a425couple
2017-04-28 16:12:12 UTC
The Media Bubble Is Worse Than You Think
We crunched the data on where journalists work and how fast it's changing.
The results should worry you.
By Jack Shafer and Tucker Doherty
May/June 2017
These bubbles represent the 150 counties with the most newspaper and
internet publishing jobs. | Illustration by DataPoint
(go to site to see graphs & maps etc.)
How did big media miss the Donald Trump swell? News organizations old and
new, large and small, print and online, broadcast and cable assigned
phalanxes of reporters armed with the most sophisticated polling data and
analysis to cover the presidential campaign. The overwhelming assumption was
that the race was Hillary Clinton's for the taking, and the real question
wasn't how sweeping her November victory would be, but how far out to sea
her wave would send political parvenu Trump. Today, it's Trump who occupies
the White House and Clinton who's drifting out to sea-an outcome that
arrived not just as an embarrassment for the press but as an indictment. In
some profound way, the election made clear, the national media just doesn't
get the nation it purportedly covers.
What went so wrong? What's still wrong? To some conservatives, Trump's
surprise win on November 8 simply bore out what they had suspected, that the
Democrat-infested press was knowingly in the tank for Clinton all along. The
media, in this view, was guilty not just of confirmation bias but of
complicity. But the knowing-bias charge never added up: No news organization
ignored the Clinton emails story, and everybody feasted on the damaging John
Podesta email cache that WikiLeaks served up buffet-style. Practically
speaking, you're not pushing Clinton to victory if you're pantsing her and
her party to voters almost daily.
The answer to the press' myopia lies elsewhere, and nobody has produced a
better argument for how the national media missed the Trump story than
FiveThirtyEight's Nate Silver, who pointed out that the ideological
clustering in top newsrooms led to groupthink. "As of 2013, only 7 percent
of [journalists] identified as Republicans," Silver wrote in March, chiding
the press for its political homogeneity. Just after the election,
presidential strategist Steve Bannon savaged the press on the same point but
with a heartier vocabulary. "The media bubble is the ultimate symbol of what's
wrong with this country," Bannon said. "It's just a circle of people talking
to themselves who have no fucking idea what's going on."
About the Illustration
The map at the top of this piece shows how concentrated media jobs have
become in the nation's most Democratic-leaning counties. Counties that voted
for Donald Trump in 2016 are in red, and Hillary Clinton counties are in
blue, with darker colors signifying higher vote margins. The bubbles
represent the 150 counties with the most newspaper and internet publishing
jobs. Not only do most of the bubbles fall in blue counties, chiefly on the
coasts, but an outright majority of the jobs are in the deepest-blue
counties, where Clinton won by 30 points or more.
Illustration by DataPoint; data reporting by Tucker Doherty
But journalistic groupthink is a symptom, not a cause. And when it comes to
the cause, there's another, blunter way to think about the question than
screaming "bias" and "conspiracy," or counting D's and R's. That's to ask a
simple question about the map. Where do journalists work, and how much has
that changed in recent years? To determine this, my colleague Tucker Doherty
excavated labor statistics and cross-referenced them against voting patterns
and Census data to figure out just what the American media landscape looks
like, and how much it has changed.
The results read like a revelation. The national media really does work in a
bubble, something that wasn't true as recently as 2008. And the bubble is
growing more extreme. Concentrated heavily along the coasts, the bubble is
both geographic and political. If you're a working journalist, odds aren't
just that you work in a pro-Clinton county-odds are that you reside in one
of the nation's most pro-Clinton counties. And you've got company: If you're
a typical reader of Politico, chances are you're a citizen of bubbleville,
too.
The "media bubble" trope might feel overused by critics of journalism who
want to sneer at reporters who live in Brooklyn or California and don't get
the "real America" of southern Ohio or rural Kansas. But these numbers
suggest it's no exaggeration: Not only is the bubble real, but it's more
extreme than you might realize. And it's driven by deep industry trends.
The national media really does work in a bubble, something that wasn't true
as recently as 2008. And the bubble is growing more extreme.
