Post by b***@comcast.net
Are there any wargames around that support this line?

It would be interesting to see the result, if the wargame ended in
late 1942.
It is practically impossible to have an interesting, playable and
accurate strategic level wargame between US and Japan in the 1940s.

The best one that I am aware of is War in The Pacific, by Matrix and 2by3.
Not for the faint of heart. But despite some serious bugs and some subtle
slanting in favor of the Japanese (mostly so that it can be a game where one
would consider playing as the Japanese) it is probably the best you are
going to get for the forseeable future. You could probably build a "war
starts in '42" scenario in that.

[pyotr filipivich]

Post by b***@comcast.net

Post by James Gassaway
It is easier to understand the answers to these if you look at a map of the
Pacific. The sea routes between Japan and the DEI (where the oil was) pass
right past the Philippines. At the time, the PI (Philippine Islands) were
controlled by the US. Japan needed the DEI oil because the US was
embargoing oil sales to Japan. The US was doing so because of Japanese
actions in China and would therefore presumably not want Japan to have
access to alternative sources of oil. So Japan assumes that if they move
against the Dutch and British oil facilities the US will intervene and at a
minimum interdict the sea lanes from the perfectly positioned for this PI.
Japan _must_ have the oil and _must_ be able to transport it back to the
Home Islands. In order to secure the sealanes, Japan must control the PI.
That means war with the US. So, any attempt by Japan to get the oil (and
other resources) that they require will immediately involve them in a war
with the US. If they have to go to war with the US their best bet is to
knock out the USN right at the very beginning of it. Japan believed their
best chance of doing that was a surprise attack (or near surprise attack,
the 14 part message was supposed to be delivered before the attack, if only
by a few minutes) on the primary USN base in the Pacific. Pearl Harbor.

The Japanese might have thought of this line you are stating as a
possiblity. However, soon after Pearl Harbor is was clear that no USA
aircraft carriers were sunk and that most ships damaged at Pearl could
be raised, repaired and sent into battle--but the USA didn't sortie to
protect the Phillipines or in any way directly blockade Japan's sea
routes.

Imperial Japan had demoralized the US Navy, the psychological shock of
"It couldn't happen to Us(tm)." actually happening, and the fear of losing
everything that remained, prevented the US from doing a lot of things which
were possible.

Post by b***@comcast.net
The USA didn't have the naval power to do what you are
suggesting before Pearl Harbor, nor for years after Pearl Harbor. In
short, the USA naval and build-up as it stood in the Pacific upto Dec.
6th, 1941 would have needed several more years to directly cross the
Pacific to battle Japanese fleets in the Western Pacific. The USA is in
no postition to slamdunk Japan in November 1941 by June 1942 or June
1943.

In 1941, Admiral "Everybody" knew any naval war in the Pacific would be
waged with battleships.
After December 41, the "only" ships the US had in the Pacific were the
carriers. When all you have is a tack hammer, you have to make due, even
if you can't get the 5 pound maul you really want.
If in 1942, the USN had been able to stop the imperial Japanese fleet
with ballerina's in kayaks, we'd have books on "Toe Shoes and Tutu: the
Role of Ballerinas in Pacific War."

tschus
pyotr


--
pyotr filipivich
When I was a boy, we had Outcome Based Education, too.
We called it "Being held back a year"

[James Gassaway]

Post by pyotr filipivich
In 1941, Admiral "Everybody" knew any naval war in the Pacific would be
waged with battleships.
After December 41, the "only" ships the US had in the Pacific were the
carriers. When all you have is a tack hammer, you have to make due, even
if you can't get the 5 pound maul you really want.
If in 1942, the USN had been able to stop the imperial Japanese fleet
with ballerina's in kayaks, we'd have books on "Toe Shoes and Tutu: the
Role of Ballerinas in Pacific War."

Hee. You wouldn't happen to know which publishing house printed that book,
would you? Or the author?

