WI Enigma never cracked? From WI2

[Al Montestruc]

Up front let me state that I got most of this from "What If 2" Edited
by Robert Cowley (2001) a compilation of essays by
“eminent” historians as to major plausible branching
points in history. One Mr. David Kahn who wrote “The
Codebreakers” and “Seizing the Enigma” writes that
it is very plausible that Enigma would have remained largely uncracked
without the efforts of Marian Rejewski in Poland, and later Turing,
Welchman and others in the UK. IMHO as all the efforts in the UK
followed well after the Polish cracking of the basic mechanisms of
Enigma, those efforts would never take place w/o Rejewski. So IMHO if
Rejewski gets run over by a truck, or just has a bad day, then enigma
is never cracked. What if?

According to Khan, one very clear result he sees of this is that El
Alamein and consequently Egypt falls to the Germans in October of
’42. The reason being that IOTL Rommel ran short of fuel
because ULTRA decrypts were being used to home allied submarines and
aircraft in on tanker after tanker delivering fuel to the Afrika Corp.
Also, through ULTRA decrypts, Montgomery knew of Rommel’s fuel
shortage in detail, and could plan his operations to take advantage of
this knowledge, and know the Germans could not pursue allied forces
far, and could plan his operations to waste German fuel, and attack
when they ran out.

In addition, according to Kahn, German cryptography IOTL had cracked
the U.S. Military Attaché code. IOTL they got very detailed
dispositions of British military forces in Egypt by radio intercepts
of American transmissions. The British forces were reported in detail
by the US military attaché in Egypt to Washington by encrypted radio
traffic, which was read by the Germans. This intelligence was
promptly relayed to Rommel by radio encrypted by Enigma. Of course
IOTL the fact that the US military Attaché code was broken was made
obvious by the Ultra decrypts and the leak plugged quickly.
Furthermore the British were aware of what the Germans knew.

Now imagine that Rejewski did not exist, or just does not come up with
the ideas needed, and Enigma is never cracked. While some of the
tankers going to fuel the Afrika Corp will be sunk, far fewer will
given that the sailing dates and escort rendezvous points and times
will not be known to the Allies, and neither will the fact that Rommel
was becoming short of fuel, (which set off the use of Enigma to home
subs and aircraft in on tankers as opposed to other traffic) while at
the same time Rommel will have detailed knowledge of British forces
and their deployment in Egypt, and the British know nothing of it.
Further, we can anticipate more such information will fall in German
hands until someone on the allied side figures out that the U.S. code
has been broken, which might take years if the Germans are careful how
they use the information.

Furthermore on the port facilities limit argument that Phil has raised
when any discussion of changes in flow of supplies is brought up has
merit when discussing solid supplies in pallets or boxes. When
discussing a liquid that can be pumped through a hose from a seagoing
tanker, to a tank farm or even to a beach where tanker trucks are
filled, the objection has much less merit. Tankers have the
facilities to pump the product they carry, and commonly carry long
lengths of large hose for transfers of oil from one tanker to another.
This is less true in peacetime and much less true now in peacetime as
environmental laws are much more strict. But in 1942 in the middle
of a war zone? Oil spills on beaches would not be an issue much
thought would be wasted on.

Thus we can be sure that the fuel that Rommel was starved for would
not be a limit w/o the cracking of Enigma.

In the end of course, the Germans will lose the war in August or
perhaps September of 1945 when the bomb becomes available. But the
effects on the intermediate period will be significant. If Egypt and
Suez falls, the western Med becomes firmly Axis controlled. Probably
Palestine, Trans-Jordon, Syria and Iraq fall, if Hitler wants them, by
mid 1943. Probably Turkey can be shoehorned into the war on the Axis
side by then as well with uncomfortable results for the Russians. The
fight for west North Africa and Italy will be very different and much
more difficult for the Allies. I suspect that Italy will not be
invaded on schedule, and possibly not at all till after the bomb is
dropped. Thoughts??


By the way, according to Khan the Afrika Corp was using 300 tons of
petrol per day of normal activity and 600 tons per day of offensive
operations.

[Jack Linthicum]

***@yahoo.com (Al Montestruc) wrote in message news:<***@posting.google.com>...

If you butterfly away the Poles do you also butterfly Herr Asche and
his 19 visits with the French head of the Intelligence Department's
Cryptology Bureau? The instruction manual, the codebook, and a sample
encyphered message with the plaintext? The Frenchman, Bertrand, passed
these on to the Poles, with whom France was working, but would have
kept copies and if the Poles hadn't been there probably put some of
those Frenchies to work on it. Problem here, if the French make
significant inroads does someone tell the Germans when they take over?

I strongly suspect that greater efforts would be made to steal an
Enigma or find one in a captured ship, submarine, etc. One of the
dumbest things the Germans did was to use ABC as the alphabet sequence
on the rotors. This made solution mathematically a much simpler job
when known.

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by Jack Linthicum
I strongly suspect that greater efforts would be made to steal an
Enigma or find one in a captured ship, submarine, etc. One of the
dumbest things the Germans did was to use ABC as the alphabet sequence
on the rotors. This made solution mathematically a much simpler job
when known.

Two more rotors and better key management would have rendered Enigma
unbreakable.

Or the US Adonis (KL-47) solution with more than the number of rotors
in the cage available, adjustable inside ring, adjustable (and
different) outside rings, rules on setting up message indicators,
nasty people reading the raw traffic and grading senders on attention
to drill. The Bacchus machine was even neater with reversable rotors,
but we gave some to the Soviets.

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by Jack Linthicum
I strongly suspect that greater efforts would be made to steal an
Enigma or find one in a captured ship, submarine, etc. One of the
dumbest things the Germans did was to use ABC as the alphabet sequence
on the rotors. This made solution mathematically a much simpler job
when known.

Two more rotors and better key management would have rendered Enigma
unbreakable.

http://www.pacificsites.com/~brooke/crypto.shtml pretty good
bibliography, careful might be a holocaust denial site or a game
player's list of toys.

Cites a book that says the Soviets were breaking everything in 1979
but the KWR-37, which they probably had from Pueblo and probably
getting keycards from John Walker.

[Al Montestruc]

Post by Jack Linthicum
If you butterfly away the Poles do you also butterfly Herr Asche and
his 19 visits with the French head of the Intelligence Department's
Cryptology Bureau? The instruction manual, the codebook, and a sample
encyphered message with the plaintext? The Frenchman, Bertrand, passed
these on to the Poles, with whom France was working, but would have
kept copies and if the Poles hadn't been there probably put some of
those Frenchies to work on it. Problem here, if the French make
significant inroads does someone tell the Germans when they take over?

I know nothing of this set of incidents. The published author
historian Khan seem to think them not important enough to mention.
Possibly this is well after the initial cracking of enigma by the
Poles, as that was IIRC a couple of years before the war started.

Post by Jack Linthicum
I strongly suspect that greater efforts would be made to steal an
Enigma or find one in a captured ship, submarine, etc. One of the
dumbest things the Germans did was to use ABC as the alphabet sequence
on the rotors. This made solution mathematically a much simpler job
when known.

I don't see how. In the end you must be able to translate back into
plain german text, and that is not something you can get around.

[Faeelin]

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Al Montestruc
I know nothing of this set of incidents. The published author

historian Khan seem to think them not important enough to mention.

The WI books are horrible when it comes to little details like accuracy.
Published historians in them have also explained how a nazi focus on the
meidterranean could have let them attack the USSR over the causacus.

[Faeelin]

Right and phil and I guess you think that is poppycock, I do not. If
you can get Turkey in the war on the Axis side before Barbarossa
starts by either doing a lot more in the Med earlier, or postponing
Barbarossa, you can start the war with an invasion on much more
frontage and with a lot more troops and you can cut off soviet access
to oil from Baku and that area. Oil is the life blood of an army of
that era, shut it off and you have a bunch of peasents with rifles and
not much more.

How do they do more in the med? There's a good book on this, "blood, tears,
and folly" which goes into how the logistics in north africa were basically,
well, a nightmare.

And how do the germans cross the caucasus?

[Al Montestruc]

Post by Faeelin

Right and phil and I guess you think that is poppycock, I do not. If
you can get Turkey in the war on the Axis side before Barbarossa
starts by either doing a lot more in the Med earlier, or postponing
Barbarossa, you can start the war with an invasion on much more
frontage and with a lot more troops and you can cut off soviet access
to oil from Baku and that area. Oil is the life blood of an army of
that era, shut it off and you have a bunch of peasents with rifles and
not much more.

How do they do more in the med? There's a good book on this, "blood, tears,
and folly" which goes into how the logistics in north africa were basically,
well, a nightmare.

In very large measure because enigma was broken. If you know where to
send your sub or plane to intercept all my oil tankers and freighters,
you can truly screw up my supply situation. That was in very large
measure the "supply problem" for the Germans in Africa.

Post by Faeelin
And how do the germans cross the caucasus?

They don't need to. I supposed you read that I was pretty sure that
Turkey could be gotten into the war on the Axis side if the Germans
run the British out of the eastern med?? Given the Turks are on the
German side, one can now get the Italian Navy, some German Navy units,
any available captured French Navy units, and the Romanian, Yugoslav,
and Hungarian Navy (if any) into the black sea, combine them with the
Turkish Navy, and the Luftwaffe, and go beat the crap out of the
Soviet navy in the Black Sea. Then take both Odessa and or Rostov on
the Don by sea using massive superior air power and Naval units and
land on the south coast of Ukraine at about the same time as troops
are kicking in the door on the western fronteer of the Soviet Union.
From Rostov, it is a much shorter march to Baku than from Romania
which is where the Germans started from IOTL.

In any case to cut the Russian oil flow one does not need to invade,
just have airbases in Turkey and fly bombing missions on a regular
basis to torch the refineries and pipelines. Set up top notch
defensive positions on the Turkish side of the caucasian mountains,
and let the Russians come to you. Use mostly Turkish troops for this.

The russians will not win the war in the air, and will be forceed to
conceed or attack in the Caucasian mountains, and they will beat
themselves to death on on a good defensive line manned by top quality
infantry in defence (which the Turks are).

[Al Montestruc]

--------------snip

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Faeelin
And how do the germans cross the caucasus?

They don't need to. I supposed you read that I was pretty sure that
Turkey could be gotten into the war on the Axis side if the Germans
run the British out of the eastern med?? Given the Turks are on the
German side, one can now get the Italian Navy, some German Navy units,
any available captured French Navy units, and the Romanian, Yugoslav,

Romanian "Navy" was based on the Black sea, because (if you look at
the map) Black sea is the only sea Romania has access to.

True but by themselves the Russian Navy of that period would squish
them. If you can add in the Italians and Turks and some German units
(which may be ex-French) then the combined fleet becomes far more
formidable.

But it wasn't
anything which could even remotely threaten Red Black sea fleet. There
were no significant captured French Navy units.

Significant is a question begging term. 40-50 odd MTBs and a few
destroyers manned by Germans can be pretty scary if they have air
superiority.

Only Italian Navy was
a significant force.

Post by Al Montestruc
and Hungarian Navy (if any) into the black sea, combine them with the

Hungaria is landlocked and thus doesn't (and didn't) have a Navy.

OK I recalled that the Austria-Hungary did and figured that since I
knew Austria was land locked that it must be Hungary that had a coast.
Of course they moved the borders.

Post by Al Montestruc
Turkish Navy, and the Luftwaffe, and go beat the crap out of the
Soviet navy in the Black Sea. Then take both Odessa and or Rostov on

Rostov can't be taken from sea.

Ok then the Russian or Georgian coast of the Black Sea south of Rostov
and the Sea of Azov shown in this map:

Loading Image...

Then strike overland toward an area north of Baku and cut the
pipelines.

Again, Rostov is impossible to take from the sea. Novorossiisk? I
don't know. Doesn't help much though. German troops were stopped
cold near Novorossiick in 1942 and couldn't move any furhter along
the Black sea shore. They never were good in mountains. Later on,
ragtag urgently drafted army stopped German advance from Mozdok
area.

The Italians sent several 1st rate alpine units that were squandered
as regular infantry on the stepps north of Stalingrad in winter of
1942-43. Those could be used as the striker elements with support
from the rest.

Post by Al Montestruc
In any case to cut the Russian oil flow one does not need to invade,
just have airbases in Turkey and fly bombing missions on a regular
basis to torch the refineries and pipelines. Set up top notch
defensive positions on the Turkish side of the caucasian mountains,
and let the Russians come to you. Use mostly Turkish troops for this.

There is some probability that Stalin would add 2 and 2 and move
significant anti-aircraft forces to Baku region (in addition to
those which already were there). When Soviet cities were defended
well by PVO (russian acronim for AA defence), Lufwaffe didn't have
much success bombing them. Examples: Moscow, Sevastopol. Night
bombing raids would hardly damage refineries, forget about
pipelines.

True night bombing will not, but one cannot defend the entire length
of a pipeline well in a economical way. Also high altitude daylight
bombing with a mix of high explosives and incindiary bombs can KO any
refinery. One has to be willing to take casualties doing it, but the
USA proved it can be done over and over again. And this was one of
the most cost effective uses of stratigic bombardment in WWII

Post by Al Montestruc
The russians will not win the war in the air, and will be forceed to
conceed or attack in the Caucasian mountains, and they will beat
themselves to death on on a good defensive line manned by top quality
infantry in defence (which the Turks are).

Russian army beat the crap of that top quality infantry during WWI.
Later, in 1921 armenian army repeated the beating. All in the mountains,
and the main problem of Russian army was desease, losses from deseases
exceeded combat losses at rate about 10:1.

Ok

[Alex Filonov]

Post by Al Montestruc
--------------snip

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Faeelin
And how do the germans cross the caucasus?

They don't need to. I supposed you read that I was pretty sure that
Turkey could be gotten into the war on the Axis side if the Germans
run the British out of the eastern med?? Given the Turks are on the
German side, one can now get the Italian Navy, some German Navy units,
any available captured French Navy units, and the Romanian, Yugoslav,

Romanian "Navy" was based on the Black sea, because (if you look at
the map) Black sea is the only sea Romania has access to.

True but by themselves the Russian Navy of that period would squish
them. If you can add in the Italians and Turks and some German units
(which may be ex-French) then the combined fleet becomes far more
formidable.

But it wasn't
anything which could even remotely threaten Red Black sea fleet. There
were no significant captured French Navy units.

Significant is a question begging term. 40-50 odd MTBs and a few
destroyers manned by Germans can be pretty scary if they have air
superiority.

Red Black sea fleet didn't take much casualtied from air attacks, with
exception of Sevastopol evacuation, when ships were caught alone. Ships
in formation or in port had pretty efficient AA defence. I'd like to know
what actually can destroyed do against a heavy cruiser? Or MTB against
a destroyer? And Black Sea fleet had a lot of torpedo boats itself...

Post by Al Montestruc

Only Italian Navy was
a significant force.

Post by Al Montestruc
and Hungarian Navy (if any) into the black sea, combine them with the

Hungaria is landlocked and thus doesn't (and didn't) have a Navy.

OK I recalled that the Austria-Hungary did and figured that since I
knew Austria was land locked that it must be Hungary that had a coast.
Of course they moved the borders.

Post by Al Montestruc
Turkish Navy, and the Luftwaffe, and go beat the crap out of the
Soviet navy in the Black Sea. Then take both Odessa and or Rostov on

Rostov can't be taken from sea.

Ok then the Russian or Georgian coast of the Black Sea south of Rostov
http://www.photius.com/gif/bsec_map.gif
Then strike overland toward an area north of Baku and cut the
pipelines.

Such a pity this map doesn't show mountains. The chains go alongside
the Black Sea, effectively preventing any significant attack from Black
Sea in the direction of Baku.

Post by Al Montestruc

Again, Rostov is impossible to take from the sea. Novorossiisk? I
don't know. Doesn't help much though. German troops were stopped
cold near Novorossiick in 1942 and couldn't move any furhter along
the Black sea shore. They never were good in mountains. Later on,
ragtag urgently drafted army stopped German advance from Mozdok
area.

The Italians sent several 1st rate alpine units that were squandered
as regular infantry on the stepps north of Stalingrad in winter of
1942-43. Those could be used as the striker elements with support
from the rest.

Germans used their 1st rate alpine units there. Didn't help much. Or yeah,
they raised a flag on Elbrus. Don't forget, mountains are the huge force
multiplier for the defence. On the plain, you just need 82mm mortar to
kill machine gun. In mountains, you need 6 inch cannons.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Al Montestruc
In any case to cut the Russian oil flow one does not need to invade,
just have airbases in Turkey and fly bombing missions on a regular
basis to torch the refineries and pipelines. Set up top notch
defensive positions on the Turkish side of the caucasian mountains,
and let the Russians come to you. Use mostly Turkish troops for this.

There is some probability that Stalin would add 2 and 2 and move
significant anti-aircraft forces to Baku region (in addition to
those which already were there). When Soviet cities were defended
well by PVO (russian acronim for AA defence), Lufwaffe didn't have
much success bombing them. Examples: Moscow, Sevastopol. Night
bombing raids would hardly damage refineries, forget about
pipelines.

True night bombing will not, but one cannot defend the entire length
of a pipeline well in a economical way. Also high altitude daylight

Why not? Just regular fighter patrols would do that.

Post by Al Montestruc
bombing with a mix of high explosives and incindiary bombs can KO any
refinery. One has to be willing to take casualties doing it, but the
USA proved it can be done over and over again. And this was one of
the most cost effective uses of stratigic bombardment in WWII

Well, Luftwaffe never ever tried that. Either strategic nighttime
raids or precision daytime bombing. No strategic daytime bombing, not
against well protected USSR areas anyway. And LW didn't have any
strategic bombers to speak of. He-111 was a best bet here, but it
was too slow, any decent fighter defence would catch them well before
they reach target.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Al Montestruc
The russians will not win the war in the air, and will be forceed to
conceed or attack in the Caucasian mountains, and they will beat
themselves to death on on a good defensive line manned by top quality
infantry in defence (which the Turks are).

Russian army beat the crap of that top quality infantry during WWI.
Later, in 1921 armenian army repeated the beating. All in the mountains,
and the main problem of Russian army was desease, losses from deseases
exceeded combat losses at rate about 10:1.

Ok

[The Horny Goat]

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Al Montestruc
and Hungarian Navy (if any) into the black sea, combine them with the

Hungaria is landlocked and thus doesn't (and didn't) have a Navy.

OK I recalled that the Austria-Hungary did and figured that since I
knew Austria was land locked that it must be Hungary that had a coast.
Of course they moved the borders.

!!!
Well of course Austria pre-1914 wasn't what it is post-1945.

As for the Austrian navy, they had 3 or 4 dreadnaught class ships -
and let us not forget what for most North Americans at least is the
most famous 20th century Austrian naval officer of all - Freiherr von
Trapp of Sound of Music fame.

Post by Al Montestruc
The Italians sent several 1st rate alpine units that were squandered
as regular infantry on the stepps north of Stalingrad in winter of
1942-43. Those could be used as the striker elements with support
from the rest.

In actual fact, German mobile patrols reached the Caspian but didn't
accomplish much either in reconaissance or in cutting the rail lines
to the Caucasus. Obviously if this railway remains cut for serious
periods of time it is hugely bad news for Russia but logistically
that's not on as long as Stalingrad remains untaken by the Germans.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Al Montestruc
In any case to cut the Russian oil flow one does not need to invade,
just have airbases in Turkey and fly bombing missions on a regular
basis to torch the refineries and pipelines. Set up top notch
defensive positions on the Turkish side of the caucasian mountains,
and let the Russians come to you. Use mostly Turkish troops for this.

