Minimal Type Theory specifies the Mathematics of Semantics

Discussion:

Minimal Type Theory specifies the Mathematics of Semantics

(too old to reply)

Pete Olcott

2017-12-13 02:50:59 UTC

<html>
<head>

<meta http-equiv="content-type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
Minimal Type Theory is primarily intended as a means to specify any
natural language or formal language semantic meaning using a single
mathematical formalism. It is the same sort of idea as the Tarksi
metalanguage, except that MTT does contain its own Truth predicate.
<br>
<br>
A key aspect of this system is that every semantic meaning that
could possibly ever exist already has its own unique place in a
knowledge inheritance hierarchy. <br>
<br>
Thus there is no need for specialized "terms of the art" that chop
off some conventional meaning and append some new meaning. <br>
<br>
Defining a previously unreferenced concept (new idea) is like
locating a specific point on a number line, except the "number line"
has more than two dimensions. <br>
<br>
The above three sentences are brand new material that I never
thought of before. Since I am deriving this material through a
process of elimination by the progressively narrowing of general
concepts to attain increasingly greater degrees of specificity there
may be errors in the above scheme. <br>
<br>
<b>The goal of the new material is to further elaborate the natural
preexisting order of the set of all knowledge. </b><b><br>
</b><br>
Copyright 2017 Pete Olcott <br>
<div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<b> Γ ⊢<sub><font style="font-size:8pt" size="1">FS</font></sub>
A ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)</b>
// MTT notational conventions <br>
<b>∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT Provable(Γ, X) </b> // MTT Truth
Predicate </div>
</body>
</html>

DKleinecke

2017-12-13 03:27:31 UTC

Post by Pete Olcott
Minimal Type Theory is primarily intended as a means to specify any
natural language or formal language semantic meaning using a single
mathematical formalism. It is the same sort of idea as the Tarksi
metalanguage, except that MTT does contain its own Truth predicate.
A key aspect of this system is that every semantic meaning that
could possibly ever exist already has its own unique place in a
knowledge inheritance hierarchy.
Thus there is no need for specialized "terms of the art" that chop
off some conventional meaning and append some new meaning.
Defining a previously unreferenced concept (new idea) is like
locating a specific point on a number line, except the "number line"
has more than two dimensions.
The above three sentences are brand new material that I never
thought of before. Since I am deriving this material through a
process of elimination by the progressively narrowing of general
concepts to attain increasingly greater degrees of specificity there
may be errors in the above scheme.

I think most observers will agree that the above three
sentences are essentially meaningless.

Arnaud Fournet

2017-12-13 10:15:36 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
Minimal Type Theory is primarily intended as a means to specify any
natural language or formal language semantic meaning using a single
mathematical formalism. It is the same sort of idea as the Tarksi
metalanguage, except that MTT does contain its own Truth predicate.
A key aspect of this system is that every semantic meaning that
could possibly ever exist already has its own unique place in a
knowledge inheritance hierarchy.
Thus there is no need for specialized "terms of the art" that chop
off some conventional meaning and append some new meaning.
Defining a previously unreferenced concept (new idea) is like
locating a specific point on a number line, except the "number line"
has more than two dimensions.
The above three sentences are brand new material that I never
thought of before. Since I am deriving this material through a
process of elimination by the progressively narrowing of general
concepts to attain increasingly greater degrees of specificity there
may be errors in the above scheme.

I think most observers will agree that the above three
sentences are essentially meaningless.

Not written by a human being, rather generated by a meta-bullshit word-processor and sentence-generator.
A.

Pete Olcott

2017-12-14 04:43:18 UTC

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/12/2017 9:27 PM, DKleinecke
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:25a108a4-626c-4726-8dfe-***@googlegroups.com">
<pre wrap="">On Tuesday, December 12, 2017 at 6:51:08 PM UTC-8, Pete Olcott wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">Minimal Type Theory is primarily intended as a means to specify any
natural language or formal language semantic meaning using a single
mathematical formalism. It is the same sort of idea as the Tarksi
metalanguage, except that MTT does contain its own Truth predicate.

A key aspect of this system is that every semantic meaning that
could possibly ever exist already has its own unique place in a
knowledge inheritance hierarchy.

Thus there is no need for specialized "terms of the art" that chop
off some conventional meaning and append some new meaning.

Defining a previously unreferenced concept (new idea) is like
locating a specific point on a number line, except the "number line"
has more than two dimensions.

The above three sentences are brand new material that I never
thought of before. Since I am deriving this material through a
process of elimination by the progressively narrowing of general
concepts to attain increasingly greater degrees of specificity there
may be errors in the above scheme.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
I think most observers will agree that the above three
sentences are essentially meaningless.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
The reason that no one ever understands anything about what I am
saying is that apparently even linguists are sloppy when they apply
the meaning of words. It is not helpful that terms themselves screw
up compositionality. <br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colorless_green_ideas_sleep_furiously">https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Colorless_green_ideas_sleep_furiously</a>
<br>
Meaningless says that it has {less meaning} yet means that there is
no meaning what-so-ever. <br>
Neither my paragraphs nor Noam Chomsky's famous example is entirely
bereft of all meaning. <br>
<br>
Although (as I have already acknowledged) the above sentence may
turn out to make a false claim, a false claim is not ever
meaningless. <br>
<br>
For future reference here is a good example of meaningless: "fkn sio
erti ejh ccf"<br>
Even that character string has the meaning of its ASCII values and
Unicode ordinals. <br>
<br>
<b>It is the case that there is a preexisting natural (inheritance
hierarchy based) order to the set of all knowledge. </b><b><br>
<br>
</b>
<div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<b> Γ ⊢<sub><font style="font-size:8pt" size="1">FS</font></sub>
A ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)</b>
// MTT notational conventions <br>
<b>∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT Provable(Γ, X) </b> // MTT Truth
Predicate </div>
</body>
</html>

DKleinecke

2017-12-14 17:07:21 UTC

Post by Pete Olcott
It is the case that there is a preexisting natural (inheritance
hierarchy based) order to the set of all knowledge.

That proposition has not been "proven" much less plausibly
argued for. In order to give it meaning I must
(1) ignore the parentheses (because it refers to undefined
concepts)
(2) take "natural" in its mathematically usual sense
(3) accept the dubious proposition that "all knowledge"
is a set.
Considerably more support must be provided before I can even
consider that proposition as a working hypothesis.

BUT - in any case this has nothing to do with language as
used by human beings in everyday discourse.

Pete Olcott

2017-12-16 15:17:32 UTC

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/14/2017 11:07 AM, DKleinecke
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:7258459d-2077-41a1-b180-***@googlegroups.com">
<pre wrap="">On Wednesday, December 13, 2017 at 8:43:27 PM UTC-8, Pete Olcott wrote:

</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap=""> It is the case that there is a preexisting natural (inheritance
hierarchy based) order to the set of all knowledge.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
That proposition has not been "proven" much less plausibly
argued for. </pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
<b>It is a hypothesis, I will strive to state it in more precise
terms. </b><b><br>
</b>Now that I have stated it in precise terms I cannot publish
these precise terms <br>
in a public forum because this aspect of my work is best protected
as a trade secret. <br>
<br>
I still want to be able to partner with Doug Lenat to complete his
project<br>
and key details of the mathematics of semantics form important
prerequisites to<br>
fully automating the process of the population of enormous knowledge
ontologies. <br>
<br>
Doug brought up the idea of deep leaning being applied to his work
in an email to me with this link: <br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602094/ais-language-problem/">https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602094/ais-language-problem/</a> <br>
<br>
<div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<b> Γ ⊢<sub><font style="font-size:8pt" size="1">FS</font></sub>
A ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)</b>
// MTT notational conventions <br>
<b>∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT Provable(Γ, X) </b> // MTT Truth
Predicate </div>
</body>
</html>

DKleinecke

2017-12-16 17:22:41 UTC

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/14/2017 11:07 AM, DKleinecke
It is the case that there is a preexisting natural (inheritance
hierarchy based) order to the set of all knowledge.
That proposition has not been "proven" much less plausibly
argued for.
It is a hypothesis, I will strive to state it in more precise
terms.
Now that I have stated it in precise terms I cannot publish
these precise terms
in a public forum because this aspect of my work is best protected
as a trade secret.
I still want to be able to partner with Doug Lenat to complete his
project
and key details of the mathematics of semantics form important
prerequisites to
fully automating the process of the population of enormous knowledge
ontologies.
Doug brought up the idea of deep leaning being applied to his work
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602094/ais-language-problem/
--
Γ ⊢FS
A ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)
// MTT notational conventions
∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT Provable(Γ, X) // MTT Truth
Predicate

I feel sure that Lenat will not be so foolish.