[b***@comcast.net]

http://encarta.msn.com/sidebar_461501667/1939_World_Economics.html


There is a problem with sources. While this source above isn't a
comprehensive statistical book on Japanese ecomics, it doesn't state
that in 1940 Japan kept its gold reserve intact and that it showed a
trade surplus. Mike, did you directly state that Japan had no foreign
exchange earings? Did you directly state that Japan was completely out
of gold? What are your thoughts on the article I've posted? In 1940
Japan was getting an an export driven boom going or it wasn't.


John Freck

[mike]

Post by b***@comcast.net
http://encarta.msn.com/sidebar_461501667/1939_World_Economics.html
There is a problem with sources. While this source above isn't a
comprehensive statistical book on Japanese ecomics, it doesn't state
that in 1940 Japan kept its gold reserve intact and that it showed a
trade surplus.Mike, did you directly state that Japan had no foreign
exchange earings? Did you directly state that Japan was completely out
of gold? What are your thoughts on the article I've posted?

Keep in mind that Exports included shipments to Korea, Manchuria
and Formosa, captive markets, and to help keep Gold in country,
laws were passed restricting outflows without BoJ approval.

Using msn is fine, rather than the info I pull out of books,
I guess.

http://encarta.msn.com/sidebar_461500971/1938_World_Economics.html
--
. The outstanding factor is, of course, the cost of the war. Total
.cost of government in the year ending March 1937 was 2,272,000,000
.yen; for the year 1937-38 it was 5,463,000,000 yen while the budget
.estimate for 1938-39 is 8,400,000,000 yen. Of the total expenditures
.for this last year, 81 per cent has been for war purposes; 5.8M yen
.is to be raised by borrowing.
--

Bond Sales from the Bank of Japan reached 120% of GNP by the end
of the War. Doing this digs such a deep hole, you can end up like
Argentina. By 1944, thier Debt to GNP ratio was 200%

It is non-sustainable. You can delay it, like Japan did
by going to war- that gets a Siege Economy going. But
in the long run, it makes things even worse.


--
.Such borrowing inevitably leads to a strain on the banking system
.and eventually to inflation of which signs are abundant. The note
.circulation of the Bank of Japan in the year from October 1937 to
.October 1938 (latest available figure) rose from 1,787,000,000
.yen to 2,157,000,000 yen, or some 25 per cent. Commercial bank
.deposits increased from 11,644,000,000 yen in September 1937 to
.13,597,000,000 yen in September 1938 or 20 per cent. The index
.of industrial production on a 1929 base stood in June at 170
.compared with an average of 171 for the year 1937. This index,
.however, conceals the radical changes taking place in the nature
.of productive activity. An index for the production of consumers
.goods on a 1930 base indicates that production of such goods fell
.from an average of 155 for 1937 to 137 for June 1938, while the
.index for investment goods (including war materials) rose from
.262 to 299. With productive activity actually deflected in this
.manner, prices naturally rose in spite of numerous Government
.restrictions. The index of wholesale prices of the Bank of
.Japan (1900 = 100) rose only from 245 at the beginning of the
.year to 253 in October (latest figure). One prepared by the
.Oriental Economist, however, shows a 30 per cent increase in the
.year to July.... The cost of living has increased also.
.The Bank of Japan index rose from an average of 96 for 1937 to
.114.6 in October 1938. Since earnings have lagged in the rise,
.the real income of the people of Japan has declined considerably.
---

Pay attention here, as it puts the next years figures you mentioned
in perspective

---
.Not only did domestic production diminish, but so also did
.foreign trade. In the first half year, imports were reduced by
.3.4 per cent and exports by 20 per cent. Although the compara-
.tively heavy decline in imports reduced the adverse balance,
.it was at the price of a heavy diminution in trade as a whole.
.The decline in imports has further limited the goods available
.for consumption purposes. In the fall, trade expanded a little
.(some 12 per cent), but was still very much below the 1937 level.

--
like I mentioned, pots, pans and cloths were Blackmarket,
and increasingly, foodstuffs. You need some Consumer Goods
production, unless you conscript everybody.