If Germany somehow manages to get Turkey to join the Axis it radically
changes both the war in Russia and the war in North Africa. It was
certainly possible but after having had the topic discussed at huge
length here I am now convinced Turkey joining the Axis would have been
a rather low-odds probability (at least assuming no German victory
over Russia in 1941 in which case the Germans don't need Turkish aid
against Russia though could still use the aid against North Africa).

[Stuart Wilkes]

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Faeelin

Right and phil and I guess you think that is poppycock, I do not. If
you can get Turkey in the war on the Axis side before Barbarossa
starts by either doing a lot more in the Med earlier,

Rommel arrived in North Africa in April 1941. Barbarossa started two
monts later. Are you proposing that Rommel drives to the suez canal
in two months?

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Faeelin

or postponing Barbarossa, you can start the war with an invasion on
much more frontage and with a lot more troops and you can cut off
soviet access to oil from Baku and that area.

By postponing Barbarossa, you let the Molotov Line get much more
complete, another year of training for the Mechanized Corps, running
another year's production of T-34s and KVs, the VVS gets more MiGs,
Yaks, Sturmoviks, Tupelovs, and Petlakovs, and you might even get
Sovetskaya Ukrainia commissioned.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Faeelin

Oil is the life blood of an army of
that era, shut it off and you have a bunch of peasents with rifles and
not much more.

How do they do more in the med? There's a good book on this, "blood, tears,
and folly" which goes into how the logistics in north africa were
basically, well, a nightmare.

In very large measure because enigma was broken.

In larger measure because of that long, fuel-sucking,
continually-strafed-by-the-RAF road.

Post by Al Montestruc
If you know where to send your sub or plane to intercept all my oil
tankers and freighters, you can truly screw up my supply situation.

Indeed. But you've not shown that "no Enigma" will un-screw it
sufficiently.

Post by Al Montestruc
That was in very large measure the "supply problem" for the Germans in
Africa.

Certainly part. By no means all.

Then there's the problem that Rommel was kind of a one-trick pony.
Without a desert flank to turn, he was out of ideas.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Faeelin
And how do the germans cross the caucasus?

They don't need to. I supposed you read that I was pretty sure that
Turkey could be gotten into the war on the Axis side if the Germans
run the British out of the eastern med??

1) You've not shown how the British are to be run out of the eastern
Med.

2) You were once pretty sure that the Brits had no guns that could
shoot 40 km.

Post by Al Montestruc
Given the Turks are on the German side, one can now get the Italian Navy,

The Brits still have Gibralter, and the US is in the war, so the
Western Med is of great concern to the Italians.

Post by Al Montestruc
some German Navy units,

How do they get there?

Post by Al Montestruc
any available captured French Navy units, and the
Romanian, Yugoslav, and Hungarian Navy (if any) into the black sea, combine
them with the Turkish Navy, and the Luftwaffe, and go beat the crap out of
the Soviet navy in the Black Sea.

Which runs to Novorossisk and hides under its own naval air, until a
time of its choosing.

Post by Al Montestruc
Then take both Odessa

That took considerable doing OTL.

Post by Al Montestruc
and or Rostov on the Don by sea

Alex has already commented on the Sea of Azov depth issue.

Post by Al Montestruc
using massive superior air power

Over the Black Sea? So where do you conjour that up?

Post by Al Montestruc
and Naval units and
land on the south coast of Ukraine at about the same time as troops
are kicking in the door on the western fronteer of the Soviet Union.
From Rostov, it is a much shorter march to Baku than from Romania
which is where the Germans started from IOTL.
In any case to cut the Russian oil flow one does not need to invade,
just have airbases in Turkey and fly bombing missions on a regular
basis to torch the refineries and pipelines.

Well, that airspace was already heavily defended, since the threat of
"Operation Pike" in 1940.

And you're proposing to support a strategic bombing campaign on a
decrepit single-tracked railroad? In 1940, the Brits tried to get
airfield construction going in eastern Turkey, to support Operation
Pike, and found that distance and transportation issues caused no end
of headaches and delays.

Post by Al Montestruc
Set up top notch
defensive positions on the Turkish side of the caucasian mountains,

Turkey dosen't border on the Caucasus range.

Stuart Wilkes

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Rommel arrived in North Africa in April 1941. Barbarossa started two
monts later. Are you proposing that Rommel drives to the suez canal
in two months?

No but much earlier involvement in Africa was proposed by several high
ranking german military leaders. The war in France was over by the
end of summer 1940 and anyone with a war college eduction could see
that Sealion was not going to happen in 1940 or 1941. Involvement in
North Africa was looked at as a means of forceing the British to the
table.

When precisely was this proposed? I have to believe that sending
Germans into Italian controlled North Africa before Graziani lost at
Sidi Barani (December 1940) would have sent Mussolini up a wall.
Churchill quotes Ciano on Graziani's feelings that Mussolini was
putting pressure on Graziani because Rommel (attache?) was advising
Mussolini. There is almost no way that the Germans could have foretold
that the Italian army of a million or so couldn't push the British
65,000 men back to Cairo.

[Stuart Wilkes]

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Faeelin

Right and phil and I guess you think that is poppycock, I do not. If
you can get Turkey in the war on the Axis side before Barbarossa
starts by either doing a lot more in the Med earlier,

Rommel arrived in North Africa in April 1941. Barbarossa started two
monts later. Are you proposing that Rommel drives to the suez canal
in two months?

No but much earlier involvement in Africa was proposed by several high
ranking german military leaders.

They're not the ones you need to convince. Mussolini is. And he's
after an <Italian> empire in the Med, not a German one.

<snip>

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Faeelin

or postponing Barbarossa, you can start the war with an invasion on
much more frontage and with a lot more troops and you can cut off
soviet access to oil from Baku and that area.

By postponing Barbarossa, you let the Molotov Line get much more
complete, another year of training for the Mechanized Corps, running
another year's production of T-34s and KVs, the VVS gets more MiGs,
Yaks, Sturmoviks, Tupelovs, and Petlakovs, and you might even get
Sovetskaya Ukrainia commissioned.

And you allow another year of production of german tanks and aircraft.

The tanks of which are not as good as the Soviet. And the MiGs and
Yaks are pretty well the equals of the German variety. So the time is
stll to the advantage of the Soviets, what with the fortifications
being more complete and all those Mechanized Corps getting more
training, not to mention being fully mobilized and alerted.

IMHO that and the addition of Turkey and the removal of the UK off
the southern flank more than make up for what you say.

And IYHO, at one time, the Brits had no guns that could shoot 40 km.
I don't find YHO particularly convincing.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Faeelin

Oil is the life blood of an army of
that era, shut it off and you have a bunch of peasents with rifles and
not much more.

How do they do more in the med? There's a good book on this, "blood, tears,
and folly" which goes into how the logistics in north africa were
basically, well, a nightmare.

In very large measure because enigma was broken.

In larger measure because of that long, fuel-sucking,
continually-strafed-by-the-RAF road.

Crap.

Hardly.

With more fuel delivered to North Africa the Luftwaffe fighters
can sorti more often and make such attacks much more dangerous.

So what do you use the additional fuel for, a bigger Afrika Korps or
enough Luftwaffe to protect the road? And how do you know the
additional fuel will be enough to support <either> option?

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
If you know where to send your sub or plane to intercept all my oil
tankers and freighters, you can truly screw up my supply situation.

Indeed. But you've not shown that "no Enigma" will un-screw it
sufficiently.

It is very well historically documented that ultra decrypts were used
to strangle the Afrika Corps.

Then cite the documentation please.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
That was in very large measure the "supply problem" for the Germans in
Africa.

Certainly part. By no means all.

More than enought to make the difference between victory and defeat.

Sez who?

How much fuel was sent, how much was sunk, how much was burned by the
german log system, and how much would have been required for victory?

You snipped the fact that not only were tankers being intercepted by
these decrypts, but Monty knew in detail of Rommel's fuel shortages
and could plan accordingly. Had he not known he could be much easyier
to bluff.

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Then there's the problem that Rommel was kind of a one-trick pony.
Without a desert flank to turn, he was out of ideas.

Without fuel with a tank army, you cannot manuver, without manuver one
cannot do anything.

It wasn't fuel shortage that deprived Rommel of the desert flank at El
Alamein. It was the Qatarra depression.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Faeelin
And how do the germans cross the caucasus?

They don't need to. I supposed you read that I was pretty sure that
Turkey could be gotten into the war on the Axis side if the Germans
run the British out of the eastern med??

1) You've not shown how the British are to be run out of the eastern
Med.

Egypt falls if Rommel has the fuel he needs to defeat Monty.

No. First of all, it wasn't Monty he needs to defeat. Its Auchinlek.
Auchinlek is the guy who stopped Rommel at 1st Alamein. It was monty
who <attacked> at 2nd Alamein.

He still needs to get through the passage between the Qattara
depression and the coast.

And what is it that gives him a desert flank to turn at El Alamein,
seeing as how without one he was out of ideas?

<snip unsupported handwaving, in the absence of an answer to this
question>

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
Given the Turks are on the German side, one can now get the Italian Navy,

The Brits still have Gibralter,

So?

Means the Italians need their Navy to guard their west coast.

Post by Stuart Wilkes
and the US is in the war,

Not till '42 and possibly not even then. Butterflys from the fall of
Egypt may change Japanese plans.

Then again, they may not. You've supplied no reason why they should.

So tell us all how the new German strategy in the Med prevents the US
embargoing Japan's oil, for instance.

Post by Stuart Wilkes
so the Western Med is of great concern to the Italians.

Not as much as you may think.

Not that you've shown.

And they do not need the whole Italian
fleet, just enough to pound the soviet navy in the Balck sea in
conjunction with the Turkish fleet and airforce, and german and
italian air cover.

And how much is that? With the British and the US Atlantic Fleet
combined, the Italians have a <lot> to worry about.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
some German Navy units,

How do they get there?

Same way they did IOTL via Gibralter (U-boats) also they can
commandeer old french units.

Sure. A few U-boats making a high-risk passage past Gibralter. Why
am I not impressed?

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
any available captured French Navy units, and the
Romanian, Yugoslav, and Hungarian Navy (if any) into the black sea, combine
them with the Turkish Navy, and the Luftwaffe, and go beat the crap out of
the Soviet navy in the Black Sea.

Which runs to Novorossisk and hides under its own naval air, until a
time of its choosing.

Or till it's naval air umbrella is shot away.

You've not told us when this happens.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
Then take both Odessa

That took considerable doing OTL.

Post by Al Montestruc
and or Rostov on the Don by sea

Alex has already commented on the Sea of Azov depth issue.

Post by Al Montestruc
using massive superior air power

Over the Black Sea? So where do you conjour that up?

Air bases in Turkey.

Note the difficulty the Brits had getting airfields built in eastern
turkey to support Operation Pike. Why should German difficulties be
less?

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
and Naval units and
land on the south coast of Ukraine at about the same time as troops
are kicking in the door on the western fronteer of the Soviet Union.
From Rostov, it is a much shorter march to Baku than from Romania
which is where the Germans started from IOTL.
In any case to cut the Russian oil flow one does not need to invade,
just have airbases in Turkey and fly bombing missions on a regular
basis to torch the refineries and pipelines.

Well, that airspace was already heavily defended, since the threat of
"Operation Pike" in 1940.
And you're proposing to support a strategic bombing campaign on a
decrepit single-tracked railroad? In 1940, the Brits tried to get
airfield construction going in eastern Turkey, to support Operation
Pike, and found that distance and transportation issues caused no end
of headaches and delays.

Post by Al Montestruc
Set up top notch
defensive positions on the Turkish side of the caucasian mountains,

Turkey dosen't border on the Caucasus range.

Loading Image...
really? What range is it then? I was under the impression that
Georgia was in the caucus montains and the map clearly shows Turkey
borders Georgia.

So now all mountains in the Caucasus are the Caucasus range? That's a
new one.

As I understand it, the Caucasus range is on the border of Georgia and
<Russia>.

Stuart Wilkes

[Alan Lothian]

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Rommel arrived in North Africa in April 1941.

Tsk, tsk. 12 Feb 1941. In aggressive action two weeks later. O'Connor
captured 7 April (Neame, too, but he was no great loss, nice chap that
he undoubtedly was[1]) plus a slew of other high-ranking Brits.

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Barbarossa started two
monts later. Are you proposing that Rommel drives to the suez canal
in two months?

Well, he actually has three and a half months. No problem for the
Feldherr of the Front Line, surely?

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Faeelin

or postponing Barbarossa, you can start the war with an invasion on
much more frontage and with a lot more troops and you can cut off
soviet access to oil from Baku and that area.

I am not sure who this is above; but whatever problems OTL Barbarossa
had were not due to lack of frontage. World record for frontage, was
ol' barbie.

Post by Stuart Wilkes
By postponing Barbarossa, you let the Molotov Line get much more
complete, another year of training for the Mechanized Corps, running
another year's production of T-34s and KVs, the VVS gets more MiGs,
Yaks, Sturmoviks, Tupelovs, and Petlakovs, and you might even get
Sovetskaya Ukrainia commissioned.

You do have the outside chance that the Soviets (esp Stalin) will do
something really stupid to interfere with this, but that's about it.
Much harder nut to crack, has to be.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Faeelin

Oil is the life blood of an army of
that era, shut it off and you have a bunch of peasents with rifles and
not much more.

How do they do more in the med? There's a good book on this, "blood, tears,
and folly" which goes into how the logistics in north africa were
basically, well, a nightmare.

In very large measure because enigma was broken.

In larger measure because of that long, fuel-sucking,
continually-strafed-by-the-RAF road.

As I have said before meself. The wet, watery stuff also causes
problems.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
If you know where to send your sub or plane to intercept all my oil
tankers and freighters, you can truly screw up my supply situation.

Indeed. But you've not shown that "no Enigma" will un-screw it
sufficiently.

Post by Al Montestruc
That was in very large measure the "supply problem" for the Germans in
Africa.

Certainly part. By no means all.
Then there's the problem that Rommel was kind of a one-trick pony.
Without a desert flank to turn, he was out of ideas.

He never had enough stuff, and he couldn't *get* enough stuff. Thought
experiment: an entire Panzerarmee assigned to North Africa. Assume
(handwaving, bit of luck, skilful diversions; in any case, this is the
easy bit) you get to land it more or less intact. Then what? It's quite
impossible to supply.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Faeelin
And how do the germans cross the caucasus?

They don't need to. I supposed you read that I was pretty sure that
Turkey could be gotten into the war on the Axis side if the Germans
run the British out of the eastern med??

1) You've not shown how the British are to be run out of the eastern
Med.

Much harder than it looks on easy paper. It's that damned road more
than anything, but not just that damned road. The Brits are allowed to
respond to the changed situation. (Hang on, didn't we just go through
all this a week or so ago?)

Post by Stuart Wilkes
2) You were once pretty sure that the Brits had no guns that could
shoot 40 km.

Post by Al Montestruc
Given the Turks are on the German side, one can now get the Italian Navy,

An ally of virtually no value whatsoever, given that they haven't got a
pot to piss in, no transport infrastructure, etc.

Post by Stuart Wilkes
The Brits still have Gibralter, and the US is in the war, so the
Western Med is of great concern to the Italians.

Post by Al Montestruc
some German Navy units,

How do they get there?

Not a whole hell of a lot around in the way of German naval units. But
indeed, how do they get there? Hmm, Super Channel Dash. Salmon and
Gluckstein run the Straits of Gibraltar. Due to British dithering,
incompetence, bad luck, whatever, S & G with the odd escorting
destroyer get into the Western Med. Never mind imaginary fleet actions
with Cunningham; "Wo ist der gas station?"

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
any available captured French Navy units, and the
Romanian, Yugoslav, and Hungarian Navy (if any) into the black sea, combine
them with the Turkish Navy, and the Luftwaffe, and go beat the crap out of
the Soviet navy in the Black Sea.

Which runs to Novorossisk and hides under its own naval air, until a
time of its choosing.

Post by Al Montestruc
Then take both Odessa

That took considerable doing OTL.

Post by Al Montestruc
and or Rostov on the Don by sea

Alex has already commented on the Sea of Azov depth issue.

Post by Al Montestruc
using massive superior air power

Over the Black Sea? So where do you conjour that up?

Post by Al Montestruc
and Naval units and
land on the south coast of Ukraine at about the same time as troops
are kicking in the door on the western fronteer of the Soviet Union.
From Rostov, it is a much shorter march to Baku than from Romania
which is where the Germans started from IOTL.
In any case to cut the Russian oil flow one does not need to invade,
just have airbases in Turkey and fly bombing missions on a regular
basis to torch the refineries and pipelines.

Well, that airspace was already heavily defended, since the threat of
"Operation Pike" in 1940.

Also, the Germans don't have a strategic bombing force. Also, geography
allowed them to use accurate night-bombing aids against Britain. None
of these will work worth a shit in that neck of the woods. Assume
(Luftwaffe crews being better than everyone else) that 30% of your
bombs will be dropped within about five miles of the target. Assume,
also, operational losses considerably higher than those caused by enemy
action. And at least consider *just how much supply a bomber base
requires.* Mind you, if you want to go for daylight raiding (with
aircraft vastly less competent than B-24s, which took a hiding doing
this sort of thing) your supply requirements will soon be much reduced.

Post by Stuart Wilkes
And you're proposing to support a strategic bombing campaign on a
decrepit single-tracked railroad? In 1940, the Brits tried to get
airfield construction going in eastern Turkey, to support Operation
Pike, and found that distance and transportation issues caused no end
of headaches and delays.

Should have read this para before I wrote mine above. Quite. By
comparison, look at the awesome trans-oceanic supply line the USN
created in the Pacific.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
Set up top notch
defensive positions on the Turkish side of the caucasian mountains,

Turkey dosen't border on the Caucasus range.

Small-scale maps.[2] 1:5,000,000 makes all sort of things possible.
Tried it myself with SAGWL years ago, was rightly roasted.


[1] Being a recipient of the Victoria Cross seems to be a poor
qualification for general command. Gort (not as bad as he was later
blackened by Allanbrooke) Freyberg....

[2] to this day, I am never quite sure what is meant by small-scale and
large-scale when it comes to maps. For me, a large-scale map is the
1:25000 job I use for backpacking in the Scottish Highlands. But I can
see how it might be read the other way around.

[Jack Linthicum]

Alan Lothian <***@mac.com> wrote in message news:<220920032319049911%***@mac.com>...

Sticking my nose in to accent my own misgivings about any chance of
the Germans getting from Libya to Georgia in 1941 without falling down
on their own. Something as simple as tank tread replacements, where do
you send the parts and how? Liberally snipped for ego purposes.

Post by Alan Lothian

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Indeed. But you've not shown that "no Enigma" will un-screw it
sufficiently.

The locations were known, point A Italy, Point B North Africa. It was
the when that Enigma helped. Might lead to more raids on ships in port
rather than the "chance" encounters in mid Sea that Enigma
perpetrated.

Post by Alan Lothian

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
That was in very large measure the "supply problem" for the Germans in
Africa.

Post by Faeelin
And how do the germans cross the caucasus?

There are two Caucasusses (Caucasii?) the little one on the
Turkey-Sakartvelo border, the big one on the north edge of Sakartvelo.
The big one has one pass, period. Which the Russians would know about,
and defend. Wonder if the Brits have any residual assets left in
Georgia and Azerbajan after their 1920s interference there?

Post by Alan Lothian

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
They don't need to. I supposed you read that I was pretty sure that
Turkey could be gotten into the war on the Axis side if the Germans
run the British out of the eastern med??

1) You've not shown how the British are to be run out of the eastern
Med.

Much harder than it looks on easy paper. It's that damned road more
than anything, but not just that damned road. The Brits are allowed to
respond to the changed situation. (Hang on, didn't we just go through
all this a week or so ago?)