Pete Olcott

2017-12-16 20:20:17 UTC

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/16/2017 11:22 AM, DKleinecke
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:7870dfbd-612d-4f02-a68e-***@googlegroups.com">
<pre wrap="">On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 7:17:39 AM UTC-8, Pete Olcott wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">On 12/14/2017 11:07 AM, DKleinecke
wrote:

On Wednesday, December 13, 2017 at 8:43:27 PM UTC-8, Pete Olcott wrote:

It is the case that there is a preexisting natural (inheritance
hierarchy based) order to the set of all knowledge.

That proposition has not been "proven" much less plausibly
argued for.

It is a hypothesis, I will strive to state it in more precise
terms.

Now that I have stated it in precise terms I cannot publish
these precise terms

in a public forum because this aspect of my work is best protected
as a trade secret.

I still want to be able to partner with Doug Lenat to complete his
project

and key details of the mathematics of semantics form important
prerequisites to

fully automating the process of the population of enormous knowledge
ontologies.

<b> Doug brought up the idea of deep learning being applied to his work
in an email to me with this link:
</b>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602094/ais-language-problem/">https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602094/ais-language-problem/</a>
--
Γ ⊢FS
A ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)
// MTT notational conventions

∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT Provable(Γ, X) // MTT Truth
Predicate
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
I feel sure that Lenat will not be so foolish.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
So foolish to suggest the possibility that deep learning might be
applied to formalized natural language? <br>
<b>Here are his exact words cut-and-paste from his email: </b><br>
<b>
</b><br>
Thanks, Pete.<br>
<br>
Reading <a
href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602094/ais-language-problem/"
target="_blank"><span style="font-size:11.0pt">https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602094/ais-language-problem/</span></a>
e.g., it's disappointing that these folks -- who know better -- are
clinging to
pattern-formation technologies to provide the whole solution to AI,
instead of
HALF the solution.
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<b> Γ ⊢<sub><font style="font-size:8pt" size="1">FS</font></sub>
A ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)</b>
// MTT notational conventions <br>
<b>∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT Provable(Γ, X) </b> // MTT Truth
Predicate </div>
</body>
</html>

Pete Olcott

2017-12-16 20:34:45 UTC

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/16/2017 2:20 PM, Pete Olcott
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:uLadndVfI9WfHajHnZ2dnUU7-***@giganews.com">
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/16/2017 11:22 AM, DKleinecke
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:7870dfbd-612d-4f02-a68e-***@googlegroups.com">
<pre wrap="">On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 7:17:39 AM UTC-8, Pete Olcott wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">On 12/14/2017 11:07 AM, DKleinecke
wrote:

On Wednesday, December 13, 2017 at 8:43:27 PM UTC-8, Pete Olcott wrote:

It is the case that there is a preexisting natural (inheritance
hierarchy based) order to the set of all knowledge.

That proposition has not been "proven" much less plausibly
argued for.

It is a hypothesis, I will strive to state it in more precise
terms.

Now that I have stated it in precise terms I cannot publish
these precise terms

in a public forum because this aspect of my work is best protected
as a trade secret.

I still want to be able to partner with Doug Lenat to complete his
project

and key details of the mathematics of semantics form important
prerequisites to

fully automating the process of the population of enormous knowledge
ontologies.

<b> Doug brought up the idea of deep learning being applied to his work
in an email to me with this link:
</b>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602094/ais-language-problem/" moz-do-not-send="true">https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602094/ais-language-problem/</a>

</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">I feel sure that Lenat will not be so foolish.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
So foolish to suggest the possibility that deep learning might be
applied to formalized natural language? <br>
<b>Here are his exact words cut-and-paste from his email: </b><br>
<b> </b><br>
Thanks, Pete.<br>
<br>
Reading <a
href="https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602094/ais-language-problem/"
target="_blank" moz-do-not-send="true"><span
style="font-size:11.0pt">https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602094/ais-language-problem/</span></a>
e.g., it's disappointing that these folks -- who know better --
are clinging to pattern-formation technologies to provide the
whole solution to AI, instead of HALF the solution. <br>
<br>
</blockquote>
<b><br>
<font size="+2">Minimal Type Theory simply expresses semantic
logical entailment syntactically<br>
</font><br>
I had to enhance the way that predicate logic works by creating an
{assign alias name} operator:</b><br>
<br>
LHS is assigned as an alias name for the RHS<br>
<b><span style="background: #ffff00">LHS ≡ RHS</span></b><br>
The LHS is <i><b>logically equivalent to </b></i>the RHS <i><b>Because
the LHS is merely an alias name </b></i>for the RHS<br>
<br>
This is the Truth predicate that Tarski "proved" is impossible in
his undefinability theorem: <span style="background: #ffff00"></span><br>
<span style="background: #ffff00">∀<b>X True(X)</b></span><b> ≡ (∃Γ
⊆ MTT Provable(Γ, X)) </b>// Minimal Type Theory <br>
<br>
<font size="+1">If we take this <b><span style="background:
#ffff00">propositional logic expression: (X ∧ Y) → Z </span></b></font><br>
<font size="+1"><b><span style="background: #ffff00">plugged into
the above MTT Truth predicate</span></b><b> </b>we get this
MTT expression</font><br>
<font size="+1"><b><span style="background: #ffff00">True(Z) ≡ (
Provable( {X,Y}, Z) )</span></b></font><br>
<font size="+1"><b><span style="background: #ffff00"></span></b></font><br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315367846_Minimal_Type_Theory_MTT">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315367846_Minimal_Type_Theory_MTT</a>
<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext"
href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317953772_Provability_with_Minimal_Type_Theory">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317953772_Provability_with_Minimal_Type_Theory</a><br>
<br>
Copyright 2017 Pete Olcott <br>
<br>
<div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<b> Γ ⊢<sub><font style="font-size:8pt" size="1">FS</font></sub>
A ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)</b>
// MTT notational conventions <br>
<b>∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT Provable(Γ, X) </b> // MTT Truth
Predicate </div>
</body>
</html>

DKleinecke

2017-12-16 20:49:02 UTC

Post by Pete Olcott
Minimal Type Theory simply expresses semantic
logical entailment syntactically

This statement makes no sense if "semantic" and "syntactically"
are understood in the usual linguistic way.

Pete Olcott

2017-12-17 02:24:27 UTC

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/16/2017 2:49 PM, DKleinecke
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:1a4df303-05e7-4526-8aa5-***@googlegroups.com">
<pre wrap="">On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 12:34:52 PM UTC-8, Pete Olcott wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
Minimal Type Theory simply expresses semantic
logical entailment syntactically
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
This statement makes no sense if "semantic" and "syntactically"
are understood in the usual linguistic way.
</pre>
</blockquote>
Of course you would be correct unless and until you get into the
sub-field of the formal semantics of linguistics, then I am correct.
<br>
<br>
<span style="color: rgb(26, 26, 26); font-size: 16.5px; font-style:
normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal;
font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-style:
initial; text-decoration-color: initial; display: inline !
important; float: none; font-family: serif;">When I talk about
this sub-field now I am not referring to the Montague grammar of
semantics, I am only talking about the much more general idea that
a grammar of semantics can be derived. <br>
<br>
Minimal Type Theory is a formal language almost identical to First
Order Predicate Logic and is capable of exhaustively specifying
any formal language or natural language semantics that can be
conceived. <br>
</span><font color="#1a1a1a"><font face="serif"><font size="3"><span
style="background: #ffff00"><b><br>
Richard
Montague Quote</b></span></font></font></font>
<span style="color: rgb(26, 26, 26); font-size: 16.5px; font-style:
normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal;
font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-style:
initial; text-decoration-color: initial; display: inline !
important; float: none; font-family: serif;"><br>
There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between
natural languages and the artificial languages of logicians;
indeed I consider it possible to comprehend the syntax and
semantics of both kinds of languages with a single natural and
mathematically precise theory. (Montague 1970c, 222)<br>
</span><span style="color: rgb(26, 26, 26); font-size: 16.5px;
font-style: normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal;
font-variant-caps: normal; font-weight: 400; letter-spacing:
normal; text-align: start; text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none;
white-space: normal; word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width:
0px; background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-style:
initial; text-decoration-color: initial; display: inline !
important; float: none; font-family: serif;"><b></b></span><font
color="#1a1a1a"><font face="serif"><font size="3"><span
style="background: #ffff00"><b><br>
I
have now named this theory: {The Mathematics of Semantics}
</b></span></font></font></font><br>
<font color="#1a1a1a"><font face="serif"><font size="3"><span
style="background: #ffff00"></span></font></font></font><span
style="color: rgb(26, 26, 26); font-size: 16.5px; font-style:
normal; font-variant-ligatures: normal; font-variant-caps: normal;
font-weight: 400; letter-spacing: normal; text-align: start;
text-indent: 0px; text-transform: none; white-space: normal;
word-spacing: 0px; -webkit-text-stroke-width: 0px;
background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255); text-decoration-style:
initial; text-decoration-color: initial; display: inline !
important; float: none; font-family: serif;"></span>
<br>
<div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<b> Γ ⊢<sub><font style="font-size:8pt" size="1">FS</font></sub>
A ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)</b>
// MTT notational conventions <br>
<b>∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT Provable(Γ, X) </b> // MTT Truth
Predicate </div>
</body>
</html>