---
.The fall in foreign trade was partially a result of the world
.decline in trade, but it was induced in part by the necessity to
.conserve supplies of foreign exchange. The gold supply of Japan
.has dwindled. Imports into the United States from Japan amounted
.to some $140,000,000 during the first eight months of this year.
.At the end of July, the Bank of Japan allocated $100,000,000 from
.its reserves for the use of the revolving foreign exchange account.
.This left the Bank of Japan with only $163,000,000. As a result
.of the use of the gold reserves, the yen has not depreciated
.seriously. In the last year, it has dropped only from 29.2 to
.27.5 cents. However, the gold resources are nearing their end.
.The Bank of Japan has already replenished its stocks both by
.revaluing the gold stock and by making an intensive campaign
.to secure gold from its own citizens.
---end quote

1939 wasn't too bad of a year, but in 1940( where my figures came
from) showed that to be just a blip.

Post by b***@comcast.net
In 1940 Japan was getting an an export driven boom going or it wasn't.

Boom times normaly means good times, but in 1940, Rice was already
being rationed, and what few Consumer Goods were being produced
was increasingly like the WWI 1917 German Ersats items. add
ontop of that, Price _and_ Capital Controls, you have an Economy
that was headed for Meltdown, even if they 'Won' the War in 1942
with a Magic Wand, plus the US saying 'We're so Sorry. Please let
us sell Oil and Scrapiron to you again, pretty please?'

**
mike
**

[s***@yahoo.com]

Post by Daniel Titley
What would be the bare minimum the Japanise needed to do to get the
embargo lifted?

Pulling out of Indochina would probably have done it.

The Roosevelt administration was deliberately vague on this point,
because they thought they might be able to push the Japanese into
making peace with Chiang. After all, the embargo would slowly but
surely squeeze the IJA, as fuel for planes and trucks became ever more
scarce.

But that was more hope than fixed goal. The US had been able to live
with a China conflict since 1937. Occupying Indochina, though, was a
clear strategic threat to the Philippines, Malaya, and the Dutch East
Indies.

Post by Daniel Titley
What would have been the effect of Japan doing whatever it takes to get
the embargo lifted?

Politically? Major loss of face for the military, especially the Army.

Geostrategically? They'd be in a much less good position for a sudden
war of aggression.

Economically? None at all -- the Japanese already had access to the
resources of French Indochina.


Doug M.

[Tim McDaniel]

Post by Daniel Titley
What would have been the effect of Japan doing whatever it takes to
get the embargo lifted?

John Keegan, _The Second World War_, ch. 12, p. 250:

All ambiguities were resolved on 26 November [1941]. Then Cordell
Hull bluntly presented [Nomura and Kurusu] with the United States'
ultimate position, which was a firm restatement of the position
frmo which it had begun. Japan was to withdraw its troops not
only from Indo-China but also from China, to accept the legitimacy
of Chiang Kai-shek's government and, in effect, to abrogate
Japan's membership of the Tripartite Pact. The Hull note reached
Tokyo on 27 November and provoked consternation. It appeared to
go further than any American counter-proposal yet issued. Not
only did it link the relaxation of economic embargoes to a
humiliating diplomatic surrender. It also demanded, by the
Japanese interpretation, a withdrawal from the whole territory
which the Chinese emperors had formerly ruled -- Manchuria as well
as China proper. Since Manchuria was technically not part of
ethnic China, and since the Japanese believed they had conquered
it by four-square means, this provision of the Hull note confirmed
Tojo's belief in the rectitude of his policy. It revealed, as he
and his followers had long argued, that the United States did not
regard the Japanese empire as its equal in the community of
nations, that it expected the emperor and his government to obey
the American President when told to do so, and that it altogether
discounted the reality of Japanese strategic power. The army and
navy at once agreed that the note was unacceptable and ...

[Mike Ralls]

Post by Tim McDaniel

Post by Daniel Titley
What would have been the effect of Japan doing whatever it takes to
get the embargo lifted?