Parts of the media have always had their own bubbles. The national magazine
industry has been concentrated in New York for generations, and the copy
produced reflects an Eastern sensibility. Radio and TV networks based in New
York and Los Angeles likewise have shared that dominant sensibility. But
they were more than balanced out by the number of newspaper jobs in big
cities, midsized cities and smaller towns throughout the country, spreading
journalists everywhere.
No longer. The newspaper industry has jettisoned hundreds of thousands of
jobs, due to falling advertising revenues. Dailies have shrunk sections,
pages and features; some have retreated from daily publication; hundreds
have closed. Daily and weekly newspaper publishers employed about 455,000
reporters, clerks, salespeople, designers and the like in 1990, according to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. By January 2017, that workforce had more
than halved to 173,900. Those losses were felt in almost every region of the
country.
Graph1-Shafer-ByTuckerDoherty-crop.jpg
Graphic by Tucker Doherty
As newspapers have dwindled, internet publishers have added employees at a
bracing clip. According to BLS data, a startling boom in "internet
publishing and broadcasting" jobs has taken place. Since January 2008,
internet publishing has grown from 77,900 jobs to 206,700 in January 2017.
In late 2015, during Barack Obama's second term, these two trend lines-jobs
in newspapers, and jobs in internet publishing-finally crossed. For the
first time, the number of workers in internet publishing exceeded the number
of their newspaper brethren. Internet publishers are now adding workers at
nearly twice the rate newspaper publishers are losing them.
This isn't just a shift in medium. It's also a shift in sociopolitics, and a
radical one. Where newspaper jobs are spread nationwide, internet jobs are
not: Today, 73 percent of all internet publishing jobs are concentrated in
either the Boston-New York-Washington-Richmond corridor or the West Coast
crescent that runs from Seattle to San Diego and on to Phoenix. The
Chicagoland area, a traditional media center, captures 5 percent of the
jobs, with a paltry 22 percent going to the rest of the country. And almost
all the real growth of internet publishing is happening outside the
heartland, in just a few urban counties, all places that voted for Clinton.
So when your conservative friends use "media" as a synonym for "coastal" and
"liberal," they're not far off the mark.
What caused the majority of national media jobs to concentrate on the
coasts? An alignment of the stars? A flocking of like-minded humans? The
answer is far more structural, and far more difficult to alter: It was
economics that done the deed.
The magic of the internet was going to shake up the old certainties of the
job market, prevent the coagulation of jobs in the big metro areas, or so
the Web utopians promised us in the mid-1990s. The technology would free
internet employees to work from wherever they could find a broadband
connection. That remains true in theory, with thousands of Web developers,
writers and producers working remotely from lesser metropolises.
WhiteHousePress-Lede-ByMattChase.jpg
1600 Penn
Trump's Fake War on the Fake News
By Ben Schreckinger and Hadas Gold
But economists know something the internet evangelists have ignored: All
else being equal, specialized industries like to cluster. Car companies didn't
arise in remote regions that needed cars-they arose in Detroit, which
already had heavy industry, was near natural resources, boasted a skilled
workforce and was home to a network of suppliers that could help car
companies thrive. As industries grow, they bud and create spinoffs, the best
example being the way Silicon Valley blossomed from just a handful of
pioneering electronics firms in the 1960s. Seattle's rise as a tech
powerhouse was seeded by Microsoft, which moved to the area in 1979 and
helped create the ecosystem that gave rise to companies like Amazon.
As Enrico Moretti, a University of California, Berkeley, economist who has
studied the geography of job creation, points out, the tech entrepreneurs
who drive internet publishing could locate their companies in low-rent,
low-cost-of-living places like Cleveland, but they don't. They need the most
talented workers, who tend to move to the clusters, where demand drives
wages higher. And it's the clusters that host all the subsidiary industries
a tech start-up craves-lawyers specializing in intellectual property and
incorporation; hardware and software vendors; angel investors; and so on.
The old newspaper business model almost prevented this kind of clustering.