DKleinecke

2017-12-17 04:24:38 UTC

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/16/2017 2:49 PM, DKleinecke
Minimal Type Theory simply expresses semantic
logical entailment syntactically
This statement makes no sense if "semantic" and "syntactically"
are understood in the usual linguistic way.
Of course you would be correct unless and until you get into the
sub-field of the formal semantics of linguistics, then I am correct.
When I talk about
this sub-field now I am not referring to the Montague grammar of
semantics, I am only talking about the much more general idea that
a grammar of semantics can be derived.
Minimal Type Theory is a formal language almost identical to First
Order Predicate Logic and is capable of exhaustively specifying
any formal language or natural language semantics that can be
conceived.
Richard
Montague Quote
There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between
natural languages and the artificial languages of logicians;
indeed I consider it possible to comprehend the syntax and
semantics of both kinds of languages with a single natural and
mathematically precise theory. (Montague 1970c, 222)

Why do you think you can do what Dick Montague failed to do?

Pete Olcott

2017-12-18 02:50:24 UTC

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/16/2017 10:24 PM, DKleinecke
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:2d562a54-674b-4038-8d95-***@googlegroups.com">
<pre wrap="">On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 6:24:33 PM UTC-8, Pete Olcott wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">On 12/16/2017 2:49 PM, DKleinecke
wrote:

On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 12:34:52 PM UTC-8, Pete Olcott wrote:

Minimal Type Theory simply expresses semantic
logical entailment syntactically

This statement makes no sense if "semantic" and "syntactically"
are understood in the usual linguistic way.

Of course you would be correct unless and until you get into the
sub-field of the formal semantics of linguistics, then I am correct.

When I talk about
this sub-field now I am not referring to the Montague grammar of
semantics, I am only talking about the much more general idea that
a grammar of semantics can be derived.

Minimal Type Theory is a formal language almost identical to First
Order Predicate Logic and is capable of exhaustively specifying
any formal language or natural language semantics that can be
conceived.

Richard
Montague Quote

There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between
natural languages and the artificial languages of logicians;
indeed I consider it possible to comprehend the syntax and
semantics of both kinds of languages with a single natural and
mathematically precise theory. (Montague 1970c, 222)
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
Why do you think you can do what Dick Montague failed to do?
</pre>
</blockquote>
<p><font face="Segoe UI Symbol">He only failed because he was
murdered before he could complete his work. </font><br>
</p>
<div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<b> Γ ⊢<sub><font style="font-size:8pt" size="1">FS</font></sub>
A ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)</b>
// MTT notational conventions <br>
<b>∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT Provable(Γ, X) </b> // MTT Truth
Predicate </div>
</body>
</html>

DKleinecke

2017-12-18 03:16:42 UTC

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/16/2017 10:24 PM, DKleinecke
On 12/16/2017 2:49 PM, DKleinecke
Minimal Type Theory simply expresses semantic
logical entailment syntactically
This statement makes no sense if "semantic" and "syntactically"
are understood in the usual linguistic way.
Of course you would be correct unless and until you get into the
sub-field of the formal semantics of linguistics, then I am correct.
When I talk about
this sub-field now I am not referring to the Montague grammar of
semantics, I am only talking about the much more general idea that
a grammar of semantics can be derived.
Minimal Type Theory is a formal language almost identical to First
Order Predicate Logic and is capable of exhaustively specifying
any formal language or natural language semantics that can be
conceived.
Richard
Montague Quote
There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between
natural languages and the artificial languages of logicians;
indeed I consider it possible to comprehend the syntax and
semantics of both kinds of languages with a single natural and
mathematically precise theory. (Montague 1970c, 222)
Why do you think you can do what Dick Montague failed to do?
He only failed because he was
murdered before he could complete his work.

Possible, of course - but none of his followers improved upon
what he had already done. They made a serious attempt to apply
his ideas to human speech and failed rather spectacularly.

Pete Olcott

2017-12-18 14:46:25 UTC

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/17/2017 9:16 PM, DKleinecke
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:08fe15ee-388f-42bc-b515-***@googlegroups.com">
<pre wrap="">On Sunday, December 17, 2017 at 6:50:30 PM UTC-8, Pete Olcott wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">On 12/16/2017 10:24 PM, DKleinecke
wrote:

On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 6:24:33 PM UTC-8, Pete Olcott wrote:

On 12/16/2017 2:49 PM, DKleinecke
wrote:

On Saturday, December 16, 2017 at 12:34:52 PM UTC-8, Pete Olcott wrote:

Minimal Type Theory simply expresses semantic
logical entailment syntactically

This statement makes no sense if "semantic" and "syntactically"
are understood in the usual linguistic way.

Of course you would be correct unless and until you get into the
sub-field of the formal semantics of linguistics, then I am correct.

When I talk about
this sub-field now I am not referring to the Montague grammar of
semantics, I am only talking about the much more general idea that
a grammar of semantics can be derived.

Minimal Type Theory is a formal language almost identical to First
Order Predicate Logic and is capable of exhaustively specifying
any formal language or natural language semantics that can be
conceived.

Richard
Montague Quote

There is in my opinion no important theoretical difference between
natural languages and the artificial languages of logicians;
indeed I consider it possible to comprehend the syntax and
semantics of both kinds of languages with a single natural and
mathematically precise theory. (Montague 1970c, 222)

Why do you think you can do what Dick Montague failed to do?

He only failed because he was
murdered before he could complete his work.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
Possible, of course - but none of his followers improved upon
what he had already done. They made a serious attempt to apply
his ideas to human speech and failed rather spectacularly.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
I cannot begin to understand how anyone could say that they failed
at all. They simply did not succeed in simplifying the work
sufficiently that someone with no knowledge of math (most linguists)
could begin to understand them. <br>
<br>
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
understand what it is saying:<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/">http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/</a>
<br>
<br>
The huge advantage of Minimal Type Theory is that it can formalize
the semantics of any natural or formal language in a language as
simple as first order predicate logic. <br>
<br>
The other key advantage is that it can detect and reject semantic
paradoxes syntactically, thus closing the gap of all other
representation systems. <br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315367846_Minimal_Type_Theory_MTT">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/315367846_Minimal_Type_Theory_MTT</a>
<br>
<br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317953772_Provability_with_Minimal_Type_Theory">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/317953772_Provability_with_Minimal_Type_Theory</a><br>
<br>
<br>
<div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<b> Γ ⊢<sub><font style="font-size:8pt" size="1">FS</font></sub>
A ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)</b>
// MTT notational conventions <br>
<b>∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT Provable(Γ, X) </b> // MTT Truth
Predicate </div>
</body>
</html>

DKleinecke

2017-12-18 18:18:28 UTC

Post by Pete Olcott
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/

I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.

I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.