All ambiguities were resolved on 26 November [1941]. Then Cordell
Hull bluntly presented [Nomura and Kurusu] with the United States'
ultimate position, which was a firm restatement of the position
frmo which it had begun. Japan was to withdraw its troops not
only from Indo-China but also from China, to accept the legitimacy
of Chiang Kai-shek's government and, in effect, to abrogate
Japan's membership of the Tripartite Pact.

As anyone with the basics of negotiations knows, what the other person
offers is usually very far from what they will accept.

[Tim McDaniel]

Post by Mike Ralls

Post by Tim McDaniel

Post by Daniel Titley
What would have been the effect of Japan doing whatever it takes to
get the embargo lifted?

Wrong prior quote. The previous question I was trying to answer was
along the lines of "What would have been the minimum Japan would have
had to do to avert trouble with the US?".

Post by Mike Ralls

Post by Tim McDaniel
All ambiguities were resolved on 26 November [1941]. Then Cordell
Hull bluntly presented [Nomura and Kurusu] with the United States'
ultimate position, which was a firm restatement of the position
frmo which it had begun. Japan was to withdraw its troops not
only from Indo-China but also from China, to accept the legitimacy
of Chiang Kai-shek's government and, in effect, to abrogate
Japan's membership of the Tripartite Pact.

As anyone with the basics of negotiations knows, what the other
person offers is usually very far from what they will accept.

On the other hand, demands that increase after negotiating, rather
than decrease, indicates (I think) that one is not budging.

[Aaron Kuperman]

Agree to a peace treaty that includes Japanese withdrawal from all
territories conquered after 1930, in return for free elections and
independence for those territories. Trying people for the rape of Nanking
would help.

***@yahoo.com (***@yahoo.com) wrote:
: I've seen lots of discussion on alternate WW2s in Europe,
: but not many in the Pacific. So, I'll post a simple question:

: With a POD of 1-1-1942[1] or later, could Japan have won[2] WW2?

: [1] Or, after 8 Dec '41, if you prefer.

: [2] What does "win" mean? That's my question. What's the best that
: they could have hoped for? At a minimum, let's say that it means
: avoiding getting nuked, and avoiding foreign occupation of the home
: islands. Is this possible? How? Can Japan hope for more? How and
: why?

[Alfred Montestruc]

Post by o***@yahoo.com
I've seen lots of discussion on alternate WW2s in Europe,
With a POD of 1-1-1942[1] or later, could Japan have won[2] WW2?
[1] Or, after 8 Dec '41, if you prefer.
[2] What does "win" mean? That's my question. What's the best that
they could have hoped for? At a minimum, let's say that it means
avoiding getting nuked, and avoiding foreign occupation of the home
islands. Is this possible? How? Can Japan hope for more? How and
why?

All in all I think that without massive Alien Space Bat (TM-Alison
Brooks) intervention, as in that dog will not hunt. Atleast not in any
meaningful sense of "win".

The best outcome I can think of it a more rapid and so less costly
defeat. So some major additional blunders on the part of the Japanese.

If the Japanese high command makes a virtuoso performace in tactics and
stratagy, assuming the USA and friends do not make more that say twice
as many blunders as we did IOTL, the Japanses may last a bit longer,
but in the end will still collapse by mid to late '45 from being nuked.


Only think I can think of that might help them is if "somehow" (also
ASB land) the Germans do a hell of a lot better than OTL. Say the USSR
folds up in '42, and Germany gets all the land to the Urals and frees
up most of that manpower and has the oil and minerals of that land
which will come on line at least in part by '44, and the added manpower
and lack of cost of the Russian frount will make the war longer and
force the first use of Nukes on Germany.

Given the Manhatten project goes much as OTL, Japan and Germany even in
this time line will fold up by mid to late '46 at the latest due to
repeated nuking of all industrial centers.

[b***@yahoo.com]

For Japan to have a complete victory (e.g. force the US to terms) I
can't see it happening unless Germany is victorious in the European
theatre. Imagine D-Day failing and Army Group A successfully getting to
the Caucuses and meeting up with Rommel's Afrika Corps... Paulus's 6th
army avoids entrapment at Stalingrad and simply bypasses the city and
continues to push into southern Russia.