Except for the national broadsheets-the New York Times, the Wall Street
Journal, USA Today and increasingly the Washington Post-newspapers must
locate, cheek by jowl, next to their customers, the people who consume local
news, and whom local advertisers need to reach. The Sioux Falls Argus Leader
is stuck in South Dakota just as the owners of hydroelectric plants in the
Rockies are stuck where they are. As much as they might want to move their
dams to coastal markets where they could charge more for electricity, fate
has fixed them geographically. Economists call these "non-tradable
goods"-goods that must be consumed in the same community in which they're
made. The business of a newspaper can't really be separated from the place
where it's published. It is, or was, driven by ads for things that don't
travel, like real estate, jobs, home decor and cars. And as that advertising
has gotten harder and harder to come by, local newsrooms have become thinner
and thinner.
The online media, liberated from printing presses and local ad bases, has
been free to form clusters, piggyback-style, on the industries and
government that it covers. New York is home to most business coverage
because of the size of the business and banking community there. Likewise,
national political reporting has concentrated in Washington and grown apace
with the federal government. Entertainment and cultural reporting has
bunched in New York and Los Angeles, where those businesses are strong.
The result? If you look at the maps on the next page, you don't need to be a
Republican campaign strategist to grasp just how far the "media bubble" has
drifted from the average American experience. Newspaper jobs are far more
evenly scattered across the country, including the deep red parts. But as
those vanish, it's internet jobs that are driving whatever growth there is
in media-and those fall almost entirely in places that are dense, blue and
right in the bubble.
***
As the votes streamed in on election night, evidence that the country had
further cleaved into two Americas became palpable. With few exceptions,
Clinton ran the table in urban America, while Trump ran it in the
ruralities. And as you might suspect, Clinton dominated where internet
publishing jobs abound. Nearly 90 percent of all internet publishing
employees work in a county where Clinton won, and 75 percent of them work in
a county that she won by more than 30 percentage points. When you add in the
shrinking number of newspaper jobs, 72 percent of all internet publishing or
newspaper employees work in a county that Clinton won. By this measure, of
course, Clinton was the national media's candidate.
Mag - Trump Eliana Johnson Trump animation
Fourth Estate
How Trump Blew Up the Conservative Media
By Eliana Johnson
Resist-if you can-the conservative reflex to absorb this data and conclude
that the media deliberately twists the news in favor of Democrats. Instead,
take it the way a social scientist would take it: The people who report,
edit, produce and publish news can't help being affected-deeply affected-by
the environment around them. Former New York Times public editor Daniel
Okrent got at this when he analyzed the decidedly liberal bent of his
newspaper's staff in a 2004 column that rewards rereading today. The "heart,
mind, and habits" of the Times, he wrote, cannot be divorced from the ethos
of the cosmopolitan city where it is produced. On such subjects as abortion,
gay rights, gun control and environmental regulation, the Times' news
reporting is a pretty good reflection of its region's dominant
predisposition. And yes, a Times-ian ethos flourishes in all of internet
publishing's major cities-Los Angeles, New York, Boston, Seattle, San
Francisco and Washington. The Times thinks of itself as a centrist national
newspaper, but it's more accurate to say its politics are perfectly centered
on the slices of America that look and think the most like Manhattan.
Something akin to the Times ethos thrives in most major national newsrooms
found on the Clinton coasts-CNN, CBS, the Washington Post, BuzzFeed,
Politico and the rest. Their reporters, an admirable lot, can parachute into
Appalachia or the rural Midwest on a monthly basis and still not shake their
provincial sensibilities: Reporters tote their bubbles with them.
shafer_maps_1.png
In a sense, the media bubble reflects an established truth about America:
The places with money get served better than the places without. People in
big media cities aren't just more liberal, they're also richer: Half of all
newspaper and internet publishing employees work in counties where the
median household income is greater than $61,000-$7,000 more than the
national median. Commercial media tend to cluster where most of the GDP is
created, and that's the coasts. Perhaps this is what Bannon is hollering
about when he denounces the "corporatist, global media," as he did in
February at the Conservative Political Action Conference. If current trends
continue-and it's safe to predict they will-national media will continue to
expand and concentrate on the coasts, while local and regional media
contract.