Pete Olcott

2017-12-18 22:20:40 UTC

<html>
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=utf-8">
</head>
<body text="#000000" bgcolor="#FFFFFF">
<div class="moz-cite-prefix">On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
wrote:<br>
</div>
<blockquote type="cite"
cite="mid:8082fcee-9390-40f7-b668-***@googlegroups.com">
<pre wrap="">On Monday, December 18, 2017 at 6:46:32 AM UTC-8, Pete Olcott wrote:
</pre>
<blockquote type="cite">
<pre wrap="">
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
understand what it is saying:

<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/">http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/</a>
</pre>
</blockquote>
<pre wrap="">
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.

I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
</pre>
</blockquote>
<br>
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work? <br>
<a class="moz-txt-link-freetext" href="http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf">http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf</a><br>
<br>
Minimal Type Theory is like Propositional Logic where the internal
semantics of the propositional variable referents are formalized
using Rudolf Carnap (1952) Meaning Postulates. The end result is
very much like Davidson's work. <br>
<br>
<div class="moz-signature">-- <br>
<meta charset="UTF-8">
<b> Γ ⊢<sub><font style="font-size:8pt" size="1">FS</font></sub>
A ↔ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)</b>
// MTT notational conventions <br>
<b>∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT Provable(Γ, X) </b> // MTT Truth
Predicate </div>
</body>
</html>

DKleinecke

2017-12-18 23:32:08 UTC

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.

I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

pete olcott

2017-12-19 01:20:34 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It was not complete clear whether or not you thought that other linguists are for or against Davidson.

DKleinecke

2017-12-19 03:39:41 UTC

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It was not complete clear whether or not you thought that other linguists are for or against Davidson.

I don't know what Davidson said or thought apart from that one
point. Linguists would agree with Davidson ABOUT THAT POINT - but
they cannot be said to agree with Davidson without that reservation.

pete olcott

2017-12-19 04:24:28 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It was not complete clear whether or not you thought that other linguists are for or against Davidson.

I don't know what Davidson said or thought apart from that one
point. Linguists would agree with Davidson ABOUT THAT POINT - but
they cannot be said to agree with Davidson without that reservation.

That is very encouraging.

pete olcott

2017-12-19 05:45:57 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It was not complete clear whether or not you thought that other linguists are for or against Davidson.

I don't know what Davidson said or thought apart from that one
point. Linguists would agree with Davidson ABOUT THAT POINT - but
they cannot be said to agree with Davidson without that reservation.

So by THAT POINT you mean the whole section on Davidsonian Representations
8.1.1 to 8.1.7 ?

DKleinecke

2017-12-19 19:17:51 UTC

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It was not complete clear whether or not you thought that other linguists are for or against Davidson.

I don't know what Davidson said or thought apart from that one
point. Linguists would agree with Davidson ABOUT THAT POINT - but
they cannot be said to agree with Davidson without that reservation.

So by THAT POINT you mean the whole section on Davidsonian Representations
8.1.1 to 8.1.7 ?

I skipped the part on how Cyc represented Davidson's ideas.

pete olcott

2017-12-20 02:42:09 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It was not complete clear whether or not you thought that other linguists are for or against Davidson.

I don't know what Davidson said or thought apart from that one
point. Linguists would agree with Davidson ABOUT THAT POINT - but
they cannot be said to agree with Davidson without that reservation.

So by THAT POINT you mean the whole section on Davidsonian Representations
8.1.1 to 8.1.7 ?

I skipped the part on how Cyc represented Davidson's ideas.

You mean that you agreed with all these:
Events and roles
Event ontology
Subevents
Situations
The ActorSlot hierarchy
Temporal properties of events in the Davidsonian representation

Yet did not carefully examine how they are translated into predicate logic?

DKleinecke

2017-12-20 06:33:03 UTC

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It was not complete clear whether or not you thought that other linguists are for or against Davidson.

I don't know what Davidson said or thought apart from that one
point. Linguists would agree with Davidson ABOUT THAT POINT - but
they cannot be said to agree with Davidson without that reservation.

So by THAT POINT you mean the whole section on Davidsonian Representations
8.1.1 to 8.1.7 ?

I skipped the part on how Cyc represented Davidson's ideas.

Events and roles
Event ontology
Subevents
Situations
The ActorSlot hierarchy
Temporal properties of events in the Davidsonian representation
Yet did not carefully examine how they are translated into predicate logic?

I only read as far as the dependency on events. Perhaps I
need to read further. Your topic outline looks plausible but
I suppose I should make sure Davidson means what I think he
means.

From the account in Wikipedia I doubt that all linguists would
accept all of Davidson's ideas. The quotation

I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a
language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists
have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned,
mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly
defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then
apply to cases. And we should try again to say how convention
in any important sense is involved in language; or, as I think,
we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate
by appeal to conventions.

would I think be rejected by all schools of linguists although
for different reasons by different schools. For example, I
personally feel that communication IS based on convention (but,
of course, Davidson may not mean by "convention" what I think
he means)

I gather that Davidson never attempted a synthesis of his ideas
and any reference to "Davidson's Theory" is rather a secondary
exegesis of his many scattered works.

Peter T. Daniels

2017-12-20 14:38:16 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It was not complete clear whether or not you thought that other linguists are for or against Davidson.

I don't know what Davidson said or thought apart from that one
point. Linguists would agree with Davidson ABOUT THAT POINT - but
they cannot be said to agree with Davidson without that reservation.

So by THAT POINT you mean the whole section on Davidsonian Representations
8.1.1 to 8.1.7 ?

I skipped the part on how Cyc represented Davidson's ideas.

Events and roles
Event ontology
Subevents
Situations
The ActorSlot hierarchy
Temporal properties of events in the Davidsonian representation
Yet did not carefully examine how they are translated into predicate logic?

I only read as far as the dependency on events. Perhaps I
need to read further. Your topic outline looks plausible but
I suppose I should make sure Davidson means what I think he
means.
From the account in Wikipedia I doubt that all linguists would
accept all of Davidson's ideas. The quotation

*************

Post by DKleinecke
I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a
language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists
have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned,
mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly
defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then
apply to cases. And we should try again to say how convention
in any important sense is involved in language; or, as I think,
we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate
by appeal to conventions.

*************

Post by DKleinecke
would I think be rejected by all schools of linguists although
for different reasons by different schools. For example, I
personally feel that communication IS based on convention (but,
of course, Davidson may not mean by "convention" what I think
he means)
I gather that Davidson never attempted a synthesis of his ideas
and any reference to "Davidson's Theory" is rather a secondary
exegesis of his many scattered works.

I don't know what he "concludes" from, but his first clause is identical to Robert A. Hall, Jr.,'s
assertion that there is no such thing as "a language" -- because every idiolect differs slightly
from every other idiolect (including from the same person in different situations), so it is
not possible to draw up a complete description of anything but a single idiolect at a single
time. When he described French or Hungarian or Tok Pisin, he was abstracting from a
large number of slightly different idiolects those things they had in common that made
communication possible.

I don't know whether that is or is not consistent with Davidson's "not if" follow-up.

And his "therefore" is completely unwarranted.

pete olcott

2017-12-20 16:02:50 UTC

Post by Peter T. Daniels

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It was not complete clear whether or not you thought that other linguists are for or against Davidson.

I don't know what Davidson said or thought apart from that one
point. Linguists would agree with Davidson ABOUT THAT POINT - but
they cannot be said to agree with Davidson without that reservation.

So by THAT POINT you mean the whole section on Davidsonian Representations
8.1.1 to 8.1.7 ?

I skipped the part on how Cyc represented Davidson's ideas.

Events and roles
Event ontology
Subevents
Situations
The ActorSlot hierarchy
Temporal properties of events in the Davidsonian representation
Yet did not carefully examine how they are translated into predicate logic?

I only read as far as the dependency on events. Perhaps I
need to read further. Your topic outline looks plausible but
I suppose I should make sure Davidson means what I think he
means.
From the account in Wikipedia I doubt that all linguists would
accept all of Davidson's ideas. The quotation

*************

Post by DKleinecke
I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a
language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists
have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned,
mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly
defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then
apply to cases. And we should try again to say how convention
in any important sense is involved in language; or, as I think,
we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate
by appeal to conventions.

*************

Post by DKleinecke
would I think be rejected by all schools of linguists although
for different reasons by different schools. For example, I
personally feel that communication IS based on convention (but,
of course, Davidson may not mean by "convention" what I think
he means)
I gather that Davidson never attempted a synthesis of his ideas
and any reference to "Davidson's Theory" is rather a secondary
exegesis of his many scattered works.