So Europe takes a different turn, and the US becomes preoccupied with
merely keeping the Atlantic ocean open and supporting Britain as its
last remaining ally.

For Japan to 'win', I see the following taking place:

- Pearl Harbour is even more successful than OTL. A 3rd sortie planned
for the oil storage fields is not aborted and the infrastructure on
Hawaii is destroyed. Basically the Japanese don't hit & run, they hit
and hit and hit and annihilate the island's infrastructure. This
prevents the US from using it as a staging ground, delays them 6-12
months while the facilities are repaired. A token invasion may take
place to further limit American recovery in the Pacific, but a
long-term commitment to holding Hawaii does not take place. I see
Hawaii as a temporary staging ground for Japanese subs to do California
coast commerce raiding, but not much else.

- Aside from the Phillipnes, which is invaded to eliminate the American
presence, no distracting island-gobbling campaigns; no pushes into
India, no eyeing Australia, no attempts to get to Alaska. Japan's army
is kept busy with mainland China, solidifying territorial gains. I
suspect they can be more successful here with an exclusive focus.
Ideally MacArthur is killed trying to escape the island or in the
initial attack.

- Japanese focus on building their aircraft carrier fleet and airforce,
for the upcoming (and much delayed) Midway. The objective is to fight
the US to a draw in the Pacific, with better preparations and a little
bit of luck the Japanese can hold their own against the rebuilding US.

So what's the end result?
- Japan annihilates but eventually cedes Hawaii. This gives the US a
'saving face' for reclaiming lost territory.

- Japan takes the position that they resent American Imperialism in
Asia, have no eastern expansion desire. This is their negotiating
position, and it plays well with continentalists and isolationists in
the US. If Germany is still a threat this gives the US an 'out' to
concentrate on a single front war. Also after considerably less
progress (e.g. first fleet destroyed at Pearl Harbour, second fleet
beaten back/pyrhic victory in later Midway) US is less confident of its
chances in the Pacific.

- Japan achieves long-term objectives of territorial expansion -- Asian
landmass taken from China, plus the Philipines. Once Japan achieves
this 'sphere of influence' recognition, Indonesia and some of the other
islands can fall too.

Japan's best hope lies in keeping the US at a distance, they got too
greedy in WWII and should have focused upon establishing a recongised
sphere of influence vs invading everything in range.

[d***@minolta.com]

Japan's government had no realistic long-term survival option on Dec 8,
1941. The United States crushed Japan utilizing something like 10% of
it's indutrial base.

Further, the Japanese fought the war poorly. Unlike Britain, Japan
didn't invest in any kind of convoy system, meaning that it could not
maintain it's economy even after it conquered the Southern Resource
Area.

Logistics, logistics, logistics.
Plus a medievil philosophy of war.
= Dead Japanese.

Dave Knudson

[Rich Rostrom]

Post by o***@yahoo.com
I've seen lots of discussion on alternate WW2s in Europe,
With a POD of 1-1-1942[1] or later, could Japan have won[2] WW2?
[1] Or, after 8 Dec '41, if you prefer.
[2] What does "win" mean? That's my question. What's the best that
they could have hoped for? At a minimum, let's say that it means
avoiding getting nuked, and avoiding foreign occupation of the home
islands. Is this possible? How? Can Japan hope for more? How and
why?

About the only possible way I could ever see was
something like this:

FDR dies

Wallace becomes President

Wallace screws up the war high wide and handsome

Leading to Soviet collapse in 1943

Beria escapes the collapse by fleeing to Japan with
a briefcase full of intelligence from the Manhattan
Project. Japanese scientists confirm that this
thing would work, and Japan starts a crash project.

Meanwhile, the US Manhattan Project is exposed and
denounced as a crazy boondoggle for Communist scientists.
(Wallace faces a Republican majority in Congress after
the '42 elections.) It gets shut down.