Can media myopia be cured? Unlike other industries, the national media has a
directive beyond just staying in business: Many newsrooms really do feel a
commitment to reflecting America fairly. Sometimes, correcting for liberal
bias can be smart business as well. For instance, by rightly guessing that
there was a big national broadcast audience that didn't see their worldviews
represented in the mainstream networks, the Fox News Channel came to
dominate cable TV ratings. Adopting Fox's anti-mainstream media message to
his political needs, Trump ended up running on a Foxesque platform, making a
vote for him into a vote against the elite media-his trash talk was always
directed at the national press, not the local. Similarly, Breitbart has seen
huge success sticking it to liberals, implicitly taking the side of the
"real America" against the coastal bubbles. Breitbart now attracts more than
15 million visitors a month, according to comScore, which isn't far behind
more established outlets like the Hill's 24 million and Politico's 25
million.
Everyone acknowledges that Trump's election really was a bad miss, and
if the media doesn't figure it out, it will miss the next one, too.
But is this really America, either? It's worth mentioning that Fox and
Breitbart-and indeed most of the big conservative media players-also happen
to be located in the same bubble. Like the "MSM" they rail against, they're
a product of New York, Washington and Los Angeles. It's an argument against
the bubble, being waged almost entirely by people who work inside it.
Is America trapped? Certainly, the media seems to be. It's hard to imagine
an industry willingly accommodating the places with less money, fewer people
and less expertise, especially if they sense that niche has already been
filled to capacity by Fox. Yet everyone acknowledges that Trump's election
really was a bad miss, and if the media doesn't figure it out, it will miss
the next one, too.
Journalism tends toward the autobiographical unless reporters and editors
make a determined effort to separate themselves from the frame of their own
experiences. The best medicine for journalistic myopia isn't reeducation
camps or a splurge of diversity hiring, though tiny doses of those two
remedies wouldn't hurt. Journalists respond to their failings best when
their vanity is punctured with proof that they blew a story that was right
in front of them. If the burning humiliation of missing the biggest
political story in a generation won't change newsrooms, nothing will. More
than anything, journalists hate getting beat.
Jack Shafer is senior media writer at Politico.
Tucker Doherty is a data reporter for Politico Pro.
A note on the methodology: These maps are based on U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics employment data collected through state unemployment insurance
programs. They're limited by the way BLS defines media and publishing jobs,
which in some cases may count all employees, including press operators and
sales staff. For privacy reasons, BLS doesn't give exact numbers for the
smallest counties by population, so we generated estimates for those
counties using Census data. The BLS data also aren't perfect at sifting out
which employees at big internet firms like Facebook count as "publishing" or
"media," and which don't. BLS doesn't release employment data by individual
company, so it's hard to drill deeper into the data for accuracy. Even so,
this data gives the most reliable general view of how employment in media
has evolved and shifted.
How did big media miss the Donald Trump swell? News organizations old and
new, large and small, print and online, broadcast and cable assigned
phalanxes of reporters armed with the most sophisticated polling data and
analysis to cover the presidential campaign. The overwhelming assumption was
that the race was Hillary Clinton's for the taking, and the real question
wasn't how sweeping her November victory would be, but how far out to sea
her wave would send political parvenu Trump. Today, it's Trump who occupies
the White House and Clinton who's drifting out to sea-an outcome that
arrived not just as an embarrassment for the press but as an indictment. In
some profound way, the election made clear, the national media just doesn't
get the nation it purportedly covers.
What went so wrong? What's still wrong? To some conservatives, Trump's
surprise win on November 8 simply bore out what they had suspected, that the
Democrat-infested press was knowingly in the tank for Clinton all along. The
media, in this view, was guilty not just of confirmation bias but of
complicity. But the knowing-bias charge never added up: No news organization
ignored the Clinton emails story, and everybody feasted on the damaging John
Podesta email cache that WikiLeaks served up buffet-style. Practically
speaking, you're not pushing Clinton to victory if you're pantsing her and
her party to voters almost daily.
The answer to the press' myopia lies elsewhere, and nobody has produced a
bet
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/25/media-bubble-real-journalism-jobs-east-coast-215048
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/25/media-bubble-real-journalism-jobs-east-coast-215048
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/25/media-bubble-real-journalism-jobs-east-coast-215048
We crunched the data on where journalists work and how fast it's changing.