I don't know what he "concludes" from, but his first clause is identical to Robert A. Hall, Jr.,'s
assertion that there is no such thing as "a language" -- because every idiolect differs slightly
from every other idiolect (including from the same person in different situations), so it is
not possible to draw up a complete description of anything but a single idiolect at a single
time. When he described French or Hungarian or Tok Pisin, he was abstracting from a
large number of slightly different idiolects those things they had in common that made
communication possible.
I don't know whether that is or is not consistent with Davidson's "not if" follow-up.
And his "therefore" is completely unwarranted.

To me any statement like that (using language to say that language does not exist) would be analogous to Kurt Godel making a Godel number that says numbers do not exist. In other words self-evidently very stupid.

None of that matters to me at all. Section 8.1 says all that I need to hear.

Peter T. Daniels

2017-12-20 17:27:58 UTC

Post by pete olcott

Post by Peter T. Daniels

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It was not complete clear whether or not you thought that other linguists are for or against Davidson.

I don't know what Davidson said or thought apart from that one
point. Linguists would agree with Davidson ABOUT THAT POINT - but
they cannot be said to agree with Davidson without that reservation.

So by THAT POINT you mean the whole section on Davidsonian Representations
8.1.1 to 8.1.7 ?

I skipped the part on how Cyc represented Davidson's ideas.

Events and roles
Event ontology
Subevents
Situations
The ActorSlot hierarchy
Temporal properties of events in the Davidsonian representation
Yet did not carefully examine how they are translated into predicate logic?

I only read as far as the dependency on events. Perhaps I
need to read further. Your topic outline looks plausible but
I suppose I should make sure Davidson means what I think he
means.
From the account in Wikipedia I doubt that all linguists would
accept all of Davidson's ideas. The quotation

*************

Post by DKleinecke
I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a
language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists
have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned,
mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly
defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then
apply to cases. And we should try again to say how convention
in any important sense is involved in language; or, as I think,
we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate
by appeal to conventions.

*************

Post by DKleinecke
would I think be rejected by all schools of linguists although
for different reasons by different schools. For example, I
personally feel that communication IS based on convention (but,
of course, Davidson may not mean by "convention" what I think
he means)
I gather that Davidson never attempted a synthesis of his ideas
and any reference to "Davidson's Theory" is rather a secondary
exegesis of his many scattered works.

I don't know what he "concludes" from, but his first clause is identical to Robert A. Hall, Jr.,'s
assertion that there is no such thing as "a language" -- because every idiolect differs slightly
from every other idiolect (including from the same person in different situations), so it is
not possible to draw up a complete description of anything but a single idiolect at a single
time. When he described French or Hungarian or Tok Pisin, he was abstracting from a
large number of slightly different idiolects those things they had in common that made
communication possible.
I don't know whether that is or is not consistent with Davidson's "not if" follow-up.
And his "therefore" is completely unwarranted.

To me any statement like that (using language to say that language does not exist) would be analogous to Kurt Godel making a Godel number that says numbers do not exist. In other words self-evidently very stupid.
None of that matters to me at all. Section 8.1 says all that I need to hear.

If you don't understand Davidson's and Hall's distinction between "a language"
and "language," then you're not ready to discuss this topic.

pete olcott

2017-12-20 17:40:43 UTC

Post by Peter T. Daniels

Post by pete olcott

Post by Peter T. Daniels

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It was not complete clear whether or not you thought that other linguists are for or against Davidson.

I don't know what Davidson said or thought apart from that one
point. Linguists would agree with Davidson ABOUT THAT POINT - but
they cannot be said to agree with Davidson without that reservation.

So by THAT POINT you mean the whole section on Davidsonian Representations
8.1.1 to 8.1.7 ?

I skipped the part on how Cyc represented Davidson's ideas.

Events and roles
Event ontology
Subevents
Situations
The ActorSlot hierarchy
Temporal properties of events in the Davidsonian representation
Yet did not carefully examine how they are translated into predicate logic?

I only read as far as the dependency on events. Perhaps I
need to read further. Your topic outline looks plausible but
I suppose I should make sure Davidson means what I think he
means.
From the account in Wikipedia I doubt that all linguists would
accept all of Davidson's ideas. The quotation

*************

Post by DKleinecke
I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a
language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists
have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned,
mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly
defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then
apply to cases. And we should try again to say how convention
in any important sense is involved in language; or, as I think,
we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate
by appeal to conventions.

*************

Post by DKleinecke
would I think be rejected by all schools of linguists although
for different reasons by different schools. For example, I
personally feel that communication IS based on convention (but,
of course, Davidson may not mean by "convention" what I think
he means)
I gather that Davidson never attempted a synthesis of his ideas
and any reference to "Davidson's Theory" is rather a secondary
exegesis of his many scattered works.

I don't know what he "concludes" from, but his first clause is identical to Robert A. Hall, Jr.,'s
assertion that there is no such thing as "a language" -- because every idiolect differs slightly
from every other idiolect (including from the same person in different situations), so it is
not possible to draw up a complete description of anything but a single idiolect at a single
time. When he described French or Hungarian or Tok Pisin, he was abstracting from a
large number of slightly different idiolects those things they had in common that made
communication possible.
I don't know whether that is or is not consistent with Davidson's "not if" follow-up.
And his "therefore" is completely unwarranted.

To me any statement like that (using language to say that language does not exist) would be analogous to Kurt Godel making a Godel number that says numbers do not exist. In other words self-evidently very stupid.
None of that matters to me at all. Section 8.1 says all that I need to hear.

If you don't understand Davidson's and Hall's distinction between "a language"
and "language," then you're not ready to discuss this topic.

Like I said all of this is a red-herring, what counts is how to formalize the details of events using predicate logic. I make it a point not to get hung up on extraneous minutiae.

It seems that most of the people that I encounter do not understand the material well enough to distinguish the difference between extraneous minutiae and essence. They nitpick on the minutiae to mask their lack of understanding of the essence.

Peter T. Daniels

2017-12-20 17:46:49 UTC

Post by pete olcott

Post by Peter T. Daniels

Post by pete olcott

Post by Peter T. Daniels

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It was not complete clear whether or not you thought that other linguists are for or against Davidson.

I don't know what Davidson said or thought apart from that one
point. Linguists would agree with Davidson ABOUT THAT POINT - but
they cannot be said to agree with Davidson without that reservation.

So by THAT POINT you mean the whole section on Davidsonian Representations
8.1.1 to 8.1.7 ?

I skipped the part on how Cyc represented Davidson's ideas.

Events and roles
Event ontology
Subevents
Situations
The ActorSlot hierarchy
Temporal properties of events in the Davidsonian representation
Yet did not carefully examine how they are translated into predicate logic?

I only read as far as the dependency on events. Perhaps I
need to read further. Your topic outline looks plausible but
I suppose I should make sure Davidson means what I think he
means.
From the account in Wikipedia I doubt that all linguists would
accept all of Davidson's ideas. The quotation

*************

Post by DKleinecke
I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a
language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists
have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned,
mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly
defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then
apply to cases. And we should try again to say how convention
in any important sense is involved in language; or, as I think,
we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate
by appeal to conventions.

*************

Post by DKleinecke
would I think be rejected by all schools of linguists although
for different reasons by different schools. For example, I
personally feel that communication IS based on convention (but,
of course, Davidson may not mean by "convention" what I think
he means)
I gather that Davidson never attempted a synthesis of his ideas
and any reference to "Davidson's Theory" is rather a secondary
exegesis of his many scattered works.

I don't know what he "concludes" from, but his first clause is identical to Robert A. Hall, Jr.,'s
assertion that there is no such thing as "a language" -- because every idiolect differs slightly
from every other idiolect (including from the same person in different situations), so it is
not possible to draw up a complete description of anything but a single idiolect at a single
time. When he described French or Hungarian or Tok Pisin, he was abstracting from a
large number of slightly different idiolects those things they had in common that made
communication possible.
I don't know whether that is or is not consistent with Davidson's "not if" follow-up.
And his "therefore" is completely unwarranted.

To me any statement like that (using language to say that language does not exist) would be analogous to Kurt Godel making a Godel number that says numbers do not exist. In other words self-evidently very stupid.
None of that matters to me at all. Section 8.1 says all that I need to hear.