In 1945, Japan uses atomic bombs to destroy the US
Pacific fleet, Pearl Harbor, the Panama Canal, and San
Francisco. The US capitulates under threat of further
bombings.

[mike]

Post by Rich Rostrom
Beria escapes the collapse by fleeing to Japan with
a briefcase full of intelligence from the Manhattan
Project. Japanese scientists confirm that this
thing would work, and Japan starts a crash project.
Meanwhile, the US Manhattan Project is exposed and
denounced as a crazy boondoggle for Communist scientists.
(Wallace faces a Republican majority in Congress after
the '42 elections.) It gets shut down.
From all the posts beating down on Freck, you would note

2 years wouln't be enough to gather the infrastructure,
even had time travellers dropped complete blueprints and tech
notes for Little Boy on them. Fuchs was far better than any
briefcase( and the Home Team like the 'Beard' were no slouch,
either) and it still took the Soviets 4 years to do a test
bomb, and a few more years to actually weaponize it to a deployable
system

Or develop a Bomber that could actually put that bomb on
target. A 15kt nuke even won't destroy the Canal, airbursts
just aren't that harmful to massive concrete and beyond massive
earthen Gatun Dam. You need penetrating bombs, and thats a few
years of atomic testing down the road. Burning San Francisco
won't end the War, Nazi Germany didn't fold after Hamburg.

by '43, I think no more than only(!) 600 million had been spent,
so that frees up a Billion and a half Dollars and tens of thousands
of workers for other projects. Like Bioweapons.

I don't think Wallace(or any warm body) in the White House
could derail things that much. If the USSR doesn't fold
in December '41, it will last the War. The Nazis even
taking (and holding) Moscow or Baku won't even do this.

Like I said, the Japanese can only delay the Pain.

Or delaying too much, make the Pain worse, like Bioweapons deployed
and/or Invasion. Japanese spoken only in Hell and all that.

On Dec 8, 1941 they were Dead Man Walking. They just didn't realize
it, or believe it, even though nearly every city in the Home Islands
with a Pop. of over 100k had been burnt to cinders before Enola Gay
even took off.

**
mike
**

[a***@pacific.net.au]

On Thu, 12 May 2005 14:10:51 -0500, Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom
Beria escapes the collapse by fleeing to Japan with
a briefcase full of intelligence from the Manhattan
Project. Japanese scientists confirm that this
thing would work, and Japan starts a crash project.

Using rotary aero engines, no doubt. And their sugar ration.

Post by Rich Rostrom
In 1945, Japan uses atomic bombs to destroy the US
Pacific fleet, Pearl Harbor, the Panama Canal, and San
Francisco. The US capitulates under threat of further
bombings.

Are you sure you're not Frack in disguise?

Seriously, while I don't think anyone would deny that even Slobbovia
could *eventually* build an A Bomb, Japan? In the middle of WW2? In
two years?

*That* is frackian in its ASBishness.

Phil

Author, Space Opera (FGU), RBB #1 (FASA), Road to Armageddon (PGD).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Email: ***@pacific.net.au

[b***@yahoo.com]

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
On Thu, 12 May 2005 14:10:51 -0500, Rich Rostrom
Are you sure you're not Frack in disguise?
Seriously, while I don't think anyone would deny that even Slobbovia
could *eventually* build an A Bomb, Japan? In the middle of WW2? In
two years?
*That* is frackian in its ASBishness.
Phil
Author, Space Opera (FGU), RBB #1 (FASA), Road to Armageddon (PGD).

----------------------------------------------------------------------
The only way the Japanese get an A-Bomb is by the Germans giving it to
them. And as I understand it the current concensus is that the Germans
-- despite having 2 competing programs -- were a good 2-3 years behind
the US at war's end, despite an early lead in atomic theory. This of
course might change if the Germans defeat the USSR early in an
alternate timeline, which is the only way I see Japan 'winning'
WWII...they can't do it alone.

[mike]

Post by b***@yahoo.com
The only way the Japanese get an A-Bomb is by the Germans
giving it to them.