The results should worry you.
By Jack Shafer and Tucker Doherty
May/June 2017
These bubbles represent the 150 counties with the most newspaper and
internet publishing jobs. | Illustration by DataPoint
(go to site to see graphs & maps etc.)
How did big media miss the Donald Trump swell? News organizations old and
new, large and small, print and online, broadcast and cable assigned
phalanxes of reporters armed with the most sophisticated polling data and
analysis to cover the presidential campaign. The overwhelming assumption was
that the race was Hillary Clinton's for the taking, and the real question
wasn't how sweeping her November victory would be, but how far out to sea
her wave would send political parvenu Trump. Today, it's Trump who occupies
the White House and Clinton who's drifting out to sea-an outcome that
arrived not just as an embarrassment for the press but as an indictment. In
some profound way, the election made clear, the national media just doesn't
get the nation it purportedly covers.
What went so wrong? What's still wrong? To some conservatives, Trump's
surprise win on November 8 simply bore out what they had suspected, that the
Democrat-infested press was knowingly in the tank for Clinton all along. The
media, in this view, was guilty not just of confirmation bias but of
complicity. But the knowing-bias charge never added up: No news organization
ignored the Clinton emails story, and everybody feasted on the damaging John
Podesta email cache that WikiLeaks served up buffet-style. Practically
speaking, you're not pushing Clinton to victory if you're pantsing her and
her party to voters almost daily.
The answer to the press' myopia lies elsewhere, and nobody has produced a
better argument for how the national media missed the Trump story than
FiveThirtyEight's Nate Silver, who pointed out that the ideological
clustering in top newsrooms led to groupthink. "As of 2013, only 7 percent
of [journalists] identified as Republicans," Silver wrote in March, chiding
the press for its political homogeneity. Just after the election,
presidential strategist Steve Bannon savaged the press on the same point but
with a heartier vocabulary. "The media bubble is the ultimate symbol of what's
wrong with this country," Bannon said. "It's just a circle of people talking
to themselves who have no fucking idea what's going on."
About the Illustration
The map at the top of this piece shows how concentrated media jobs have
become in the nation's most Democratic-leaning counties. Counties that voted
for Donald Trump in 2016 are in red, and Hillary Clinton counties are in
blue, with darker colors signifying higher vote margins. The bubbles
represent the 150 counties with the most newspaper and internet publishing
jobs. Not only do most of the bubbles fall in blue counties, chiefly on the
coasts, but an outright majority of the jobs are in the deepest-blue
counties, where Clinton won by 30 points or more.
Illustration by DataPoint; data reporting by Tucker Doherty
But journalistic groupthink is a symptom, not a cause. And when it comes to
the cause, there's another, blunter way to think about the question than
screaming "bias" and "conspiracy," or counting D's and R's. That's to ask a
simple question about the map. Where do journalists work, and how much has
that changed in recent years? To determine this, my colleague Tucker Doherty
excavated labor statistics and cross-referenced them against voting patterns
and Census data to figure out just what the American media landscape looks
like, and how much it has changed.
The results read like a revelation. The national media really does work in a
bubble, something that wasn't true as recently as 2008. And the bubble is
growing more extreme. Concentrated heavily along the coasts, the bubble is
both geographic and political. If you're a working journalist, odds aren't
just that you work in a pro-Clinton county-odds are that you reside in one
of the nation's most pro-Clinton counties. And you've got company: If you're
a typical reader of Politico, chances are you're a citizen of bubbleville,
too.
The "media bubble" trope might feel overused by critics of journalism who
want to sneer at reporters who live in Brooklyn or California and don't get
the "real America" of southern Ohio or rural Kansas. But these numbers
suggest it's no exaggeration: Not only is the bubble real, but it's more
extreme than you might realize. And it's driven by deep industry trends.
The national media really does work in a bubble, something that wasn't true
as recently as 2008. And the bubble is growing more extreme.