Those Long Range Desert Group people get a third season of The Desert
Rats on TV, just one road to snip and much room for manuever.

Post by Alan Lothian

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
Set up top notch
defensive positions on the Turkish side of the caucasian mountains,

Turkey dosen't border on the Caucasus range.

Small-scale maps.[2] 1:5,000,000 makes all sort of things possible.
Tried it myself with SAGWL years ago, was rightly roasted.

See above on Caucusus

[Stuart Wilkes]

Post by Alan Lothian

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Rommel arrived in North Africa in April 1941.

Tsk, tsk. 12 Feb 1941.

Oops!! Thank you for catching that. Shows what hjappens when you
post without a look at the library.

Post by Alan Lothian
In aggressive action two weeks later. O'Connor
captured 7 April (Neame, too, but he was no great loss, nice chap that
he undoubtedly was[1]) plus a slew of other high-ranking Brits.

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Barbarossa started two
monts later. Are you proposing that Rommel drives to the suez canal
in two months?

Well, he actually has three and a half months. No problem for the
Feldherr of the Front Line, surely?

What matters is the will!

Post by Alan Lothian

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc

or postponing Barbarossa, you can start the war with an invasion on
much more frontage and with a lot more troops and you can cut off
soviet access to oil from Baku and that area.

I am not sure who this is above;

Pas moi.

<snip>

Post by Alan Lothian

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
That was in very large measure the "supply problem" for the Germans in
Africa.

Certainly part. By no means all.
Then there's the problem that Rommel was kind of a one-trick pony.
Without a desert flank to turn, he was out of ideas.

He never had enough stuff, and he couldn't *get* enough stuff. Thought
experiment: an entire Panzerarmee assigned to North Africa. Assume
(handwaving, bit of luck, skilful diversions; in any case, this is the
easy bit) you get to land it more or less intact. Then what? It's quite
impossible to supply.

You're only hope is to get to Alamein with the OTL force, dig in, and
then send the rest of the force. Then you dig <them> in, and then
start accumulating the fuel to get the whole crowd to Alexandria.

Oh, and Eighth Army has to sit there the whole time and let you do
this.


<snip>

Post by Alan Lothian

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
In any case to cut the Russian oil flow one does not need to invade,
just have airbases in Turkey and fly bombing missions on a regular
basis to torch the refineries and pipelines.

Well, that airspace was already heavily defended, since the threat of
"Operation Pike" in 1940.

Also, the Germans don't have a strategic bombing force.

Now wait a minute, they've got some 270 FW-200! Now those had the
distressing habit of their tails dropping off, but apart from that,
they should do nicely. ;)

Post by Alan Lothian

Post by Stuart Wilkes
And you're proposing to support a strategic bombing campaign on a
decrepit single-tracked railroad? In 1940, the Brits tried to get
airfield construction going in eastern Turkey, to support Operation
Pike, and found that distance and transportation issues caused no end
of headaches and delays.

Should have read this para before I wrote mine above. Quite. By
comparison, look at the awesome trans-oceanic supply line the USN
created in the Pacific.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
Set up top notch
defensive positions on the Turkish side of the caucasian mountains,

Turkey dosen't border on the Caucasus range.

Small-scale maps.[2] 1:5,000,000 makes all sort of things possible.

Indeed, they are a great help in Winning the War in a Day:

"The scale of the map should be small if you're winning the war in a
day.
it mustn't show mountains at all, for mountains may be in the way.
But, taking a statesmanlike view, and sitting at home in a room,
I'm all for some bombs on Baku. And, of course, a few bombs on
Batum."

A.P Herbert, "Baku, or the Map Game".

Stuart Wilkes

[The Horny Goat]

Egypt falls if Rommel has the fuel he needs to defeat Monty. That
necessaraly means Suez falls, W/O Suez the British cannot supply Malta
or any other seaport in the eastern Med w/o running a very long
gauntlet of aircoverage from both Italy and North Africa from
Gibralter to the eastern Med which is just not practical.
Without ship delivered supplies, Palestine, Syria (if taken by Britain
from the Vichy French by this time) and Trans-Jordan fall if the
Germans want them. If they do, the Turkey will be surrounded by the
Germans and allies except where they border the Soviet Union. That
shoehorns the Turks in bed with the Germans. Then the Germans can
threaten Iraq, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf Coast from Syria and
Turkey.

Logistically that only works in Panzer General. (And is in fact one of
the more enjoyable scenarios of that game so long as one remembers
that it's a fantasy)

[Al Montestruc]

Post by The Horny Goat

Egypt falls if Rommel has the fuel he needs to defeat Monty. That
necessaraly means Suez falls, W/O Suez the British cannot supply Malta
or any other seaport in the eastern Med w/o running a very long
gauntlet of aircoverage from both Italy and North Africa from
Gibralter to the eastern Med which is just not practical.
Without ship delivered supplies, Palestine, Syria (if taken by Britain
from the Vichy French by this time) and Trans-Jordan fall if the
Germans want them. If they do, the Turkey will be surrounded by the
Germans and allies except where they border the Soviet Union. That
shoehorns the Turks in bed with the Germans. Then the Germans can
threaten Iraq, Kuwait and the Persian Gulf Coast from Syria and
Turkey.

Logistically that only works in Panzer General.

Panzer General ignores logistics totally. The fact of the matter is
that had the British not known of Rommel's fuel shortage, and had not
cracked enigma, then Rommel's fuel problems would have been cleared up
with a couple of tanker loads and Egypt would have fallen. If Egypt
falls, Suez falls, if Suez falls then the British in the eastern med
are the ones with supply problems, and the British would problably be
able to put up far less resistance than the Panzer General
"middleeast" game indicates, as their fuel must come overland from
Iraq to Palestine, and they would not be able to fuel the ships on the
allied side in that game. W/o those ships, the Italian navy can romp
and stomp on British positions up to 10 miles or so inland with
impunity.

Post by The Horny Goat
(And is in fact one of
the more enjoyable scenarios of that game so long as one remembers
that it's a fantasy)

[The Horny Goat]

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by The Horny Goat
Logistically that only works in Panzer General.

Panzer General ignores logistics totally. The fact of the matter is
that had the British not known of Rommel's fuel shortage, and had not
cracked enigma, then Rommel's fuel problems would have been cleared up
with a couple of tanker loads and Egypt would have fallen. If Egypt
falls, Suez falls, if Suez falls then the British in the eastern med

You DO realize I was being sarcastic don't you?

I mean I really enjoyed Panzer General but no I don't think I "proved"
Hitler was capable of taking Moscow, London and Washington even though
I did on several occasions.

Trust me - I *DO* understand the difference!

[Al Montestruc]

Post by The Horny Goat

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by The Horny Goat
Logistically that only works in Panzer General.

Panzer General ignores logistics totally. The fact of the matter is
that had the British not known of Rommel's fuel shortage, and had not
cracked enigma, then Rommel's fuel problems would have been cleared up
with a couple of tanker loads and Egypt would have fallen. If Egypt
falls, Suez falls, if Suez falls then the British in the eastern med

You DO realize I was being sarcastic don't you?

Yes, sure, one of the ways of dealing with sarcastic comments is to
treat them as straight. I note you ingnored the rest of my points.

Post by The Horny Goat
I mean I really enjoyed Panzer General but no I don't think I "proved"
Hitler was capable of taking Moscow, London and Washington even though
I did on several occasions.

Neither does it proove it cannot be done. If the logistical
assumptions behind the game scenario in question are reasonable one
can use that wargame to discuss what can happen. If not then it
cannot.

The PG "North Africa" scenario is innacurate in that it does not cause
German units at a specific time to be unable to get supplies (fuel and
ammo are an important part of the game for those who have never
played) regardless of where they are or what the general does. In OTL
this happened when the British leared through Ultra decrypts that
Rommel had overextended himself a bit and needed a lot of fuel to keep
going, but that he could keep going if he got the fuel. British High
Command made the call to use Ultra intel to deny him fuel at the small
risk of someone in German Intelligence figuring out that the allies
were reading Enigma messages. If in the game all german panzer units
are either out of fuel or very low on it, and low on ammo to, it would
be nearly childs play for the British player with less units and less
strong ones to destroy the German army.

What I am saying is that had enigma not been cracked, the "North
African" PG scenario would be ~ accurate except that the Germans would
have better initial intelligence to British deploymens, and I suspect
that the number of British troops in Egypt is less than the game
suggests.

Again if Egypt falls, Suez falls and then the "middleast scenario"
would be nearly as innacurate as the "North Africa" is IOTL as the
British cannot properly supply Palestine without shipping through
Suez, and could not support a significant sized fleet in the eastern
Med.

[Stuart Wilkes]

***@yahoo.com (Al Montestruc) wrote in message news:<***@posting.google.com>...

<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc
Yes, sure, one of the ways of dealing with sarcastic comments is to
treat them as straight. I note you ingnored the rest of my points.

You continually ignore my points about the coastal road burning most
of his fuel transporting supplies and the lack of a desert flank to
turn once you get level with the Qattara Depression.

Fuel tankers sinking isn't Rommels only problem.

He will still burn most of it driving it to the front, and he's still
a one-trick pony.

Stuart Wilkes

[Al Montestruc]

Post by Stuart Wilkes
<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc
Yes, sure, one of the ways of dealing with sarcastic comments is to
treat them as straight. I note you ingnored the rest of my points.

You continually ignore my points about the coastal road burning most
of his fuel transporting supplies

Excuse me, that is horseshit.


http://www.geocities.com/medalofhonoraa8/vehicles.html

the above site indicates the specs of an Opel Blinz truck the standard
german army truck of wwii. It is a nominal 3 ton truck meaning it can
transport 3 (metric) tons, a metric ton is 2205 lbs --> 6615 lbs cargo
load, forget the internal tank of the Blinz. A gallon of water weighs
8 lb, gasoline weighs about 0.8 what water does volume for volume, but
let us say it is the same to account for the weight of the jerry cans.
That means it can yomp 827 gallons of fuel.

My Saturn VUE has a 189 horsepower V6, and gets about 16 miles per
gallon when I run in stop and go Houston traffic with the A/C running
full blast, as much as 22-23 MPG when running on the freeway at ~65 -
70 mph with no A/C over long distaces.

An Opel Blinz had a 68 horse probably slant six, and cannot run
anything like as fast as my VUE. Note that all else equal, an
automobile expends fuel at a rate proportional to the square of it's
speed if that speed is much over around 20 mph as rolling resistance
starts to be pretty small set next to wind resistance at higher speed.
Let us for the sake of argument on your part say that the 68 hp Blinz
running at maybe 45 mph with no A/C or other auxillery BS is going to
get 16 MPG, even though realistically it will probably get much better
than that.

It is about 500 miles from Tripoli to Cairo or Alexandria. If
Alexandria falls then clearly we can use it for a port so the worst
possible case is a 1000 mile round trip which will require -->
1000/16=62.5 gallons or 1 out of 13.23 of the gallons loaded on the
truck.

Matter of fact the fuel will be around 50%, maybe more of the supplies
needed so figure we will need 2 gallons of every 13.23 of those loaded
on the truck, to cover the other 50% of the supply load for the 500
mile round trip to Alexandia. Not to get to the early part of the
fighting. That means we can deliver AT LEAST 11.23 gallons of fuel
for every 13.23 loaded, and this is using very conservative
assumptions.

Mr. Wilkes, based on simple calculations I showed above, I do think
that your position is quite unrealistic.

Post by Stuart Wilkes
and the lack of a desert flank to
turn once you get level with the Qattara Depression.

The Qattara depression is not as impassible as you seem to think.

As an alternative he could turn the sea side flank with an amphibious
landing behind Monti's flank.

[Robert A. Woodward]

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc
Yes, sure, one of the ways of dealing with sarcastic comments is to
treat them as straight. I note you ingnored the rest of my points.

You continually ignore my points about the coastal road burning most
of his fuel transporting supplies

Excuse me, that is horseshit.

I think you should be a bit more humble in expressing your opinions.

Post by Al Montestruc
http://www.geocities.com/medalofhonoraa8/vehicles.html
the above site indicates the specs of an Opel Blinz truck the standard
german army truck of wwii.

<snip of calculations based on comparing WWII German truck, presumably
operating on whatever roads, trails, etc. that could be found in North
Africa, with modern USA truck operating on good highways on even terms.>

Post by Al Montestruc
Mr. Wilkes, based on simple calculations I showed above, I do think
that your position is quite unrealistic.

It is my distinct impression that German logistics records were used to
determine that carrying stuff to the front used up most of the fuel
landed in North Africa by the Axis.

In other words, your calculations are simplistic and based on faulty and
probably incomplete assumptions.

[mike]

Post by Al Montestruc
the above site indicates the specs of an Opel Blinz truck the standard
german army truck of wwii. It is a nominal 3 ton truck meaning it can
transport 3 (metric) tons, a metric ton is 2205 lbs --> 6615 lbs cargo
load, forget the internal tank of the Blinz. A gallon of water weighs
8 lb, gasoline weighs about 0.8 what water does volume for volume, but
let us say it is the same to account for the weight of the jerry cans.
That means it can yomp 827 gallons of fuel.

Not Quite.
the Opel Blitz was a knockoff of a '30s Chevy truck, not surprising,
given GM relationship with Opel PreWWII

So here are the stats of the Chevy its based off.
truck weight, empty 4500 lbs: 3-4000 lbs payload
83hp (bit more than the Opel, its 6cyl was bored and stroked at bit by 1940)
48mph top speed
30 gallon tank,195 mile range at max load--6.5mpg
the tanker version had a 700 or 750 gallon capacity

Post by Al Montestruc
It is about 500 miles from Tripoli to Cairo or Alexandria. If
Alexandria falls then clearly we can use it for a port so the worst
possible case is a 1000 mile round trip which will require -->
1000/16=62.5 gallons or 1 out of 13.23 of the gallons loaded on the
truck.

at 6.5mpg, it sucks up nearly 154gallons: nearly 20% of the load gone.

Post by Al Montestruc
Mr. Wilkes, based on simple calculations I showed above, I do think
that your position is quite unrealistic.

do some googling on 'red ball express' and see the trouble of doing
100% truck logistics.

And the US did much better than the Nazis, as it was mostly all
the same make, while the Nazis had more British and Italian
trucks than German-- a spare parts nightmare, and hot desert
eats tires much faster than France, as well.

Post by Al Montestruc
As an alternative he could turn the sea side flank with an amphibious
landing behind Monti's flank.

RN based in Egypt makes that really dangerous, plus R had zero
amphib experience.

**
mike
**

[Stuart Wilkes]

<snip>

Post by mike

Post by Al Montestruc
It is about 500 miles from Tripoli to Cairo or Alexandria. If
Alexandria falls then clearly we can use it for a port so the worst
possible case is a 1000 mile round trip which will require -->
1000/16=62.5 gallons or 1 out of 13.23 of the gallons loaded on the
truck.

at 6.5mpg, it sucks up nearly 154gallons: nearly 20% of the load gone.

I just caught this:

It's not 500 miles from Tripoli to Alexandria. By the coast road, its
about 1,200. So at 6.5 mpg, the truck will suck 185 gallons of its
700 gallon payload on the trip out. But wait. Engine operation was
inefficient in the desert, what with all that blowing sand and dust
clogging air filters and getting into everything. So drop your MPGs
to 5 or so, as a SWAG. Now your trip out costs 240 gallons. And
that's the best case, with no idling or other inefficiencies. Then
the truck has to go back, unless you want to just park it in the
desert.

Then you have the trucks carrying replacements, ammo, food, water, and
other supplies. They need gas too. And have the long trip back
empty.

I'm afraid that the German log system <still> sucks down practically
all the fuel, no matter how you slice it.

Stuart Wilkes

[pyotr filipivich]

And lo, it came about, that on 14 Oct 2003 08:00:55 -0700 in

Post by mike
at 6.5mpg, it sucks up nearly 154gallons: nearly 20% of the load gone.

Which means that every fifth truck is a tanker just to get to the end of
the supply line. Or that 2/5ths of your trucks are hauling gas to get the rest
of the stuff to the front.

I'd wager the US "Red Ball Express" had similar "inefficiencies of scale"
that didn't come to light because the war in essence ran out before the trucks
did.

[mike]

Post by pyotr filipivich
Which means that every fifth truck is a tanker just to get to the end of
the supply line. Or that 2/5ths of your trucks are hauling gas to get the rest
of the stuff to the front.
I'd wager the US "Red Ball Express" had similar "inefficiencies of
scale" that didn't come to light because the war in essence ran out
before the trucks did.

Like in my other post about the 300mile trip from Tobruk to El Alamien
burned near 35% of the transported gas, now figure in the gas
it took the move the other bullets and beans(and Water!), you can see
that ASBs must have gave Rommel a crackpipe to make him think
he had the logistics to pull off that drive to Suez.

The RedBall Express had more, and better, trucks than the DAK dreamed
of having,plus the PLUTO Pipelines to Normandy.

the RBE was falling apart by September, and Armies had to wait till
the Military Railway Service repaired enough of the shattered
French Railnet to be usable.

**
mike
**

[Stuart Wilkes]

Post by mike

Post by pyotr filipivich
Which means that every fifth truck is a tanker just to get to the end of
the supply line. Or that 2/5ths of your trucks are hauling gas to get the
rest of the stuff to the front.
I'd wager the US "Red Ball Express" had similar "inefficiencies of
scale" that didn't come to light because the war in essence ran out
before the trucks did.

Like in my other post about the 300mile trip from Tobruk to El Alamien
burned near 35% of the transported gas, now figure in the gas
it took the move the other bullets and beans(and Water!), you can see
that ASBs must have gave Rommel a crackpipe to make him think
he had the logistics to pull off that drive to Suez.

What he had was the 35,000 tons (IIRC) of British petrol captured in Tobruk.
That's what got him to Alamein.

Just enough rope to hang himself.

Stuart Wilkes

[Sophia]

Post by Stuart Wilkes
What he had was the 35,000 tons (IIRC) of British petrol captured in Tobruk.
That's what got him to Alamein.

A question: why didn't the British blow that up when Tobruk fell? What
would the campaign have looked like if Rommel didn't get this fuel
windfall?

Sophia

[hlg]

Post by Sophia

Post by Stuart Wilkes
What he had was the 35,000 tons (IIRC) of British petrol captured in Tobruk.
That's what got him to Alamein.

A question: why didn't the British blow that up when Tobruk fell? What
would the campaign have looked like if Rommel didn't get this fuel
windfall?
Sophia

Possibly because the command structure in Tobruk had fallen apart. The
formations involved all destroyed their own equipment and supplies,
including all their second-line transport, but the base fuel supplies
weren't anybody's responsibility. If they were, it was perhaps General
Klopper's Q Staff; and Klopper's staff and subordinates were more keen to
spare South African lives than they were to stop Rommel.

[mike]

Post by Sophia
A question: why didn't the British blow that up when Tobruk fell? What

Patton got lucky at times during the run across France, capturing
dumps before the Nazis could blow them. Same deal, I'd imagine.

Post by Sophia
would the campaign have looked like if Rommel didn't get this fuel
windfall?

As per my other post, probably not much past the Wire on the Border
of Egypt.

Auk might have kept his job, too.

**
mike
**

[Stuart Wilkes]

Post by Sophia

Post by Stuart Wilkes
What he had was the 35,000 tons (IIRC) of British petrol captured in
Tobruk. That's what got him to Alamein.

A question: why didn't the British blow that up when Tobruk fell?

They burned some, but far from all. After all, Rommel's attack
started on 20 June, and Tobruk fell in a day. The minefields had been
lifted and laid on the Gazala Line (Which Rommel got around, though
not without some tense moments due to the determined resistance of the
Free French Brigade at Bir Hachiem) and the antitank ditch hadn't been
maintained. The rapidity of the collapse, and the resulting general
panic and muddle, ensured that a lot fell into Rommel's hands.