If you don't understand Davidson's and Hall's distinction between "a language"
and "language," then you're not ready to discuss this topic.

Like I said all of this is a red-herring, what counts is how to formalize the details of events using predicate logic. I make it a point not to get hung up on extraneous minutiae.
It seems that most of the people that I encounter do not understand the material well enough to distinguish the difference between extraneous minutiae and essence. They nitpick on the minutiae to mask their lack of understanding of the essence.

So if you're not interested in language, why do you keep coming back to pester us?

DKleinecke

2017-12-20 19:40:55 UTC

Post by Peter T. Daniels

Post by pete olcott

Post by Peter T. Daniels

Post by pete olcott

Post by Peter T. Daniels

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It was not complete clear whether or not you thought that other linguists are for or against Davidson.

I don't know what Davidson said or thought apart from that one
point. Linguists would agree with Davidson ABOUT THAT POINT - but
they cannot be said to agree with Davidson without that reservation.

So by THAT POINT you mean the whole section on Davidsonian Representations
8.1.1 to 8.1.7 ?

I skipped the part on how Cyc represented Davidson's ideas.

Events and roles
Event ontology
Subevents
Situations
The ActorSlot hierarchy
Temporal properties of events in the Davidsonian representation
Yet did not carefully examine how they are translated into predicate logic?

I only read as far as the dependency on events. Perhaps I
need to read further. Your topic outline looks plausible but
I suppose I should make sure Davidson means what I think he
means.
From the account in Wikipedia I doubt that all linguists would
accept all of Davidson's ideas. The quotation

*************

Post by DKleinecke
I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a
language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists
have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned,
mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly
defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then
apply to cases. And we should try again to say how convention
in any important sense is involved in language; or, as I think,
we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate
by appeal to conventions.

*************

Post by DKleinecke
would I think be rejected by all schools of linguists although
for different reasons by different schools. For example, I
personally feel that communication IS based on convention (but,
of course, Davidson may not mean by "convention" what I think
he means)
I gather that Davidson never attempted a synthesis of his ideas
and any reference to "Davidson's Theory" is rather a secondary
exegesis of his many scattered works.

I don't know what he "concludes" from, but his first clause is identical to Robert A. Hall, Jr.,'s
assertion that there is no such thing as "a language" -- because every idiolect differs slightly
from every other idiolect (including from the same person in different situations), so it is
not possible to draw up a complete description of anything but a single idiolect at a single
time. When he described French or Hungarian or Tok Pisin, he was abstracting from a
large number of slightly different idiolects those things they had in common that made
communication possible.
I don't know whether that is or is not consistent with Davidson's "not if" follow-up.
And his "therefore" is completely unwarranted.

To me any statement like that (using language to say that language does not exist) would be analogous to Kurt Godel making a Godel number that says numbers do not exist. In other words self-evidently very stupid.
None of that matters to me at all. Section 8.1 says all that I need to hear.

If you don't understand Davidson's and Hall's distinction between "a language"
and "language," then you're not ready to discuss this topic.

Like I said all of this is a red-herring, what counts is how to formalize the details of events using predicate logic. I make it a point not to get hung up on extraneous minutiae.
It seems that most of the people that I encounter do not understand the material well enough to distinguish the difference between extraneous minutiae and essence. They nitpick on the minutiae to mask their lack of understanding of the essence.

So if you're not interested in language, why do you keep coming back to pester us?

I sympathize with your disgust at how PO is presenting his
material but he really is saying something about natural
language - in the same way Montague Grammar attempted to say
something about language. If you refuse to read expositions
expressed in Lisp-type languages you have plenty of goodly
company.

pete olcott

2017-12-20 16:00:08 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It was not complete clear whether or not you thought that other linguists are for or against Davidson.

I don't know what Davidson said or thought apart from that one
point. Linguists would agree with Davidson ABOUT THAT POINT - but
they cannot be said to agree with Davidson without that reservation.

So by THAT POINT you mean the whole section on Davidsonian Representations
8.1.1 to 8.1.7 ?

I skipped the part on how Cyc represented Davidson's ideas.

Events and roles
Event ontology
Subevents
Situations
The ActorSlot hierarchy
Temporal properties of events in the Davidsonian representation
Yet did not carefully examine how they are translated into predicate logic?

I only read as far as the dependency on events. Perhaps I
need to read further. Your topic outline looks plausible but
I suppose I should make sure Davidson means what I think he
means.
From the account in Wikipedia I doubt that all linguists would
accept all of Davidson's ideas. The quotation
I conclude that there is no such thing as a language, not if a
language is anything like what many philosophers and linguists
have supposed. There is therefore no such thing to be learned,
mastered, or born with. We must give up the idea of a clearly
defined shared structure which language-users acquire and then
apply to cases. And we should try again to say how convention
in any important sense is involved in language; or, as I think,
we should give up the attempt to illuminate how we communicate
by appeal to conventions.
would I think be rejected by all schools of linguists although
for different reasons by different schools. For example, I
personally feel that communication IS based on convention (but,
of course, Davidson may not mean by "convention" what I think
he means)
I gather that Davidson never attempted a synthesis of his ideas
and any reference to "Davidson's Theory" is rather a secondary
exegesis of his many scattered works.

The way that I see it everything up to section 8.2 makes perfect sense, especially including the translation of natural language to predicate logic.

If Davidson said something stupid somewhere else I do not know about it or care about it.

Can you agree with everything in section 8.1?
Would other linguists agree with everything in section 8.1?

For me section 8.1 entirely by itself logically entails a whole analytical framework such that any missing pieces can be deduced on the basis of the elaboration that is provided.

DKleinecke

2017-12-20 19:41:09 UTC

On Wednesday, December 20, 2017 at 8:00:13 AM UTC-8, pete olcott wrote:

Concerning the CYC treatment of Davidon's ideas.

Post by pete olcott
The way that I see it everything up to section 8.2 makes perfect sense, especially including the translation of natural language to predicate logic.
If Davidson said something stupid somewhere else I do not know about it or care about it.
Can you agree with everything in section 8.1?
Would other linguists agree with everything in section 8.1?
For me section 8.1 entirely by itself logically entails a whole analytical framework such that any missing pieces can be deduced on the basis of the elaboration that is provided.

My reaction to section 8.1 is that it is severely limited to
a certain type of proposition and, while not wrong, is grossly
inadequate as a model of either knowledge or language outside
of small closed-off segments of reality. I do not know whether
the inadequacy I feel is due to Davidson or or Cyc.

This is another example of the inadequacy that torpedoed
Montague Grammar.

pete olcott

2017-12-20 19:49:04 UTC

Post by DKleinecke
Concerning the CYC treatment of Davidon's ideas.

Post by pete olcott
The way that I see it everything up to section 8.2 makes perfect sense, especially including the translation of natural language to predicate logic.
If Davidson said something stupid somewhere else I do not know about it or care about it.
Can you agree with everything in section 8.1?
Would other linguists agree with everything in section 8.1?
For me section 8.1 entirely by itself logically entails a whole analytical framework such that any missing pieces can be deduced on the basis of the elaboration that is provided.

My reaction to section 8.1 is that it is severely limited to
a certain type of proposition and, while not wrong, is grossly
inadequate as a model of either knowledge or language outside
of small closed-off segments of reality. I do not know whether
the inadequacy I feel is due to Davidson or or Cyc.
This is another example of the inadequacy that torpedoed
Montague Grammar.

Let's see if you agree with this:
To put this in a positive light instead of a negative light section 8.1 did a really great job in formalizing the limited set of things that it formalized.

DKleinecke

2017-12-21 00:59:55 UTC

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke
Concerning the CYC treatment of Davidon's ideas.

Post by pete olcott
The way that I see it everything up to section 8.2 makes perfect sense, especially including the translation of natural language to predicate logic.
If Davidson said something stupid somewhere else I do not know about it or care about it.
Can you agree with everything in section 8.1?
Would other linguists agree with everything in section 8.1?
For me section 8.1 entirely by itself logically entails a whole analytical framework such that any missing pieces can be deduced on the basis of the elaboration that is provided.

My reaction to section 8.1 is that it is severely limited to
a certain type of proposition and, while not wrong, is grossly
inadequate as a model of either knowledge or language outside
of small closed-off segments of reality. I do not know whether
the inadequacy I feel is due to Davidson or or Cyc.
This is another example of the inadequacy that torpedoed
Montague Grammar.