Parts of the media have always had their own bubbles. The national magazine
industry has been concentrated in New York for generations, and the copy
produced reflects an Eastern sensibility. Radio and TV networks based in New
York and Los Angeles likewise have shared that dominant sensibility. But
they were more than balanced out by the number of newspaper jobs in big
cities, midsized cities and smaller towns throughout the country, spreading
journalists everywhere.
No longer. The newspaper industry has jettisoned hundreds of thousands of
jobs, due to falling advertising revenues. Dailies have shrunk sections,
pages and features; some have retreated from daily publication; hundreds
have closed. Daily and weekly newspaper publishers employed about 455,000
reporters, clerks, salespeople, designers and the like in 1990, according to
the Bureau of Labor Statistics. By January 2017, that workforce had more
than halved to 173,900. Those losses were felt in almost every region of the
country.
Graph1-Shafer-ByTuckerDoherty-crop.jpg
Graphic by Tucker Doherty
As newspapers have dwindled, internet publishers have added employees at a
bracing clip. According to BLS data, a startling boom in "internet
publishing and broadcasting" jobs has taken place. Since January 2008,
internet publishing has grown from 77,900 jobs to 206,700 in January 2017.
In late 2015, during Barack Obama's second term, these two trend lines-jobs
in newspapers, and jobs in internet publishing-finally crossed. For the
first time, the number of workers in internet publishing exceeded the number
of their newspaper brethren. Internet publishers are now adding workers at
nearly twice the rate newspaper publishers are losing them.
This isn't just a shift in medium. It's also a shift in sociopolitics, and a
radical one. Where newspaper jobs are spread nationwide, internet jobs are
not: Today, 73 percent of all internet publishing jobs are concentrated in
either the Boston-New York-Washington-Richmond corridor or the West Coast
crescent that runs from Seattle to San Diego and on to Phoenix. The
Chicagoland area, a traditional media center, captures 5 percent of the
jobs, with a paltry 22 percent going to the rest of the country. And almost
all the real growth of internet publishing is happening outside the
heartland, in just a few urban counties, all places that voted for Clinton.
So when your conservative friends use "media" as a synonym for "coastal" and
"liberal," they're not far off the mark.
What caused the majority of national media jobs to concentrate on the
coasts? An alignment of the stars? A flocking of like-minded humans? The
answer is far more structural, and far more difficult to alter: It was
economics that done the deed.
The magic of the internet was going to shake up the old certainties of the
job market, prevent the coagulation of jobs in the big metro areas, or so
the Web utopians promised us in the mid-1990s. The technology would free
internet employees to work from wherever they could find a broadband
connection. That remains true in theory, with thousands of Web developers,
writers and producers working remotely from lesser metropolises.
WhiteHousePress-Lede-ByMattChase.jpg
1600 Penn
Trump's Fake War on the Fake News
By Ben Schreckinger and Hadas Gold
But economists know something the internet evangelists have ignored: All
else being equal, specialized industries like to cluster. Car companies didn't
arise in remote regions that needed cars-they arose in Detroit, which
already had heavy industry, was near natural resources, boasted a skilled
workforce and was home to a network of suppliers that could help car
companies thrive. As industries grow, they bud and create spinoffs, the best
example being the way Silicon Valley blossomed from just a handful of
pioneering electronics firms in the 1960s. Seattle's rise as a tech
powerhouse was seeded by Microsoft, which moved to the area in 1979 and
helped create the ecosystem that gave rise to companies like Amazon.
As Enrico Moretti, a University of California, Berkeley, economist who has
studied the geography of job creation, points out, the tech entrepreneurs
who drive internet publishing could locate their companies in low-rent,
low-cost-of-living places like Cleveland, but they don't. They need the most
talented workers, who tend to move to the clusters, where demand drives
wages higher. And it's the clusters that host all the subsidiary industries
a tech start-up craves-lawyers specializing in intellectual property and
incorporation; hardware and software vendors; angel investors; and so on.
The old newspaper business model almost prevented this kind of clustering.