Post by Sophia
What would the campaign have looked like if Rommel didn't get this
fuel

And food, and transport..

Post by Sophia
windfall?

I expect large-scale offensive operations wouldn't have been feasable.

Stuart Wilkes

[mike]

Post by Stuart Wilkes
What he had was the 35,000 tons (IIRC) of British petrol captured in Tobruk.
That's what got him to Alamein.
Just enough rope to hang himself.

35k is chump-change, logistics wise.

googles abit....

ah-- captured 2,200,000 gallons. A tidy sum.

but--

from http://www.qmfound.com/fuels_wwII.htm
--
Fuels and Lubricants for Johnny Doughboy
Lt JOHN K. EVANS, Q.M.C.
The Quartermaster Review
May-June 1944
<snip>
"A single mechanized division requires 18,000 gallons of gasoline
every hour it is on the move"

--

now this is for a heavy USArmy units, so it is more than a DAK
Div, but you get the idea.

Elsewhere on the site www.qmfound.com (BTW,All should read it) a
factiod that the 2 Armys (Patton and Hodges) was using over a million
gallons a day in September, and that the 6000 odd trucks
of the Red Ball Express was using 300k themselves daily in hauling
gas to the front.

2.2mil/18k== 122 hours= approx 5 days at the rate Patton used gas

call it 10 days for Rommel, since the DAK wasn't even the size of a
single Armored Div of Patton, like the'Super Sixth'

Tobruk, June21, 1st Alamein, July 7

that gas from Tobruk was probably all burned well before R even got
to Alam Halfa.

Like I said, CrackPipe time. No way the Italians could offload
enough POL at Tobruk to sustain a defence line in Egypt,
even if R had a magic teleporter to move gas, let alone dream of
taking Suez.

But do agree it was just enough to really get the DAK in
what would really be a bad spot.

Head, meet Mr. Noose.


**
mike
**

[Stuart Wilkes]

Post by pyotr filipivich
And lo, it came about, that on 14 Oct 2003 08:00:55 -0700 in

Post by mike
at 6.5mpg, it sucks up nearly 154gallons: nearly 20% of the load gone.

Which means that every fifth truck is a tanker just to get to the end of
the supply line. Or that 2/5ths of your trucks are hauling gas to get the
rest of the stuff to the front.

Oh, its <much> worse than that. All those trucks also need fuel for
the 1200 mile return trip to Tripoli...

Stuart Wilkes

[Firelock]

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by pyotr filipivich
Which means that every fifth truck is a tanker just to get to the end of
the supply line. Or that 2/5ths of your trucks are hauling gas to get the
rest of the stuff to the front.

Oh, its <much> worse than that. All those trucks also need fuel for
the 1200 mile return trip to Tripoli...

Wasn't he planning on refueling them in Suez the same way he
refueled them in Tobruk?

Walt Smith
Firelock on DALNet

[Al Montestruc]

Post by mike

Post by Al Montestruc
the above site indicates the specs of an Opel Blinz truck the standard
german army truck of wwii. It is a nominal 3 ton truck meaning it can
transport 3 (metric) tons, a metric ton is 2205 lbs --> 6615 lbs cargo
load, forget the internal tank of the Blinz. A gallon of water weighs
8 lb, gasoline weighs about 0.8 what water does volume for volume, but
let us say it is the same to account for the weight of the jerry cans.
That means it can yomp 827 gallons of fuel.

Not Quite.
the Opel Blitz was a knockoff of a '30s Chevy truck, not surprising,
given GM relationship with Opel PreWWII
So here are the stats of the Chevy its based off.
truck weight, empty 4500 lbs: 3-4000 lbs payload

Then it cannot be rated at three ton. A three ton truck can carry
three tons and often did more. Note that a jeep was called a 1/4 ton
truck, 1/4 ton is 500 lbs, which is 3 average men, or four skinny ones
with no gear, and jeeps are shown in combat films commonly carrying
four fully equiped G.I.'s, with many of them big fellas.

Post by mike
83hp (bit more than the Opel, its 6cyl was bored and stroked at bit by 1940)
48mph top speed
30 gallon tank,195 mile range at max load--6.5mpg

Range means their and back again =2*195miles /30 gallons=13 mpg, and
in fact theny you add the *three* ton payload on top of that 30
gallons, and that rated 195 range would include a fuel reserve. 6.5
mpg on a truck with a less than 100 hp engine is CRAZY. On the other
hand perhaps you have no automotive or engineering experiance. I have
plenty of both, and even 13 mpg seems fishy to me.

->

Post by mike
the tanker version had a 700 or 750 gallon capacity

750 gallons is 100.26 cubic feet, which would be a cylinder three
feet in diameter a bit less than eight feet long. Not a very big tank
for a truck that big and the fuel will weigh about .9*750 *8=5400 lbs,
and like I said if the truck is rated at three tons, it can carry
three tons at least, three tons US would be 6000 lbs so ok close
enough. The truck will have a total of 780 gallons to start, at 13
mpg she will consume 76.92 gallons and so could deliver 703 gallons
500 miles from the port.

Post by mike

Post by Al Montestruc
It is about 500 miles from Tripoli to Cairo or Alexandria. If
Alexandria falls then clearly we can use it for a port so the worst
possible case is a 1000 mile round trip which will require -->
1000/16=62.5 gallons or 1 out of 13.23 of the gallons loaded on the
truck.

at 6.5mpg, it sucks up nearly 154gallons: nearly 20% of the load gone.

Look don't bother me with that 6.5 mpg figure without a reasonable
cite. It is crazy for any automobile using a engine of that low
horsepower and designed for road use. If we were talking a semi, or a
10 ton truck with a 500 hp motor, or a farm tractor, maybe. A three
ton truck with a 68 hp motor that is in semi good condition getting
only 6.5 mpg? Get a grip on reality fella.

[Stuart Wilkes]

***@yahoo.com (Al Montestruc) wrote in message news:<***@posting.google.com>...

<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc
Range means their and back again

No, <radius> means there and back again. Range means one-way.

Stuart Wilkes

[k***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

Post by Al Montestruc
Range means their and back again =2*195miles /30 gallons=13 mpg,

Depends on who is defining it.

Post by Al Montestruc
e. 6.5
mpg on a truck with a less than 100 hp engine is CRAZY.

Really, you are familiar with pre-war side valve engines then.
Especially ones that run on about 72 octane petrol. ( British pool
petrol). Compression ratio would be in the region of 4-5 to 1 and the
combustion chamber shape would be far from ideal especially if it used
a T-head which was popular with US designers. Steam lorries were
competing successfully with petrol ones in Britain for operating costs
during the 1930s.

Mike has not made his source clear but it looks likes manufacturers
figures.

By the way I happen to have figures for the engines used in German
armoured vehicles

The Maybach HLTRKM capacity 4.2l power 100PS speed 3000 RPM

That works out as 8hp/l/1000rpm which is good for the time but most
modern car engines are around 10-12, much more efficient.

Ken Young
***@cix.co.uk

Those who cover themselves with martial glory
frequently go in need of any other garment. (Bramah)

[Al Montestruc]

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk

Post by Al Montestruc
Range means their and back again =2*195miles /30 gallons=13 mpg,

Depends on who is defining it.

Post by Al Montestruc
e. 6.5
mpg on a truck with a less than 100 hp engine is CRAZY.

Really, you are familiar with pre-war side valve engines then.
Especially ones that run on about 72 octane petrol. ( British pool
petrol). Compression ratio would be in the region of 4-5 to 1 and the
combustion chamber shape would be far from ideal especially if it used
a T-head which was popular with US designers.

umm so? Get me a cite of the mpg of a typical truck used in that
service by the german or italian army in that period.

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Steam lorries were
competing successfully with petrol ones in Britain for operating costs
during the 1930s.

Steam is not less fuel efficient than IC engines as a general rule, in
fact it has the very real potential to be more fuel efficent. (From my
education as a Mechanical Engineer that did graduate work in the field
of combustion engineering. I hold both BS and MS in the subject.)
The reason steam automobiles died is the same as the reason that
non-nuclear steam navy ships are no longer built, the pain in the butt
start-up time for a boiler of as much as 1/2 hour (for an auto, for a
ship it can be many hours) to get steam up to be able to go. That is
a huge disadvantage in a warship, and at least some disadvantage to a
transport truck or personal auto.

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Mike has not made his source clear but it looks likes manufacturers
figures.

Then he should cite the source rather than act like he is pulling it
out of his butt. For the most part I state my assumptions and guesses
as such, and cite sources where I can.

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
By the way I happen to have figures for the engines used in German
armoured vehicles
The Maybach HLTRKM capacity 4.2l power 100PS speed 3000 RPM
That works out as 8hp/l/1000rpm which is good for the time but most

I am not following that reference, if you mean a fuel efficiencey it
should be in Brake Specific power multiplied by a time unit and
divided by a fuel unit of either mass or volume. One measure would be
horsepower*hours/gallon that rating would be for a specific engine at
a specific RPM and torque output. Alternative units could be
kilowatt-hours/liter or kilowatt-hours/kilogram. Both for a specific
engine at specific RPM. Also the reference should specify the air
temperature and altitude, as fuel efficency will drop at higher
altitudes (even a few thousand feet).

This will not translate well into mpg as one does not use all the
powere the engine can put out in cruising down a road, even a dirt one
in north africa. Most of the resistance will be wind resistance and
that will be what consumes most of the fuel, not rolling resistance,
even on dirt roads.

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
modern car engines are around 10-12, much more efficient.

Like I said, brake specific horsepower efficency is not as big a
player as you seem to think, and me running down the freeway at 70 mph
will take about 1.56 times more fuel per mile traveled given the same
auto and engine. So in me applying my stop-n-go with full blast A/C
fuel efficiency should cover the difference in engine and vehicle. My
SUV by the way, *can* tote three tons if I use a trailer. I can
assure you that it could do so even on a dirt road in north africa and
I am reasonably confident, given I was not doing a lot of hill
climbing, and that I will be cruising at around 45 mph with no A/C
that the milage will not drop below 16 mpg, and probably will be more
like 18-20 or more. Like I said, speed eats fuel.

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk
Ken Young
Those who cover themselves with martial glory
frequently go in need of any other garment. (Bramah)

[mike]

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by mike
So here are the stats of the Chevy its based off.
truck weight, empty 4500 lbs: 3-4000 lbs payload

Then it cannot be rated at three ton. A three ton truck can carry
three tons and often did more.

<shrug> Its what the manufacturer called it. Not my fault that
a US built ton and a half had most of the features that other nations
rated for much higher use(Full floating axles and so on)

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by mike
83hp (bit more than the Opel, its 6cyl was bored and stroked at bit by 1940)
48mph top speed
30 gallon tank,195 mile range at max load--6.5mpg

gallons, and that rated 195 range would include a fuel reserve. 6.5
mpg on a truck with a less than 100 hp engine is CRAZY. On the other
hand perhaps you have no automotive or engineering experiance. I have
plenty of both, and even 13 mpg seems fishy to me.

Al, I live in Iowa and I've got a barn behind my house. If I dig in the
right spot, I can find horseshoes my Great-Grandfather lost plowing.
Old shit like ancient Fords and Chevys aren't exactly uncommon. Yes,
in a Coupe those old sixes could do 18 mpg if you spent time tweaking
the carb, but in an old stake truck, sub 10s(or much worse) are the
rule while working a heavy load.

Flatheads (or Sidevalve block, for you folks across the pond)
run near forever and super easy to work on, but great mileage
under load isn't one of thier charms. Early OHV stuff wasn't that
much better, like that Chevy Stovebolt Six or GMC 270

Now those numbers I posted weren't a WAG, they were from _Standard
Military Motor Vehicles TM9-2800_ 1944 the section on '1 1/2 Ton,4X4
(2DT)Trucks, Standard'

Don't believe Uncle Sam, well ok. flip over to

http://homepage.powerup.com.au/~djr/ref.html
where you might find the data also from a library loan

or Web

http://www.belgianassault.be/ENGopelblitz.php

which has stats on an Opel,
and the 9 mpg/6.7 mpg can be calculated from

http://balsi.de/Waffen+Gebaeude/Fahrzeuge/opelblitz.htm

Helps if you read German, though.

http://www.autogallery.org.ru/gopel.htm

shows that not all Blitz trucks were 3 tonners, as well.

Post by Al Montestruc
750 gallons is 100.26 cubic feet, which would be a cylinder three
feet in diameter a bit less than eight feet long. Not a very big tank
for a truck

Again, thats a common size on GMC, 11 foot long 52" wide, 34" high,
elliptical cross section, see TM 9-901 700 gallon standard water truck.

Google on 'blitz' and 2500 and you will see that was a common
tanker size, and thats under 700 gallons as well.

Post by Al Montestruc
Look don't bother me with that 6.5 mpg figure without a reasonable
cite.

US Army, 1944. the data is for 195 miles. Using your idea for Radius,
would give the Jeep listed in those pages a near 34 mpg rating,
and the old Jeep CJ-2A I had, never got close to the 17mpg it lists
in that TM. Only way it would get 17 would be downhill with a strong
wind at the rear, let alone 34.

Post by Al Montestruc
It is crazy for any automobile using a engine of that low
horsepower and designed for road use.

Mack Bulldogs from 1915 to 1938 were only rated at 40 to 75hp,
and they went up to 7 tons on that.

Post by Al Montestruc
10 ton truck with a 500 hp motor, or a farm tractor, maybe. A three
ton truck with a 68 hp motor that is in semi good condition getting
only 6.5 mpg? Get a grip on reality fella.

That 68hp motor in the Blitz came from the Buick Marquette line,
and that was from an earlier '20s Oldsmobile. That motor wasn't high
tech at all.

A 94hp 1948 GMC 2 1/2T used for hauling beans and corn, got about 5mpg
empty or loaded. Happy day it was when it got replaced. Not Engine
or Drivetrain trouble, but rust that killed the beast.

**
mike
**

[Al Montestruc]

***@yahoo.com (mike) wrote in message

------snip

Post by mike
http://www.belgianassault.be/ENGopelblitz.php
which has stats on an Opel,
and the 9 mpg/6.7 mpg can be calculated from
http://balsi.de/Waffen+Gebaeude/Fahrzeuge/opelblitz.htm

OK now that you show a cite that I think very acceptable, I will
accept it verbatim including the 3 metric ton capacity, and the 20
gallon internal fuel tank, 9mpg road and 6.7 mpg cross country.

Again doing the same calc as before. I shall assume 80% of travel
will be on at least level dirt roads that will give you 9mpg and 20%
can be truly called "cross country" travel giving 6.7mpg. So the mean
milage shall be 1/(.8/9+.2/6.7)=8.42 mpg then again applying the
formulation that jerry cans make the average density of the fuel equal
to water then the number of gallons is 20+826.9=846.9 gallons to
travel 500 mile round trip we need 1000/8.42=118.76 gallons leaving
728.1 gallons to deliver. If we assume the fuel loaded is 50% of the
total initial load and then the consumption will double meaning we
deliver 609.35 gallons of fuel and 3000 kg of other stuff in two
trucks, having expended 28% of the fuel delivering 72% of the starting
loaded fuel and an equal weight of other cargo like food, water and
ammo.

Like I said, that is the distance from Tripoli to Cairo by air. As I
recall Tripoli was not the closest port avialable to the axis, and
Cairo was not the frount. The distances were all much shorter. I
have seen a post by someone asserting that the coast road mileage was
1200, but I did not notice any cite of that, and he was not very
specific as to from where, to where. If from Tripoli to Cairo, I
doubt it as roads will have longer milage than the birds flight
distance, but 2.4 times? Naaaa, that seems like a major whopper I will
not buy without some back up.

The facts still indicate to me that w/o enigma being cracked, Egypt
falls. The compression of frountage due to the quttara depression,
even if it truly were impassible, is mitigated by Rommel's intel
source I wrote about in the start of the thread. Knowing your enemy's
compleat deployments in depth is a big advantage.

[Stuart Wilkes]

***@yahoo.com (Al Montestruc) wrote in message news:<***@posting.google.com>...

<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc
Like I said, that is the distance from Tripoli to Cairo by air.

No, its not. Tripoli to Cairo is more like 1000 miles by air.
Bengazi to Cairo is about 500. Tripoli is clear on the other side of
Lybia, near Tunisia.

Post by Al Montestruc
As I
recall Tripoli was not the closest port avialable to the axis,

It was certainly the biggest, and coastal shipping was very short for
the Axis.

Post by Al Montestruc
and
Cairo was not the frount. The distances were all much shorter. I
have seen a post by someone asserting that the coast road mileage was
1200, but I did not notice any cite of that, and he was not very
specific as to from where, to where.

I was very specific. I said Tripoli to Alexandria.

Post by Al Montestruc
If from Tripoli to Cairo, I doubt it as roads will have longer milage than
the birds flight distance, but 2.4 times? Naaaa, that seems like a major
whopper I will not buy without some back up.

Its your grasp of the facts on North Africa that's shaky here, Al.

Post by Al Montestruc
The facts still indicate to me that w/o enigma being cracked, Egypt
falls.

Nope.

Post by Al Montestruc
The compression of frountage due to the quttara depression,
even if it truly were impassible, is mitigated by Rommel's intel
source I wrote about in the start of the thread.

Rommel never successfully penetrated an intact fortified line. Which
is what he faces at El Alamein. In the battles he won, he always went
around. In the battles he lost (First Tobruk, First Alamein), there
was no way around.

Post by Al Montestruc
Knowing your enemy's compleat deployments in depth is a big advantage.

Its irrelevent when he's in fortifications behind minefields and
antitank ditches that you can't cross.

Stuart Wilkes

[Al Montestruc]

Post by Stuart Wilkes
<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc
Like I said, that is the distance from Tripoli to Cairo by air.

No, its not. Tripoli to Cairo is more like 1000 miles by air.
Bengazi to Cairo is about 500. Tripoli is clear on the other side of
Lybia, near Tunisia.

Ok I goofed, I don't know how. It is as you said ~1000 by air from
tripoli to either Alexandria or Cairo, so your figure of 1200 miles by
road seems not too unreasonable.

Still 6615lb cargo divided by 8 pounds per gallon= 827 gallons add 20
gallons for the fuel tank in the truck gives 847 gallons and at about
8.5 mpg we can deliver 564.5 gallons for every 847 loaded and if we
assume that 50% of the dropped off payload is stuff other than fuel,
we can deliver 282 gallons for every 564 loaded or 50% consumption in
delivery while delivering an equal weight of food water and ammo.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
As I
recall Tripoli was not the closest port avialable to the axis,

It was certainly the biggest, and coastal shipping was very short for
the Axis.

You do not need a big port to deliver fuel. Fuel can be pumped using
pumps in the tanker and hoses that can be carried on the deck of the
tanker. All you need on shore are tanks that are pretty easy to
fabricate and repair.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
and
Cairo was not the frount. The distances were all much shorter. I
have seen a post by someone asserting that the coast road mileage was
1200, but I did not notice any cite of that, and he was not very
specific as to from where, to where.

I was very specific. I said Tripoli to Alexandria.

I do not recall it that way and you did not cite your source.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
The facts still indicate to me that w/o enigma being cracked, Egypt
falls.

Nope.

Post by Al Montestruc
The compression of frountage due to the quttara depression,
even if it truly were impassible, is mitigated by Rommel's intel
source I wrote about in the start of the thread.

Rommel never successfully penetrated an intact fortified line.

For the very good reason that it is stupid to try if you can get
around it, and apperently the only time he had to go through, sombody
swiped the fuel he would need to do it.

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Which
is what he faces at El Alamein. In the battles he won, he always went
around. In the battles he lost (First Tobruk, First Alamein), there
was no way around.