In some ways, the Japanese were ahead of the Nazis.

They had not determined the amount of fissile material needed
for Critical Mass, while the Nazis had calculated poorly, and had
not got to the point of developing a Reactor, while had the Nazis
actually built thiers, it would have been a disaster.

They still had the chance to stumble across more accurate
theory, rather than chasing dead ends.

The Bomb wasn't the Nazis to give. August 1945, the captured
Nazi scientists were trying to wrap thier minds around
how the USAAF had a plane big enough to drop a 20 ton
atomic reactor (that went critical on impact) on a Japanese
City. Implosion wasn't even dreamed of.

**
mike
**

[b***@comcast.net]

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
On Thu, 12 May 2005 14:10:51 -0500, Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom
Beria escapes the collapse by fleeing to Japan with
a briefcase full of intelligence from the Manhattan
Project. Japanese scientists confirm that this
thing would work, and Japan starts a crash project.

Using rotary aero engines, no doubt.
And their sugar ration.

Post by Rich Rostrom
In 1945, Japan uses atomic bombs to destroy the US
Pacific fleet, Pearl Harbor, the Panama Canal, and San
Francisco. The US capitulates under threat of further
bombings.

Are you sure you're not Frack in disguise?
Seriously, while I don't think anyone would deny that even Slobbovia
could *eventually* build an A Bomb, Japan? In the middle of WW2? In
two years?
*That* is frackian in its ASBishness.

Just to get it stright on my Japanese A-bomb by 1943 ATL, I will layout
the basics again. The POD is all the way back to 1934, when Dr. Nishina
is recreating experimental studies performed by others that same year.
Nishina performs, additionally, somewhat more involved, larger, and
intracate experimentation along similar lines that Dr. Fermi and Dr.
Szilard had done. Of course, he gets a large increase in
radioactivity--an even larger increase in radioactivity. All of the
Rikkin Radiological Science Division researers are enthuisastic as
well, and this leads into larger fundemental research funding for,
hoped for, eventual applicaitons to nuclear (fission) reactors, fission
atomic bombs, and also possible fussion weapons too. In 1934, the POD
is a modest increase in science funding in Japan.

It doesn't take ASBs to have increasing physics research various areas
sooner. My ATL takes 9 years for a Japanese bomb that has a great deal
of help from German industry. What Japan might be able to do is make a
boiler bomb, a critical reactor that explodes due to the extreme heat
of the reactor and high-heat or high-explosives wrapped around the
reactor. This sort of boiler weapon is natrual uranium and heavy-water
brought togehter and allowed to melt down rapidly and then exploded.
This "boiler" is a high-end dirty-bomb and would have effects similar
to a chemcial weapon.

I don't recall reading anything on how serious weapon a well done
dirty-bomb might be. If Japan had used a boiler in a suicide attack on
Iwo Jima, then might have killed 20,000 USA troops, maybe, and that's a
guess.


John Freck

[a***@pacific.net.au]

Post by b***@comcast.net

Post by a***@pacific.net.au
On Thu, 12 May 2005 14:10:51 -0500, Rich Rostrom

Post by Rich Rostrom
Beria escapes the collapse by fleeing to Japan with
a briefcase full of intelligence from the Manhattan
Project. Japanese scientists confirm that this
thing would work, and Japan starts a crash project.

Using rotary aero engines, no doubt.
And their sugar ration.

Post by Rich Rostrom
In 1945, Japan uses atomic bombs to destroy the US
Pacific fleet, Pearl Harbor, the Panama Canal, and San
Francisco. The US capitulates under threat of further
bombings.

Are you sure you're not Frack in disguise?

Just to get it stright on my Japanese A-bomb by 1943 ATL, I will layout
the basics again. The POD is all the way back to 1934, when Dr. Nishina

TROLL ALERT!

MORON ALERT!

FRACK ALERT!

Phil

Author, Space Opera (FGU), RBB #1 (FASA), Road to Armageddon (PGD).
----------------------------------------------------------------------
Email: ***@pacific.net.au