Except for the national broadsheets-the New York Times, the Wall Street
Journal, USA Today and increasingly the Washington Post-newspapers must
locate, cheek by jowl, next to their customers, the people who consume local
news, and whom local advertisers need to reach. The Sioux Falls Argus Leader
is stuck in South Dakota just as the owners of hydroelectric plants in the
Rockies are stuck where they are. As much as they might want to move their
dams to coastal markets where they could charge more for electricity, fate
has fixed them geographically. Economists call these "non-tradable
goods"-goods that must be consumed in the same community in which they're
made. The business of a newspaper can't really be separated from the place
where it's published. It is, or was, driven by ads for things that don't
travel, like real estate, jobs, home decor and cars. And as that advertising
has gotten harder and harder to come by, local newsrooms have become thinner
and thinner.
The online media, liberated from printing presses and local ad bases, has
been free to form clusters, piggyback-style, on the industries and
government that it covers. New York is home to most business coverage
because of the size of the business and banking community there. Likewise,
national political reporting has concentrated in Washington and grown apace
with the federal government. Entertainment and cultural reporting has
bunched in New York and Los Angeles, where those businesses are strong.
The result? If you look at the maps on the next page, you don't need to be a
Republican campaign strategist to grasp just how far the "media bubble" has
drifted from the average American experience. Newspaper jobs are far more
evenly scattered across the country, including the deep red parts. But as
those vanish, it's internet jobs that are driving whatever growth there is
in media-and those fall almost entirely in places that are dense, blue and
right in the bubble.
***
As the votes streamed in on election night, evidence that the country had
further cleaved into two Americas became palpable. With few exceptions,
Clinton ran the table in urban America, while Trump ran it in the
ruralities. And as you might suspect, Clinton dominated where internet
publishing jobs abound. Nearly 90 percent of all internet publishing
employees work in a county where Clinton won, and 75 percent of them work in
a county that she won by more than 30 percentage points. When you add in the
shrinking number of newspaper jobs, 72 percent of all internet publishing or
newspaper employees work in a county that Clinton won. By this measure, of
course, Clinton was the national media's candidate.
Mag - Trump Eliana Johnson Trump animation
Fourth Estate
How Trump Blew Up the Conservative Media
By Eliana Johnson
Resist-if you can-the conservative reflex to absorb this data and conclude
that the media deliberately twists the news in favor of Democrats. Instead,
take it the way a social scientist would take it: The people who report,
edit, produce and publish news can't help being affected-deeply affected-by
the environment around them. Former New York Times public editor Daniel
Okrent got at this when he analyzed the decidedly liberal bent of his
newspaper's staff in a 2004 column that rewards rereading today. The "heart,
mind, and habits" of the Times, he wrote, cannot be divorced from the ethos
of the cosmopolitan city where it is produced. On such subjects as abortion,
gay rights, gun control and environmental regulation, the Times' news
reporting is a pretty good reflection of its region's dominant
predisposition. And yes, a Times-ian ethos flourishes in all of internet
publishing's major cities-Los Angeles, New York, Boston, Seattle, San
Francisco and Washington. The Times thinks of itself as a centrist national
newspaper, but it's more accurate to say its politics are perfectly centered
on the slices of America that look and think the most like Manhattan.
Something akin to the Times ethos thrives in most major national newsrooms
found on the Clinton coasts-CNN, CBS, the Washington Post, BuzzFeed,
Politico and the rest. Their reporters, an admirable lot, can parachute into
Appalachia or the rural Midwest on a monthly basis and still not shake their
provincial sensibilities: Reporters tote their bubbles with them.
shafer_maps_1.png
In a sense, the media bubble reflects an established truth about America:
The places with money get served better than the places without. People in
big media cities aren't just more liberal, they're also richer: Half of all
newspaper and internet publishing employees work in counties where the
median household income is greater than $61,000-$7,000 more than the
national median. Commercial media tend to cluster where most of the GDP is
created, and that's the coasts. Perhaps this is what Bannon is hollering
about when he denounces the "corporatist, global media," as he did in
February at the Conservative Political Action Conference. If current trends
continue-and it's safe to predict they will-national media will continue to
expand and concentrate on the coasts, while local and regional media
contract.