In the the Panzer General game I think I know where the Al Quttara
depression is, and in the game anyway you can go around/through it.
The steep slopes on the north you cannot traverse, but you can slog
accross the more southern route which is slow, and consumes lots of
fuel but the computer playing the british never guards it. You can
send a smallish mechanized force by that route, and turn their flank
and attack at the same time from the frount.

I do not buy from seeing pictures of that area and maps of it that it
is impassible to tracked vehicles. I know that an area can be if you
have too many big rocks, or too much soft ground, or too steep of
slopes, then it can be impassible, but the photos and maps do not
suggest that, just that it is difficult. The northern downslopes may
be too steep, but so what, they stop not far behind El Alimain.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
Knowing your enemy's compleat deployments in depth is a big advantage.

Its irrelevent when he's in fortifications behind minefields and
antitank ditches that you can't cross.

No it is not irrelevent, and their is no such thing as a minefield or
antitank ditch that cannot be crossed.

Knowing their positions will help to fire on them with arty by map,
and keep out of their fields of fire.

[Stuart Wilkes]

<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
It was certainly the biggest, and coastal shipping was very short for
the Axis.

You do not need a big port to deliver fuel. Fuel can be pumped using
pumps in the tanker and hoses that can be carried on the deck of the
tanker. All you need on shore are tanks that are pretty easy to
fabricate and repair.

Again, the shortage of coastal shipping?

<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
I was very specific. I said Tripoli to Alexandria.

I do not recall it that way and you did not cite your source.

I measured it on a map.

<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Rommel never successfully penetrated an intact fortified line.

For the very good reason that it is stupid to try if you can get
around it, and apperently the only time he had to go through, sombody
swiped the fuel he would need to do it.

No. Both times he had to and tried, he failed: the 1st battle of
Tobruk, and the 1st battle of El Alamein.

Without a desert flank to turn, he was out of ideas.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Which
is what he faces at El Alamein. In the battles he won, he always went
around. In the battles he lost (First Tobruk, First Alamein), there
was no way around.

In the the Panzer General game I think I know where the Al Quttara
depression is, and in the game anyway you can go around/through it.

Its just that Rommel's real live tanks couldn't.

Post by Al Montestruc
The steep slopes on the north you cannot traverse, but you can slog
accross the more southern route which is slow, and consumes lots of
fuel but the computer playing the british never guards it.

And from this you have deduced that the real Brit generals didn't?
Interesting.

Post by Al Montestruc
You can
send a smallish mechanized force by that route, and turn their flank
and attack at the same time from the frount.
I do not buy from seeing pictures of that area and maps of it that it
is impassible to tracked vehicles.

Every day, Rommel would travel to the end of the German line, and
stare sadly out over the depression, with the hope, I guess, of
finding a trafficable rute over it. Then he would give up, and get on
with the day's work.

Post by Al Montestruc
I know that an area can be if you
have too many big rocks, or too much soft ground, or too steep of
slopes, then it can be impassible, but the photos and maps do not
suggest that, just that it is difficult.

Then why didn't he do it, Al?

Post by Al Montestruc
The northern downslopes may
be too steep, but so what, they stop not far behind El Alimain.

No, it extends for miles and miles behind Alamein.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
Knowing your enemy's compleat deployments in depth is a big advantage.

Its irrelevent when he's in fortifications behind minefields and
antitank ditches that you can't cross.

No it is not irrelevent, and their is no such thing as a minefield or
antitank ditch that cannot be crossed.

Its just that Rommel never managed it...

Post by Al Montestruc
Knowing their positions will help to fire on them with arty by map,
and keep out of their fields of fire.

Whatever you do, you must do a frontal attack on an enemy fortified
line, needing about 10:1 odds to bring it off.

Fewer sunk tankers dosen't translate into 10:1 odds.

Stuart Wilkes

[Al Montestruc]

Post by Stuart Wilkes
<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
It was certainly the biggest, and coastal shipping was very short for
the Axis.

You do not need a big port to deliver fuel. Fuel can be pumped using
pumps in the tanker and hoses that can be carried on the deck of the
tanker. All you need on shore are tanks that are pretty easy to
fabricate and repair.

Again, the shortage of coastal shipping?

would be much less w/o enigma being cracked. Which was the whole point
of the thread.

Post by Stuart Wilkes
<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
I was very specific. I said Tripoli to Alexandria.

I do not recall it that way and you did not cite your source.

I measured it on a map.
<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Rommel never successfully penetrated an intact fortified line.

For the very good reason that it is stupid to try if you can get
around it, and apperently the only time he had to go through, sombody
swiped the fuel he would need to do it.

No. Both times he had to and tried, he failed: the 1st battle of
Tobruk, and the 1st battle of El Alamein.

At El Alamein his fuel supply was short, which was my point. My
understanding recollection was at the first battle of Tobruk the
Germans won and captured a lot.

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Without a desert flank to turn, he was out of ideas.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Which
is what he faces at El Alamein. In the battles he won, he always went
around. In the battles he lost (First Tobruk, First Alamein), there
was no way around.

In the the Panzer General game I think I know where the Al Quttara
depression is, and in the game anyway you can go around/through it.

Its just that Rommel's real live tanks couldn't.

Didn't is more correct, and perhaps that Rommel and his staff were not
able to figure out a way to do it with what they had available. I
suggest that going further south, and at the western edge of the
slopes that lead to the Qattara depression, then stock them up with
plenty of extra fuel and pick the lower ground pressure tracked
vehicles. I suspect a route could have been found if he used
motorcycle and half-track scouts.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
The steep slopes on the north you cannot traverse, but you can slog
accross the more southern route which is slow, and consumes lots of
fuel but the computer playing the british never guards it.

And from this you have deduced that the real Brit generals didn't?

No, from the fact that the British generals keep getting their flank
turned. Read Sun Tzu's "Art of War" The route with a long march over
difficult terrain will almost always be less costly in the lives of
your men.

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Interesting.

Post by Al Montestruc
You can
send a smallish mechanized force by that route, and turn their flank
and attack at the same time from the frount.
I do not buy from seeing pictures of that area and maps of it that it
is impassible to tracked vehicles.

Every day, Rommel would travel to the end of the German line, and
stare sadly out over the depression, with the hope, I guess, of
finding a trafficable rute over it. Then he would give up, and get on
with the day's work.

Well that explains it in part, you need to start near the western edge
of the depression, even in the game no vehicles can cross that slope,
it is just too steep.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
I know that an area can be if you
have too many big rocks, or too much soft ground, or too steep of
slopes, then it can be impassible, but the photos and maps do not
suggest that, just that it is difficult.

Then why didn't he do it, Al?

I don't know. Lack of fuel may have had something to do with it.

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
The northern downslopes may
be too steep, but so what, they stop not far behind El Alimain.

No, it extends for miles and miles behind Alamein.

How many miles? See the map.

Loading Image...

The route I see is going south to Qara then east and north-east
following the shallow slopes ( I assume you can read a contour map) in
the map at least the end of really steep countours is almost level
with the town of Alamain yes some miles to the east of it, but less
than the width of the frount at that point. You should be able to
turn about on the line on the map labled "Gohar". The map is for a
hydroelectric study of use of the depression and seawater to generate
electricity. The sun would evaporate the sea water and keep the
system going.


---snip

[BraveNewWhirl]

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
The steep slopes on the north you cannot traverse, but you can slog
accross the more southern route which is slow, and consumes lots of
fuel but the computer playing the british never guards it.

And from this you have deduced that the real Brit generals didn't?

No, from the fact that the British generals keep getting their flank
turned. Read Sun Tzu's "Art of War" The route with a long march over
difficult terrain will almost always be less costly in the lives of
your men.

Not Sun Tzu - but maybe Conan the Barbarian. It's the latter you're
most familiar with I expect.

[Nicholas Smid]

Post by BraveNewWhirl

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes

Post by Al Montestruc
The steep slopes on the north you cannot traverse, but you can slog
accross the more southern route which is slow, and consumes lots of
fuel but the computer playing the british never guards it.

And from this you have deduced that the real Brit generals didn't?

No, from the fact that the British generals keep getting their flank
turned. Read Sun Tzu's "Art of War" The route with a long march over
difficult terrain will almost always be less costly in the lives of
your men.

Not Sun Tzu - but maybe Conan the Barbarian. It's the latter you're
most familiar with I expect.

Also in the real war the Brits had a very effective scout system, not just
LRDG but plenty of those cavalry outfits now riding around in armoured cars.
These kept pretty close tabs on what the Germans were up to as did the RAF.
There are ways across to the south, but the Brits had been in Egypt a long
time by 42 and knew these, all had outposts watching them and a force tring
to sneek past was going to find itself mouse traped as the Brits could move
much faster useing the rail system by the Nile.
Rommel broke through fixed defences only once out of three tries, and that
was against a very scratch and disordered force. First time at Tobruk he
lost alot of Panzers for very little gain and the Aussies held out untill
replaced by sea. City held out from april 41 till releaved in November. Got
stopped hard at El Alamein, twice infact so its one in four, by troops that
had just been routed and were still rolling in as the attack started.
As for shipping supplies up the coast the RN would have been overjoyed to
demonstrate the unwisdom of such a move, and even without Ultra they had
plenty of air recon.

[Stuart Wilkes]

<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Again, the shortage of coastal shipping?

would be much less w/o enigma being cracked. Which was the whole point
of the thread.

Interesting that secure German codes suffices to construct Italian
coastal shipping in the Med.

<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
No. Both times he had to and tried, he failed: the 1st battle of
Tobruk, and the 1st battle of El Alamein.

At El Alamein his fuel supply was short, which was my point. My
understanding recollection was at the first battle of Tobruk the
Germans won and captured a lot.

No, that was 2nd Tobruk. 20 June 1941. About two weeks later Rommel
started, and lost 1st Alamein.


<Snip re: trafficability of Qattara Depression in real life>

Post by Al Montestruc
I suspect a route could have been found if he used
motorcycle and half-track scouts.

Mike has posted a very interesting link about the tracks across the
Qattara Depression that very effectively puts paid to the notion that
any real force could be gotten across it.

<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
And from this you have deduced that the real Brit generals didn't?

No, from the fact that the British generals keep getting their flank
turned.

There was no way to extend the line long enough in the open desert.
Any position could be flanked. Until you get to the Qattara
Depression.

Stuart Wilkes

[The Horny Goat]

Post by Al Montestruc
In the the Panzer General game I think I know where the Al Quttara
depression is, and in the game anyway you can go around/through it.
The steep slopes on the north you cannot traverse, but you can slog
accross the more southern route which is slow, and consumes lots of
fuel but the computer playing the british never guards it. You can
send a smallish mechanized force by that route, and turn their flank
and attack at the same time from the frount.

In fairness about the only thing one can deduce from Panzer General is
the geographic position of landmarks - the map for that game *IS*
quite good. The map for the North Africa scenario was in fact fairly
reasonable and the sceniario is fairly tough for the Germans,
particularly if their recon units get bombed into oblivion by the
British!

Now if you seriously believe that game as a source of military
strategy then you believe that Hitler lost the war because he did not
build enough JU-88s to attack British fleet elements in the Channel
and thus failed at Sealion. (I should know, I've won that scenario
multiple times as the German - great fun but not exactly a reliable
source)

[Al Montestruc]

Post by The Horny Goat

Post by Al Montestruc
In the the Panzer General game I think I know where the Al Quttara
depression is, and in the game anyway you can go around/through it.
The steep slopes on the north you cannot traverse, but you can slog
accross the more southern route which is slow, and consumes lots of
fuel but the computer playing the british never guards it. You can
send a smallish mechanized force by that route, and turn their flank
and attack at the same time from the frount.

In fairness about the only thing one can deduce from Panzer General is
the geographic position of landmarks - the map for that game *IS*
quite good. The map for the North Africa scenario was in fact fairly
reasonable and the sceniario is fairly tough for the Germans,
particularly if their recon units get bombed into oblivion by the
British!

You must be thinking of the standerd version. I am used to the
campaign version where I start in Poland. I follow an "air power"
long term stratagy that works very well. That being to buy lots of
fighers and lavish them with elite replacements, and be very careful
with them. By the battle of france I get air supremacy very quickly
over all opponents. When I move to North Africa with this army I have
a heavy numbers and quality advantage in the air. I do this at the
expence of ground units and to a lesser extent bombers. At the start
of each scenario I generally quickly get air supremacy and the
leverages the power of my ground units a lot.

Post by The Horny Goat
Now if you seriously believe that game as a source of military
strategy then you believe that Hitler lost the war because he did not
build enough JU-88s to attack British fleet elements in the Channel
and thus failed at Sealion. (I should know, I've won that scenario
multiple times as the German - great fun but not exactly a reliable
source)

I realize that it is quite limited in many ways, for example the
Sealion scenario does not show the difficulties that german troops
would have getting organized after landing, grossly underestimates the
number of RN units that would be opposing the landings, and the number
of RAF units as well, and the number of militia that while not of high
military quality, would be useful in pinning german units onto beaches
and delay of their advance afterword.

However, I do not think that when they make a significant fraction of
the Al Qattara depression impassible to motorized units, and IIRC very
slow going to foot, that they would make the southern route passible
but quite difficult and long. That is how it looks from the real life
maps I have seen as well. My main reason is that looking at the other
maps the route looks passible.

[mike]

Post by Al Montestruc
However, I do not think that when they make a significant fraction of
the Al Qattara depression impassible to motorized units, and IIRC very
slow going to foot, that they would make the southern route passible
but quite difficult and long. That is how it looks from the real life
maps I have seen as well. My main reason is that looking at the other
maps the route looks passible.

The Qattara Depression, besides being below sea-level, is famous for
being a collection of salt marshes and quicksand. This limits
travel for vehicles to a few areas with hardpack and not cut off
by gullies or cliffs.

Yes, Camel Caravans had used them, but putting enough trucks thru
to supply an army is another matter, let alone tanks, which would destroy
the trail quickly.

http://www.geocities.com/firefly1002000/qattara.html

**
mike
**

[david]

In message <***@posting.google.com>, Al
Montestruc <***@yahoo.com> writes

(snip of what are basically calculations to measure something that
measurements exist for, namely how much fuel was consumed by Rommel's
supply line getting fuel to the front. I personally tend to regard what
the actual consumption was to be of rather more use than attempts to
calculate what it might have been based on some rather interesting
assumptions.)

Post by Al Montestruc
The facts still indicate to me that w/o enigma being cracked, Egypt
falls.

Then you have a strange grasp of the facts. I'll try to explain my views
on this one more time, and then I'll leave the discussion, unless some
new data comes to light.

In order for Egypt to fall, Rommel has to neutralise Alexandria. In
order for Alex to be neutralised, Egypt has to have fallen. The naval
dominance that Britain (1) has while Alex is in play means that the sole
line of supply that Rommel has at his disposal is, to put it mildly,
vulnerable.

Elsewhere in this thread, I have pointed out the rather large number of
supply bottlenecks (3) that the Germans had in supporting any offensive
in north Africa, and the minor fact that, until the Germans can
neutralise Alex, Britain can ship in far greater quantities.

As the Germans advance, their supply line gets ever more stretched and
consuming, while at the same time, the British supply lines get shorter.

Post by Al Montestruc
The compression of frountage due to the quttara depression,
even if it truly were impassible, is mitigated by Rommel's intel
source I wrote about in the start of the thread. Knowing your enemy's
compleat deployments in depth is a big advantage.

Just how, pray, is Rommel going to get through? He can't send tanks
round the Qattara depression. He can't send forces round the northern
flank, it being filled with wet stuff that Britain dominates. He can't
go over, because all the German paratroops died at Crete, and Britain
has air superiority, and airborne operations are rather a bad idea when
the other side has air superiority. He doesn't have enough shovels to go
under, which only leaves going through as an option. At the time in
question, Britain has something like a 10:1 superiority in tanks, and
the German axis of advance is fairly obvious (and was, OTL, fairly
thoroughly covered with minefields). The German 88 was a fairly
effective anti-tank weapon, and was noted for its capability of knocking
out British tanks taking the offensive. However, the Germans are
attacking, which means that Rommel has to conjure up a victory when
facing odds of 10:1 in the key arm, against fortified and prepared
positions. The British are lavishly equipped with supplies of all sorts,
and the Germans, well, aren't. Rommel's tanks are all on the verge of
mechanical breakdown (something to do with long periods in sandy
conditions - German tank losses to mechanical breakdown are well
recorded), and the British tanks are close to repair depots, and most of
them have far fewer sand-miles on the clock.

Indeed, it can be much more convincingly argued that Rommel benefited
from the British (2) having Enigma than he suffered. There was more than
one occasion when Rommel achieved tactical surprise because the British
had read Enigma transcripts that indicated that German orders to Rommel
were not to attack. Rommel, however, conveniently ignored orders he
didn't like and attacked anyway, when the British assumed that he
wouldn't.

Of course, your opinion is that the facts suggest that Rommel could have
burst through the defence line (despite the need to attack at 1:10
against fortified positions), and then had the strength left to drive on
across the rest of Egypt with sufficient speed to be able to reach the
important bits of Egypt (ie, Alex and Suez) before the British can
scrape together another blocking defence line. Your opinion is that he
can do this despite Britain having air superiority, and shorter sortie
distances. Your opinion is that somehow, the British aren't going to use
their naval dominance to lob rather large bricks at this extended German
supply line.




1. Term used rather loosely, and includes Indians, Kiwis, Aussies, South
Africans, Ghurkhas, Nigerians, and other assorted participants from the
far-flung corners - all will be subsumed under the catch-all term
"British".

2. Term used to include Poles and others involved in the breaking of
Enigma.

3. Lack of supplies, lack of merchant shipping to transport supplies,
interdiction of supplies across the Med, inadequate unloading
infrastructure at port, long single road that is easily interdicted,
lack of transport to shift supplies, etc etc etc.

[Al Montestruc]

Post by david
(snip of what are basically calculations to measure something that
measurements exist for, namely how much fuel was consumed by Rommel's
supply line getting fuel to the front. I personally tend to regard what
the actual consumption was to be of rather more use than attempts to
calculate what it might have been based on some rather interesting
assumptions.)

Post by Al Montestruc
The facts still indicate to me that w/o enigma being cracked, Egypt
falls.

Then you have a strange grasp of the facts. I'll try to explain my views
on this one more time, and then I'll leave the discussion, unless some
new data comes to light.
In order for Egypt to fall, Rommel has to neutralise Alexandria.

Why??

Take an alternative stratagy, besiege and bypass both Alexandria, and
Cairo and establish a bridghead over the Nile. Damage the Suez canal,
to the point it cannot be used for shipping, then set up a base of
operations with a large artillery firebase near a point where you have
badly damaged the canal and it must be repaired for the British to use
it. In time Alexandria will fall like a rotten fruit from a tree. In
the meantime take and hold the countryside and confiscate food
intended for the cities and cut off their drinking water. With your
food and water problems solved, you only need ship in fuel spares and
ammo, while the british troops are starving and going w/o water.

Post by david
In
order for Alex to be neutralised, Egypt has to have fallen. The naval
dominance that Britain (1) has while Alex is in play means that the sole
line of supply that Rommel has at his disposal is, to put it mildly,
vulnerable.
Elsewhere in this thread, I have pointed out the rather large number of
supply bottlenecks (3) that the Germans had in supporting any offensive
in north Africa, and the minor fact that, until the Germans can
neutralise Alex, Britain can ship in far greater quantities.

Via Suez yes, which is why they must take it out.

Post by david
As the Germans advance, their supply line gets ever more stretched and
consuming, while at the same time, the British supply lines get shorter.

Always true for a defender, if this were enough to win then no one
could ever be sucessful in an offensive operation.