To put this in a positive light instead of a negative light section 8.1 did a really great job in formalizing the limited set of things that it formalized.

I'd have to study the section before I agreed.

Pete Olcott

2017-12-21 01:23:33 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke
Concerning the CYC treatment of Davidon's ideas.

Post by pete olcott
The way that I see it everything up to section 8.2 makes perfect sense, especially including the translation of natural language to predicate logic.
If Davidson said something stupid somewhere else I do not know about it or care about it.
Can you agree with everything in section 8.1?
Would other linguists agree with everything in section 8.1?
For me section 8.1 entirely by itself logically entails a whole analytical framework such that any missing pieces can be deduced on the basis of the elaboration that is provided.

My reaction to section 8.1 is that it is severely limited to
a certain type of proposition and, while not wrong, is grossly
inadequate as a model of either knowledge or language outside
of small closed-off segments of reality. I do not know whether
the inadequacy I feel is due to Davidson or or Cyc.
This is another example of the inadequacy that torpedoed
Montague Grammar.

To put this in a positive light instead of a negative light section 8.1 did a really great job in formalizing the limited set of things that it formalized.

I'd have to study the section before I agreed.

It is only 5.5 pages of text. It is the key essence that I have been trying to communicate to you for years.

--
*Γ ⊢_FS A ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)* // MTT notational conventions
*∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT ∧ Axioms(Γ) Provable(Γ, X) * // MTT Truth Predicate

DKleinecke

2017-12-21 05:53:12 UTC

Post by Pete Olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke
Concerning the CYC treatment of Davidon's ideas.

Post by pete olcott
The way that I see it everything up to section 8.2 makes perfect sense, especially including the translation of natural language to predicate logic.
If Davidson said something stupid somewhere else I do not know about it or care about it.
Can you agree with everything in section 8.1?
Would other linguists agree with everything in section 8.1?
For me section 8.1 entirely by itself logically entails a whole analytical framework such that any missing pieces can be deduced on the basis of the elaboration that is provided.

My reaction to section 8.1 is that it is severely limited to
a certain type of proposition and, while not wrong, is grossly
inadequate as a model of either knowledge or language outside
of small closed-off segments of reality. I do not know whether
the inadequacy I feel is due to Davidson or or Cyc.
This is another example of the inadequacy that torpedoed
Montague Grammar.

To put this in a positive light instead of a negative light section 8.1 did a really great job in formalizing the limited set of things that it formalized.

I'd have to study the section before I agreed.

It is only 5.5 pages of text. It is the key essence that I have been trying to communicate to you for years.
--
*Γ ⊢_FS A ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)* // MTT notational conventions
*∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT ∧ Axioms(Γ) Provable(Γ, X) * // MTT Truth Predicate

Not just now.

pete olcott

2017-12-21 06:24:08 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke
Concerning the CYC treatment of Davidon's ideas.

Post by pete olcott
The way that I see it everything up to section 8.2 makes perfect sense, especially including the translation of natural language to predicate logic.
If Davidson said something stupid somewhere else I do not know about it or care about it.
Can you agree with everything in section 8.1?
Would other linguists agree with everything in section 8.1?
For me section 8.1 entirely by itself logically entails a whole analytical framework such that any missing pieces can be deduced on the basis of the elaboration that is provided.

My reaction to section 8.1 is that it is severely limited to
a certain type of proposition and, while not wrong, is grossly
inadequate as a model of either knowledge or language outside
of small closed-off segments of reality. I do not know whether
the inadequacy I feel is due to Davidson or or Cyc.
This is another example of the inadequacy that torpedoed
Montague Grammar.

To put this in a positive light instead of a negative light section 8.1 did a really great job in formalizing the limited set of things that it formalized.

I'd have to study the section before I agreed.

It is only 5.5 pages of text. It is the key essence that I have been trying to communicate to you for years.
--
*Γ ⊢_FS A ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)* // MTT notational conventions
*∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT ∧ Axioms(Γ) Provable(Γ, X) * // MTT Truth Predicate

Not just now.

Well anyway, I was very encouraged by the huge degree that you did agree. This is the most progress that I have had with any linguist. It seems to me that most people here are convinced that natural language can never possibly be any more than mush.

DKleinecke

2017-12-21 18:39:49 UTC

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke
Concerning the CYC treatment of Davidon's ideas.

Post by pete olcott
The way that I see it everything up to section 8.2 makes perfect sense, especially including the translation of natural language to predicate logic.
If Davidson said something stupid somewhere else I do not know about it or care about it.
Can you agree with everything in section 8.1?
Would other linguists agree with everything in section 8.1?
For me section 8.1 entirely by itself logically entails a whole analytical framework such that any missing pieces can be deduced on the basis of the elaboration that is provided.

My reaction to section 8.1 is that it is severely limited to
a certain type of proposition and, while not wrong, is grossly
inadequate as a model of either knowledge or language outside
of small closed-off segments of reality. I do not know whether
the inadequacy I feel is due to Davidson or or Cyc.
This is another example of the inadequacy that torpedoed
Montague Grammar.

To put this in a positive light instead of a negative light section 8.1 did a really great job in formalizing the limited set of things that it formalized.

I'd have to study the section before I agreed.

It is only 5.5 pages of text. It is the key essence that I have been trying to communicate to you for years.
--
*Γ ⊢_FS A ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)* // MTT notational conventions
*∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT ∧ Axioms(Γ) Provable(Γ, X) * // MTT Truth Predicate

Not just now.

Well anyway, I was very encouraged by the huge degree that you did agree. This is the most progress that I have had with any linguist. It seems to me that most people here are convinced that natural language can never possibly be any more than mush.

You know very strange people.

pete olcott

2017-12-21 22:06:34 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke
Concerning the CYC treatment of Davidon's ideas.

Post by pete olcott
The way that I see it everything up to section 8.2 makes perfect sense, especially including the translation of natural language to predicate logic.
If Davidson said something stupid somewhere else I do not know about it or care about it.
Can you agree with everything in section 8.1?
Would other linguists agree with everything in section 8.1?
For me section 8.1 entirely by itself logically entails a whole analytical framework such that any missing pieces can be deduced on the basis of the elaboration that is provided.

My reaction to section 8.1 is that it is severely limited to
a certain type of proposition and, while not wrong, is grossly
inadequate as a model of either knowledge or language outside
of small closed-off segments of reality. I do not know whether
the inadequacy I feel is due to Davidson or or Cyc.
This is another example of the inadequacy that torpedoed
Montague Grammar.

To put this in a positive light instead of a negative light section 8.1 did a really great job in formalizing the limited set of things that it formalized.

I'd have to study the section before I agreed.

It is only 5.5 pages of text. It is the key essence that I have been trying to communicate to you for years.
--
*Γ ⊢_FS A ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)* // MTT notational conventions
*∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT ∧ Axioms(Γ) Provable(Γ, X) * // MTT Truth Predicate

Not just now.

Well anyway, I was very encouraged by the huge degree that you did agree. This is the most progress that I have had with any linguist. It seems to me that most people here are convinced that natural language can never possibly be any more than mush.

You know very strange people.

I will phrase that more precisely. It seems to me that most people in this sci.lang forum are convinced that moving natural language even in the direction of a mathematical formalism is utterly impossible.

Because of your favorable comments on Davidson's work I estimate that you may be the single exception to this rule.

DKleinecke

2017-12-22 01:25:34 UTC

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke
Concerning the CYC treatment of Davidon's ideas.

Post by pete olcott
The way that I see it everything up to section 8.2 makes perfect sense, especially including the translation of natural language to predicate logic.
If Davidson said something stupid somewhere else I do not know about it or care about it.
Can you agree with everything in section 8.1?
Would other linguists agree with everything in section 8.1?
For me section 8.1 entirely by itself logically entails a whole analytical framework such that any missing pieces can be deduced on the basis of the elaboration that is provided.

My reaction to section 8.1 is that it is severely limited to
a certain type of proposition and, while not wrong, is grossly
inadequate as a model of either knowledge or language outside
of small closed-off segments of reality. I do not know whether
the inadequacy I feel is due to Davidson or or Cyc.
This is another example of the inadequacy that torpedoed
Montague Grammar.

To put this in a positive light instead of a negative light section 8.1 did a really great job in formalizing the limited set of things that it formalized.