Can media myopia be cured? Unlike other industries, the national media has a
directive beyond just staying in business: Many newsrooms really do feel a
commitment to reflecting America fairly. Sometimes, correcting for liberal
bias can be smart business as well. For instance, by rightly guessing that
there was a big national broadcast audience that didn't see their worldviews
represented in the mainstream networks, the Fox News Channel came to
dominate cable TV ratings. Adopting Fox's anti-mainstream media message to
his political needs, Trump ended up running on a Foxesque platform, making a
vote for him into a vote against the elite media-his trash talk was always
directed at the national press, not the local. Similarly, Breitbart has seen
huge success sticking it to liberals, implicitly taking the side of the
"real America" against the coastal bubbles. Breitbart now attracts more than
15 million visitors a month, according to comScore, which isn't far behind
more established outlets like the Hill's 24 million and Politico's 25
million.
Everyone acknowledges that Trump's election really was a bad miss, and
if the media doesn't figure it out, it will miss the next one, too.
But is this really America, either? It's worth mentioning that Fox and
Breitbart-and indeed most of the big conservative media players-also happen
to be located in the same bubble. Like the "MSM" they rail against, they're
a product of New York, Washington and Los Angeles. It's an argument against
the bubble, being waged almost entirely by people who work inside it.
Is America trapped? Certainly, the media seems to be. It's hard to imagine
an industry willingly accommodating the places with less money, fewer people
and less expertise, especially if they sense that niche has already been
filled to capacity by Fox. Yet everyone acknowledges that Trump's election
really was a bad miss, and if the media doesn't figure it out, it will miss
the next one, too.
Journalism tends toward the autobiographical unless reporters and editors
make a determined effort to separate themselves from the frame of their own
experiences. The best medicine for journalistic myopia isn't reeducation
camps or a splurge of diversity hiring, though tiny doses of those two
remedies wouldn't hurt. Journalists respond to their failings best when
their vanity is punctured with proof that they blew a story that was right
in front of them. If the burning humiliation of missing the biggest
political story in a generation won't change newsrooms, nothing will. More
than anything, journalists hate getting beat.
Jack Shafer is senior media writer at Politico.
Tucker Doherty is a data reporter for Politico Pro.
A note on the methodology: These maps are based on U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics employment data collected through state unemployment insurance
programs. They're limited by the way BLS defines media and publishing jobs,
which in some cases may count all employees, including press operators and
sales staff. For privacy reasons, BLS doesn't give exact numbers for the
smallest counties by population, so we generated estimates for those
counties using Census data. The BLS data also aren't perfect at sifting out
which employees at big internet firms like Facebook count as "publishing" or
"media," and which don't. BLS doesn't release employment data by individual
company, so it's hard to drill deeper into the data for accuracy. Even so,
this data gives the most reliable general view of how employment in media
has evolved and shifted.
How did big media miss the Donald Trump swell? News organizations old and
new, large and small, print and online, broadcast and cable assigned
phalanxes of reporters armed with the most sophisticated polling data and
analysis to cover the presidential campaign. The overwhelming assumption was
that the race was Hillary Clinton's for the taking, and the real question
wasn't how sweeping her November victory would be, but how far out to sea
her wave would send political parvenu Trump. Today, it's Trump who occupies
the White House and Clinton who's drifting out to sea-an outcome that
arrived not just as an embarrassment for the press but as an indictment. In
some profound way, the election made clear, the national media just doesn't
get the nation it purportedly covers.
What went so wrong? What's still wrong? To some conservatives, Trump's
surprise win on November 8 simply bore out what they had suspected, that the
Democrat-infested press was knowingly in the tank for Clinton all along. The
media, in this view, was guilty not just of confirmation bias but of
complicity. But the knowing-bias charge never added up: No news organization
ignored the Clinton emails story, and everybody feasted on the damaging John
Podesta email cache that WikiLeaks served up buffet-style. Practically
speaking, you're not pushing Clinton to victory if you're pantsing her and
her party to voters almost daily.
The answer to the press' myopia lies elsewhere, and nobody has produced a
bet
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/25/media-bubble-real-journalism-jobs-east-coast-215048
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/25/media-bubble-real-journalism-jobs-east-coast-215048
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/25/media-bubble-real-journalism-jobs-east-coast-215048