Post by david

Post by Al Montestruc
The compression of frountage due to the quttara depression,
even if it truly were impassible, is mitigated by Rommel's intel
source I wrote about in the start of the thread. Knowing your enemy's
compleat deployments in depth is a big advantage.

Just how, pray, is Rommel going to get through? He can't send tanks
round the Qattara depression.

You assert. I have yet to see authoritative documentation that it
simply could not be done. A rough route that is not guarded is often
better than an easy one that is.

Post by david
He can't send forces round the northern
flank, it being filled with wet stuff that Britain dominates. He can't
go over, because all the German paratroops died at Crete, and Britain
has air superiority, and airborne operations are rather a bad idea when
the other side has air superiority. He doesn't have enough shovels to go
under, which only leaves going through as an option. At the time in
question, Britain has something like a 10:1 superiority in tanks,

So the British earned the disrespect the Italians are commonly given
in that war?? If I had 10 :1 odds in tanks considering that my tank
quality was not too much lower, and given that I have a good supply
situation, then I should be the one on the offensive, unless I am
incompetent, or have low moral trash troops. Dave this does not make
any sense, British troops are usually good to excellent quality, so I
do not get why they should be on the defensive if they have a
numerical advantage in tanks, and IIRC a numerical advantage in
infantry and artillery, and were in good supply, and had cracked
enigma. Why be on the defensive???

---snip

[Walter R. Strapps]

Al Montestruc wrote:
<snippage>

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by david
He can't send forces round the northern
flank, it being filled with wet stuff that Britain dominates. He can't
go over, because all the German paratroops died at Crete, and Britain
has air superiority, and airborne operations are rather a bad idea when
the other side has air superiority. He doesn't have enough shovels to go
under, which only leaves going through as an option. At the time in
question, Britain has something like a 10:1 superiority in tanks,

So the British earned the disrespect the Italians are commonly given
in that war?? If I had 10 :1 odds in tanks considering that my tank
quality was not too much lower, and given that I have a good supply
situation, then I should be the one on the offensive, unless I am
incompetent, or have low moral trash troops.

Why?

Post by Al Montestruc
Dave this does not make
any sense, British troops are usually good to excellent quality, so I
do not get why they should be on the defensive if they have a
numerical advantage in tanks, and IIRC a numerical advantage in
infantry and artillery, and were in good supply, and had cracked
enigma. Why be on the defensive???

Because Rommel had no choice in where to go and what to do. He had to
attack and soon. The longer he waited, the weaker he got and the
stronger the British got.

Why should the British go on the offensive until they were 100% ready
and the enemy had shot his wad and failed? Because Al thinks they
should? To show that they had good morale?
--
Cheers,

Walter R. Strapps, Ph.D

"The sheer closeness of our two countries and the intensity of our
mutual interaction combined with the disparity between us in terms of
wealth and power--all these things guarantee there will be problems in
U.S.-Canadian relations without anybody having to do anything to
deliberately worsen the situation."

Robert L. Stanfield, Oct. 28, 1971

[Ivan Hodes]

Post by Walter R. Strapps
<snippage>

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by david
He can't send forces round the northern
flank, it being filled with wet stuff that Britain dominates. He can't
go over, because all the German paratroops died at Crete, and Britain
has air superiority, and airborne operations are rather a bad idea when
the other side has air superiority. He doesn't have enough shovels to go
under, which only leaves going through as an option. At the time in
question, Britain has something like a 10:1 superiority in tanks,

So the British earned the disrespect the Italians are commonly given
in that war?? If I had 10 :1 odds in tanks considering that my tank
quality was not too much lower, and given that I have a good supply
situation, then I should be the one on the offensive, unless I am
incompetent, or have low moral trash troops.

Why?

Post by Al Montestruc
Dave this does not make
any sense, British troops are usually good to excellent quality, so I
do not get why they should be on the defensive if they have a
numerical advantage in tanks, and IIRC a numerical advantage in
infantry and artillery, and were in good supply, and had cracked
enigma. Why be on the defensive???

Because Rommel had no choice in where to go and what to do. He had to
attack and soon. The longer he waited, the weaker he got and the
stronger the British got.
Why should the British go on the offensive until they were 100% ready
and the enemy had shot his wad and failed?

"Initiative" is one possible answer, but I don't know the operational
details of the North Africa thing so I'll shut up.

Ivan Hodes

[Walter R. Strapps]

Post by Ivan Hodes

Post by Walter R. Strapps
<snippage>

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by david
He can't send forces round the northern
flank, it being filled with wet stuff that Britain dominates. He can't
go over, because all the German paratroops died at Crete, and Britain
has air superiority, and airborne operations are rather a bad idea when
the other side has air superiority. He doesn't have enough shovels to go
under, which only leaves going through as an option. At the time in
question, Britain has something like a 10:1 superiority in tanks,

So the British earned the disrespect the Italians are commonly given
in that war?? If I had 10 :1 odds in tanks considering that my tank
quality was not too much lower, and given that I have a good supply
situation, then I should be the one on the offensive, unless I am
incompetent, or have low moral trash troops.

Why?

Post by Al Montestruc
Dave this does not make
any sense, British troops are usually good to excellent quality, so I
do not get why they should be on the defensive if they have a
numerical advantage in tanks, and IIRC a numerical advantage in
infantry and artillery, and were in good supply, and had cracked
enigma. Why be on the defensive???

Because Rommel had no choice in where to go and what to do. He had to
attack and soon. The longer he waited, the weaker he got and the
stronger the British got.
Why should the British go on the offensive until they were 100% ready
and the enemy had shot his wad and failed?

"Initiative" is one possible answer, but I don't know the operational
details of the North Africa thing so I'll shut up.

Ah, but the nature of the terrain and other operational details meant
that the British already had the initiative while on the defensive.
Rommel simply couldn't get by them without going through them. And the
longer he waited, the worse his situation got.
--
Cheers,

Walter R. Strapps, Ph.D

"The sheer closeness of our two countries and the intensity of our
mutual interaction combined with the disparity between us in terms of
wealth and power--all these things guarantee there will be problems in
U.S.-Canadian relations without anybody having to do anything to
deliberately worsen the situation."

Robert L. Stanfield, Oct. 28, 1971

[Al Montestruc]

---------

Post by Walter R. Strapps
Why?

Post by Al Montestruc
Dave this does not make
any sense, British troops are usually good to excellent quality, so I
do not get why they should be on the defensive if they have a
numerical advantage in tanks, and IIRC a numerical advantage in
infantry and artillery, and were in good supply, and had cracked
enigma. Why be on the defensive???

Because Rommel had no choice in where to go and what to do. He had to
attack and soon. The longer he waited, the weaker he got and the
stronger the British got.

If he went on the defensive and conserved his fuel and other supplies
he could get some of his troops out of africa which if that was indeed
the situation (way outnumbered and w/o supply) is the most sane
option.

Post by Walter R. Strapps
Why should the British go on the offensive until they were 100% ready
and the enemy had shot his wad and failed?

With 10:1 odds in tanks and large numerical advantage in infatry and
artillery and air superiority?

1)To keep the enemy from escaping.
2) To provide the home folks with victories to keep moral up.
3) To make allies such as Stalin think that the British were more than
hot air.
4) To hurt German moral at home and on other frounts, they had an aura
of invincibility that needed to be broken.
5) To show the Russians that Germans can be beaten.

Good god man!! Look at the political-military situation at the time.

[Walter R. Strapps]

Post by Al Montestruc
---------

Post by Walter R. Strapps
Why?

Post by Al Montestruc
Dave this does not make
any sense, British troops are usually good to excellent quality, so I
do not get why they should be on the defensive if they have a
numerical advantage in tanks, and IIRC a numerical advantage in
infantry and artillery, and were in good supply, and had cracked
enigma. Why be on the defensive???

Because Rommel had no choice in where to go and what to do. He had to
attack and soon. The longer he waited, the weaker he got and the
stronger the British got.

If he went on the defensive and conserved his fuel and other supplies
he could get some of his troops out of africa which if that was indeed
the situation (way outnumbered and w/o supply) is the most sane
option.

Hitler had a name for such defeatists. It was 'dead man'.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Walter R. Strapps
Why should the British go on the offensive until they were 100% ready
and the enemy had shot his wad and failed?

With 10:1 odds in tanks and large numerical advantage in infatry and
artillery and air superiority?
1)To keep the enemy from escaping.

Did they?

Post by Al Montestruc
2) To provide the home folks with victories to keep moral up.

They did. (And the word is morale)

Post by Al Montestruc
3) To make allies such as Stalin think that the British were more than
hot air.

They did.

Post by Al Montestruc
4) To hurt German moral at home and on other frounts, they had an aura
of invincibility that needed to be broken.

They did.

Post by Al Montestruc
5) To show the Russians that Germans can be beaten.

They did.

Post by Al Montestruc
Good god man!! Look at the political-military situation at the time.

I have. They accomplished every goal you think would have been
accomplished by immediately going on the offensive. And in addition,
they accomplished several others.
--
Cheers,

Walter R. Strapps, Ph.D

"The sheer closeness of our two countries and the intensity of our
mutual interaction combined with the disparity between us in terms of
wealth and power--all these things guarantee there will be problems in
U.S.-Canadian relations without anybody having to do anything to
deliberately worsen the situation."

Robert L. Stanfield, Oct. 28, 1971

[Al Montestruc]

Post by Walter R. Strapps

Post by Al Montestruc
---------

Post by Walter R. Strapps
Why?

Post by Al Montestruc
Dave this does not make
any sense, British troops are usually good to excellent quality, so I
do not get why they should be on the defensive if they have a
numerical advantage in tanks, and IIRC a numerical advantage in
infantry and artillery, and were in good supply, and had cracked
enigma. Why be on the defensive???

Because Rommel had no choice in where to go and what to do. He had to
attack and soon. The longer he waited, the weaker he got and the
stronger the British got.

If he went on the defensive and conserved his fuel and other supplies
he could get some of his troops out of africa which if that was indeed
the situation (way outnumbered and w/o supply) is the most sane
option.

Hitler had a name for such defeatists. It was 'dead man'.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Walter R. Strapps
Why should the British go on the offensive until they were 100% ready
and the enemy had shot his wad and failed?

With 10:1 odds in tanks and large numerical advantage in infatry and
artillery and air superiority?
1)To keep the enemy from escaping.

Did they?

They did not try till much later.

Post by Walter R. Strapps

Post by Al Montestruc
2) To provide the home folks with victories to keep moral up.

They did. (And the word is morale)

Later than they could have if the odds were that lopsided.

Post by Walter R. Strapps

Post by Al Montestruc
3) To make allies such as Stalin think that the British were more than
hot air.

They did.

Later than they could have given the odds were that lopsided.

Post by Walter R. Strapps

Post by Al Montestruc
4) To hurt German moral at home and on other frounts, they had an aura
of invincibility that needed to be broken.

They did.

Later than they could have given the odds were that lopsided.

Post by Walter R. Strapps

Post by Al Montestruc
5) To show the Russians that Germans can be beaten.

They did.

Later than they could have given the odds were that lopsided.

Post by Walter R. Strapps

Post by Al Montestruc
Good god man!! Look at the political-military situation at the time.

I have. They accomplished every goal you think would have been
accomplished by immediately going on the offensive.

Later than they could have given the odds were that lopsided.

Post by Walter R. Strapps
And in addition,
they accomplished several others.

Like??

[Walter R. Strapps]

Al Montestruc wrote:<snip Al admitting that all goals he thought would
be accomplished by an immediate British offensive being accomplished anyway>

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Walter R. Strapps

Post by Al Montestruc
Good god man!! Look at the political-military situation at the time.

I have. They accomplished every goal you think would have been
accomplished by immediately going on the offensive.

Later than they could have given the odds were that lopsided.

Arguably. If attacking an enemy when you have 10:1 superiority is good,
then attacking an enemy when you have 15:1 superiority is great.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Walter R. Strapps
And in addition,
they accomplished several others.

Like??

Like attacking a weakened enemy therefore suffering fewer casualties
(which is sort of seen as good thing, especially by the guys who, you
know, now aren't casualties: being alive really helps morale), resulting
in more troops with combat experience when the time comes to face, you
know, Continental Europe.

I mean really, it has been repeatedly pointed out to you that time is
one (of many things) that Rommel *DOES NOT HAVE* on his side. He will
get weaker. It is inevitable, regardless of what 'Panzer General' says.
David Brooks has summarised this far better than I could.

And him being, you know, a guy with some passing familiarity with
military operations, maybe you should actually start listening for a
change. Might open up whole new avenues for you.
--
Cheers,

Walter R. Strapps, Ph.D

"The sheer closeness of our two countries and the intensity of our
mutual interaction combined with the disparity between us in terms of
wealth and power--all these things guarantee there will be problems in
U.S.-Canadian relations without anybody having to do anything to
deliberately worsen the situation."

Robert L. Stanfield, Oct. 28, 1971

[david]

Post by Walter R. Strapps
David Brooks has summarised this far better than I could.

Just for the record, when I married Alison Brooks, she let me keep my
maiden name. It's a Scottish thing.

Curiously, when we visited Iran, the fact that we had different surnames
was never a problem, despite the religious sensibilities in that country
regarding non-married couples sharing a hotel room. However, when we
visited South Carolina, hotels were remarkably reluctant to believe that
couples could have different surnames yet be married to each other, and
were unwilling to allow what they believed to be unmarried people share
a hotel room. From this, I deduce that South Carolina is more intolerant
over adultery (1) than Iran. Some mistake here, surely (2).




1. Or it might not be adultery. I understand that adultery is only such
when one or other or both of the involved parties is married to someone
else. If neither party is married, then it is not adultery.

2. Which is a massive digression from the "My surname is, and always has
been, Flin" point.

[Walter R. Strapps]

Post by david

Post by Walter R. Strapps
David Brooks has summarised this far better than I could.

Just for the record, when I married Alison Brooks, she let me keep my
maiden name. It's a Scottish thing.

Ach! Sorry :) I knew something wasn't right, but I bulled ahead anyway :)

Post by david
Curiously, when we visited Iran, the fact that we had different surnames
was never a problem, despite the religious sensibilities in that country
regarding non-married couples sharing a hotel room. However, when we
visited South Carolina, hotels were remarkably reluctant to believe that
couples could have different surnames yet be married to each other, and
were unwilling to allow what they believed to be unmarried people share
a hotel room. From this, I deduce that South Carolina is more intolerant
over adultery (1) than Iran. Some mistake here, surely (2).
1. Or it might not be adultery. I understand that adultery is only such
when one or other or both of the involved parties is married to someone
else. If neither party is married, then it is not adultery.
2. Which is a massive digression from the "My surname is, and always has
been, Flin" point.

--
--
Cheers,

Walter R. Strapps, Ph.D

"The sheer closeness of our two countries and the intensity of our
mutual interaction combined with the disparity between us in terms of
wealth and power--all these things guarantee there will be problems in
U.S.-Canadian relations without anybody having to do anything to
deliberately worsen the situation."

Robert L. Stanfield, Oct. 28, 1971

[Al Montestruc]

Post by david

Post by Walter R. Strapps
David Brooks has summarised this far better than I could.

Just for the record, when I married Alison Brooks, she let me keep my
maiden name. It's a Scottish thing.
Curiously, when we visited Iran, the fact that we had different surnames
was never a problem, despite the religious sensibilities in that country
regarding non-married couples sharing a hotel room. However, when we
visited South Carolina, hotels were remarkably reluctant to believe that
couples could have different surnames yet be married to each other, and
were unwilling to allow what they believed to be unmarried people share
a hotel room. From this, I deduce that South Carolina is more intolerant
over adultery (1) than Iran. Some mistake here, surely (2).

Umm not just adultery, the US South and much of the west and midwest
(what many New Yorkers and Californians call flyover country),
especially the rural areas tend to have a thing against fornication,
and hold such is not respectable, and don't want it in their
establishment. The attitude is much wider spread than South Carolina.

Now mind you it is much less visible in larger cities. Also you may
have run into the attitude that a woman is supposed to take her
husband's name and anything else is outlandish, strange and
suspicious.

I am told that the South was before the civil war much less religious,
pious and bigoted about religion and sex than the north. That stopped
and reversed during and after the war and the opposite is the case
now.

Post by david
1. Or it might not be adultery. I understand that adultery is only such
when one or other or both of the involved parties is married to someone
else. If neither party is married, then it is not adultery.

Strictly from the definition in the bible (Levidicus?), it is the
"crime" of a man, having sex with the wife of another man. That is
not however the way it is interpreted by 99.9 % of all people in the
USA. After all, the wife of a philandering husband in the USA will
still accuse her husband of adultery even if the other [ducking for
cover] floozy he has sex with is not married to anyone.

Post by david
2. Which is a massive digression from the "My surname is, and always has
been, Flin" point.

Yes, that was a bit of an odd statement. On the other hand I suspect
that Mr, Strapps is an American, and assumed that your beloved had
taken your name, as is the custom here.

[k***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

Post by david
If neither party is married, then it is not adultery.

Correct, it is fornication. Also a sin.

Ken Young
***@cix.co.uk

Those who cover themselves with martial glory
frequently go in need of any other garment. (Bramah)

[Ivan Hodes]

Post by Walter R. Strapps
Arguably. If attacking an enemy when you have 10:1 superiority is good,
then attacking an enemy when you have 15:1 superiority is great.

This is...not wrong, exactly, but not right even as a generality. If
there isn't enough supply for 15:1, then attacking with 15:1 could be
quite a bit worse than 10:1 superiority. Again, I don't kno whow this
applies to the North Africa situation, but it bears pointing out.

Ivan Hodes

[Walter R. Strapps]

Post by Ivan Hodes

Post by Walter R. Strapps
Arguably. If attacking an enemy when you have 10:1 superiority is good,
then attacking an enemy when you have 15:1 superiority is great.

This is...not wrong, exactly, but not right even as a generality. If
there isn't enough supply for 15:1, then attacking with 15:1 could be
quite a bit worse than 10:1 superiority. Again, I don't kno whow this
applies to the North Africa situation, but it bears pointing out.

Oh, sorry, I meant the odds went from 10:1 to 15:1, not because of
*more* British troops, but because of fewer Axis troops. Therefore, in
this case, the British logistics are not different.
--
Cheers,

Walter R. Strapps, Ph.D

"The sheer closeness of our two countries and the intensity of our
mutual interaction combined with the disparity between us in terms of
wealth and power--all these things guarantee there will be problems in
U.S.-Canadian relations without anybody having to do anything to
deliberately worsen the situation."

Robert L. Stanfield, Oct. 28, 1971

[david]

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by david
In order for Egypt to fall, Rommel has to neutralise Alexandria.

Why??
Take an alternative stratagy, besiege and bypass both Alexandria, and
Cairo and establish a bridghead over the Nile.

Besiege Alex is an interesting suggestion, given the disparity in naval
capability. It is not easy to besiege a port when the other side has
naval dominance.

FWIW, you will notice (1) I said "neutralise". Neutralisation can be
achieved by a number of means, ranging from converting into a pile of
rubble and salting the fields, to simply making sure that it can't be
used. However, the disparity in naval potential means that Alex is
pretty much invulnerable to anything that the Germans can do.

Post by Al Montestruc
Damage the Suez canal,
to the point it cannot be used for shipping, then set up a base of
operations with a large artillery firebase

A large artillery firebase will, unsurprisingly, get through supplies
like it is going out of fashion. Damaging the Suez canal with artillery
will be an interesting exercise, given the aerial capability of the two
sides at the time. If we are assuming that the Luftwaffe have enough
fuel and supplies and spares and pilots and planes to provide cover for
the artillery against the RAF, and if we are assuming that the German
artillery can get with effective range of the canal with sufficient
supplies to do anything other than die, then we may as well give up
discussions, because the capacity of delivering supplies of this
magnitude just didn't exist, and we are inventing things out of whole
cloth.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by david
In
order for Alex to be neutralised, Egypt has to have fallen. The naval
dominance that Britain (1) has while Alex is in play means that the sole
line of supply that Rommel has at his disposal is, to put it mildly,
vulnerable.
Elsewhere in this thread, I have pointed out the rather large number of
supply bottlenecks (3) that the Germans had in supporting any offensive
in north Africa, and the minor fact that, until the Germans can
neutralise Alex, Britain can ship in far greater quantities.