I'd have to study the section before I agreed.

It is only 5.5 pages of text. It is the key essence that I have been trying to communicate to you for years.
--
*Γ ⊢_FS A ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)* // MTT notational conventions
*∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT ∧ Axioms(Γ) Provable(Γ, X) * // MTT Truth Predicate

Not just now.

Well anyway, I was very encouraged by the huge degree that you did agree. This is the most progress that I have had with any linguist. It seems to me that most people here are convinced that natural language can never possibly be any more than mush.

You know very strange people.

I will phrase that more precisely. It seems to me that most people in this sci.lang forum are convinced that moving natural language even in the direction of a mathematical formalism is utterly impossible.
Because of your favorable comments on Davidson's work I estimate that you may be the single exception to this rule.

Noam Chomsky thought he did exactly that back in 1957 - he
formulated what he considered a rigid mathematical formalism
for grammar. His book is called "Syntactic Structures". As
time went on his thinking and that of his followers has become
somewhat mystical but it remains today the dominant kind of
linguistics. Note that none of the posters to sci.lang can be
considered Chomskian linguists. The literature of Chomskian
linguistics today is rife with "mathematical" formalism - you
should look it (key term - generative grammar).

pete olcott

2017-12-22 05:11:08 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke
Concerning the CYC treatment of Davidon's ideas.

Post by pete olcott
The way that I see it everything up to section 8.2 makes perfect sense, especially including the translation of natural language to predicate logic.
If Davidson said something stupid somewhere else I do not know about it or care about it.
Can you agree with everything in section 8.1?
Would other linguists agree with everything in section 8.1?
For me section 8.1 entirely by itself logically entails a whole analytical framework such that any missing pieces can be deduced on the basis of the elaboration that is provided.

My reaction to section 8.1 is that it is severely limited to
a certain type of proposition and, while not wrong, is grossly
inadequate as a model of either knowledge or language outside
of small closed-off segments of reality. I do not know whether
the inadequacy I feel is due to Davidson or or Cyc.
This is another example of the inadequacy that torpedoed
Montague Grammar.

To put this in a positive light instead of a negative light section 8.1 did a really great job in formalizing the limited set of things that it formalized.

I'd have to study the section before I agreed.

It is only 5.5 pages of text. It is the key essence that I have been trying to communicate to you for years.
--
*Γ ⊢_FS A ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ FS Provable(Γ, A)* // MTT notational conventions
*∀X True(X) ≡ ∃Γ ⊆ MTT ∧ Axioms(Γ) Provable(Γ, X) * // MTT Truth Predicate

Not just now.

Well anyway, I was very encouraged by the huge degree that you did agree. This is the most progress that I have had with any linguist. It seems to me that most people here are convinced that natural language can never possibly be any more than mush.

You know very strange people.

I will phrase that more precisely. It seems to me that most people in this sci.lang forum are convinced that moving natural language even in the direction of a mathematical formalism is utterly impossible.
Because of your favorable comments on Davidson's work I estimate that you may be the single exception to this rule.

Noam Chomsky thought he did exactly that back in 1957 - he
formulated what he considered a rigid mathematical formalism
for grammar. His book is called "Syntactic Structures". As
time went on his thinking and that of his followers has become
somewhat mystical but it remains today the dominant kind of
linguistics. Note that none of the posters to sci.lang can be
considered Chomskian linguists. The literature of Chomskian
linguistics today is rife with "mathematical" formalism - you
should look it (key term - generative grammar).

I will look into that. In several lists of greatest linguists he is #1.

pete olcott

2017-12-19 01:21:41 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

The Rudolf Carnap material is the fundamental basis that the Davidson material is derived from.

DKleinecke

2017-12-19 03:41:10 UTC

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

The Rudolf Carnap material is the fundamental basis that the Davidson material is derived from.

That might explain the error Davidson was correcting but I
have no interest in whom Davidson was correcting.

pete olcott

2017-12-19 18:28:10 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
On 12/18/2017 12:18 PM, DKleinecke
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/
I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.
So are you saying that you and most other linguists agree with
Davidson's work?
http://www.thatmarcusfamily.org/philosophy/Course_Websites/Readings/Carnap%20-%20Meaning%20Postulates.pdf

This link has nothing to do with the subject under discussion. I
think you presented a link you didn't mean to use.
I have no idea what Davidson's entire theory is. I was referring to
the material at the end of your original link that discussed how
Davidson required an event to make sense out of a complex sentence.

It is very encouraging that you seem to agree with Davidson and believe that most linguists would also agree. When-so-ever I have been referring to the formal semantics of linguistics over the years I was most specifically referring to this work of Davidson.

pete olcott

2017-12-19 18:22:34 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/

I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.

What was the error that formal semantics people were making?

DKleinecke

2017-12-19 19:19:02 UTC

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/

I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.

What was the error that formal semantics people were making?

Ignoring the dependency on events.

pete olcott

2017-12-19 23:16:13 UTC

Post by DKleinecke

Post by pete olcott

Post by DKleinecke

Post by Pete Olcott
Here is an example of self-evident success as long as you can
http://www.cyc.com/documentation/ontologists-handbook/writing-efficient-cycl/cycl-representation-choices/

I think linguists (for many centuries - not just modern
linguists) would read about Davidson's idea and say - of
course, only a fool would interpret it otherwise.
I don't mean to disparage Davidson - he was quite properly
correcting an error the formal semantics people were making.

What was the error that formal semantics people were making?

Ignoring the dependency on events.

Ah I see now.
In other words the error of semantic compositionality ignoring context?

Arnaud Fournet

2017-12-15 08:39:47 UTC

Post by Pete Olcott
The reason that no one ever understands anything about what I am
saying is that apparently even linguists are sloppy when they apply
the meaning of words. It is not helpful that terms themselves screw
up compositionality.

Personally, I think your "theory" has nothing to do with linguistics.
In all cases, you'd better write that somewhere else than here.
A.

Franz Gnaedinger

2017-12-15 09:10:56 UTC

Post by Pete Olcott
For future reference here is a good example of meaningless: "fkn sio
erti ejh ccf"

You still don't understand the concept of context. Every uttering is made
within a context, for example that sequence of letters might occur in
a passage of a computer program, or it can be an angry comment on someone
spouting techno-babble. You are not God, you can't foresee each and every
constellation and possible context.

49 Replies
18 Views
Permalink to this page
Disable enhanced parsing

Thread Navigation

Pete Olcott 2017-12-13 02:50:59 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-13 03:27:31 UTC

Arnaud Fournet 2017-12-13 10:15:36 UTC

Pete Olcott 2017-12-14 04:43:18 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-14 17:07:21 UTC

Pete Olcott 2017-12-16 15:17:32 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-16 17:22:41 UTC

Pete Olcott 2017-12-16 20:20:17 UTC

Pete Olcott 2017-12-16 20:34:45 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-16 20:49:02 UTC

Pete Olcott 2017-12-17 02:24:27 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-17 04:24:38 UTC

Pete Olcott 2017-12-18 02:50:24 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-18 03:16:42 UTC

Pete Olcott 2017-12-18 14:46:25 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-18 18:18:28 UTC

Pete Olcott 2017-12-18 22:20:40 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-18 23:32:08 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-19 01:20:34 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-19 03:39:41 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-19 04:24:28 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-19 05:45:57 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-19 19:17:51 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-20 02:42:09 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-20 06:33:03 UTC

Peter T. Daniels 2017-12-20 14:38:16 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-20 16:02:50 UTC

Peter T. Daniels 2017-12-20 17:27:58 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-20 17:40:43 UTC

Peter T. Daniels 2017-12-20 17:46:49 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-20 19:40:55 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-20 16:00:08 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-20 19:41:09 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-20 19:49:04 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-21 00:59:55 UTC

Pete Olcott 2017-12-21 01:23:33 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-21 05:53:12 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-21 06:24:08 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-21 18:39:49 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-21 22:06:34 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-22 01:25:34 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-22 05:11:08 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-19 01:21:41 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-19 03:41:10 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-19 18:28:10 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-19 18:22:34 UTC

DKleinecke 2017-12-19 19:19:02 UTC

pete olcott 2017-12-19 23:16:13 UTC

Arnaud Fournet 2017-12-15 08:39:47 UTC

Franz Gnaedinger 2017-12-15 09:10:56 UTC

about - legalese

Loading...