Via Suez yes, which is why they must take it out.

Forgive me. I don't appear to have your imaginative grasp of strategy.
To take out Suez, the Germans have to get past Alex and cross the Nile.
I don't have your imagination, and I find it a bit difficult to work out
how the Germans are supposed to neutralise the canal before getting past
Alex and across the Nile. I mean, the RAF has greater strength, so the
Germans trying to drop bombs on it seems like an exercise in killing
valuable German pilots. Perhaps Rommel could parachute in solo and
single handedly destroy the canal using his bare hands. It's more
sensible than anything you've come up with.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by david
As the Germans advance, their supply line gets ever more stretched and
consuming, while at the same time, the British supply lines get shorter.

Always true for a defender, if this were enough to win then no one
could ever be sucessful in an offensive operation.

You will notice that the pattern of operations in the desert war in
particular followed the format of one side advances, comes to a grinding
halt at some point, and then gets driven back until the pendulum
balanced, until a point is reached where the offensive had enough steam
to reach the end zone (2).

I didn't claim that this was the sole factor. Indeed, I actually went to
some trouble to point out a whole bunch of other factors. At least you
appear to grant that it is a factor, and so we have finally got
agreement on something.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by david

Post by Al Montestruc
The compression of frountage due to the quttara depression,
even if it truly were impassible, is mitigated by Rommel's intel
source I wrote about in the start of the thread. Knowing your enemy's
compleat deployments in depth is a big advantage.

Just how, pray, is Rommel going to get through? He can't send tanks
round the Qattara depression.

You assert. I have yet to see authoritative documentation that it
simply could not be done. A rough route that is not guarded is often
better than an easy one that is.

I suspect that the fact that quite a few chaps who were fairly
knowledgeable about WW2 tank capabilities looked at the prospect of
getting tanks through, and every single one of them came to the
conclusion that it couldn't be done. It wasn't as though no-one
appreciated the strategic advantage of being able to do so; they did.
Rommel and Monty both carried out extensive recon into the area. Yet
strangely, Rommel, who was quite noted for attempting flanking moves,
never tried a flanking move, and instead barrelled forward in a frontal
assault. Likewise, at Second El Alemein, Monty went for a
straightforward assault rather than trying to turn a flank.

FWIW, I really would suggest that you be very careful about what appears
to be the patronising tone you adopt by explaining to me about an
unguarded rough route in comparison to a guarded easy one. You might
want to take a check on the assault on Mt Harriet 11/12 June 1982,
carried out by 42 Commando. When you have done that, I would recommend
that you offer to teach your grandmother how to suck eggs.

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by david
He can't send forces round the northern
flank, it being filled with wet stuff that Britain dominates. He can't
go over, because all the German paratroops died at Crete, and Britain
has air superiority, and airborne operations are rather a bad idea when
the other side has air superiority. He doesn't have enough shovels to go
under, which only leaves going through as an option. At the time in
question, Britain has something like a 10:1 superiority in tanks,

So the British earned the disrespect the Italians are commonly given
in that war?? If I had 10 :1 odds in tanks considering that my tank
quality was not too much lower, and given that I have a good supply
situation, then I should be the one on the offensive, unless I am
incompetent, or have low moral trash troops.

I'm not surprised, frankly. However, given that the Germans were in a
tricky position, at the end of an impossible supply line, and being
forced by the strategic position into having to conduct an offensive,
the British not unreasonably, decided to let the Germans kill themselves
in carrying out a futile attack in order to shift the odds even further
in their favour.

You see, the trick in the desert war was not how to carry out an
offensive, but how to keep it rolling. If the enemy has stripped itself
of supplies and manpower and reserves in attacking you in a futile
assault, then that makes your counteroffensive that much more
devastating, and that much more likely to just keep on rolling.

Post by Al Montestruc
Dave this does not make
any sense, British troops are usually good to excellent quality, so I
do not get why they should be on the defensive if they have a
numerical advantage in tanks, and IIRC a numerical advantage in
infantry and artillery, and were in good supply, and had cracked
enigma. Why be on the defensive???

Because the objective was not to occupy acres of useless sand. The
objective was to kill Germans. If the Germans are forced to attack you
when they have an unfavourable position, then there isn't a problem (3).

Battles and wars are not won or lost by how much of a map is coloured
pink (4). They are won by destroying the ability of the enemy to resist
you. If the enemy doesn't come to you, then you have to go in and
destroy them. However, if the enemy is coming to you, and they are
giving you home ground advantage, then you may as well make use of that
home ground advantage in order to better destroy the enemy.



1. Actually, I doubt it very much.

2. I try to mix metaphors.

3. Unless you are a German soldier.

4. Substitute colour of your choice if you prefer.

[Al Montestruc]

---snip

Post by david

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by david
In
order for Alex to be neutralised, Egypt has to have fallen. The naval
dominance that Britain (1) has while Alex is in play means that the sole
line of supply that Rommel has at his disposal is, to put it mildly,
vulnerable.
Elsewhere in this thread, I have pointed out the rather large number of
supply bottlenecks (3) that the Germans had in supporting any offensive
in north Africa, and the minor fact that, until the Germans can
neutralise Alex, Britain can ship in far greater quantities.

Via Suez yes, which is why they must take it out.

Forgive me. I don't appear to have your imaginative grasp of strategy.
To take out Suez, the Germans have to get past Alex and cross the Nile.

Getting past does not mean going through. Yes the must cross the
Nile, no it need not be done at either Alexandria or Cairo. Having
aquainted myself with a map of the area, I do not see any good natural
defensive positions from El Alimain to the Nile. So the Germans can
bypass British strongpoints along the way, and if quick enough, may be
able to cross the Nile against light opposition.

On the other hand, my understanding of the situation is not that the
British have 10:1 advantage in tanks and large numerical advantages in
infantry and other arms. If they in fact do, then the whole excercize
is pointless, and Rommel will know it.

If you read my much earlier posts on this thread, I was going off a
publication called "what if? 2" which is published by supposedly well
established academic historians and is advertized as such. The fellow
in question, clearly did do some research into the German supply
situation as he was quoting figures as to the consumption of supplies
by German and Italian units, and the amount of fuel sunk by the
British in various naval actions. He also stated that the Germans at
that time had broken a US diplomatic code and were reading near
compleate British deployments in North Africa from reports by an
American officer on the diplomatic staff who was reporting to
Washington where the battle was being watched with interest.

Given that Rommel did have this intelligence IOTL, and in the proposed
alternate timeline he would still have it, and it would not be
suddenly cut off when Ultra decrypts were reporting this promptly to
the Americans, then he knew of this massive superiority of British
numbers, and their positions.

If the superiority was as large as you say, it does not make sense to
me that Rommel continued his attacks. Had he taken up a defensive
position and fed most of his fuel to his fighers, and contested air
superiority he would have been a much harder nut to crack.

Post by david
I don't have your imagination, and I find it a bit difficult to work out
how the Germans are supposed to neutralise the canal before getting past
Alex and across the Nile.

No they get past Alex, and across the Nile, just not through Alex.

As I have stated in other threads, attempting to take Stalingrad house
by house, street by street when the Soviets could resupply it was
crazy. The intelligent thing to do was cross the Volga north of
Stalingrad, set up a pontoon bridge there, and take a corner of land
from a bit north of the bridge to the Caspian to deny the defenders
supplies, and to deny the Russians the use of the lower Volga for
river traffic. I suspect such a plan would have cost far less, and
gotten much more done.

Post by david
I mean, the RAF has greater strength, so the
Germans trying to drop bombs on it seems like an exercise in killing
valuable German pilots. Perhaps Rommel could parachute in solo and
single handedly destroy the canal using his bare hands. It's more
sensible than anything you've come up with.

Again, my understanding was not that the British had a huge numerical
superiority in North Africa, if they did the whole thing was
pointless.
-------------snip

Post by david

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by david
Just how, pray, is Rommel going to get through? He can't send tanks
round the Qattara depression.

You assert. I have yet to see authoritative documentation that it
simply could not be done. A rough route that is not guarded is often
better than an easy one that is.

I suspect that the fact that quite a few chaps who were fairly
knowledgeable about WW2 tank capabilities looked at the prospect of
getting tanks through, and every single one of them came to the
conclusion that it couldn't be done.

Or perhaps Rommel's men found a way through, but could not use it
becuase they were desperatly short of fuel, and it required a large
expenditure of fuel to use to any effect. Later British units may
have known of such a long roundabout route that was dangerous and
pointless to use if they already had the Germans on the run and the
fleeing Germans would already be past the exit point of this route by
the time a unit traversed it.

Post by david
It wasn't as though no-one
appreciated the strategic advantage of being able to do so; they did.
Rommel and Monty both carried out extensive recon into the area. Yet
strangely, Rommel, who was quite noted for attempting flanking moves,
never tried a flanking move,

Like I pointed out he was desperatly short of fuel, the route I looked
at adds I think hundreds of miles, and you can probably expect to lose
some tanks in rough or soft ground. He may just not have had the fuel
to do it.

Post by david
and instead barrelled forward in a frontal
assault. Likewise, at Second El Alemein, Monty went for a
straightforward assault rather than trying to turn a flank.

Monty had an enormous numerical advantage according to you, and he
knew Rommel was very short of fuel according to the book I referenced.
Thus he knew that panzer units could not be here their and everywhere
to reply to his advances, and so a long flank march may just not have
been necessary or of much use.

Post by david
FWIW, I really would suggest that you be very careful about what appears
to be the patronising tone you adopt by explaining to me about an
unguarded rough route in comparison to a guarded easy one. You might
want to take a check on the assault on Mt Harriet 11/12 June 1982,
carried out by 42 Commando. When you have done that, I would recommend
that you offer to teach your grandmother how to suck eggs.

Ok, you are that David. Sorry.

Post by david

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by david
He can't send forces round the northern
flank, it being filled with wet stuff that Britain dominates. He can't
go over, because all the German paratroops died at Crete, and Britain
has air superiority, and airborne operations are rather a bad idea when
the other side has air superiority. He doesn't have enough shovels to go
under, which only leaves going through as an option. At the time in
question, Britain has something like a 10:1 superiority in tanks,

So the British earned the disrespect the Italians are commonly given
in that war?? If I had 10 :1 odds in tanks considering that my tank
quality was not too much lower, and given that I have a good supply
situation, then I should be the one on the offensive, unless I am
incompetent, or have low moral trash troops.

I'm not surprised, frankly. However, given that the Germans were in a
tricky position, at the end of an impossible supply line, and being
forced by the strategic position into having to conduct an offensive,
the British not unreasonably, decided to let the Germans kill themselves
in carrying out a futile attack in order to shift the odds even further
in their favour.

But they did not have to be that stupid, they could have used the
break to their advantage in fortifications or in withdrawl to better
positons (perhaps across the Med) that could cost more British lives
later. My understanding is that it is most unwise to count on the
enemy being stupid. Perhaps you see it different, but I cannot see a
frountal assault against superior numbers as anything but stupid, when
one has not yet utterly lost the war, and one is not faced with an
enemy that will butcher you even if you do surrender. For partisans
facing the SS in Russia when they cannot escape, a suicidal charge
against superior numbers would make sense, almost never otherwise.

Post by david
You see, the trick in the desert war was not how to carry out an
offensive, but how to keep it rolling. If the enemy has stripped itself
of supplies and manpower and reserves in attacking you in a futile
assault, then that makes your counteroffensive that much more
devastating, and that much more likely to just keep on rolling.

Post by Al Montestruc
Dave this does not make
any sense, British troops are usually good to excellent quality, so I
do not get why they should be on the defensive if they have a
numerical advantage in tanks, and IIRC a numerical advantage in
infantry and artillery, and were in good supply, and had cracked
enigma. Why be on the defensive???

Because the objective was not to occupy acres of useless sand.

Agree.

Post by david
The
objective was to kill Germans. If the Germans are forced to attack you

I do not see them as forced to attack. Was their a specific military
reason they must? If it was just Hitler ranting, then the British
could not count on someone not talking some sense into him.

Post by david
when they have an unfavourable position, then there isn't a problem (3).
Battles and wars are not won or lost by how much of a map is coloured
pink (4). They are won by destroying the ability of the enemy to resist
you.

Agree, or more important his will to resist.

Post by david
If the enemy doesn't come to you, then you have to go in and
destroy them. However, if the enemy is coming to you, and they are
giving you home ground advantage, then you may as well make use of that
home ground advantage in order to better destroy the enemy.

Agree, but I do not see the military necessity of Rommel attacking
given the odds you say he was up against.

[david]

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by david
The
objective was to kill Germans. If the Germans are forced to attack you

I do not see them as forced to attack. Was their a specific military
reason they must? If it was just Hitler ranting, then the British
could not count on someone not talking some sense into him.

If they don't attack, then they have to retreat all the way back along
this single desert road, and will be a lovely target for the RAF boys to
strafe and bomb at leisure. The British tanks can set off in pursuit,
confident that they won't come across significant defences, and can even
hope to outrun the retreating forces and get between them and their base
(even the British were capable of turning flanks from time to time).

The Germans (1) have, immediately prior to 1st El Alamein, three
options. They can attack at vastly inferior odds, hope for a miracle and
succeed in moving on to the next obstacle. They can sit where they are,
and slowly die as attrition and lack of supplies takes its toll. Or they
can retreat, taking their chances on fighting a rearguard action for
over 1000 miles in circumstances where they have air inferiority (and
experience showed that air inferiority makes movement somewhat
problematic), and are likely to have to fight numerous encounter battles
where the big advantage goes to the side that has the quantity.

If you must retreat under such circumstances, the first thing you have
to do is to make sure that the enemy are reluctant to pursue, because if
they do pursue you and can catch up with you, you're in big trouble.
Even bigger than if you had taken the initiative and attacked. A
comparison, in somewhat different terrain and tactical circumstances, is
the British retreat from Burma.

Rommel's best hope in such a retreat was that the Italians would
surrender in large enough quantities that they would slow the British
advance down (2).



1. And the Italians, not that they had much say in decisions at this
point.

2. In OTL, after 2nd El Alamein, the Italians were sacrficed to cover
the retreat, and they did far better than Rommel expected - which still
left Rommel with major problems during the retreat.

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by david

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by david
The
objective was to kill Germans. If the Germans are forced to attack you

I do not see them as forced to attack. Was their a specific military
reason they must? If it was just Hitler ranting, then the British
could not count on someone not talking some sense into him.

If they don't attack, then they have to retreat all the way back along
this single desert road, and will be a lovely target for the RAF boys to
strafe and bomb at leisure. The British tanks can set off in pursuit,
confident that they won't come across significant defences, and can even
hope to outrun the retreating forces and get between them and their base
(even the British were capable of turning flanks from time to time).
The Germans (1) have, immediately prior to 1st El Alamein, three
options. They can attack at vastly inferior odds, hope for a miracle and
succeed in moving on to the next obstacle. They can sit where they are,
and slowly die as attrition and lack of supplies takes its toll. Or they
can retreat, taking their chances on fighting a rearguard action for
over 1000 miles in circumstances where they have air inferiority (and
experience showed that air inferiority makes movement somewhat
problematic), and are likely to have to fight numerous encounter battles
where the big advantage goes to the side that has the quantity.
If you must retreat under such circumstances, the first thing you have
to do is to make sure that the enemy are reluctant to pursue, because if
they do pursue you and can catch up with you, you're in big trouble.
Even bigger than if you had taken the initiative and attacked. A
comparison, in somewhat different terrain and tactical circumstances, is
the British retreat from Burma.
Rommel's best hope in such a retreat was that the Italians would
surrender in large enough quantities that they would slow the British
advance down (2).
1. And the Italians, not that they had much say in decisions at this
point.
2. In OTL, after 2nd El Alamein, the Italians were sacrficed to cover
the retreat, and they did far better than Rommel expected - which still
left Rommel with major problems during the retreat.

http://britishhistory.about.com/cs/wwii/a/180403.htm
Plus the harrassment of the Long Range Desert Group and the original of the SAS

[Al Montestruc]

Post by david

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by david
The
objective was to kill Germans. If the Germans are forced to attack you

I do not see them as forced to attack. Was their a specific military
reason they must? If it was just Hitler ranting, then the British
could not count on someone not talking some sense into him.

If they don't attack, then they have to retreat all the way back along
this single desert road, and will be a lovely target for the RAF boys to
strafe and bomb at leisure.

I don't see the need to retreat farther than just outside the nearest
port facilities, in this case I think Tobruk. Fuel food and ammo can
be delivered via ship to Tobruk (or not at all if the RAF and RN can
stop it, I do not see a big difference between Tripoli and Tobruk, as
tankers can deploy hoses so that will not limit unloading, and
freighters can transfer boxes of supplies to boats that can run them
up on the beach. It is not like Rommel would have a shortage of young
fit husky men to unload cargo off boats. As I said, he could conserve
his fuel and give most of it to the Luftwaffe fighters, and
intelligently deploy his AAA, he can attrition the RAF quite a bit and
get some of his more valuable men and equipment back to Europe. IIRC
that is like 200-300 miles from El Alamein, not 1000 miles, and making
a 300 mile fighting retreat to a port you control is a heck of a lot
easyier than a 1000 mile one.

Post by david
The British tanks can set off in pursuit,
confident that they won't come across significant defences,

As long as the Germans have significant numbers of 88mm AAA guns and
ammo for them, and the fuel and half-tracks to scoot them when the
British were getting too close, that would be very overconfident IMHO.

Post by david
and can even
hope to outrun the retreating forces and get between them and their base
(even the British were capable of turning flanks from time to time).
The Germans (1) have, immediately prior to 1st El Alamein, three
options. They can attack at vastly inferior odds, hope for a miracle and
succeed in moving on to the next obstacle.

Given the odds you state that is not much of a choice.

Post by david
They can sit where they are,
and slowly die as attrition and lack of supplies takes its toll.

This allows them to spend most of their fuel supplies on Luftwaffe
fighters to make life difficult for the RAF. But in the end they
lose.

Post by david
Or they
can retreat, taking their chances on fighting a rearguard action for
over 1000 miles

I strongly dispute that distance. If they cannot use Tobruk as a port
due to the RAF and RN, then Tripoli will be just as bad when the
German frount lines are as close to Tripoli as to Tobruk allowing the
RAF to set up airfields close to Tripoli. The unloading issue is not
as big of a deal as some make it out to be as you can use hoses for
oil, and boats & beaches for boxed cargo. The ships will have their
own cranes to offload, and the Med in that are is very calm.

Might as well stand and die at Tobruk. The difference in distance
from Alex is a "so what" issue for the RN at least as far as fuel
goes, and one cannot get significantly better naval or air support
from Italy in either spot AFAIK.

Post by david
in circumstances where they have air inferiority (and
experience showed that air inferiority makes movement somewhat
problematic), and are likely to have to fight numerous encounter battles
where the big advantage goes to the side that has the quantity.
If you must retreat under such circumstances, the first thing you have
to do is to make sure that the enemy are reluctant to pursue, because if
they do pursue you and can catch up with you, you're in big trouble.

Keep the pioneers busy leaving presents of mines and booby traps for
the British, especially on the road, and a rear guard of 88 mm AAA
batteries and infantry. Keep the 88s under camoflage and scoot them
soon after they fire so that they will not be subject to long arty
bombardment, keep Luftwaffe fighters in the air near the 88 batteries
as much as possible so they can support each other. Me-109 runs away
from some RAF fighters right over three or four 88 mm AAA batteries in
a row, I suspect the RAF pilots will think that is cheating. Overlap
the fields of fire of the 88 batteries so they support each other, and
do alternate movements. If the 88 batteries get KOed or captured or
run out of ammo, the Germans are screwed.

--snip

[k***@cix.compulink.co.uk]

Post by Al Montestruc
I don't see the need to retreat farther than just outside the
nearest port facilities, in this case I think Tobruk.

There were no functional port facilities at Tobruk, they had been
trashed by British and German bombing (depending on who held the place
at the time). The harbour was full of sunk ships.

Post by Al Montestruc
as to Tobruk allowing the
RAF to set up airfields close to Tripoli.

Several problems with that, you seem to have no idea of the transport
required, plus any bases would be within range of German air during
the setup.

Ken Young
***@cix.co.uk

Those who cover themselves with martial glory
frequently go in need of any other garment. (Bramah)

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by k***@cix.compulink.co.uk

Post by Al Montestruc
I don't see the need to retreat farther than just outside the
nearest port facilities, in this case I think Tobruk.

There were no functional port facilities at Tobruk, they had been
trashed by British and German bombing (depending on who held the place
at the time). The harbour was full of sunk ships.

Post by Al Montestruc
as to Tobruk allowing the
RAF to set up airfields close to Tripoli.

Several problems with that, you seem to have no idea of the transport
required, plus any bases would be within range of German air during
the setup.

I can't resist, this letter appears in the November/December issue of
Archaeology magazine:

Proto-Indy?
"Cloak and Trowel" (September/October) was very entertaining. It
brought to mind a movie which first triggered my interest in
archaelogy. Some of your older readers may recall the film 'Five
Graves to Cairo', that told of the fictional story of German agents
prior to World War II hiding military supplies in or near historic
sites. From there, their army could resupply themselves when the Nazi
attempted their march on Cairo to capture the Suez Canal. The story
depicts the German general Rommel as the archaelogist-spy leading the
effort,which is foiled by a disguised English soldier in hiding.
Charles Lubbert, Battle Ground, WA

[Stuart Wilkes]

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc
Yes, sure, one of the ways of dealing with sarcastic comments is to
treat them as straight. I note you ingnored the rest of my points.

You continually ignore my points about the coastal road burning most
of his fuel transporting supplies

Excuse me, that is horseshit.

Not.

Post by Al Montestruc
http://www.geocities.com/medalofhonoraa8/vehicles.html
the above site indicates the specs of an Opel Blinz truck the standard
german army truck of wwii.

Now if only Rommel had many of these fine vehicles.

Most of his truck park was either Italian, or captured British.

<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
and the lack of a desert flank to
turn once you get level with the Qattara Depression.

The Qattara depression is not as impassible as you seem to think.

Then why didn't he do it?

Post by Al Montestruc
As an alternative he could turn the sea side flank with an amphibious
landing behind Monti's flank.

An amphibious landing from non-existent Italian landing craft within a
few hours sailing of a major British naval base where lurks a number
of 15"-armed Brit BBs and under airspace that's buzzing with
Spitfires. Hm.

You must have something for drowning German and Italian troops in
large numbers.

Stuart Wilkes

[david]

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc
Yes, sure, one of the ways of dealing with sarcastic comments is to
treat them as straight. I note you ingnored the rest of my points.

You continually ignore my points about the coastal road burning most
of his fuel transporting supplies

Excuse me, that is horseshit.

I would suggest that your confidence is not entirely appropriate.

Post by Al Montestruc
http://www.geocities.com/medalofhonoraa8/vehicles.html
the above site indicates

(snip of calculations based on a modern engine operating on modern,
well-maintained roads without the problems of carrying full load being
converted to a WW2 engine and chassis operating on a desert road (with
all the maintenance issues that implies) under laden conditions, with
the desert road being not of the best construction. A more appropriate
check for you to do might be to take your SUV out into the desert or a
beach somewhere, load it up to its maximum capacity, and drive it along
firm sand for some time, and see what sort of fuel consumption you get
out of it then. Of course, in the German situation, every time a vehicle
breaks down, it causes a logistical tailback).

In OTL, the German records show that roughly speaking 9 gallons of fuel
were burnt getting 1 gallon of fuel from the port to the front line.
Since that is the figures that the Germans actually achieved, I would
respectfully suggest that, unless one postulates a PoD that would change
this figure, then this figure is the best first approximation. Of
course, if you want to ignore what actually happened, then fine, but it
does make debate essentially futile.

[Stuart Wilkes]

Post by david

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
<snip>

Post by Al Montestruc
Yes, sure, one of the ways of dealing with sarcastic comments is to
treat them as straight. I note you ingnored the rest of my points.

You continually ignore my points about the coastal road burning most
of his fuel transporting supplies

Excuse me, that is horseshit.

I would suggest that your confidence is not entirely appropriate.

Post by Al Montestruc
http://www.geocities.com/medalofhonoraa8/vehicles.html
the above site indicates

(snip of calculations based on a modern engine operating on modern,
well-maintained roads without the problems of carrying full load being
converted to a WW2 engine and chassis operating on a desert road (with
all the maintenance issues that implies) under laden conditions, with
the desert road being not of the best construction. A more appropriate
check for you to do might be to take your SUV out into the desert or a
beach somewhere, load it up to its maximum capacity, and drive it along
firm sand for some time,

Well the coast road was paved pretty much all the way, IIRC. But it
bore heavy traffic, and non-trivial amounts of asphalt probably went
into keeping it drivable. So the German log system also has to carry
asphalt to keep the road in shape...

Stuart Wilkes

[david]

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Well the coast road was paved pretty much all the way, IIRC.

My understanding is that while the road was paved, sand tended to get
blown on to it with great regularity. The density of traffic tended to
throw the sand off again. The net result was a hard road with a covering
of sand that could range in thickness from zero to significant,
depending upon wind and traffic and local topology.

Post by Stuart Wilkes
But it
bore heavy traffic, and non-trivial amounts of asphalt probably went
into keeping it drivable. So the German log system also has to carry
asphalt to keep the road in shape...

[Stuart Wilkes]

Post by david

Post by Stuart Wilkes
Well the coast road was paved pretty much all the way, IIRC.

My understanding is that while the road was paved, sand tended to get
blown on to it with great regularity. The density of traffic tended to
throw the sand off again. The net result was a hard road with a covering
of sand that could range in thickness from zero to significant,
depending upon wind and traffic and local topology.

Of course. What was I thinking?

So there's sand in the air filter and sand on the road. Can sand in
the oil, transmission, axles and petrol be far behind?

Stuart Wilkes

[david]

Post by Stuart Wilkes
So there's sand in the air filter and sand on the road. Can sand in
the oil, transmission, axles and petrol be far behind?

I think it is fair to say that maintenance of the logistic train might
be something of an issue.

[mike]

Post by david

Post by Stuart Wilkes
So there's sand in the air filter and sand on the road. Can sand in
the oil, transmission, axles and petrol be far behind?

I think it is fair to say that maintenance of the logistic train might
be something of an issue.

If you read the History of the LRDG and Popski's Private Army,
the Desert was harsh on vehicles. Some needed quite a bit
of Modification to last at all.
Like a durability scale went from Italian SPAs, to Ford, to Chevy
to Jeeps: they pretty much had thier pick of equipment, being
mostly Chevys and Jeeps in '42

In Deighton's_Blood Tears and Folly_ in the chapter on N.A. called
'Quartermaster's Nightmare' he notes that for every 1000 gallons
of gas offloaded at Tobruk and driven to the front at Alamein,
only 636 would remain to by added to supply dumps. That was only
about 300 miles away. He did not list what the usage would be from
the Main Port at Tripoli, 1500 miles away.

In Dec '41, due to fuel shortages, the Luftwaffe could
only support one sortie per day.

He didn't just slam the Nazis, as further on the UK side,noted
that slackness,waste,mismanagement,misappropriation and theft
of military gear was on a scale not surpassed until the War
in Vietnam.

**
mike
**

[david]

Post by Al Montestruc

Post by Stuart Wilkes
and the lack of a desert flank to
turn once you get level with the Qattara Depression.

The Qattara depression is not as impassible as you seem to think.
As an alternative he could turn the sea side flank with an amphibious
landing behind Monti's flank.

I'm sorry? An amphibious operation? Until Alex falls, German amphibious
operations are not entirely plausible. You are suggesting that the
Germans carry out an amphibious operation with naval inferiority, aerial
inferiority (both of which are givens until after the fall of Alex,
which will be after this proposed amphibious operation). The Germans
have no significant specialised amphibious vessels, and there are no
convenient landing points for ships. Any German amphibious operations
would be carried out by transhipping everything needed from ships to
boats and then dumping them on an open beach. Do you have any idea how
long that means that the amphibious task force will be sitting around
unloading? The landing will have damn all in the way of artillery or
armour, and unsupported infantry was not noted for being terribly
effective in the desert war.

Do we have examples of German attempts to conduct amphibious operations?
We do; they attempted an amphibious operation against Crete. Even with
total air dominance, that amphibious operation was not a major success
story. You are proposing to conduct an amphibious operation in
circumstances where the other side has air and naval superiority.

[david]

Post by Al Montestruc
Panzer General ignores logistics totally.

I don't know a great deal about Panzer General, and can't comment on it.
I do know a little bit about military operations, however, and am
prepared to comment on that.

Post by Al Montestruc
The fact of the matter is
that had the British not known of Rommel's fuel shortage, and had not
cracked enigma, then Rommel's fuel problems would have been cleared up
with a couple of tanker loads and Egypt would have fallen.

Rommel's fuel problems arose for many reasons. Firstly, the Germans and
Italians didn't have too much in the way of merchant marine to ship fuel
over, much of the merchant marine being turned into ad hoc submarines in
the first few months of Italy's involvement. The lack of carrying
capacity is logistic bottleneck number 1.

Bottleneck number two was that a high proportion of the merchant marine
failed to cross the Mediterranean. Your proposed PoD will improve the
percentage crossing (but it still won't be perfectly safe, as the entry
and exit points of the shipping will be very well known, and British
submarines and aircraft will be able to rely on standing patrols being
able to cause as much damage to Italian shipping as German submarines
caused to British shipping during the Battle of the Atlantic. Indeed,
the British cause is better, because of the paucity of Italian ASW
capability, and the more tightly defined routes in the Med). For a rough
rule of thumb, we can assume that the Italian shipping losses decline
from a peak of 60-80% to a "mere" 30%.

Bottleneck number 3 is the unloading capacity on the north African
coast. There is nothing that you have changed about this, so the only
effect your change will make is that ships will be tied up longer on the
north African coast waiting to be unloaded.

Bottleneck number 4 is the fact that all the supplies that are
eventually unloaded have to be trucked along a single road that is
easily within range of interdiction by the British at any point they
choose. In OTL, something like 90% of fuel actually shipped to north
Africa was burnt getting that fuel to the front line. There is nothing
that can be done to improve this, and until Alexandria falls, the
British have naval dominance in the area, and can interdict the supply
line at will. Your suggestion seems to be that Alexandria falls because
the Germans have better supplies. However, until Alex falls, the Germans
don't have better supplies (or at least, insignificantly so). So one is
in a classic Catch 22 situation. When Alex falls, the supply situation
changes, but until Alex falls, the supply situation doesn't change; in
order for Alex to fall, the supply situation has to change.

Bottleneck number 5 in the Qattara depression. No room for flanking, and
the Germans have no option but to try and barrel their way forward
through defences that know that they are coming in a frontal assault
with no room to manoeuvre. Such actions require huge amounts of logistic
support. Unfortunately, improved logistic support won't be forthcoming
until well after such an attack is successful. Regardless of how the
battle is fought, the German forces are going to be well knackered after
it has been fought, and the prospect of further advance are somewhat
limited, to put it mildly. At this stage in proceedings, Britain
outnumbered the German forces by around 10:1 in tanks. If we double the
capacity of the German forces, that takes it to 5:1 (and the British
situation isn't changed until Alex falls). The exchange rate in OTL of
attrition in tanks, all factors taken into account, was roughly 2:1 in
favour of the German forces. Just for the hell of it, we'll double that
exchange rate. That gives the Germans an exchange ratio of 4:1. Even
making those rather generous assumptions, the Germans STILL lose any
attrition contest - and the only way past the Qattara depression will
involve a costly frontal assault which will involve such a battle of
attrition.

Bottleneck number 6 is the simple fact that the farther the Germans
advance, the worse their bottleneck number 4 situation becomes, and the
better the comparable situation is for the British. In addition, the
tempo increasingly favours Britain, as it takes a shorter time for a
request for specific supplies from the front to be met by Britain, and a
longer time for the Germans to adjust to circumstances.

Bottleneck number 7 is the simple mental outlook of Rommel. Rommel was a
fine tactical commander. As far as logistics is concerned, Rommel was an
idiot, regarding logistics as something far to boring for him to worry
about, and leaving it to others to deal with. He specifically described
logistics as an exercise for quartermasters, and was terribly dismissive
of the role that logistics plays in warfare. Totally unsurprisingly, it
was logistics that killed off the Germans in north Africa. Given the
situation that they found themselves in, that was probably always going
to happen. However, this tough situation was made worse by having a
general who didn't care about the problem. Rommel simply wanted to be up
front playing with the big steel toys, wining glory, and being a platoon
commander writ large, rather than doing the job of being a general.

Post by Al Montestruc
If Egypt
falls, Suez falls, if Suez falls then the British in the eastern med
are the ones with supply problems,

If wishes were horses, then beggars would ride. To reach Suez, Rommel
has to win a battle to get past the Qattara depression. He then has to
manage the logistics of getting across the left hand side of Egypt
(still along that single road). He then has to take Alexandria,
presumably by waving a magic wand, because he doesn't have any sort of
naval position before he does, and any advance is going to have to go
through some serious problems. He then has to conduct an opposed
crossing of the Suez Canal, and then he's got to start repairing damaged
infrastucture.

The best option for Germany in WW2 is to say "North Africa? Not on any
of our maps, old boy. You're on your own their, Benny the Moose. We're
not sending even one Bavarian bagpiper."

[david]

As an addendum, I missed off the very first bottleneck, namely that the
Axis powers didn't have that much of an excess of supplies to send in
the first place. Until they get access to oil from either the Caucusas
or from Persia, they are dependent almost entirely on Romanian oil. As
this has to fuel the war against Russia (and a great number of thirsty
tanks), the U-boat war against Britain, fuel the Luftwaffe in its
supporting role in all theatres and protecting Germany against the
steadily increasing bombing raids from Britain and the USA, there isn't
a lot to spare from an already slender resource.

From the German strategic point of view, north Africa has to be regarded
as at best a totally irrelevant sideshow. The war will be won or lost
against Russia, and any distractions from this work in favour of the
Allies.

[Alex Filonov]

Post by david
As an addendum, I missed off the very first bottleneck, namely that the
Axis powers didn't have that much of an excess of supplies to send in
the first place. Until they get access to oil from either the Caucusas
or from Persia, they are dependent almost entirely on Romanian oil. As
this has to fuel the war against Russia (and a great number of thirsty
tanks), the U-boat war against Britain, fuel the Luftwaffe in its
supporting role in all theatres and protecting Germany against the
steadily increasing bombing raids from Britain and the USA, there isn't
a lot to spare from an already slender resource.
From the German strategic point of view, north Africa has to be regarded
as at best a totally irrelevant sideshow. The war will be won or lost
against Russia, and any distractions from this work in favour of the
Allies.

Just one question. OTL Germans had to occupy Vichy France immediately
after operation Torch. If British Army succeeds in crushing Italians in
Libya, wouldn't they be tempted to go after Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco?
And Germany would have to occupy Vishy France 2 years earlier, probably.
And how situation in Italy would change?

[david]

Post by Alex Filonov

Post by david
From the German strategic point of view, north Africa has to be regarded
as at best a totally irrelevant sideshow. The war will be won or lost
against Russia, and any distractions from this work in favour of the
Allies.

Just one question. OTL Germans had to occupy Vichy France immediately
after operation Torch. If British Army succeeds in crushing Italians in
Libya, wouldn't they be tempted to go after Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco?

And the question that the German planners have to ask is: "What actual
problem does that give us?" It places Italy in deeper trouble, and it
might mean that Italy will conclude a separate peace. But rather than
spending effort and resources propping up Italy, it might be regarded as
better to concentrate on Russia, and leave the fringe theatres to after
Russia has been dealt with.

Post by Alex Filonov
And Germany would have to occupy Vishy France 2 years earlier, probably.
And how situation in Italy would change?

[Al Montestruc]

---snip

It isn't the end text in one message you are worried about, what you
need to know is the path through the three rotors (a fourth reflector
i n Naval) and the plug boxes. Simon Singh's The Code Book, Chapter 4
explains as does Rudolf Kippenhahn's Code Breaking, Chapters 9 and 10.
The idea is to increase the number of possibilities, this was the
purpose of the plug board and should have also been part of the roror
set.

Ok, fine. I was not very interested in the technical details of how
the enigma machine worked, just in the what if posted as to what the
effects on the war are.
I am sorry but I am not going to buy that it is inevitable that the
allies will crack enigma, historically it took an enigma machine
falling into the hands of the Poles and them having the chance to take
it apart and photograph the process (of taking it apart) then put it
back together in working order and getting it back into the hands of
the Germans w/o the germans ever knowing they had it.

Yes well into the war several different enigma machines fell into the
hands of the British, but that was years later and if that were the
start point, no way in hell is enigma going to be cracked wide open by
fall '42.

My question is whether or not it is plausible that Egypt falls if
enigma is not cracked and what the rammifications of that on the war
are.

[Thresh1642]

I think the odds are increased that Egypt does fall, to at least 50/50. Supply
is still a problem, but I think if Germany retains the advantage in the Med,
they have a better shot at winning. I also think if they focused on Malta more
than Crete, alot of the supply problems they had would have been mitigated...

How important is it that Germany hold onto Egypt? If they were to deny the
Sues, or destroy the locks and parts of the waterway, rendering it inoperative,
that would do the job as well, right?

Post by Al Montestruc
My question is whether or not it is plausible that Egypt falls if
enigma is not cracked and what the rammifications of that on the war
are.

[Jack Linthicum]

Post by Thresh1642
I think the odds are increased that Egypt does fall, to at least 50/50. Supply
is still a problem, but I think if Germany retains the advantage in the Med,
they have a better shot at winning. I also think if they focused on Malta more
than Crete, alot of the supply problems they had would have been mitigated...
How important is it that Germany hold onto Egypt? If they were to deny the
Sues, or destroy the locks and parts of the waterway, rendering it inoperative,
that would do the job as well, right?

Post by Al Montestruc
My question is whether or not it is plausible that Egypt falls if
enigma is not cracked and what the rammifications of that on the war
are.

This is one of those WIs that require the butterflies to only reach
one object to the end goal of accomplishing one event. This takes
Chaos Theory and stands it on its head. To take Kolker's time mantra
and apply it to this situation: things don't get simpler they get more
complicated.

You don't want to know why Enigma didn't live up to its 159 followed
by 18 zeros invernerability, or why Rejewski, Rozycki and Zygalski
knocked that down to 105,000 possibilities, or why Herr Asche sold the
operational plans and spent 8 years and 19 visits feeding important
information to the French, or any event that would keep Rommel out of
Cairo, like a lack of troops to occupy Egypt once they got there and
guard the prisoners they might take. The Brits are in Ethiopia, the
Yanks are planning Torch, doesn't the squeeze come anyway?